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FOREWORD 
Directorate-General  XV  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  and  the 
Committee  of  Stock  Exchanges  in  the  EEC  jointly  commissioned  Messrs.  Michael  HALL  and 
Malcolm  DUNCAN  to  produce  this  study  in  January  1982. 
The  Consultants'  first  step  was  to  visit  all  the  Community  Exchanges,  meeting  stock 
market  authorities  and  major  financial  intermediaries  specialising  in  international  -
more  particularly  European  -dealing  in  equity  securities. 
They  then  presented  three  interim  reports,  the  first  in  September  1982,  the  second  in 
,  May  1983  and  the  third  in  September  1983.  Following  discussions  with  the 
Committee  of  Stock  Exchanges  in  the  E.E.C  and  Directorate-General  ·xv  of  the 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  these  were  used  as  the  basis  for  the  final 
report  produced  in  May.1984. 
At  the  request  of  several  Stock  Exchanges,  this  final  report  was· also  discussed  and 
some  amendments  were  made. 
As  the  Report  now  stands,  the  following  points  should  be  made  : 
1.  The  main  objective  is  to  review  the  whole  range  of  problems  posed,  at  the  time 
of  drafting,  by  cross-frontier  dealing  in European  securities  listed  on.  several 
Community  Exchanges.  As  such,  it  constitutes  a  source  ·of  information  and 
opinions  hitherto  unequalled  in  scope  and  value. 
2.  Secondly,  the  Report·  discusses  various  working  hypotheses  for  achieving 
interconnection  of  European  Stock  Exchange  floors,  with  the  aim  of  ensuring  that 
the ·majority,  if  not  all,  of  the  securities  transactions .in  question  are,  by  a 
quite  natural  process,  concentrated  on  Exchange  floors. 
3.  Finally,  tbe  tenor  of  the  Report  and  the  suggestions  it 
responsibility  of  the  authors,  Messrs.  Hall  and  Duncan. 
commit  either  the  Committee  of  Stock  Exchanges  in  the 
Gen~ral  XV  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities. 
contains  are  the  sole 
They  do  not  in  any  way 
E.E.C.  or  Directorate-
It  should  therefore  be,  clearly  understood  that  the  Report  is,  and  should  only  be  used 
as,  a  reference,  research  and  discussion  document.  It  should  not  be  seen  in  any  way 
as  a  work  programme. 
Yves  FLORNOY 
Chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Stock  Exchanges  in  the  E.E.C. 
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SECTION  1  TERMS  Oi'  REFERENCE  AND  THE  SCHEME  OF  THE  REPORT 
1.1  Introduction 
This  Report is presented to the  Directorate-General,  Financial 
Institutions and Fiscal Matters of the Commission  of the  European 
Communities  (the  Commission),  and  the  Committee  of Stock  Exchanges 
of the E.E.C.  (the Committee)  in response  to terms  of reference 
set for  the Consultants by  the Directorate-General and  agreed by  the 
Committee. 
The  terms  of reference  from  the  Commission  required the Consultants 
to undertake detailed stuqies with a  view  to developing  a  European 
securities market on  a  progress~ve basis,  and  to make  appropriate 
proposals in this connection.  They  clarified that any  moves  towards 
the gradual  integration of the  securities markets of  the  European 
Communities  should be built on  the existing official markets.  The 
studies were  to acknowledge  the overall objective of progressive 
development of  a  European Securities Market  by means  of the inter-
linking of the  existing Stock  Exchanges.  It was  specified that the 
improvements,  ~odifications or projects of harmonisation proposed 
should be capable of gradual  implementation. 
Accepting  the  terms of reference of the Consultants,  the  Committee 
accepted  and  supported  the Project as  a  study only,  and affirmed  that 
any decisions related to it would  be  made  by  the General  Assembly of 
E.E.C.  Stock Exchanges  in conjunction with the Commission.  The 
co-operation of the Stock  E~changes was  accorded  on  the basis that the 
work  of the Consultants was  to  be  strictly limited to a  study of  the 
possibilities of establishing a  European  securities market.  The  scope 
of the study was  further limited to the  secondary equities market, 
considered  to be  the main  pr~ority. 
With  the support of the Committee,  the Consultants carried out  two 
tours of the Community  capital market·s  in 1982  and  1983.  All  the 
E.E.C.  count~ies were  visited,  most  twice,  and  in the case of Germany 
three Stock  Exchanges  in different regional  centres were  visited and 4 
contact  establi~ed with a  fourth.  Detailed discussions  were  carried 
out,  on  an  individual basis with  400-500 market participants,  who,  as 
well  as Stock  Exchange  members  and officials,  included investing 
institutions,  non-member  banks,  the securities depositaries and 
relevant central bank or Government departments. 
The Consultants would like to express their appreciation of the help 
given to them  on  these visits which,  in all cases,  enabled  them  to 
obtain expert local opinion on matters related to international 
dealing .and  linkage,  and which permitted  them  to assemble material 
from  which  an appreciation of the national situations could be  further 
developed.  A list of  the Consultants'  market contacts is appended. 
The  Consultants  would  also  like  to  thank  the  officials  of  Stock  Exchanges  who 
commented  on  the  sections  of  the  Report  covering  individual  Member  States.  The 
Association  of  German  Stock  Exchanges,  in  particular,  undertook  the  task  of 
redrafting  much  of  Section  7  and  the  part  of  Section  20  which  relates  to  the 
German  market. 
1.2  The  Benefits of  Linkage  of  the Community  Stock Exchanges 
The  elaboration of the benefits of linkage of the Community  equity 
markets which,  in itself,  could be  a  major task,  was  not within the 
Consultants  terms of reference,  in which  the general  advantage of 
linkage was  implied.  While  the  evidence  and  commentary  in the  Report 
endorse the  urgent  need  to create  a  euro-equities market  through 
linkage of the·Stock  Exchanges,  it is in the main  concerned with  the 
technical difficulties of  linkage  and  the routes  through which it 
might be  achieved.  For  the purposes of the Report,  the broader 
justification of linkage is,  in  summary,  considered to be  as  follows:-
(i)  It would broaden the base  of operations  in specified equities  to permit 
the national European Stock  Exchanges  to participate in a  European 
linkage which would attain World  scale.  It would encourage development 
of a  euro-equity market,  extending  the issue of and dealing in shares 
of the major  European companies  across  the  Community.  To  date, 
euro-finance has  only been  sought by  the major  European  companies  in 
the bond markets. 
(ii)  It would  support the Community  principles of free  capital  flows  across 
the national boundaries  and  of  the right of the individual  to best 
execution of transactions across all  the official markets,  and  advance 
the  aims  in this respect of  the Treaty of Rome. (iii) 
5 
The  existence or the system,  assuming its success,  would put pressure 
on certain national  Governments  to remove  obstacles  such as  Exchange 
Control,  whith deprive  their nationals  of  the  advantage of 
participating in the international securities market.  It would 
stimulate the removal  of fiscal,  legal and regulatory qbstacles at 
Government  level which at present  impede  the efficient operation of 
the international equities market within the Community,  and  the 
attainment of its economic  and  financial objectives. 
(iv)  It woulo stimulate Community-wide  information flows  and investor 
interest across  an  increasin~ range of European securities,  and 
increase cross-border trading. 
(v)  By  broadening  the market it would  lead to increased business  on  all 
the national  Stock Exchanges. 
(vi)  It would assist the growth  of European  securities houses of inter-
national scale  and full  range  of  function  and assist the Stock Exchanges 
in meeting  the  competition of the major  foreign  intermediaries,  who  are 
increasingly  a~tive in Europe. 
(vii)  It would provide  a  market base sufficiently strong to absorb  inflow or 
outflow of foreign  funds  into Europe,  without undue de-stabilisation 
of the European capital markets,  and  reduce-the present dependency of 
their performance  on  the stock markets outside Europe. 
(viii)  It would stimulate inter-European equities trading by  making possible 
well-ordered dealing within defined procedures  and understood 
conventions. 
(ix)  It would present the opportunity  to rationalise commission and  reduce 
transaction costs across  the  Community  Exchanges  and  remove  other 
similar anomalies of charging which at present impede  international 
trading in the Community. 6 
(x)  It would offer jmproved capability to the exchanges  to meet the 
growing  competition in the international securitiea markets  from 
dealing off the official markets  and  enable·them on a  European 
base to draw  the present diffused international business of StoCk 
Exchange members  back into the official markets,  under appropriate 
Stock Exchange regulation and  supported by services as efficient as 
those available to the domestic markets. 
(xi)  It would offer opportunities to develop  an efficient international 
settlem~t linkage based on the existing institutions, which could, 
with the co-operation of the depositaries,  service the specific needs 
of the European international market. 
(xii}  It would  allow the official markets to pre-empt other initiatives to 
provide the mechanisms  of a  euro-equity market which  are almost certain 
to be  taken by  non-member  intermediaries if the Exchanges  do not act. 
1.3  Structure of the Report 
The  Report divides into three parts,  - the facts,  the obstacles to 
linkage  and  recommendations. 
Sections  2  to  13  present short synopses of the present international 
equities market in each country,  followed  by  a  review of the  European 
market as a  whole.  Guided by their terms of reference,  and the 
interpretation of them  by  the Committee  of Stock Exchanges,  the 
Consultants  consider a  major purpose,  possibly the major purpose,  of 
their Report is to convey to the sponsors of the study the present 
situation in the European international equities markets  and a  reflection 
of the views of the expert market participants interviewed. 
Due  to the scope of coverage of the Report,  across  ten national capital 
markets,  only a  summary  account of the situation in each is possible. 
Comprehensive description of each national market is not attempted,  and 
the  synopses  are  limited to the salient featues  of each market and 
participants'  views  on  future market development which have particular 
relevance  to linkage.  Each  individual market could have been the 7 
subject of a  report the  length of the present document.  A plethora of 
material on  each was  made  available to the Consultants.  Throughout 
the Report footnotes  have  been avoided unless particularly apposite, 
but a  bibliography of sources is  appende~. 
The  important question of quantitative assessment of the present 
European internation.al equities market is not dealt with in the 
individual Sections  on each country,  but it is considered in context 
of them all in Section 12.  The  problem of estimation of this business 
is  broa~ly similar in all the Community  countries with active inter-
national· markets,  and it is best addressed in this manner.  For 
similar reasons  a  joint rlsuml of settlement and depositary facilities 
is deferred until Section  20. 
Sections;l3to 18  analyse the main  ranges of obstacles to linkage of 
the Community  Stock  Exchanges.  Comment  on  such obstacles has been 
guided in the main  by market opinion.  Although  attaching  the highest 
importance  to such  opinion,  the Consultants have not considered it 
totally definitive as it is mainly inspired by  an existing situation, 
in which  many  ~articipants have material interest.  It cannot be 
expected to take  adequate account of  the potential benefits of  any 
re-structured linked situation.  An  attempt has  been made  to present an 
analysis which strikes a  balance  between  the  two  attitudes,  the first an 
idealistic view of the potential of a  European capital market,  and the 
second,  a  scepticism based on pre--occupation with  the practical obstacles. 
The  final  Sections,  19  to  22,  attempt to draw  together the present 
framework  of thought on  linkage of  the markets.  The  Report does  not 
attempt any trite  'conclusions  and  recommendations'  of the type which 
would be expected in a  report of more  limited scope.  The  Consultants 
believe that to set out a  neat and well-defined schedule of activities 
through which  a  fully-linked European equities market might be achieved, 
even if it were  proved to be valid,  might be counter-productive at this 
stage. 8 
Achievement of the  linked market has  three requirements :  first,  a 
profound knowledge  of the present and  complex  international market, 
second,  a  sound  appreciation of  the  theoretical  and  ideal possibilities 
of a  Euro··equities market  ~nd  thir~ a  will amongst all parties to 
exploit  these  possibilities.  It is in the third of these conditions 
that the real problem of establishing effective linkage lies.  The 
Consultants  do  not infer that this problem arises  from  thoughtless 
inertia on  the part of the Governments  and  their capital market 
authorities.  Institutional conservatism may,  in some  circumstances,  be 
well-advised and  justifiable.  The  effectiveness of the Stock Exchanges 
as the central intermediaries of the national financial  systems 
crucially depends  on  the viability of their members,  and  any  changes in 
their operating environment have  to be cautiously evaluated in hard 
business  terms.  Moreover,  changes  to stock markets are difficult to 
achieve  due  both to statutory definitions of structure and  functions 
and to representative control within the  exchanges. 
The  changes  required,  in course of time,  to produce  a  Community  equities 
market which will accord with  the provisions of the Treaty of  Rome  and 
which will provide  the European capital market intermediaries with a 
market base big enough  to meet overseas competition,  involve issues of 
the greatest magnitude  for the individual national exchanges.  It is the 
general  theme  of this Report  that these issues are being  faced and are 
resulting in significant changes at national level.  It is submitted 
that the Community  capital markets  are,  in all likelihood,on a 
convergent course  towards  more  similar structures  which will,  in a 
future  that begins  to be  forseeable,  permit their full  linkage into a 
European equity market of World  scale.  The  Consultants believe that it 
is of paramount importance,  from  a  Community  standpoint,  that these 
changes  are accelerated at national level and internationally 
co-ordinated within  the Community.  If the objectives of the Treaty of 
Rome  to which all the E.E.C.  nations have  subscribed are to be  achieved, 
the  emergence  of a  Community  equities market is predicated by 
deterministic economic  and  financial.logic.  It is,  therefore,  not 
surprising that major  developments  - such as,  for  example,  the 
reconstruction of  the London  capital market,  the institution of a 9 
continuous  mark~t in Amsterdam,  th.e  development of contrapartiste 
functions  in Paris,  or the re-thinking in Germany  on  the effective-
ness of present systems of corporate finance  - are all likely to 
lead to changes  which will facilitate ultimate linkage. 
It will,  however,  be  recognised that while  the Consultants may 
legitimately consider commentary  on  such current issues to be  within 
their brief, it would be grossly inappropriate to make  them  the 
subject of recommendations in this Report. 
The  concluding Sections,  therefore,  attempt to draw  together the 
observed state of thought on  these major questions  and identify 
from  them  a  general strategy towards  a  Community  euro-equities market 
based on  an information,  dealing  and settlement network  between the 
Stock Exchanges,  appropriately assisted by electronic processing and 
high-speed telecommunication.  Within this longer  term  framework 
progress  towards  which will be  governed by  the rate of resolution of 
the major issues discussed in the Report  - more precise and  limited 
recommendations  on  immediate  action are made.  These the Consultants 
have  attempted  to relate firmly  to the present stance of the 
Commission  and  the Committee  of Stock  Exchanges  of the E.E.C •. - 10  -
SECTION  2  THE  INTtRNATIONAL  EQUITIES  MARKET  IN  BELGIUM 
2.1  The  Local  Market in Foreign EqUities 
The  market floor in Brussels plays an important role in foreign equities 
dealing.  More than a third of the companies listed on the Bourse are foreign. 
Discounting the period beginning in 1982 {with the de Clercq Law),  during which 
the market in domestic securities has for various reasons become more  active, 
dealing in these  foreign  stocks  represented more  than  50%  of total 
share  turnover.  The  Brussels Bourse  is pre-eminent in Europe  in the 
development of an effective localised market in foreign securities. 
As  discussed more  fully below,  this system of Bourse quotation in 
Belgian  Francs of an extensive  range  of major securities listed on 
the  Canadian,  French,  German,  Italian,  Japanese,  Luxembourg, 
Dutch, 
American 
South African,  Swedish,  U.K.  and  Commonwealth,  and 
Exchanges  responds  to the investment preferences  and 
needs  of the Belgian investor for  foreign stocks.  It is supported by 
well  regulated issue of Belgian bearer certificates which,  linked to 
advanced depository facilities,  permit effective local dealing and 
CIK  book  transfer of  the securities. 
While  the Bourse market in foreign equities is,  as has  been said 
previously,  admirably  suited to the  needs of the Belgian private 
investor,  who  can obtain bearer certificates  (although  there is 
nothing  to prevent the  listing of registered securities),  the 
localisation principles on which it rests raise a  series of 
complications.  These  have  a  relevance  to  the development of full 
linkage between Brussels  and  the other Community  Exchanges.  To 
develop this point it is necessary  to sketch briefly the relation-
ship between  the parties who  are involved in the  three  segments of 
the Brussels  foreign securities market.  The  three market segments 
are the floor market,  the Brussels arbitrage dealings and  the 
direct dealings  between Brussels investors  and  foreign centres 
which  do  not pass  through  the Bourse or the brokers.  The  parties 
are the brokers,  the banks  and  the investors  - (private and 
institutional) . 11 
2.2  The  Belgian Brokers 
The  status of  ~e braking profession in Belgium is mainly defined 
under Chapter  5  of Book  1  of the Code  of Commerce,  toqether with  a 
series of Decrees  issued between  1934  and  1980 which  have  tightened 
the provisions of  the  Code.  The  profession is protected by  a  series 
of monopolies,  the  exclusive right to title and function of Aqent de 
Change,  the monopoly  (shared with  the banks)  of receiving Stock 
Exchange  orders,  handling  foreign currency  and dealing in foreign 
exchange  and  an absolute monopoly  of execution of orders on  the 
Exchange.  The  interpretation of  these provisions substantially 
confinessecurities transactions  to  the Exchange,  and  the  law  defines 
an  'ordre de Bourse'  as  an instruction to buy or sell whether  the 
securities are quoted or not.  Similarly  'reception'  of an order is 
deemed  to be any  receipt of an order,  even if only for  transmission 
within Belgium or abroad without personal liability in the  transaction. 
In addition to  the Stock.Exchange orders described above,  it is possible 
to  trade off-Bourse by  the direct transfer of equity,  whether  listed or 
unlisted,  by  a  broker or  a  bank,  or by  using their services as 
financial  intermediaries.  These  transfers are governed by  legal 
provisions.  It should  be noted,  however,  if the sum  involved in the 
transfer of Belgian  listed securities amounts  to less than 10 million 
Belgian Francs,  the confirmation statement must be  drawn  up  by  a 
broker.  There  are  two  exceptions which make  it possible to by-pass 
the  financial  intermediaries - off-setting transfers amounting  to at 
least 10 million bf;or occasional transfers by parties who  do  not 
habitually engage  in this  type of operation. 
In return for  these monopoly  privileges,  the  law  imposes  a  series of 
strict obligations on  the Agents  de  Change.  He  may  not undertake  any 
outside profession without seeking  the prior approval of the Stock 
Exchange  Committee.  He  may  not contract business  agreements with a 
bank.  He may, however, 1)  become  a  partner,  either in a  general 
partnership or in a  limited partnership,  2)  set up  financial  under-
takings either as  a  shareholder or  as  a  partner.  The  articles of 
associaion and  the role of the  founders  must be approved by  the Stock 
Exchange  Committee.  The  financial  undertakings  cited in point 2 
cannot  undertake brokerage activities.  The  broker is held to the 12 
minimum  commission scale.  The  restrictions imposed on  the Belgian-
Agent de  Change'however are less severe  than  those imposed on his 
French counterpart.  Notably,  he is permitted to act as principal, 
under  the constraintofa clear indication that he is doing  so in 
any client transaction.  Beyond  their agency business,  the largest 
broker firms  in the Brussels Bourse are able  to operate a  wide range 
of services including research,  portfolio management,  foreign and 
domestic  bond market and  C.D.  market operations,  trading,  market-
making  and underwriting in the  Eurobond market,  foreign  exchange 
dealing and money  braking.  The  braking  community  in Brussels which 
amounts. to about  280 members,  and  the size of the brokerage firms 
varies greatly,  and' reflects its highly diversified,  even very 
specialised,  role.  Leading  the market,  some  ten to fifteen major 
firms  have  emerged which  transact the majority of Bourse business. 
Amongst  them  are several braking houses of full international scale. 
As  a  result,  although  the braking  community is more  than usually 
complex,  it reflects the intuitu personnae nature of the profession 
desired by  the legislators.  Its members  may  well have  diverging 
views  in respect of any plans  for  European  linkaqe. 
2.3  The  Belgian Banks 
The  formal  relationship between  the brokers  and  the banks is readily 
defined in principle,  in that banks  share  the brokers'  monopoly  of 
receiving orders,  but are  never permitted to execute the transactions. 
Orders,  wherever  they originated,  must be  channelledto the official 
market  and  executed on  the floor. 
This  system is well  adapted to  the collective price system  and  is 
particularly suited to handling  small and medium-sized orders.  It 
maximises  opportunity for  computer pre-processing of the indicative 
equilibrium prices.  Four  recent surveys,  two  commissioned by  the 
Exchange  and  two  by  a  financial newspaper,  - indicated that bankJ 
orders  transmitted to brokers  represented between  45%  and.60%  of 
broker  turnover.  Both  bank  and broker intermediaries receive orders 
from  private clients and institutional investors alike.  On  orders 
transmitted to brokers,  banks benefit from  a  40%  reduction on official 
commission charges. 13 
Price fixing  is carried out 1n Brussels using an efficient system 
specifically designed  for  this purpose.  This  system does,  however, 
impose  some  rigidity with  regard to  the  times at which price fixing 
I 
is carried out,  and  could,  therefore present c.ertain difficulties 
where  a  continuous market is concerned.  Supplementary procedures 
are currently being  examined. 
'!he  banks via their trust companies  and  a  system bequn in 1952,  have 
an  important role in the Belgian equities market as  issuers by  the 
use of trustees of local certificates transforming  foreign nominative 
securit~es into bearer form  of the  type  demanded  by  the  local market. 
The  issue of such bearer certificates is strictly supervised by  the 
banking commission which assures  that local certificates are backed 
by  foreign nominative stock and generally exercises audit control 
over  the  system.  As  at June  30,  1981,  the aggregate value of issued 
bearer certificates was  $1,230 million.  It is estimated that the 
vast majority of private investors still prefer holding bearer 
certificates.  Alternatively, it is possible to trade CIK  nominee 
securities,  in which  transactions in these shares  are effected by 
transfers in the  accounts of CIK.  Corresponding registered entries 
are held on  b~half of the CIK  by  foreign organisations  nominated  by 
the CIK.  (see also Section 20.1.1). 
As  is inevitable in a  situation which is part-competitive and part 
structured by  legislative arrangements  considered in the best 
interest of the capital market,  certain tensions exist between  the 
banking  and broking  communities  and with regard  to  their mutual 
functions  in the  secondary market.  In the Belgian market,  as  else-
where,  however,  tensions arising basically from  the  dome~tic market 
find  their outlet in international dealing in which  the parties 
concerned  have  greater  freedom  to act. 
In  the domestic market,  the Belgian banks  are  contained in a  well-
structured situation.  They  are confined to being intermediaries 
between  the client and  the broker.  They  are admitted to  the clearing 
system but are  not members  of the Bourse.  Any  order,  of whatever amount  and whether  for Belgian or  foreign listed securities,  must be 
transmitted by  the bank  to the broker and by  the broker  to the official 
market.  With  regard to direct transfer for  large orders,  reference 
should be made  ~o Section 2.2.  It should also be mentioned  that no 
foreign bank  in Belgium may  receive Belgian Stock Exchange orders 
unless it is registered with  the banking  commission and  therefore 
subject to the obligations entailed in this registration. 
It could be  said that  the  BFlO  million limit  fixed  by  the  Royal  Decree 
of  November  10,  1Y67,  is now  out  of  date  and  un~ealistic and  that it 
constitutes  a  major barrier to  concentratins transactions on  the  Bxchan~e 
floor •.  The  average  transAction by  an  institutional investor in Belgium  is 
increasingly large  and greatly exceeds  the BFlO  million limit.  It 
should be  said that it is currently difficult to provide exact 
figures  since  the situations and  sums  involved are constantly 
changing.  A  'continuous  telephone market'  has  developed strongly.  It 
should,  however,  be  noted  that Stock Exchange rules to which  brokers  are 
subject oblige brokers  to charge official brokerage  fees  for  any 
off-Bourse  transaction.  The  average  transaction by  an institutional 
investor in Belgium  tends  to be between  BFS  and  BFlO  million.  Although 
some  block  transactions by  insurance  companies  can be well  above  the 
average,  most  large transactions are  the result of portf0lio 
restructuring or divestment of  family portfolios rather  than of 
traditional operations.  Informed observers  consider  that such share 
movements  and block  transactions represent less  than  3%  of bargain 
volume,  but possibly  20%  of value.  The  opinion was  expressed  that the 
general  approach of detaching block  transactions  from  the floor price 
was  valid and  that it was  a  fantasy  to assume  that large blocks  should 
move  at an official price derived  from  smaller  transactions. 
Under  the  regulations on  this matter,  buy  and sell orders for 
Government,  public sector and  local authority listed funds,  whether 
Belgian or foreign,  can only be  traded on  the Stock Exchange  floor. 
This  rule applies only  for  trading within Belgium  - foreign  trading 
being subject to local regulations.  An  order may  be given  to a  bank 
or a  broker with specific instructions  for it to be transacted abroad, 
but this is rare.  The  regulations provide  the banks with two 15 
alternatives,  depending  on client instructions;  - the order can be 
transmitted to ·a broker,  in which case brokerage fees  would  be divided 
between  the broker and  the bank  - 60\  to  the broker and  40\  for  the 
bank;  - the order can be routed directly to a  foreign market which, 
given the international structure of banking, it is easy to do.  As 
with  a  broker,  the bank will then charge  the full foreign brokerage 
fee plus  50%  of the Brussels brokerage fee.  This would only be of 
advantage  to clients where  the transaction had  taken place at a 
much  more  advantageous price then that available in Brussels,  the 
spread between the  two  prices compensating for  the higher costs 
entailed in international settlement.  About  two  thirds of foreign 
securities orders originating from  Belgian banks  are placed abroad. 
This market estimate carries the implication that Belgian dealing in 
foreign securities across  the Bourse is broadly one  third of total 
Brussels  foreign dealing by value,  and  this appears broadly  consonant 
with the balance of payments portfolio transaction figures. 
Apart  from  their issuing and order-routing functions,  Belgian  banks 
have  significance in the equities market as investors.  Management 
of their portfolio investments makes  them  large institutional 
investors in their own  right.  They  also are permitted to deal  for 
their own  account,  holding  stock for  short periods  to assist their 
primary market functions.  such positioning is clearly distinguished 
in their accounts  from  other investments,  and is subject to regular 
audit by the  Commission  Bancaire. 
2.4  The  Belgian investing institutions* (1) 
The  role of  the Belgian investing institutions in the foreign 
equities markets is in the general stereotype which prevails in most 
of the European countries.  Amongst  the most.important institutions 
are  the  insurance  companies,  whose  assets might typically be  50% 
portfolio investment in securities,  30%  mortgage  loans,  10%  real 
estate,  with  the remainder  in individual policy loans  and  other 
miscellaneous  investment.  Taking  an example  of  the overall portfolio 
structure of  a  major group of life assurance  companies,  of  the 
securities  inves~ents,  73%  were in bonds,  virtually all Belgian,  and 16 
27' in company  shares.  Of  the  company  shares,  64%  represented  co~ 
holdings in Be!gian stocks,  while  36%  were  foreign.  European 
securities  tended  to represent less  than  25\ of the portfolio 
investment in foreign equities.  This is an individual case 
in general,  the average portfolio distribution appears  to be  as follows: 
Bonds:  82%  of which:  Government  and public sector 
borrowing  40%  - 50%,  corporate bonds  22.36%, 
foreign  loans  26%. 
Shares:  18%  of which:  Belgian shares  13%  - 15%, 
foreign  shares  3%. 
The  proportion of overall investment in foreign equities is seen to be 
small,  due  to actuarial need  to cover Belgian franc liabilities with 
Belgian franc  investments,  to Government regulations designed to 
support the  local market,  and to clear preference for bond-or 
property-based investment.  Even  so, it is not an insignificant volume 
of business:the  large~of the insurance companies  has1for  example, 
an  annual  cash  flow of BFlO billion. 
The  order  ro~ting of the Belgian institutions illustrates the 
difficulty of attempting  to localise dealings in foreign securities 
on the floor of  the  national Bourse.  As  pointed out above,  the Belgian 
Bourse has  achieved greater success in this respect than any  oUher 
of the European  Exchanges,  thanks  to quotation in Belgian francs, 
specialised local instruments  and highly efficient technical support. 
Ironically, it is these  localised characteristics of the Bourse 
foreign equities market,  combined with the inability of the present 
collective price system  to handle block orders,  which  renders  the 
Bourse market unattractive to the institutions in their foreign 
dealing.  The  institutions do  not in general carry out their foreign 
transactions  on the Brussels Bourse,  especially with regard to US 
shares,  but go directly to  the main foreign markets. 
(1)*  Definition of an institutional investor as provided by  the Belgian 
Central Bank  - 'An  institution whose  main activity is to 
acquire savings  for  the purposes of investment or to provide credit'. 17 
The  reasons .for this are conventional ones,  - access  to a  larger 
market,  effici~ncy of  inf~rmation, diversity of investment opportunity 
particularly in the  technology stocks,  and  liquidity which would 
permit easy withdrawal  fran  the investment if required.  To  these are 
sometimes  added  the advantages of negotiated commission and absence 
of stamp duty.  Business lost to local intermediaries in this way  is 
·unlikely  to be regained.  Although  the Belgian foreign  exchange  regime 
is liberal,  unless there was  a  major development,  business undertaken 
outside the barrier of the financial franc is likely to be left abroad. 
It appears  an  irony that the very characteristics which  render  the 
Brusseis floor market in foreigns well  adapted to the needs of the 
small local investor,  mitigate its usefulness  to the institutions. 
The  system of collective price, which is seen as a  protection to the 
small investor,  cannot accommodate  the block transactions required 
by the institutions.  The  market is further narrowed by  the 
provision of the  local bearer instrument.  This constitutes a 
separate market in the security.  Although  the price of the local 
bearer is driven by that of the underlying  stock in the main market, 
the bearer price may  vary  2%  - 3%  from  that of the underlying stock. 
The  bearer stock price itself ,sub-divides and  the official list 
quotes  two  prices,  one  for certificated and one for CIK  form. 
Conversion of bearer to the original nominative  incurs a  cost of  2% 
going  to the issuing trustee,  with a  1%  charge on  reconversion.  The 
Brussels institutions acknowledge  that they  have  'basic loyalties', 
but these cannot override  the  tangible business factors which direct 
their foreign  transactions abroad. 
2.5  Foreign Brokers 
Brokers  from  the  European  Community  benefit from  the Treaty of Rome 
with regard to  freedom  of establishment.  They  can,  therefore, 
become  members  of the Brussels Stock Exchange  provided that they 
meet  the requirements  laid down  by Belgian law.  Non-Community 
brokers who  are not members  of a  national Stock Exchange  cannot, 
under  the  law,  operate in any  way  in Belgium. 18 
~.6  Brussels arbitrage 
Arbitrage operations may  only be carried out by professional inter-
mediaries who  therefore ensure interaction between various markets 
where  the same  security is listed.  The  aim  of arbitrage operations 
is either to benefit from  a  price difference or to. hedge  on a 
market with grea  tar liquid!  ty.  Arbitrage brokers  thereby supply 
foreign securities to the market.  Based on successful developments 
of this function,  they operate more  broadly in the international 
markets.  Since  1955 all brokerage firms  have been free to under-
take arbitrage.  The  rules perm!  t  them  to act as principals and 
moreover,  exchange regulation is very liberal.  In the first decades 
after the 1955  change  t~e number  of arbitrage brokers grew  to about 
twenty.  In more  recent years,  factors  such as improvement of 
communications,  volatility of currency and direct international 
dealing by banks have  tended to tighten the arbitrage margins and 
increase its risk.  Now,  it is estimated that 80\ of the foreign 
securities arbitrage dealing is in the hands of about ten brokerage 
firms.  It should be noted that the majority of brokers have 
correspondents on various foreign exchanges who  will execute client 
orders routed to them  by Belgian brokers.  The  majority of arbitrage 
brokers have  a  foreign  exchange desk  and,  as has already bean 
mentioned,  the very liberal foreign exchange regime is of considerable 
advantage to the profession in canparison with the situation in 
other countries.  The  Belgian two-tier foreign  exchange market 
facilitates all forms  of securities and foreign exchange transactions. 
There are also smaller  family  firms  which are highly specialised 
in arbitraging stocks  from  specific markets onto the Brussels floor. 
In these arbitrage operations the risks of positioning are minimised. 
The  arbitrage broker takes  up  stock as  a  principal but aims  to undo 
the transaction immediately in another market. 
The  function is complex.  The  prices of the international stocks, 
possibly over as many  as six or seven main markets,  have  to be 
watched over the  24-hour cycle and related to the existing Brussels 
price.  The  transaction costs,  particularly those related to 
financing settlement,  have  to be  taken into account.  Settlement 
might ranqe  from  two  days in Germany  or four days in TOkyo  to a 19 
month  in Paris.  Several weeks  might have to be bridged between thtl' 
two  sides of  th~ transaction.  Conversion of Belgian bearer to the 
original stock,  even  for a  major security in the North ~erican 
market,  may  take up  to five weeks.  Financinq of money  positions 
in such operations may  easily erode the narrow marqins obtained 
between the buyinq  and selling prices. 
The  building of all these factors into the prices,  in a  highly 
competitive situation, is the essential skill of the arbitrageur. 
An  informed estimate was  given that the arbitrage spread could be 
halved if international settlement were  brought to the levels of 
efficiency which are normally obtained in domestic markets.  In 
Brussels,  arbitrage onto the floor is supported by  a  well-
established system of stock borrowing.  The  larger Brussels brokers 
carry out highly sophisticated arbitrage operations,  which extend 
beyond  the function of servicing the Brussels demand.  An order 
received from  Switzerland,  for example,  might be only part met in 
Brussels,  with the greater proportion executed through  tranaactions 
on other overseas Exchanges. 
It is clear,  a~so,  that the  large arbitraging brokers play an 
important role in meeting  large foreign orders for Belgian stocks, 
thus defending  the incapacity of the local floor  to handle such large 
bargains.  A Brussels broker for  example,  receiving a  larqe order 
from  a  Dutch institution for say 20,000 Petrofina, might immediately 
make  a  net price from  his own  position.  Such  an order to sell 
would  be considered as a  'cession~ a  transfer,  and not a  'Bourse 
order'.  This practice avoids reference to the market of a  large 
order which might unstabilise the day's price.  In fact,  were it 
required to pass such  transactions  'beyond the capacity of the 
market'  through the floor,  an  informed opinion was  given that the 
transaction would  have  to be split between several days'  trading 
sessions which would  complicate  the operation considerably. 
A large Brussels braking house undertaking arbitrage might have  some 
50\ of its business off the floor.  These arbitrageurs are permitted 
to deal net with foreign intermediaries.  In Europe,  they rel'ate 20 
effectively to the continuous markets  in U.K.,  Germany,  France, 
Holland and swftzerland.  The  main point of focus of their 
activities is, nevertheless,  the United States. 
The  activities of the Belgian arbitraqe firms  demonstrate clearly 
the role and value of efficient arbitrage in supplying foreign 
securities to a  local market.  They  level price differences between 
the markets and they perform various  functions,  under  the requlation 
of the Bourse,  which the floor market itself cannot perform.  'l'o 
represent the arbitrageur as a  redundant intermediary,  exploiting 
international market price differences without contribution,  is to 
misunderstand the essential nature of the tasks he performs.  If the 
European markets were harmonised,  linkage would partially substitute 
for arbitraqe,  but,  on  the other hand,  such linkage would  lead to a 
considerable expansion of international activities overall.  The 
.function will certainly remain necessary.  To illustrate,  an 
information system might transmit the current price of an Amsterdam 
security to the Brussels floor,  but the ability to undo  such a 
transaction in the Brussels market is limited by the whole  range of 
technical differences between  the markets.  The  qap between  the 
nature of a  q:"ansaction in Amsterdam  and that in Brussels is bridged 
by the skill and the risk-taking of the arbitrage broker.  Moreover 
no  single common  currency has been envisaged for this harmonised 
market. 
The  arbitrageur,  moreover,  is subject to intense canpeti  tion.  The 
fact that the arbitrage function exists in Belgium in the classical 
form,  more  than is the case in other European Exchanges,  is due  to 
the existence of a  large clearly identified local market in foreign 
securities which must be  serviced.  In that sense,  the arbitrage 
function is less exposed  to the full competitive forces which have 
minimised the role of arbitrage in other markets in Europe.  The 
Belgian arbitrage brokers are nevertheless subject to competition from 
foreign activities of local investors,  to tiqhtening of margins 
due  to electronic communications,  vo~atile currencies,  and 
high interest rates,  and,  more  recently,  rapid movements  of the 
equity markets  themselves.  A valid indication of the action 21 
required to set up  a  fully-linked European equities market could 
be obtained frcm  straightforward analysis of what the essential 
functions of the present arbitrageurs are. 
The  problem of designing  an appropriate interface between the 
Belgian market and any  system of European  linkage is likely to 
hinge on the complex  local situation outlined above,· the need to 
avoid disturbance to the delicate equilibria within it.  'lbe final 
factor to be taken into account,  however,  is the  technical 
difficulties which might arise_ in linkage of the floor itself. 
2.7  The  Market Floor 
It is not within the scope of this Report to discuss fully the 
structure and procedures of the Brussels trading floor.  Such 
description is available in previous  E.E.C. ·Reports.  summary 
consideration is, however,  necessary due  to the general problem of 
interfacing the floors,  and,  in particular in the Belgian case, 
due  to the strong floor market in foreign equities and its potential 
relationship to the European linkage. 
The  Belgian floor procedures  are closely analagous to those of the 
Paris Bourse.  Quotation is firmly based  on collective price 
formation,  and  the price is the same  whether for  a  purchase or a 
sale.  Although  there is evidence of some  opinion that, at least in 
international securities,  continuous prices might be required,  the 
official opinion of the Bourse is that the present price formation 
systems best suit the needs of smaller orders  on  the local market. 
They  are considered to induce stability, minimise intermediation costs 
.and offer apparent fairness  to the investing public at large.  The 
relevance of collective price systems  to international dealing is more 
generally considered in Section 16.  The  indications are,  however, 
that should it become  apparent that other methods would provide 
distinct advantages  for  the  local or international market,  the system 
would evolve.  Studies  on this matter are currently being undertaken. 
It should be noted that individual prices subsequent to the opening 
price are already being officially shown  f9r  the major  securities. 22 
The  Brussels Bourse  thus  operates trading procedures similar to  th~ 
traditional operations of the Paris Bourse criticised in the ~rouse 
Report.  The  cash market  (March~ du  Comptant)  categorises stock into 
the  'March~ des  Rentes',  'Marche des  Corbeilles',  and the  'March' du 
Parquet',  respectively comprising Government or Government supported 
bonds,  heavily-dealt shares at collective and successive price,  and 
lightly-dealt shares at single price.  As  a  distinct concept,  the 
fo:r:ward  market  (March~ ~ terme)  is established,  mainly overlapping 
the Corbeilles market and including  the major foreiqns.  Across this 
securities structure there are a  number of methods  of quotation,  by 
call over  (par  cri~e),  supported in the case of the forward market 
by  computer pre-processing of par easier type,  to which is added 
broker interest on the auction floor.  This method,  but without 
computer pre-processing,  is also used in the cash market but is 
dependent on the proposition of a  price by  the specialist.  In the 
'corbeille'  section of the cash market individual prices may  be 
established by order-matching  (par opposition). 
The majority of floor business is transacted on the forward market. 
This market,  initially an outlet for speculation  (forward positioning) 
has gradually, evolved into a  round-lot market and is used rather as  a 
cash market with deferred settlement.  This  analogy with a  round lot 
market is reinforced by  the practice of setting the minimum  lot value 
at  100,000 bf.  Eligibility amonqs t  brokers is limited to those who 
are members  of the Co-operative de  Liquidation du 'l'erme,  who  must meet 
certain criteria as  regards  experience and credit worthiness •.  Belgian 
law requires that forward operations are margined to a  value of not 
less than one quarter of the value of the transactions. 
Daily fluctuation limits apply  to Bourse prices,  - 10%  in the case of 
the  Corbeilles market,  except where  tae shares are simultaneously traded on the 
forward market  (where  there are no  limits).  This  applies in particular 
to foreign securities, which are permitted to follow price movements  of 
the ~arkets of origin.  There is a  limit of  5%  for  the  'Marche du  Parquet' 
and  no  limit is applied to the forward market. 23 
It should be noted that the Quotations Committee,  established under 
statute within ~e  Stock  Exchanqe  Commission,  closely supervises the 
market.  Where  a  suggested price is likely to cause a  considerable 
distortion,  measures are taken  to inform both professionals and 
· investors prior to official price fixinq.  'l!le  Quotations Committee 
ensures that prices fluctuations reflect movements  in the markets of 
origin.  The  problem posed by price differences between the forward 
and cash markets is less severe than the similar situation on  the 
Paris Bourse.  This is due partially to the fact that forward 
settlement is set at every  two  weeks,  rather than once a  month,  and 
partly to the active role played by specialists operating as 
principals,  who  to some  extent even out the spread between the  two 
markets.  This aspect,  as with all other questions relating to price 
fluctuations,·is closely supervised by  the Quotations Committee. 
As  implied above,  equities dealing on  the floor of the Bourse mainly 
comprises  the execution of smaller investor orders,  with some  larger 
orders or arbitrage operations  transacted either.on the floor or,  in 
the case of internationally traded securities1 on foreign markets or 
finally,via the so called block  telephone market between local 
professionals  •. 
The  trading hours  of the Brussels Bourse  conform  to  the traditional 
pattern of the Continental Exchanges.  They  permit assembly of orders 
on which  opening prices are struck until the  time at which  the 
official price is fixed,  and  the calling of successive groups of 
stocks  and  limited dealing at successive prices continues  through 
to 2.30 p.m..  In respect of synchronisation of Bourse hours,  two 
views were  expressed in the Belgian market.  Firstly, it was 
suggested that synchronisation of Bourse  hours  and simultaneous price 
fixing would  help inter-market transactions.  Conversely,  the view 
was  expressed that it was  only due  to the chance of unsynchronised 
fixing that the Bourses were  able to relate their foreign collective 
prices coherently. 24 
2,8  Stmmary of Market considerations affecting European  linkaqe  . 
The  dominant considerations likely to influence the Belqian Stock 
Exchange  in approaching  the problems of  Europea~ linkaqe are likely 
to be:-
(i)  The  preservation of the present equilibrium of interests of the 
brokers and  the banks,  or reflection,  within the  linkage scheme  of 
any modifications likely to occur in Brussels in respect of that 
balance of interest; 
(ii)  The  preservation of the existing vigorous floor market in foreign 
equities.  Any  scheme  of floor  linkage would pose an immediate 
challenge to the present arrangements of this market,  which are 
ideal under  a  general concept of a  localised market in foreign 
securities,  but which by definition are likely to be at odds with 
any  scheme  to link  the European international equities market•. 
Foreign shares listed under original bearer form  should present 
(iii) 
no  real problem  except with regard to any scarcity that might result 
from  dematerialisation.  Foreign shares in original registered form 
would pose considerably more problems.  Private investors and also 
corporate investors  (who  seek confidentiality with regard to certain 
major  transactions being undertaken)  prefer the bearer form.  This 
preference leads  to the creation of bearer certificates representing 
registered shares.  If these representative certificates were to be 
in an international form  and  therefore admissible to other markets, 
the problem would  have been solved.  One  consequence of floor  linkage 
would be that imbalances in the various markets would directly find 
an outlet in foreign markets.  It seems  unlikely and,  indeed, 
undesirable that small and medium-sized orders would be  transacted 
other than on  the traditional markets. 
The  present complex  floor dealing procedures are considered  ideal 
for  the domestic market.  They  may  have  to be adjusted so that, at 
least in the section of the market dealing in international securities, 
an effective floor interface with the  linkage system  could be  found. 
While  the insistence of the Brussels Bourse on concentration of 
foreign transactions in the  Exchange is understandable, it is 25 
submitted that this could only be achieved in two  ways.  The first 
would be to rule  th~t the arbitrage operations at present balancing 
the markets should be brought onto the floor.  The  second would be  to 
accept commitment  to a  homogeneous  European international equities 
market which would permit genuine  linkage of floors,  but which would 
most likely involve substantial change in the Brussels procedures. 
(iv)  There are likely to be divisions within the brokinq  community  on  the 
form  of linkage appropriate to adopt.  The  large majority of smaller 
brokers may  favour  a  form  of linkage which would continue to 
concentrate.both sides of the  transaction in a  foreign security on the 
local floor·.  The  larger firms,  which at present operate in the inter-
national market,  would  be more  likely to insist on  acknowledgement of 
the present order routing as  the only realistic course of development. 
(v)  The  Bourse authorities would not wish to change  structures which are 
designed to benefit the local public,  and  any plans for  linkage would 
have  to take this into account. 
(vi)  With  linkage a  problem may  emerge with regard to  the mechanisms 
involving  convers~on of.registered certificates of foreign listed 
securities to bearer form.  such operations  take place off-Bourse, 
mainly on  foreign markets  and are handled directly by  trustee organisa-
tions issuing bearer certificates.  Floor  linkage woulw  r·•Jq:u.:l.re  liquidity 
to be provided by functions  carried out on  the market floor itself.  r. 
related problem would be that the off-Exchange net dealing of large 
transactions,  carried out by  specialised brokers,  and defending  the 
present floor price formation  system,  would not be possible.  The  linkage 
system itself would require to have  the capacity for  these large-size 
deals. 
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SECTION  3  ':'HE  IN'I'E~.NATIONAL EQUITIES  MARKET  IN  DENMARK. 
~----
3. l  ThE·:  impact  C?f  E:"change  C~nt~2!. 
At  the  time  oi the Consultants'  fu:r·vey  in 1S82,  the -:openhagen 
interna.tic~al  marke~ in equities was  virtually non-existent due  to 
the  E!{Change  Cc:ntrcl  ret;:;trict:!cns  prohibiting Danish  nationals  from 
acquiring  foreig~ securities.  The  concess~on permitting  investment 
of  Dkr.  7,000 abroad,  later increastd to Dkr.  10,000,  was  not 
significant,  being  in  a  qua:1tJ.ty  too  small  to offset handling  costs of 
foreign  transactions.  D;inish  na  t~onal.s  ·~;ere  permitted 
t''  i.;west  i~:  bonds  o£  ioreign 1nsti  tutions  of  >Y"hich  Denmdrk  was  a 
rGeral"Jer,  in effect, Cor:rum.m:t cy  :i r.sti tutions,  The  Danish  Government  removed 
~he Exchange  Control  restrictions 1n January  1984. 
At  the  time  of  the  study, the equities market  was  depressed.  This  was 
t:.1e  combir,ed  :r·es..;lt  of recession,  an  endem~c .r;.roblem  of adverse 
bala.nce  of payments,  and  a  Govern1nent  whose  pr.Lme  concern was  to  fund 
annual budget def:l ci  ts by  high-rat.e  bond  issues,  rather than  to 
develop  the equities market.  As  the bonds  had to compete  against 
the  strong mortgage  bond  market,  the  rate of interest available on 
bonds at the  time  of  the  study was  ever  20%,  against a  yield on 
industrial shares which was  estimated  as  low  as  3%  - 5%  by  Copenhagen 
brokers. 
During  the  course of  the  study,  a.nd  notably in 1983,  the .investment 
climate in Denmark  radically changed.  There  began to be i.ndications 
that the  new  Danish Government would  address itself to the problem of 
the budget deficit.  The  balance of payments  on current account 
markedly  improved.  A large influx of foreign  funds  moved  into the 
Danish equities market.  During  the  course  of  1983,  the  Danish index 
out-performed all the major markets  and all but  two  of the  World 
capital markets.  Equities  trading,  which  had  been  running at Dkr.  1.8m 
per day  in 1982  rose  to  triple this rate in  the first half of  1983. 
1The  effective yield  on  bonds,  which  had  been  22%  in 1982,  had  by mid-
1983  fallen  to  13%.  From  May  1  1983,  certain - 27 
Exchange Control•regulations,  as discussed in section 14,  were  eased, 
and prospects of further concessions  indicated. 
The  period of the  study was  thus  concurrent with  a  complete  change 
in  the situation in  the  Danish  equities market.  In this new  context 
it must be  accepted that much  of  the investment comment  obtained by 
the Consultants in 1982  has  now  only retrospective relevance. 
The  new  economic,  financial  and  Exchange  Control  situation is likely 
to  st~mulate  changes  in the  Danish  stock market.  As  yet, 
however,  no major  changes  have  occurred  in  the  structure of the Danish 
market.  ·The  situation observed  by  the Consultants in 1982  remains 
that which must be  taken into account in considering European  linkage, 
~n which it appears  increasingly likely that Denmark  will be  a 
participant.  The  problems  which might  stimulate latent changes  in  the 
Danish market were visible in 1982. 
3.2  The  Corporate  Status of the  Copenhagen  Stock  Exchange 
Although  the Copenhagen  Stock  Exchange is one  of the oldest in Europe, 
- its first commission  rules in fact date  from  1684  - the status and 
regulation of  the  Exchange at the  time of the  study was  based on  the 
Copenhagen  Stock  Exchange  Lar,.;  of  1972,  as  amended  by  Law  No.  524 
of  December  27  1979.  This  has  since been supplemented  by  a  new  Law 
enacted on January  19  1982 
Unlike  the  other Community  Exchanges,  the  Copenhagen  Stock Exchange is 
governed  by  a  broadly-based committee on  which  the  Exchange  members 
are  a  minority.  Of  the  twelve members,  all of which  are  technically 
appointed by  the Ministry of Industry,  three are  recommended  by  the 
members  of  the  Stock  Exchange  after election by  the  Brokers Association, 
three  by  the Central  Bank and 2  conunerical  banks,  3 by the  Nortgage Credit 
Institutions,  and  three  jointly recommended  by  the  Copenhagen  Chamber 
of Commerce,  Federation of Danish  Industries,  and  the Danish Shipowners 
Association.  ~ne 1972  changes  represented  a  diminution of broker 
representation on  the  Committee,  as  under previous arrangements, 
brokers  had  had  50%  of the membership.  An  advantage  derived  by  the 28 
brokers is that they are responsible only  for  a  small  element of 
Stock Exchange  costs,  finance  being derived  45%  from  bond  issuers,  45% 
from  quoted  companies  and  only  10%  from  the broker members  of  the 
Stock  Exchange.  The  Chair  .  .lan  of the Committee  and his  Deputy  are 
appointed on  a  three year  renewable  term by the Minister. 
Under  the  1972 governance, the Stock Exchange  is constituted as  an 
independent  institution with the  exclusive right to operate an Exchange 
for public trading in and quotation of  shares,  bonds  and similar 
sec·..rr:1. ties.  Ho·.-~ever, in  Denmark,  there is no  legal provision confining 
securities transactions  to the central market,  and  there is no  legal 
provision  conferrim;  a monopoly of securities dealing  on  the members  of 
the  Exchange.  The  Committee  under  which  the Exchange  operates has 
broad  coverage  of the securities industry.  This may  be  a  factor of 
significance in  the manner  in which  the  Exchange  operates,  the 
impo.rtant aspects  of which are determined more  by  the equilibrium of 
interests of the institutions  involv~d than by  any  formal  structure 
provided by  the  regulations. 
In  the  1972  Law,  in  line with  the general move  to modernise Stock 
Exchange  regulation,  a  Supervisor of the  Stock  Exchange  and  of members 
of the Stock  Exchange  was  prov~ded.  The  function was  assigned to the 
Bank  Inspectorate of  the Ministry  of  Industry,  operating  under  the 
Commercial  Banks  and  Savings  Banks  Consolidated Act of January  30  1981. 
~ne Inspectorate is represented, without a  vote,  at the  Stock  Exchange 
Committee,  and,  as discussed below,  its functions  provide  important 
financial  assurances  for  investors. 
The  committee  has  charge of  the Secretariat of  the Stock  Exchange,  at 
present comprising  fourteen  full-time  and  six part-time staff. 
A Broker Association exists,  which  has  no  role in the administration 
of  the Stock  Exchange,  but which maintains  dealing  standards  and 
disciplines,  and  which  carries out such  functions  as  the representation 
of stockbrokers  to the Securities Centre  Board of Directors. 
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3.3  The  Major Characteristics of  the  Danish  Capital  Market 
Although  1983  has  seen  a  considerable resurgence in dealing in 
equities,  the  Danish market  remains  predom.i.nantly  a  bond market. 
Within this sector,  the bonds  issued by  the Mortgage Credit 
Institutions are by  far  the most important,  and it is estimated that 
they  have  tended to constitute 60\ of bond  transactions.  Though  these 
instruments are of interest to other Community  investors,{inward 
capital investment having been permitted in mortgage  bonds during  the 
period of Exchange  Control,  and  in Government  bonds  since May  1  1983} 
they  are· not  the direct subject of  the Consultants'  study,  and  analysis 
of this major  sector of the Danish securities market is not required in 
the present context.  It shoald however  be  noted that Danish interest 
in European  linkage would  clearly be  increased if bonds  were  to be 
included in any  proposed  inter-Community  information and dealing 
system.  The  extent  of the dominance  of the bonds market is summarised 
in the  following  table of market capitalisation. 
Bond  volume  1982  (Nominal)  Dkr.  M. 
Government  188,971 
Unit Mortgage  Credit  44,918 
Special institutions  37,876 
Mortgage Credit  (1st  & 2nd)313,934 
Convertible bonds  400 
TOTAL  586,099 
Share  volume  1982  (Market  Dkr.  M. 
value) 
Banks 
Transport etc. 
Co~erce 
Shipping 
Industry 
Miscellaneous 
Investment Associations 
TOTAL 
9,758 
4,197 
4,698 
7,248 
20,301 
250 
1,778 
48,230 
The  equities market is demonstrably the  narrowe~.  At  the  end of 198 3, 
215  companies  with an  average market capitalisation of D.kr.485m were 
quoted.  The  subject of the Consultants'  Report being the secondary 
equities market,  it is not appropriate to analyse  the deficiencies of 
the  new  issues market  in detail, or the vigorous activities undertaken 
by  the Danish Stock  Exchange during  the period of the Study to rectify 
the situation.  It should  be  noted  that,  in  common  with other Community 
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Exchanges,  the  flow of  new  issues had dried  up  in the period prior 
to  1982  due  to the high cost of equity  finance  to the issuer.  The 
capital gearing of Danish  companies,  and  thereby reliance on  loan 
finance,  was  extremely high.  The  normal  situation obtains whereby 
interest on  loans is deductable  from  tax while dividend payments  are 
not.  This  fiscal discrimination was  reinforced by  the fact that, 
during  the recession,  overdr~fts of ·large companies were  held at 6\-8% 
below the  normal bank  lending rates. 
In Denmark  the  shortage· of ·new·  issuf;!s  was  compounded  by  a  convention 
of issuing new  equity capital at 105% ·of its nominal  value.  In an·issue 
of rights  to existing shareholders  this represented payment of a 
premium  which might offset low  dividend  yields,~  but it was  clearly 
invalid. in respect of the real market situation,  and  a  considerable 
deterrent tOthe  issue of new  capital onto  the market.  In general, 
considering the  relationShip  oetween  nominal  value  and  market  value,  new 
issues of existing securities stuuld  have  been at  a.  modest  uiscount  to  three 
times  the  nominal  value.  Although  this problem was  broadly perce: . ·"'1 
in the markets  in 1982,  none  of  the banks  appeared ready to take  a 
lead in rectifying it.  Danish issuers had  been driven to foreign 
markets  so that they might issue at an  economic price. 
The  Danish issuer,  Bang  and  Olufsen,  confronted  the problem,. by  a 
compromise
1 by which existing shareholders participated in an issue 
at 105%,  with  new  shareholders  subscribing  at a  price closer  to the market. 
The  s.hares of newly  listed companies have, however been offered by tender for 
t:en years, and note must also be made of vig'?rous action by the Exchange to 
encourage new listing of small and medium..:. sized enterprises through the 'efter' 
market.  While  this  type of initiative is of value  in the  longer  term 
development  of the market,  resolution of the structural problems 
inhibiting further  issue of  ~quity in Denmark  by  the major  companies 
is more  important in.the short term. 
The  major  participants in the bond market are  the banks,  the insurance 
companies  and  the private and  public  pens~on funds.  Some  private investors 
are also act,i.ve  in it,but in aggregate they are not significant in comparison 31 
with institutions,  between  whom  a  bond  transaction would  tend  to be 
of  average  value of D.kr.lOm  to D.kr.25m. 
The  institutions similarly dominate  in the share market.  A market 
estimate was  given that 60%-70%  of shares issued are in the hands  of 
the institutions.  Government  regulation of institutiondl portfolio 
structures is liberal compared with most  Community  countries.  In the 
case of  the  insurance  companies,  the rules relate to 
limiting the proportion of the portfolio in any  one  company,  and 
participation 1n  any  company  to  15%.  CurrentLy  the  main  effect  ot  this 
provision is beneficial,  in  that it limits  the holdings of  the  two  large 
public pension  funds,  the A.T.P.  and  the  L.D.,  and  permits  limited cor-
porate  investment  to be  more  widely  spread.  During  recent years  the 
institutions have  shown  an  expected  and  logical preference for  the bond 
market.  The  life insurance  companies  nevertheless still constitute the 
mai~ investors in equity,  in which they  are permitted to hold  up  to  20% 
of their assets.  In  1982,  5%  was  considered more  typical. 
In 1982,  private investor interest in equities was  negligible,  and 
braking opinio.n was  that the private investor might be  out of  the 
share market  altogether.  With  the  resurgence of the equity market in 
1983,  the situation may  have  changed,  but not,  as  yet,  significantly  . 
•  l:\n  important development  in 1983  was  the  authorisa.t~.wn of.  the 
Scandinavian  Investment Company,  a  U.K.  subsidiary of a  Dani&h 
Investment Company,  to transfer  funds  abroad  for  investment in United 
Kingdom  Unit Trusts.  This  represented both  a  concession to  the 
prohibition of purchase of  foreign  shares by  Danish nationals which 
has existed since  1931,  and  an  encouragement of private investment. 
I~ ldte 1981,  the Confederation of Danish  Industry made  proposals  for 
a  Monory  type  scheme.  While  this did not materialise,  new  tax rules 
were  introduced giving relief from  capital gains  for  shares held 
for  L~ree years.  A wealth  tax is payable in Denmark  on  assets of 
over  D.kr.  lm. 
•·  •·t~~tt·· .. 
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3.4  The  Broker  Members  of the Stock  Exchange 
Membershi.p  of the Copenhagen  Stock Exchange is confined to brokers. 
Banks  and  savings banks,  whether Danish or foreign,  are not eligible. 
The  conditions  under which  a  licence may  be  obtained are set out in 
Section 10 of the Stock  Exchange  Law  1979.  Licences  are only 
granted to na-cural  persons; proposals  forcorporate  membership  have 
been  recently  reviewed  and  rejected.  As  well as  specifying 
conventional criteria of age,  experience etc.,  the Order stipulates 
that the broker should be  supported by  adequate net capital.  This is 
at present specified as  a  minimum  of D.kr.  600,000 and fidelity 
guarantees  and  insurance policies are prescribed by  the Minister 
of Industry to secure other members  and clients respectively.  The 
order also imposes  a  reserve  requirement  supervised by the Inspector, 
by which  8%  of the.total balance of a  broker firm must be 
represented by own  capital.  The  brokers are audited by  spot 
checks  and  submission of annual accounts  to the  Inspe.ctorate.  The 
Inspectorate has progressively tightened its financial monitoring, 
there having been  several  broker defaults in the 1970's,  and 
in 1980 and  1981.  In 1982  the Guarantee  Fund totalled about D.kr.l2m, 
with  further member  firm guarantees of D.kr.S m. 
The  Minister of Industry may  limit broker applications  according~to 
turnover of the Stock Exchange.  Applications  for  new  firms  however 
are rare,  the normal  procedure being to buy  into existing firms. 
The  Act contains a  requirement that a  broker  should have  Danish 
residence,  but this is relieved  in respect of nationals of other 
E.E.C.  countries,  who  may  be  granted membership  on similar terms 
to those available to Danes.  At  the  time of the study,  no  second 
country E.E.C.  nationals had  taken advantage of  such  eligibility. 
At  the end  of 1982,  there were  34  stockbrokers grouped  into  24 
braking firms,  of which 2  or  3  might be  considered substantial, with 
~P t®  50  or  60  em?loyees .  ~he  Copenhaqen  brokers  can act 33 
across  the whole  range of securities market  functions,  there .being 
virtuelly no  technical limit to their activities.  The  brokers may 
act  both as  agent and  as  principal,  the latter subject to 
declaration in the case of  the client transactions.  Brokers may  cross 
transactions  in their office if at the  same  price.  They may  sell 
short,  other than in bank  shares. 
The  larger broker  firms,  as well  as  undertaking securities dealing,  are 
active in the short-term money  market,  the  Eurobond primary  and 
secondary markets, and authorised  foreign  exchange  dealing  and  in one 
case,  new  issues.  Notably,  while not technically  considered 
banks by  the  Inspectorate,  they  undertake private banking  functio~s. 
They  are not permitted to advertise  for banking  business,  but they may 
take deposits,  operate cheque  accounts  and  oay interest.  In respect of 
these activities,  theyare not subject to banking control,  but deposits 
are  secured by  bonds  of appropriate value.  The  deposit taking  function 
appears specialised,  and  tends  to be available only to larger clients 
in amounts  of over  D.kr.  lm.  The brokers do  not compete with commercial 
banks  for  small deposit business,  which  they  do  not  want. 
While  in effect the braking and banking  functions  are separated within 
t~e braking firms  at present,  the  Inspectorate anticipates regulation 
which will fcrmally  enforce this. 
Expansion of the  larger braking  firms  has been  facilitated by  their 
ability to  seek  external capital,  though  such holdings  incur  unlimited 
liability.  1be  firms  are also permitted to introduce partners who  are 
not members  of the  Exchange.  The  need of the member  partners of the 
Exchange  to ensure the default liabilities of the firm are proportionately 
covered  results automatically in agreements within the firms  associating 
the  non-member  partners with the firm's  liabilities.  The  larger  firms 
tend  to have  three or four partners,  one  or two of whom  may  be 
non-brokers. - 34 
3.5  The  Floor Trading 
While  over  the last decade  much  progress has been made  in improving 
th~ regulatory  framework,  the physical operation of the  Danish 
market  floor  has  continued  under traditional procedures.  The  Exchange 
moved  to new  premises in 1974,  and  since  that time  facilities have been 
enhanced  byL~e installation of key-to-disk  equipment  for more  efficient 
recording of transactions  and publishing of prices.  The  structure  and 
procedures of the markets did not change. 
The  Copenhagen  market  is divided into two  floors.  The  most  important, 
on which  80~-90% of b~siness is conducted,  is the bond market which is 
not the  s:.ilijec't.  of t..'1is  Report. 
Tne  equities market has been traditionally divided into two  segments, 
hitherto called the Hovedbors or main market,  and the Efterbors or the 
after-market.  Trading  sessions  commence  at 1030 hours.  In  the main 
equities market,  which  comprises  those securities for which  a  nominal 
value  of D.kr.  15m.  or over has been issued,  prices are determined inan 
auction  system.  The Quotations Official calls each security in list order, 
identifying the ·lowest offer and  the highest bids  from  the brokers,  and 
striking a  price once  a  bid matches  an offered price.  In heavy dealing, 
further business may  be  indicated by  the brokers with further prices 
made.  The  form  of dealing may  be exemplified as  follows:-
Quotations Official - Calls security in list order with indicative 
price e.g.  84 
Buying broker  - Calls  85 
Selling broker  _,Calls  86 
Buying broker  - Calls  ~ 
Quotations Official - Calls  Six  etc. 
Selling broker  - Calls  'selling' 
Quotations  Leader  - Calls  'broker  X  to broker  Y at  (selling price) ' 35  -
Similar calls could  then continue,  until the Quotation Official declared 
the  end of dealing and  the final  spread of bids  and offers,  e.g.  85~-86. 
The  next stock  would  then be  called.  A key  rule within, the dealing 
system is that the broker may  not,  during the trading session,  sell 
cheaper  than he has bought  and  may  not buy higher  than  he  has  sold. 
Dealing  in equities under  the auction  system is in percentage of nominal 
value,  ranging  from  l%  covering prices between  100%-150%,  to  5%  for prices 
over  1,000%.  Dealing is in round  lots of D.kr.  8,000 nominal  if the 
price is below  1,000%,  and  D.kr.  4,000 if above  1,000%.  Each  transaction 
is  for  one  lot,  which is generally considered  too small  for  current 
market  needs.  The  procedure  becomes very distended  in heavy trading. 
During  the  trad~ng, representatives of  the banks, ·Several of which  have 
offices in  the  Stock  Exchange  building,  may  signal  to the brokers,  but 
they are  not.  permitted to take direct part in  the dealing.  The  esoteric 
aspects of  such  signalling is an  unusual  characteristic of the 
Copenhagen  ExchangE:\. 
The  Efterbors comprised dealing  in  the  less active minor  issues  with  a 
nominal  value of issued  shares of not less than  D.kr.lm.*  The  price 
formation  principle is similar to that of  the main equities market,  but 
d~aling is made  more  expeditious  by  the use of  four  trading boards  which 
carry  the more  active securities of this market.  Eacr.  board is deal·t 
with in turn.  Under  the  supervision of a  quotations official  assist~d 
by  two  clerks,  members  are  free  to  make  bid~ and  offers  fo£  any 
of the  securities on  the  board being  traded,  without any particular 
order being observed.  The  calls are marked  on  the board and  the  trans-
actions achieved  by matching  bids and offers.  As  calls for  the 
securities diminish,  the official declares  sixty seconds to final  trading 
which is signified by  a  clock bell.  The  conventions with regard  to bid 
intervals and  lot sizes are the  same  in both of the equities markets.  The 
Efterbors operates  under  a  procedure  which is brisk,  each  board  normally 
taking little more  than  five  minutes,  but which  is not well  adapted  to 
heavy  trading. 
*  Under  the  more  recent arrangements  the shares of newly  admitted 
companies must  be  of not less  than  D.kr.lSm value.  Older  issues of 
less value  remain  in the market also. 36 
All dealing is for  three day  settlement.  Though,  as discussed in 
Section 19, bonds  settlement is very  advanced and supported by  the 
Vaerdipapircentralen procedures,  settlement of the equity,  which is 
virtually all bearer,  remains  by  physical delivery. 
Some amendments were made to the trading system by  the Stock  Exchange Order 
. of  January  1982.  Th~ main market  innovation was  the creation of a 
special market of shares in small  and medium-sized  companies,  designated 
as  Stock  Exchange  Market III,  and  which offers easy conditions of 
listing for  companies  of D.kr.  1m-15m  capital. 
At  the  same  time  the  Hoverbors  and  Efterbors were  respectively 
re-designated Stock  Exchange  markets  I  and II.  The  change of name  was 
meant  to remove  an  invidious meaning which might have been seen in the 
previous distinction,  and  to pave  the way  for more  flexible movement  of 
securities between  Lhe  new  markets  I  and  II according  to the volume of 
transactions.  The  reforms  of  1982  related to the drive to bring more 
securities to the  equities market,  and floqr procedures  remain 
substantially the same. 
3.6  The  Banks  and  the  Off-Market dealing 
It is understood that the  Exchanges at present are considering methods 
by which the floor procedures  could be modernised.  Even at the  low 
transaction  levels which  preceded  the recent boom,  there was  an 
awareness  in Copenhagen  that the  floor procedures might not be optimal. 
rt was  considered that the traditional floor  system might be contributing 
to certain characteristics of the  Copenhagen  capital market about which 
concern was  evident.  Chief amongst  these was  the  division  of 
securities dealing between  the brokers  and  the banks,  and  the extent of 
business carried out off the market,  i.e. off the  Exchange  floor. 
As  is  the case in all capital centres of  the Community,  no  figures 
exist to establish this proportion.  Market opinion was  that 90%  of the 
bond dealing was  outside  the market.  The  off-market equities dealing 
was  considered to be  of much  the same  order. 
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Two  factors  have  combined  to produce  this result.  The  first is the 
freedom available to any  individual or  instituti~n, including the banks, 
to deal off the Exchange.  There  is no  legislation concentrating 
securities transactions  on  the  Stock  Exchange.  The  institutions are 
thus  free  to deal between themselves.  The  investing institutions rarely 
do,  for  conventional reasons which are  as valid in Denmark  as elsewhere. 
There  is,howeve~a very  substantial bank market.  The  banks  operate as 
brokers on behalf of their private  and institutional clients.  They  also 
deal  on their own  account with other Danish banks  and  investing 
institutions or with foreign  capital market intermediaries of all types. 
~ne large commercial  banks,  such as Copenhagen  Handelsbank,  Den  Danskebank 
and the Privatbanken operate full-scale securities functions.  These are rigorously 
separated  from  the credit departments.  While  the banks  are acting as 
brokers  they  only take orders,  and  they do  not exploit their position 
as banks  in their Stock Exchange  dealing.  The  split between  the broking 
and  dealing  functions  and  loan departments  is normally absolute. 
Although  some  10%  of bank business is thought to go  to the market  floor, 
the actual  dist~ibution of  the business between banks  and brokers is 
more  complex.  The  banks  acknowledge  the  importance of the central 
market  as  the only  agency  through  which  an official and  standard 
quotation can be  assured.  They  therefore have  an  i.nceD.t :t  Vl:!  to  use it to 
the extent required to establish  a  price.  Such  a  price  having been 
established and  published,  alltransactions off the market are 
influenced by  the market price of the day,  though this arises  from 
public pressure rather than,  as is the case  in Paris,  fromany  rule. 
At  the  time of the  study,  the off-market business was preponderant. 
Subsec;,uently,  heavy  volume  trading has  resulted in all-day floor dealing, 
with  less opportunity for  price-making outside  the  Exchange. 
Even  at the time  of  the study  the  fact that  80%-90%  of equity transactions 
were dealt off the market did  not  imply  that the brokers  were  not associated 
with  them.  An  important element of broker  business is on  behalf of 
insurance  companies  and pension  funds  and
1possibly with  bank  involvement,is - '38 
arranged off the market.  The  banks  frequently  find it convenient to 
operate behind  the broker,  on or off the market,  particularly in the 
case of  la~ge transactions  in which their own  direct participation would 
reveal  too much  about thel.r position.  It was  estimated that about  SO\ 
of  the  off-Ex~hange equities market might be  transacted  through  the 
brokers.  A client had  th~ right to insist that the broker  should deal 
for  him  on  the  Exchange. 
The  ~econd factor  compounding  the  importance of the off-market is the 
inherent narrowness  of the floor  trading system.  The  procedure of 
dealing  lots is slow,  and  the lot size of D.kr. 8,000 nominal bears  no 
relation to and can not accommodate  the size of the off-market 
trdnsactions.  The  technique of open calling of bids  ~nd offers, if 
r.ot supported by central  posit~oning,  for  example by  a  jobber or a 
specialist and by  a  block-passing system,  necessarily introduces 
conventions whereby brokers have  to conceal  the real size of any  large 
business  they may  have.  Although  the brokers  are permitted to take 
positions in equities,  they generally consider it a  risk to do  so,  and 
although  they hold  shares  in ti1eir portfolios they  regard these  as 
assets  and  the securities are not dealt.  Any  positioning which does 
occur in the  Danish r.1arkets  is a  by-product of  the banks  own  holdings, 
and,  as has been noted, their participation in floor dealing is indirec.t. 
Any  intervention  required to stabilise the market is normally  undertaken 
by  the banks,  which carry out the  role of  'company brokers'  for  issues 
which  they  have  sponsored  and  which  attempt to protect the interests 
of such issuers in the market. 
While  recent heavy  trading volumes  may  have brought increased liquidity 
to  the  Copenhagen  market floor,  the situation in 1982  clearly 
demonstrated the deficiencies of the  trading system.  In an equities 
market which has  suffered  low  activity for several years,  a  vicious 
spiral appeared  to have  occurred.  The  reluctance of market participants to - 39 
unsettle the market resulted in fewer  of  the  transactions going  throu9h 
the  Stoc~ Exchange  floor.  As  a  result, the  Exchanqe market became 
weaker,  and even less able to accommodate  significant orders.  The 
result was  that by  1982  brokers admitted that no  equity transactions 
of any  importance could be handled by the floor  system •.  The  only 
possible  technique was  to evaluate a  share on  'fundamentals•.  To  permit 
a  transaction arranged off-market at a  price determined  on  this basis, 
~e brokers would  then  enter the market to move  it to the price at 
which the transaction might be  execu~ed off the market. 
While  this problem might be resolved by  increased volume,  the floor 
procedures are not well adapted  to handling it.  The  trading procedures 
withstood the surge of business in 1983  when  the volume of transactions 
tripled, but this was  only achieved by  trading sessions which continued 
late into the evening.  The  excessive trading hours  and  the constant 
strain on dealers  and supporting services demonstrated the clear need 
for  a  more  flexible high-volume  trading system. 
A further  factor  taking business into the off-exchange market  is. that  while 
·forward dealing is permitted in Denmark,  the Exchange  does not operate 
either a  forward or an Options market.  Any  such covering transactions 
have to be  undertaken  in the bank market. 
There was  evidence during  the survey that banks,  thoug·::  benefiting  from 
their ability to transact a  proportion of their dealings  free of broker 
commissions  because of the off-Exchange market,  were  nevertheless 
concerned at the  general situation.  The  major  commercial  banks are 
developing strong securities functions.  one of their prime requirements 
is  a  transparent and concentrated market,  on  which  a  genuine price can 
be  established  and  market  trends observed.  The  need  for  a  continuous 
market in major stocks is also seen,  as is a  requirement for  more 
company  and  price information,  particularly to assist in the banks• 
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The  Danish banks  appeared  to be  faced  with  a  quandary with regard  to the 
development of a  stock market.  On  the one hand,  passing all their 
bus~ne~s through  the brokers would  involve  them  in further costs,· 
which  they  might  consider to  be  an  excessive  SLCsiay  of broking mentJers.  01 
the other hand only by doing  so will they secure the broad market which is 
essential for  the bankd more  significant and potentially lucrative 
securities functions.  For  example,  the banks play a  prim~ role in 
share  issues of all the major  companies.  TO  date,  the banks 1  achieve-
ment in this field have  been  im~ded by  the  narrowness  of the Danish 
stock market which has  driven at least one  Danis~ company  to the practice 
of  issuing its shares in foreign markets. 
In  summary,  mere appeared substantial opinion  among  both  the Stock 
Exch~~ge authorities and the participants in the market that the 
existing equilibrium prevailing between broker privileges and bank 
fi~ancial power,  though  working in many  ways  constructively,  might not 
full~l be meeting  the capital  marke~'s current needs.  Nor  had it 
generated  the  type of central market which would  meet  the modern 
requirements of the financial  system.  The  Stock Exchange  authorities 
have  indicated that they intend  to review  the trading procedures of the 
Copenhagen  floor.  It is accepted that the present floor  system is 
incapable of handling  more  than  10%  of the transactions,  and,  if any 
moves  are  to be  made  to concentrate the market,  the floor trading 
procedures would  have  to change.  It is not possible,  at present,  to 
predict the  form  of such  changes,  nor  the implications that  they might 
have  for  any  European  linkage based on market  floors. 
3.7  The  Market  for  International-Equities in Denmark 
In January 1984,  due  to  a  marked  improvement in the  count~J'S balance of 
payments,  Danish nationals were  relieved of the EXchange  Control 
restrictions which  had previously prevented their acquisition of 
foreign equities.  The  possibility now  exists that the Cdpenhagen  Stock 
Exchange  could participate  ~n any  Community  linkage. A brief comment  on 
the  situa~ion which prevailed at the  time of the study,  and which, 
broadl~ had  ex~sted since  the  1930's,  is,· however,  relevant to indicate 
the  threshold  from  which  the Danish capital market will move  into free 
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Prior to 1984,  Copenhagen activity in the  international equities 
market had been  sev~rely restricted by  Exchange  Control  regulations, 
and by  the preference of investors  for  bonds.  The main  foreign 
investment carried out by  the brokers was  in the permitted Eurobond 
markets.  As  a  special provision,  Danish institutions with a  Deutschmark 
risk could offset this by  buying short-term Deutschmark securities1 with 
the permi"ssion of the Central Bank.  In terms of direct portfolio 
investment in equities abroad  by  Danish nationals,  prohibition had  been 
almost total,  apart  from  minor  concessions mentioned  above.  Switching 
of stock already held abroad was  permitted as was  dealing in the three 
foreign  securities  which,b1  qu~rk of history,  had  been permitted to 
remain listed on  the  Danish  Stock  Exc·hange. 
An  important characteristic of  the Danish Exchange  Control  system was 
that inward direct portfolio investment by  foreigners  had  always  been 
permitted,  - the  one  restricted area,  Government bonds, also being mace 
accessible in May  1983.  Added  to this,  the  large  Danish  companies  had 
been  liberally permitted to raise funds  abroad,  and,  subject to Central 
Bank  permission  and  commitment  to remit profits,  to acquire  foreign 
subsidiaries.  As  a  result,  the  foreign dealing activities of the banks 
were not unimportant.  The  Danish banks,  possibly in syndicates which 
might  include brokers,  were,  during  the period of  Exchar,g.e  Control, 
active in  the international ·financial markets.  While  the  i.e  pn.me 
activities were  in the bond markets,  the banks  were  the natural 
counterparties  for  f~reign investors wishing  to acquire  Danish  equities. 
There  was  evidence  that the banks  were  vigorously developing  such 
contacts  and  providing analysed data on  the Danish equities market to 
foreign dealers.  The  main  concern of  the banks  in this respect was  the 
loss of business to  themselves,  ·and  to  the  Danish Stock  Exchanc;e  as 
markets  in Danish  securities moved  abroad. 
The  impression  was  gained that  the  banks•  foreign  equities business was 
d~storted and  constrained by  the  Exchfu~ge Control  regulations,  but that 
in the event of  liberalisation they would  be well placed  to assume  the 
international dealing roles carried out by  their counterparts  in most 
of the other  Community  countries.  Their  contribution in this respect 
will now  be  enhanced by their access  to other ScanC..i..r  .. J.v;  ..  "t~  ru.:::.::kets. 42 
3.8  S~ary of Market considerations affecting European  Linkai! 
S0veral  aspects  0f the  above  brief review  of the role of  the Copenhagen 
St:ock  Exchange  in the  Danish capital market may  indicate the likely 
attitude  and  o.J:;p:coach  of the market participants to European  linkage. 
(i)  The  removal  of  the  Exchange  Control  restrictions previously 
prohibiti::1g  the purchase  of  fureigr.  equit:i,.es  now  opens  the way  for  the 
Danish  Stock  Exchang~ to participate in any  Community  equities dealing 
l~nkage.  On  the othar hand,  the  development of a  Copenhagen  inter-
national equit.l<..s  market  i:::.  lik.:~ly  to be  the first pre-occupation of 
t~e Stock  Exchange  au~~oriti~3.  Until  th~ local balance of this  ' 
situation is  .:e;;,ol,red,  and its local  centre of gravity determined, 
external  linkac;e will bB  a  secondary priority. 
(ii)  A second  m~jor consideration is tl1at in spite of the revival of the 
~quities m~rke~,  the.t~aditional source of finance  through  the Exchange 
is through  the bond  ~arkat, notably  the mortgage  bond market.  A 
European  linkage  system  cor.f~ned to equity will,  in the foreseeable 
future, be  only of sec:ondary  interest to  the  Danish brokers.  The 
European  system would  presumably be  more  favoured  in Denmark  if it 
covered both  shares  and  bonds. 
(iii)  It seems  questionable whether  the present equilibrium between  the 
brokers,  the  Exchange  market  and  the banks  is well  adjusted to the 
current needs  of the Danish capital market.  Moves  to strengthen the 
Stock  Exchange  market may  be  anticipated.  Incre~sed concentration of 
transact~ons on  the  Exchange  is needed  to permit the market floor  to 
perform its functions  effectively,  to carry out all the broker business 
on  the  floor,  and  to provide  the banks with a  strong central market 
which  is essential to their own  major  corporate  finance 'and  new  issue 
functions.  There  is little indication that this will be  achieved by 
radical  change  in the  Exchange  structure,  such  as  admission of banks  to 
Stock  Exchange dealing.  The  present division of market  functions 
between brokers  and  banks  appears  to work  well,  is constructive,  and 
',!  -~ 
·, f 
(iv) 
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avoids  some  of the stresses which  arise in certain other Community 
markets.  The  correct balance may  be  achievable,  in the main, 
from  adjustment of technical  detail  such as  the  commission 
received by  the  banks~  A technical  requirement to increase 
concentration on  the market is likely to be  some  procedure  fo~ putting 
block transactions  through  the  Exchange.  During  the next  few  years it 
is likely that a  major pre-occupation of the Danish authorities,  the 
Stock  Exchange  and  the market participants will be  the development of 
the  doro~stic equities market,  and  the assertion of its appropriate 
position in Danish securities.  Any  proposal  for  European  linkage will 
have to accommodate  this,  and  avoid any  technique of linkage which 
might  compromise  these domestic obJectives. 
The  present reactivation of  the  Danish equities market,  and  the massive 
increase  in transactions associated with it make  it likely that the 
Danish market  floor procedures will be  modernised.  It is premature  to 
suggest what  the  form  of the  new  market is likely to be,  but it will 
have  to achieve  a  much  higher rate of execution of transactions  than 
the traditional system.  It is further likely that the new  system will 
r~quire devices.to ensure  liquidity of  the market.  If this need is 
accepted,  the  introduction of formal  market-making or specialist funct;ions 
may  be  req~ired.  The  need  for  forward  and  Options markets  on  the 
Exchange will presumably also be  considered in  the  r,;_ VJ.t,;-w  of  trading 
procedures. 
(v)  The  main interface for  foreign  equities dealing  in  Denmark,  with the removal 
of  Exchange  Controls  and  as new  trading ·procedures  are  implemented,  is 
difficult to forecast.  A major  aim  of  any  re-organisation in the  Danish 
Exchange wh~  ch would be like,l.y to be  endorsed by  the banks,  would be to ere  ate 
a  market  capable of playing  a  full  international role as  the market of 
origl.n of  the major  Danish  stocks.  Ti.e  development of such  international 
*  0.75%  up  to consideration of  D.kr.lOO,OOO;  0.5%  in larger transactions 
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bllsiness  wo'lla,  on  d  reci?rocal  ~~as is,  resuire the ~uotation of major fore11n 
securities in  the  Danish  Exchange.  As  matters presently stand, it is 
l
1..;.kely  that.  a  system of foreign dealing along the lines of that in 
Amsterdam  would  emerge,  with the banks  exploit~ng their international 
position,  capital base  and  daaling expertise to play the prime  role in 
this mari<et.  The  problem of reconciling  the development of floor trading 
with  the development of international equities business would  take the same 
form  and  pose  the  s~ne questions  as it does  in Amsterdam. 
Both  in relation to  t_he· development of  the strong central floor,  and 
in esr.a:Olishing  the  f?O::;ition  vf  the floor  in foreign dealing,  the 
ability of the  Copen},agen  brokers  to operate as banks  offers 
constructive possibilities.  It .:;.s  open  to question,  however,  whether 
the  increased element of risk  ~nvolved in positioning  in the domestic 
market or  ir.  foreign  secur~ties would  be  acceptable to the broking 
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SECTION  4  THE  INTBRNATIONAL  EQUITIES  MARlSET  IN  IRELAND 
4.1  The  negative effect of Exchange Control 
When  it was  announced  by  the Taoiseach,  on  November  15  1978,  that the 
Irish Government  had decided to participate in the European Monetary 
System right from  its outset on  December  18  1978,  Irish investors and 
brokers may  have  justifiably anticipated that investments abroad,  as 
from  that date,  would  no  longer have  to be  limited to  scheduled 
territories*,  as established by  the previous Exchange Control Law  of 
1954.  In such  a  case,  besides their traditional foreign investment 
market,  the  United  Kingdom,  Irish investors,  and particularly 
institutional investors,  would  have been able to diversify further  their 
investments within  the  boundaries of the European Community. 
On  the contrary,  and  totally against the spirit of the European  Monetary 
System,  which was  intended as  the first concrete step towards  a  European 
n1onetary  unification,  the  existing Exchange Controls were  immediately 
extended to include  Ireland's main  trading partner  - the  United Kingdom 
with which it had maintained a  de  facto monetary union  since-the early 
19th century. 
The  Central  Bank  of  Ireland  justified these restrictive measures as 
indispensable to  safeguard official  ex~ernal reserves and  to regulate 
the effects of capital movements  on  the exchange rate of  the Irish pound. 
Experience appears  to have proved  the  ineffectiveness of the restrictive 
policies,  as official external reserves  have  continued to deteriorate. 
The  measures  have proved  inadequate to regulate capital movements,  as 
speculative capital operations may  be  channelled through more  liquid 
asse~s than investments  in securities.  A straightforward purchase and 
sale operation between  the  Irish and  London  Stock Exchanges  immediately 
~nvolves a  bargnin cost  (commission  fees,  jobbers turn and  stamp duty) 
*  The  United  Kingdom,  Channel  Islands,  Isle of Man,  the  Republic  of 
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of over  7%  and  the total switching operation may  only be achieved in 
some  three weeks. 
Since  December  1978,  Irish residents,  apart from  certain institutional 
investors,  have  not been permitted  to acquire additional  foreign 
currency securities other. than  through acceptance of rights issues on 
existing holdings.  However,  investments  held prior to  that date 
could be  switched into other foreign securities within  a  three month 
period of the sale,  and all such  transactions had  to be  executed with 
non-resident  in~estors· and  through  an  approved  a~ent.  No  distinction 
was  made  either between  the  E.E.C.  and  non-E.E.C.  securities issues, 
except  fo·r  authorised  loan issues of  E~E.C.  authorities,  which might 
have  been reasonably expected on  Ireland•s  admission  to  the E.M.S •• 
However,  further controls have  been placed on  the  latter which makes 
the purchase of authorised  loan issues of E.E.C.  authorities unattractive .. 
The  consequences were drastic for both  the  Dublin Stock  Exchange  (th~ 
Irish unit of the  amalgamated  U.K.  and  Irish Stock  Exchanges)  and 
Irish investors.·  The  funds  already  invested 1abroad,  either by  private 
or institutional investors,  tended  to  remain permanently  locked out of 
t~e Irish stock.market.  In  the case of private investors,  it was 
estimated  that this  amounted  to between  three-quarters and  two-thirds 
of their  investment portfolios at that time,  which  were .for  the greater 
part invested in  the  U.K ..  The  local market  therefore  tended to lose 
much  of its liquidity which  was  previously assisted by  a  frequent 
switching  back  and  forth of  funds  between  Ireland and  the U.K.  (its· 
principal foreign  investment partner)  according  to the available yields 
of  each market. 
At  the  same  time  institutional investment in Irish listed companies 
also  tended  to become  permanently  locked  in,  owing  to the  limited size 
of  the  local market,  whose  aggregate capitalisation was  equal  to half 
the  annual  cash  flow  of the Irish insurance  companies  alone.  The 
situation was  further  aggravated  by  the.fact that the top seven  listed 
equiti.es  represented well  over  70%  of  the market capitalisation of  the 
78  listed shares,  and were  and  remain  the only  tru.ly marketable  stock 
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The  same  measures  also rendered  the well-known  company,  Arthur Guinass, 
with its  traditi~nal  strong  links with  the Republic  of Ireland,. 
subject to the  same  restrictions. 
holding  company  is listed,  the 
As  only  the U.K.  registered 
company  was  deemed 
a  foreign enterprise.  Irish investors could  therefore only acquire 
further Guinness  stock  from  the proceeds of the sale of other foreign 
stock.  Th~ Guinness  company  made  a  proposal to overcome this 
difficulty by use  of the Irish register,  but this was  turned down  by 
the Government  who  feared creating a  general precedent.  The  number 
of Irish shareholders has  subsequently fallen by an estimated  30%  and 
in 1982 .only about 14,000 of the  37,000 shareholders were Irish 
residents.  In addition,  the proportion of the shares in Irish hands 
was  believed to have diminished  from  about  27\ to  21%-22\~ 
Irish institutional investors have  therefore increasingly turned to 
seek other investment outlets,  such as  property,  Government  stock etc .• 
such  recourse as  there has  been to foreign  equity investment  has mainly 
been  towards  the UK  &  US  with  the other  European and non-European markets 
figuring  to  a  lesser  extent,  within  the  limits  imposed  by  the Exchange 
Controls.  Exc~ange Controls  have  therefore considerably distorted the 
pattern of Irish investments. 
On  September  4  1979,  deferring  to the strong case put forward  by  the 
Irish institutional investors,  the  Government granted authorised 
insurers  and  pension  f~nds the possibility of investing either  10%  of 
their net actuarial or  technical reserves or  10%  of their net cash 
flows  in foreign currency securities. 
Apart  from  Exchange  Control,  there are no  rules or regulations for 
institutional.investors,  though guidelines have been laid down  by 
the  supervisory bodies  in Ireland.  Life insurance  companies  had, 
generally speaking,  kept foreign  investments within a  maximum  of  20% 
of their assets prior to  December  1978. 48· 
It was  estimated that at the  time of the study about  40%  of portfolio 
investments  by  insurance companies were  invested in equities, with 2St 
to  30\ in qilts and  25\ to  30%  in property.  With  regard  t~ equities 
portfolios, it was  estimated that about  40%  to  50%  would  be  invested 
in foreign ·Securities and foreign currency  loans would  be utilised in 
order to top up overseas  investments. 
The  Stock  Exchange authorities in Ireland have repeatedly remonstrated 
against the discriminatory nature of Exchange Control  regulation~ 
which undeservedly penalised the  individual investors;  who  unlike the 
institutional investor,  have  no  concessions for  limited investment in 
foreign equities.  The  Stock  Exchange Committee originally made  a 
proposal for  a  £(I)l0,000 per year  concession which later,  in view of 
the continual deterioration of the currency situation was  halved to 
only £(1)5,000 per annum. 
The  Exchange Controls have proved  incapable of protecting Ireland's 
external reserves.  Whereas  net external indebtedness of 'the public 
sector and  the  banking  system  amounted  to £(I)732m  (12%  of GNP)  in 
December  1978,  by  the  end  of 1981  it had deteriorated to £(I)· 4.5 billion 
(about  42%  of GNP).  Furthermore  the separation of the Irish pound  from 
the British pound  .and its subsequent depreciation against other hard 
currencies  has  forced  up  the yield rates required  from  Irish 
Government  stock.  Whereas  previously there had  been  a  mere half a 
point .difference between. the  yields of  U.K.  and  Irish Government stock, 
the difference is now  as much  as-three to  four  points  and it would 
probably be  much  greater if freedom of investment was  allowed. 
In view  of  the huge  running  defici~  of  the  Irish  ~overnment, 
this is hardly likely to occur  in the near  future. 
A further discriminatory aspect of  the currency controls is that they 
are  in practice limited to portfolio investments,  possibly because 
such restrictions are more  easily imposed  in this area. 49 
Consumer  durables may  be  freel'y  purchased,  gold and silver coins  (the 
so-called  'biens de  refuge')  may  be  acquired ana  the purchase of 
foreign property within the  E.E.C.  is permitted.  Irish residents may 
take  up  to £(!)500 per person in foreign currency and  E(I)lOO on 
foreign holidays.  There is no  effective check on  the observance of 
these travel allowances,  nor  on  the utilisation of credit cards outside 
Ireland. 
The  generally depressed state and  lack of growth of the Dublin stock· 
market was  also caused by  fiscal  laws  which  had been in force  for  some 
years and  which  were  made  all  the more  onerous to investors in 1982.  The 
previous  30%  tapered capital gains  tax was  doubled to  60%  and whereas 
previously it was  reducible to  25.5%  after three,years  and  2lt after 
six years, it now  is only reducable  to  50%  after one year  and  remains 
constant at 40%  from  three years onwards.  However,  the previous 
annual  exemption threshold  of  E(I)SO has  now  been increased to 
£(1)2,000 per person.  This  tended to reduce  the already  low  market-
ability of most listed shares. It inhibited the reasonable  amount of 
short term investment essential to assure  an  acceptable  level of market 
liquidity. 
Pension  funds  are  exempt  from  such taxation while  insurance companies 
are taxed at 60%  of annual  realised gains.  Unlike  individual investors, 
institutional investors may  offset minus  balances and  losses calculated 
on  indexed book values,  even  though it is not possible to 
offset gains  on  one  security directly against a  loss  on  another. 
At  the end of 1982,  the ordinary shares quoted on  the  Dublin Stock 
Exchange  were  valued at £(I)l,09lm,  and  two banks  and  the five  largest 
industrial companies  represent nearly  70%  of this value.  At  the time 
of  t~e study,  the depressed  level of the market was  making it 
~ncreasingly difficult for  listed companies  to raise additional equity 
capital  through rights issues,  causing increased recourse to bank 
lending  and  State assistance.  In the past Irish listed companies  have 
successfully raised considerable  sums  on  the Dublin Stock Exchange 
(Table  4.1). so 
Table 4.1 
Equity  Issues  Admitted  to  Listing 
E(I)m. 
1973  .1974  1975 
16.4  10.2  . 18.2 
1976 
18.7 
1977 
25.7 
1978 
18.5 
1979  1980  1981 
48.8  3.3.  110.0 
The  increase in the capital gains  tax will also lead to a  reduction 
in tax revenue  on  stock market transactions.  It will discourage  the 
realisation of capital gains and therefore tend  to render  the existing 
market progressively more  rigid and  illiquid and will interfere  ,negatively 
in the efficient management of portfolios by the Irish institutions. 
4 ..  2  The  operations of the Dublin Stock Exchange 
In March  1982,  the 86  member  brokers were _organised in nineteen firms, 
sixteen located in Dublin,  two in Cork  and one in Limerick.  Trading 
takes place on  the  floor of the Dublin  Stock  Exchange  in two  sessions 
(at 9.30  hours  and 14 •  .LS hours)  and  the securities are traded by  a 
collective price call-over  system at a  trading ring.  Trading is for  a 
two  week  account period as  in London. 
Owing  to the  limited size of  the  local market  and market  volume, 
many·large  orG.ers  will  either be  traded by  ·~ut throughs',  or 
will be  traded directly with a  London  jobber.  In fact Irish brokers. 
are permitted under  the current Exchange  Control regulations to have 
foreign currency cover in order  to facilitate trading with Irish 
shares dual-listed in London. 
Irish brokers are basically subject to the  same  discipline as members 
of the U.K.  ~tock Exchange,  though,  in their case  a  broker  licence must 
also be  obtained  from  the  Irish Minister  for  Finance.  The  Irish Unit 
complies with most of the Rules  established by  th~ amalgamated U.K.  ·and 
Irish Stock Exchanges which has its main administration in London. 
For  example,  it adheres  to  the City Code,  to the regulations on mergers, 51  -
to  the  commission rates,  and is advised by  the Quotations  Department 
of the  London  Stock  Exchange.  Admission and after-listing require-
ments are also identical.  However,  in Ireland,  owing  to less stringent 
statutory regulation,  the Stock  Exchange•often has  some difficulty in 
imposing  Stock  Exchange  Rule~ particularly on  smaller Irish listed 
companies. 
Even  though  the  Irish Government  recently  seems  to have modified its 
opinion of  the role of the Stock  Exchange  in the development of  the 
national  economy  and  a  promising Unlisted Securities Market seems  to 
be  growing,  the viability of  the Irish Unit may  be  further aggravated 
by  the  forthcoming  implementation of negotiated commission  fees  in 
London. 
4. 3  Future Developments 
In August  1983  the Committee of the Irish Stock Exchange  presented a 
report to the Irish Minister for  Industry and Energy  which contained 
recommendations  for  Government action to stimulate the issue of equity 
capital by  Irish companies  and  encourage  the listing of their shares 
on  the Irish Stock  Exchange. 
The  report mentioned the absence of any  new full listings since 197S.  In 
spite of the proven ability of  the Stock  Exchange  in helping  listed 
companies  to obtain new  risk capital,  new  issues  l· •  .:;.\·::.ng  tended  to 
average  £(I)40m per  annum,  with  a  value of £(!)110m in 1981.  There 
has been a  gradual  erosion of the official list during  the last ten 
years.  The  sixty one  fully  listed corporations had  a  capitalisation 
on June  30  1983  of  £(I)l,l32m.  This  represented less than  10%  of GNP, 
as  opposed to  50%  ratios in the  U.K.  and  the U.S •• 
In the opinion of the Stock  Exchange  and  a  leading merchant bank,  at 
least thirty private Irish companies  could ?Otentially be  listed and 
would  add  an  estimated £(I)280m  to market capitalisation.  This would 
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if the top  seven enterprises are excluded.  Other potential listings 
relate to Unlisted Securities Market traded securities,  subsidiaries 
of the  U.K.  and  U.S~  firms,  and State  companies which might be 
priva-tised.  Such  listings are estimated to represent a  further  increase 
in market capitalisation of £(I)450m,  which is nearly half the present 
total value. 
In order to achieve such goals the Stock Exchanqe •  s report makes several recommenda-
tions.  The ca:;?i tal gains tax should be reduced from the present 60%/50%  and 
40%  (after three years)  to the previous  30%  level with roll-over relief 
for  gains re-invested within  two  years.  There  should be  an  increase in 
the  tax credit on aividends.  A  change  of public attitude with regard 
to corporate profits should be  encouraged.  Present Exchange Controls 
should be  eased  to encourage repatriation of Irish owned  foreiqn 
portfolios.  A  Monory~type law  to stimulate investments in new  equitie~ 
particularly new  venturecorporations,byprivate investors should be 
passed.  Lastly,  more  favourable  conditions  should be provided to 
encourage  the development of  m~nagement share option  schemes. 
It may  be  hoped  that recent improvements  in the Irish economy  and 
promising prospects offered by  the recent offshore oil developments 
may  induce  the  Irish Government  to consider implementation of the 
innovations  proposed by  the  Irish Stock  Exchange.  The  Dublin stock 
market has already reacted strikingly to the  growing  optimism. 
Business  volume  in 1983  increased by  some  four  to five  times  compared 
with 1982  and  turnover in the third quarter of 1983  was  seven  times 
that of the same  period of 1982.  The  aggregate market value of 
listed equities at the end of  1983 was  approximately £(!)1.5 billion 
as  opposed  to  £(I)  826m  in December  1982,  and the stock market index 
had risen by  approximately  60%  over  the  same  period  from  172.3 to 
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SECTION  5  THE  INTERNATIONAL  EQUITIES  MARKET  IN  FRANCE 
Summary  analysis of the international dealing of equities in France 
must  focus  on  the roles of  the Agents  de  Change,  the banks  and  the 
French private and  institutional investor.  The  main  issues arising 
relate to the principle of  'unicitl de Cotation'  and  the Agents  de 
Change  monopoly  and  the degree of adaptability of traditional Bourse 
structure and  systems to the demands  of modern  securities dealing, 
particularly with  regard to international markets,  and to the securities 
activities of the banks.  Assessment of the situation with regard to 
any  potential European  linkage is complicated by current and proposed 
changes  which in the course of the next  few  years  could radically 
alter the Paris official market. 
5.1  The  French  Agents  de  Change 
The  principles of operation of the French Agents  de  Change  are 
specified in Titre V of Livre  I  of the Code  de  Conunerce  and  remain,  in 
essence,  those  laid down  in 1807.  The  Agent de  Change  is restricted 
t,o  con'.mission-oriented  functions,  and  may  not,  apart from  a  limited 
technical  concession,  take positions in securities.  To  assure the 
ir:.tegrity of his  function  as  an  Agt:nt,  he  may  not undertake  commercial 
or  banking operations on his own  account.  The  law  further prohibits 
hirr  from  having  any interest, direct or indirect in any  c::.mznercial 
enterprise. 
Given  these restrictions,  a  monopoly  of securities trading is conferred 
on  the Agents  de  Change.  Article  76  gives  to them  the exclusive right 
to negotiate business in quoted  and  unquoted securities.  The  current 
interpretation of the  law is that this  requ~reroent to effect securities 
transactions  through  the Agents  applies  to both corporate bodies and 
individuals.  The  sole exceptions  are share  transactions within the 
same  company  group  and  share  transactions related to mergers. 
Since  1967  the Chambre  Syndicale,  the  governing body of the Compagnie 
Nationale des  Agents  de  Change,  have  permitted  an  order of concentration 
of Agents.  Prior  to that time  each  firm  had  only one Agent.  In  face of 54 
an  obvious  increasing  requirement  for  a  strengthened capital base  for  the 
braking functions,  mergers  of  two  or three Agents  were permitted.  ThP. 
Chambre  Syndicale  considered that it had an obligation to assure competition 
in the market,  and  was  concerned at any  undue  concentration of firms.  As 
a  result,  rnergers  of smaller firms  only were permitted.  Concessions 
have  also been made  in the  form  of incorporation,  and  in recent years the 
trend has been  away  from partnerships and  societ~s en  commandite 
simple  towards  societes anonymes.  The  degree of concentration of the 
Agents  in 1982  was  sixty one  offices of  which:-
32  had  l  Agent  de  Change 
22  had  2  Agents  de  Change 
6  had  3  Agents  de  Change 
1  had  4  Agents  de  Change 
(Total:  98  Agents  De  Change) 
In corporate  form  the firms  comprised thirty seven  soci~tesen commandite 
simple,  sixteen S.A.  ~ conseil  d
1administration,  four  S.A.  directoire, 
four  soci~t~en gestion personnelle.  Most_of  the mergers had  been of 
Paris Agents  de  Change.  The  provincial Agents,  whose business is largely 
in their traditional field of  management  of  large private portfolios 
still, in the main,  operate  on  an  individual basis. 
The  privileges and obligations of French Agents  remain heavily 
personalised.  Although since  1890 .the Agents  have  been permitted to 
delegate  floor dealing  functions  to Commis  Principau~ the Agents  are 
still required  to be  on  the floor.  This  can,  from  time to time,  cause a 
loss of international  business,  though. it appears  to have little 
relevance to the telephone market operated almost totally by employees. 
The  firms  are permitted infusion of outside capital,  subject to the absolute 
prohibition of association with  banks,  and of bank directors 
entering broker  firms.  There  are no  legal rules on  the holdinq of such 
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for  80%  of the Cppital or,  in the  case of a  firm with several  Agents, 
a  .similar proportion shared between  them.  OUtside capital must, 
however,  be  approved  by the Chambre  Syndicale  and  the Minister of the 
Economy.  Directors related to such outside  funding  have  the benefit 
of their shares but no  rights in the direction of the  firms. 
As  a  result of these arrangements it ha~ over the last two  decade~ 
been possible to build up substantial braking  firms  in Paris,  but they 
tend to be  small by international standards or in terms of the French 
economy.  The  Chambre  Syndicale has,  moreover,  applied a  policy whereby 
the largest firms  permitted should not be greater than three to four 
times  the size of the smallest.  The  resultant  situation  is 
that  of  sixty- one  firms  from  both Paris  and  the regions,  some 
38%  have a  cap~  tal value cf FFlOm  - FF25m,  15% lie between FF7 .Sm  - lCm,  with 
the  remaining  53%  below  FF7.5m.  If only  the Paris  firms  are taken into 
account,  the proportion of firms  in the  top  band is greater.  In the opinion 
of the  investors,  these developments  have  perm~tted the growth of firms 
which  can,  within present market arrangements,  fully discharge  the 
functions  of their domestic  agency business.  The  adequacy of the present 
capital base is thought more  questionable in relation to international 
dealing,  both now  and  with regard  to  the possible development of the Paris 
.r:.a:::Jcct  'Lnt.o  11  full-sculc international financial centre in the future. 
The  monopoly  of the Agents  operates with full  force  in the  domestic 
market,  considered to be domestic  and  foreign securities listed on 
the Bourse,  and  the hors  cote stocks.  French clients,  private or 
l.nstitutional,  must deal  through Agents  de  Change  in all French 
securities.  Incoming  foreign orders  for  French securities must be 
placed with  an  Agent,  or, if placed with  a  bank,  must be  executed 
through  an  Agent.  This  requirement applies equally to orders for 
French securities originating  fro~ foreignbrokers'offices  in Paris. 
The  monopoly  obviously does  not apply to French  shares dealt abroad. 
This  exclusion can be  significant,  and  a  single major  foreign 
intermediary stated that on  certain days  their turnover  in French 
stocks had exceeded the total equities turnover  on  the Paris Bourse. - 56 
The  position with regard  to dealing in foreign securities is however 
more  compl€x.  The  domestic role of the French  Aqent  results in 
limitation of his ability to take participation in foreign securities 
firms.  He  may  not participate in any  foreign  firm  carryinq out 
dealing  functions,  and is thus excluded  from participation in firms 
operating on other Exchanges.  His  foreign office can be  no more  than 
a  'bureau de  representation'  carrying out remisier-type functions. 
This  apart,  considerable  flexibility is available to the Agent in his 
foreign securities dealing.  In this field,  provisions of the monopoly 
do  no~ apply,  and  the Agent is to a  considerable degree released  from 
the  t~ght disciplines and  capacity rules of t:he  domestic market. 
A distinction must be made  in this regard between  foreign securities 
listed in Paris  and  unlisted foreign securities.  The  Bourse market 
in foreigns  services  2  types of investors,  - the private investor 
mosr.ly  in small  amou::1ts,  for  whom  Paris quotation and dealing is more 
appropriate,  a~d certain of the institutions,  notably the insurance 
companies,  who  are only permitted. to deal in foreign securiti'es which 
are listed on  the Paris Bourse.  Opinion was  expressed that discretion 
was  available  to deal directly to the  foreign market if the client so 
instructe~  Such  instruction is rarely received,  so  the de  facto position 
is as  stated above.  It should  be  noted that no  such convention is 
observed by  foreign  securities houses  in Paris,  who  may  and do place 
private client business in foreign securities in the markets of oriqin. 
With  regard to foreign  stocks not listed on  the Bourse,  the  Age~t  de 
Change  has  complete  freedom  of operation.  He  may-address  any market 
intermediary or investing institution in a  foreign market.  The  fixed 
commission scale relating to Paris transactions does  not apply in this 
case;  he  may  r~nit commission.  He  may  deal with  foreign centres on  a 
net basis,  though  normally,  for  reasons  discussed below he does not. 
The  ~gent can  thus  buy,  for  example,  I.B.M.  for  a  client in New  York, 
transmitting the  purchase order abroad.  He  can deal with a  Dusseldorf 
bank  in Volkswagen  as  this security is unlisted while he would,  on  the 
whole,  deal  Bayer,  which is listed,  on  the Bourse.  He  might deal  Bayer 
in Germany if the client requested. 
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A further element of flexibility accorded to the Agent de Change  is the 
al:>ili ty to deal o:ff the Bourse outside official trading hours.  While  this 
is principally significant in context of the fast-developing off-market 
in block trading in French securities, it permits the Agents  to relate 
to'foreign markets  throughout their trading ho'urs.  From  the foreiqn 
intermediarie~ potnt of view it is difficult .to deal  during Bourse 
trading,  unless  they are prepared to deal'at best'  and risk the opening 
price.  It is therefore more  normal  for  them  to place orders and 
arrange execution by  the Agent off the market.  This  the Agent is 
entitled to do.  If the security is listed in Paris,  its transaction 
must be made  within the Bourse prices of that day,  or if he is ready 
to take  the risk,  at a  price he is confident will be obtained the next. 
such transactions are normally  in French  securities in which case  they 
must be reported,  and are subject to normal  commission rules in respect 
of any client involvement. 
In  terms of his privileges,  which substantially assure him his domestic 
market,  and in  terms  of the flexibility available to him  to interface 
with the wider market in Paris  in foreign securities,  the.French Agent 
appears  favourably placed.  The  complications in the present situation 
arise from  the  ~hanges in the nature of the markets  themselves.  There 
is evidence of substantial opinion in France,  both at the  formal  level 
of  such atudies as  the Perouse  and  Dautresmes Reports and  informally at 
professional level,  that to cope  with the market situation which has 
developed  in the last 2  decades,  considerable adaptation of the 
tradi  tiona! market  system may  b.e  required.  There  is already tangible 
evidence of such changes  in recent developments on  the Paris Bourse. 
The  nature of the problem may  be  summarised by briefly reviewing the 
roles of the other  two  main participants in the French equities market, 
~he banks  and  the investing institutions. 
5.2  The  French Banks 
As  already noted, the. French banks  are precluded from  securities dealing by  the 
Code  of Commerce,  no~ subject to the exception  quoted below1 can they 
be  associated with  firms  of Agents  de  Change.  Their roles in the 
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to the present subject include order collection from  clients or  . 
institutions which,if  in French securities, must be routed to the Agents. 
The  commission split allowed to the French banks is 27.5\,  thouqh, 
~~omalously,  the Agents  can  remit commission  to foreiqn banks  in Paris. 
1~e banks  also perform a  procedural role in the market,  more  normally 
carried out elsewhere by brokers  themselves,  of  stock manaqement and 
settlement.  This  function appears concentrated,  with one major bank 
carrying out 75%  of the market settlement functions  for  foreign 
securities,  45%  of which is on behalf of Agents. 
The  prime  importance of the banks  in the Paris equities capital ma~ket 
lies in the securities movements  wl:.ich  they initiate, either on  behalf of 
their own  portfoLios,  manuged  funds,  or on behalf of the institutions, 
and the  transactions which  they execute,  either in Pa-ris or abroad. 
One  major bank  alone  owns  3%-4%  of French companies by market 
capitalisation,  and if its managed  funds  are included this figure 
riaes to  4%-5%.  The  banks  also manage  investment for clients,  and 
managa  or receive  investment instructions relating to institutional 
portfolios.  In course of such investment manaqement  large share 
transactions are effected,  an  average institutional bargain being 
perhaps between  FFlm  and  FF2m  value,  with  larg.er  transactions  involving 
possibly up  to  200,000 shares  taking place in the block market. 
The  resultant inter-bank market is of considerable  importance.  It has 
existed 'for many  years,  and until 1964  was  regulated by  the Commiasion 
Bancaire.  In its relations with  the Bourse this market divides into 2 segments. 
As  regards  Fre~ch listed securities,  all inter-bank transactions are 
required to be  formally  executed by the Agents de  Change.  This 
provision has  had  the constructive effect of linking the block market 
in  domestic  stocks with the Agents.  It further  links the transaction 
to the Bourse price,  though  this_appears an artificial aspect of the 
system.  It has allowed the Agents  to play  a  constructive and  important 
role in  the  creation of  an effective block market in Paris.  Due  to 
the market system,  the  low  capitalisation of Agents'  firms,  the prohibi-
tion of counterparty activity and general considerations of prudence, the 
Agent is rarely able to act in his own right as ablock positioner.  He  cannot 
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for  example available to American brokers.  Within the market itselC, 
the French speciAlist,  as  a  Coteur is a  functionary and  cannot take a 
position.  In these circumstances  the  type of involvement in block 
trading  which has  developed, though  suspect from the standpoint of theoretical 
price formation,  has been successful  in linking the  large volume 
transactions with  the Bourse,  and as a  result the market retains its 
dominant position forFrench securities.  The  system appears to 
involve some  technical market problems,  and  can  ~ead to complex 
inter-Agent deliveries with problems of delay and delivery of 
immediate payment  for  large lines of stock. 
In  the second  segment of the inter-bank market,  foreign equities,  the 
Bourse plays  a  far less definitive role.  In  respect of  these 
dealings,  the banks  are free  to establish their own  contact with 
foreign securities houses,  and are in direct contact with all 
appropriate  intermediaries in Europe.  The  international network of the 
banks  is fully exploited as the mechanism  for  international securities 
dealing.  Nationalisation of the major French  companies  which  removed 
from  the Bourse  some  15%  of capitalisation  but possibly 40%  of dealable 
stocks,  and other factors  have  stimulated interest in foreign equities. 
It is believed that at times  the Paris inter-bank market in Gold Mine 
A.D.R.'s has  exceeded  the daily value of the total equities trading 
on  ~~e Bourse.  Estimates of  the proportion of dealing in Paris in 
foreign shares varied,  and  there are no  absolute  figures,  ~ut an 
estimate based on  the figures of a  major bank which might be 
representative suggested that of all Terme  stocks  (i.e.  the great 
majority of business)  20%-30%  of transactions would be dealt off 
the Bourse  under normal market conditions,  while  the proportion during 
periods of high activity was  likely to be  40%-50%.  As  this off 
market dealing is likely to comprise mainly of  foreign stocks, it 
lends credibility to the higher estimates of 60%-80%  off market 
dealing  for  this sector.  The  great majority of this business by-passes 
tile Agents  de  Change,  wi  1:h  the  ~nsti  tutions placing their orders ·with the 
banks  who  then deal  abroad,  or with  the institutions transmitting their 
orders direct to forel.gn  markets.  WithJ.n  Paris,  these securities may  be 
dealt direct between  the  banks  and  institutions. 60 
The  market in international equities in Paris ia thus  sharply divided 
into a  'genuinely'  international market in the hands of the banks,  . 
and  a  domestic market in foreigns dealt by  the brokers on the Bourse, 
in the main on  the instructions of private investors.  It is an open 
question which is the price leader.  In the.case of Gold shares it is 
suggested that the inter-bank price  leads the Bourse. 
A degree of dissatisfaction  with  the structure of  the international 
equities market in Paris was  expressed by  the banks.  The  inter-
face between the Bourse and  the international market was  felt to be 
complex.  while  the strong domestic  role of the Bourse was  endorsed, 
the need  to harmonise Bourse procedures was  stressed.  The Bourse 
procedures were criticised as being too traditional for the current 
international market,  and in particular, it was  suggeated that the 
Paris market should be  integrated.  The  dual existence of the floor 
market.and the  telephone market should be  replaced by  a  single 
market  system,  It was  suggested that. if the Bourse did  not move 
effectively  into this field,  there was  a  probability that the banks, 
frustrated with  the  defici~nt  international system of  the Stock 
Exchanges,  would  use  Swift to set up  an international  securities 
market.  One  of  the  major  Paris  banks  had  already  arranged 
to  use  an  international  depository  for  its  European  settlement 
and  an  initiative  of  a  similar  type on  the dealing front was 
possible. 
5.3  The  Agents  de  Change  and  the International Market 
While most of the  larger Paris Agents are highly active in international 
dealing in French  securities,  their participation in the international 
market as  such is limited.  As  noted  above this appears  less due  to 
techn1cal  restrictions  than to  the inadequacy  of  capital available 
for  a  market which calls for  a  rapid response  to any  communicated offer 
or bid.  The  French Agent approached  by  a  foreign broker or 
institution with an  order for  French stocks has  the business virtually 
guaranteed to him  by  the monopoly.  The  strength of the Agent de 
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Change  in this respect is illustrated by  the direct recourse  to him 
by foreign intermediaries or institutions.  In the case of business 
originating in London,for  exampl~one actiye Agent receives  70%  of his 
orders direct  from  investing institutions, with only  20%-30\  from 
London brokers and  10%-20%  from  jobbers. 
With  regard to the wide market in international  securities,howeve~ any 
business must  be  found  on  an entrepreneurial basis.  The  Agent needs 
to be  in a  position in which,  if he wishes,  he  can take  up  an offer 
from  a  New  York  broker involving1for  example,FFSm  on  the spot.  The 
financial  resources  to do  this are,however,not available to him.  The 
Agent  is entitled to purchase shares to the extent of the net liquid 
assets of his  firm,  but  the  convention is to invest such resources  in 
bonds,  and  not in risk capital.  Although  it  is  possible  to 
obtain  a  dispensation of the Chambre Syndicale to take  up  shares  as  a 
principal,  the procedure is,  for  obvious  reasons,  never  used.  The  Agent 
is thus  effectively deprived of  the  opportunity  to penetrate  the  foreign 
equities market. 
Dynamic  change¥  are,  ironically,  impeded  by  one  of the strongest features 
of the Paris market,  the  'guarantee'.  In the case of the default of an Agent de 
Ch~nge,  the  'fonds  propres'  of each  firm  are  liable,  with  a  stipulated 
minimum  of  FFlm  for  each  Agent.  At  the  second  levei tn  ...  Agents  are 
liable in respect of their personal  assets.  M9st  significantly,  through 
the  Guarantee  Corporation,  the liability is collective across all Agents. 
Any  move  from  an  agency  to a  risk  taking  function  implies  a  common 
vulnerability,  which has instilled understandable caution.  The  Agent 
de  Change  firms  are similarly concerned that the new  private investor 
interest in equities,  stimulated by  the Monory  measures,  should not be 
discouraged  by  any default or instability in the market.  They  are  aware 
that,  with  the institution of  a  wealth tax, there is incentivefortheprivate 
client to make  his financial  resources  more mobile.  Attempt to wean 
French  investment preferences  away  from  real estate into risk invest-
ments  would  be deflected by  any evidence of instability amongst  the 
Bourse  firms.  The extension of a Bourse firm's present rights in order to parmi  t 
it to position to a  multiple of its liquid assets is unlikely to be 
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One  ~ethod of resolution of this quandary, the participation by  Agents  in 
foreign  ii1termediaries which might be officially admitted to the 
Bourse,  appears  to have  found  little favour.  The  real solution is 
likely to emerge  from  the ·resolution of the problem of increasing the 
Ciipital base of the domestic  firms  themselves. 
The  Perouse  Report advocated  the  adoption of the contre-partiste 
principle to increase liquidity of  the market.  The  most  impor.tant 
development in this respect has possibly been the proposal,  within the 
Second  March~,  for  joint Agent-bank  organisations which are to be 
permitted a  regulated market-making  role.  As  regards the Second Marche 
this arrangement has  the  advantage  of uniting the marketinq skills of 
the Agents  wk~h the corporate  finance  contacts and  the capital resources 
of the banks.  While initial negotiations are being retarded by 
difficulties in reconciliation of the requirements of the two parties, 
the  arrangement may  well  prove  a  laboratory for  the future structure of 
t.he  ~·'rendt market.  The  Government  continues  to support  ~he concept 
"  o.f  unicite de  cotation,  providing the necessa-ry  assurance for  the 
b~okers.  At  the  same  time  the relation between  the Aqents  and  the banks 
is constructive,  ir·.  that the banks  no  longer press for  seats on  the 
Bourse,  nor  do  they consider  a  universal  banking  system appropriate to 
Paris.  In  the braking  community  there is increasing  recognition of 
the dependence  of the liquidity of  the market on  adequate capital,  and 
of  the urgent necessity to resolve  the potentially vulnerable  statu~ of 
the Agent,  while  preserving  the significant aspects of his traditional 
social role. 
The  problem of re-establishing a  revised relationship between  the French 
banks  and  the Agents de  Change,  which  would  permit more dynamic develop-
ment of the Bourse  into a  capital market  wh~ch more appropriately 
reflected the  strengths of the French  economy  and played an appropriate 
role in it,  appears  to be being positively addressed.  A difficulty in 
its resolution may  arise  from  the extreme disparity in the size of the, 
two  types of institutions involved.  French banking is highly 
concentrated,  with  two  or  three of the French banks  amongst  the largest 
in the world,  and  abnormally  large for  the size of the  economy.  1he 63 
firms  of Agents  de  Change  are,  on  the other hand,  in international 
terms. small  for  the task they potentially have  to perform.  However 
the understanding  reached  over  the years bet¥een the  two  parties preceding 
the  Second  Marche' proposals augurs well  for  the development of a 
constructive relationship.  The  banks  appear ready  to acknowledge 
the continuing need  for  the  Agent  in his traditional role,  they 
further appear  to support the concept of a  unified market concentrated 
on  the Bourse.  It is understood  that a  report on off-market business 
is to be presented  as  a  background  study to the Seventh Plan,  and it 
is possible that a  similar need  for  joint institutions in the inter-
national market may  be  identified. 
5.4  Adverse effects of Exchange Control  Measures 
Apart  from  constraints in developing international business due  to 
weakness  of his capital base  and his l.nabili  ty to position,  the Agent is at 
present further hampered  by  Exchange  Control measures.  Under  the 
controls  introduced in May  1981,  French residents are permitted 
to deal  in any  foreign securities subject to the  use  of intermediaries 
agreed  by  the Banque  de  France  and to a  proviso  ~ith regard  to  foreign 
bonds  of  less than  five  years maturity.  The  financing  of such 
operations has,  however,  to be  through  Devlse  Titre through which  the 
foreign  inv~stment currency is acquired,  u.nd  which is available only 
from  the proceeds  of sales of foreign securities helu by residents. 
The  available  funds  are thus  limited to a  pool,  the Devise Titre 
attracting a  premium  or discount according  to the general view held of 
the  cowoercial  (official)  French  Franc.  The  acquisition of securities 
denominated  in French  Francs is permitted  through currency acquired in 
the official foreign exchange market. 
Since  the  reintroduction of Exchange Control,  partly as  a  by-product of 
the  lack  of confidence  such measures  themselves  normally instil, 
interest 1n dealing in foreign securities has been markedly increased. 
Within  two  years the Devise Titre premium  doubled and  opinion was 
expressed  that the dealing in foreign securities which underlay  it had 
likewise doubled.  The  Bourse  figures  suggest that the Agents  have 
seen  very little of this increased business,  the total of foreign 64 
equities dealt on  the Boursehaving  fallen between  1981  and  1982.  Most of 
it tended  to go direct to foreign markets,  although the figures for 1983 show 
some increase in the proportion of trading in foreign securities on the Bourse  .• 
Thf:  M.<;ent, fer  obviou;:; reasons,  ~s not able to play any role in the management of 
French ass<:2ts :;.broad which were not declared in the amnesty when French Exchange 
Control.  was  ~mposed in 1968, and  which  are widely alleged to be substantial.  A 
further consequence of the Exchange Control measures  is that the Agent de Chanqe 
may not hold a foreign currency  account in a  foreign bank. 
5.5  Paris Arbitrage 
The ?resent situation regardkng arbitrage of foreign stocks to and 
from  the Bourse is complex  and difficult to establish.  The  Paris 
market is an international capital centre of long standing.  Bourse 
deali~g  in the major  European internationals is significant.  At 
certdin time3  for  example,  Royal  Dutch has been dealt more  heavily 
i.n  Pc.ris  t.hM.  in Amsterdam  and  the  market  for  R.T.Z.  has been 
J.,  . .cg(;r,  than  ti'tat in Lcmdon.  A:>  there is no  transformation of the 
securities from  the underlying  stocA  as  in the Belgian case,  the 
arbitrage  function is less clear-cut than it is in Brussels. 
Traditionally,~ 'classical' arbitrage function  (i.e.  the taking  up of 
stock as  a  principal on  one market to  undo  the transaction on  another) 
was  carried out by  the banks.  Over  the past tWo  decades,  due  to the 
1.ncrease  of int8r-bank  and  institutional dealing,  im?roved 
telecommunications,  and increased direct recourse of large investors 
to the main  foreign market,  the distinction between true arbitrage 
and international dealing has become blurred.  The  function-of  the 
arbJ..trageur has  become  compromised by his potential local demand being 
satisfied by  the  channels which  he  himself uses.  Concurrent with these 
developments,  exchange  rates entered a  period of  unprece~ented 
volatility·  Interest  rates,and thereby the cost of money,rose to 
unprecedented heights.  These  latter factors had  a  particularly forceful 
effect on inter-market arbitrage in Europe  and,most notably,  in the 
French  case where  the uniquely  long dealing period of the  Terme  market 
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As  a  result,  the French banks have  tended to withdraw  from arbitrage, 
and to close the departments  which carried it out.  Now  only  a  handful of 
banks  are left in this field,  and  their activities a.t·e  ambiguous. 
The  large securities movements  between the markets  tend to arise from the 
direct execution of orders.  The  implication of this appears  to be 
that the needs  of the smaller investors  for  foreign securities through 
the Bourse are satisfied through disposal  from  large French-held 
portfolios.  In cases where  the stock on  one side of the  local 
transaction is not found  on  the Bourse,  an arbitrage transaction is 
likely to be  sought by  the Agent  from  a  bank.  If so executed the 
small client suffers both the natural higher cost of his small 
bargain,  and  also incurs two  commissions.  The  present system does 
not appear to be of advantage  to the smaller investor. 
~nere may  be  a  case  for  the Bourse assuring that somewhere  within 
the structure of the official market,  adequate local postions are 
taken to assure economic  supply and liquidity of foreign securities 
dealt on  the Bourse  for  the private investor.  Some  5  or 6  Agents  de 
Change  are reputed to carry out arbitrage,  but it seems  questionable 
whether this is in the true sense of the term.  Certainly,  the 
general  view expressed in the  firms  was  that the French  Agent  de 
Change  was  not well placed to deal net,  in size,  a~ ~~v  ~im~ and  in 
any currency in the  way  that effective arbitrage requires. 
5.6  French  Investing  Institutions and  the  International Equities Market 
'rhe  stance of  the institutions in their dealing  in foreign equities 
is the  corollary of the situation described above.  The  major 
institutional investors are the banks,  the insurance companies  and 
the  funds,- the  SICAVS  and  the  Fonds  Communs  de  Placement.  The 
pension  funds  are less significant,  aspensions are mainly based  on  the 
system of repartition and not on  capitalised funds.  The  activity of 
the  insurance  companies  and  the  SICAVS  in foreign equities is 
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ments  for portfotios which  are designed  to stimulate the domestic 
capital markets,  such  as  those laid down  in Article  332  of the Code 
d'Assurance.  The  insurance  companies  are  further limited to 
acqu1sition of only  those foreign securities which are quoted on the 
Bour~e,  and  they may  only invest in SICAVS  with less than  SO\  of 
in.vest:.."tlen'ts  in foreigns.  Due  to their purpose,  the Monory  SICAVS 
must hold 60%  of French.stocks.  The  pension  funds  have relative 
freedom  in that apart  from  the required  50%  holding in government or 
government-supported bonds,  their investments may  be placed either 
in French or foreign equities. 
Th2  .:es-crictions  have  one  anomalous  consequence  in the Devise Titre 
ma.rket,  since  t::e  funds  have  to trim  t.~eir portfolios to the reqUired 
structure quarterly.  'rhis has  tended  to produce  a  false currency 
mdrke~ at that time.  Despite these restrictions,  the foreign equities 
toldL:~  s  of the Frer.c:1  institutions are considerable.  The  larger 
nationali<;ed  in::;urance  companies  might be  expected to have 10\ of their 
assets in foreign equities,  the  smaller private insurance companies 
possibly up  to  25%.  A  not  untypical  structure might be derived 
from  the vast aggregate  of  the portfolios managed  by the Caisse des 
Depots  et Consignations.  Of  the total shares held or manag~  which in 
1979  were  of  $1,750 b11lion value,  the great majority represented core 
holdings of French  shares,  the  14.4%  which represented holdings of 
foreign. shares nevertheless was  of  $252  billion value.  Of  these some  20% 
were equities of other Community  countries.  In terms of dealing,  the 
foreign  section of the portfolio has more  importance  than the proportional 
holdings indicate,  the activity level in these securities being much 
higher  than  thatfor the French securities  which,  by and  large,  the 
institutions are  committed  to hold. 
Institutional trading in foreign  shares  r~flects the situation described 
above.  The  investing institution normally places its order for  foreign 
equities with  a  French bank  (as  interm~diare  agr~e)  or direct in the 
foreign market,nominating  the  French  bank  for clearance.  An  example of 
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that of a  major merchant bank  whose  transactions were  60%  through the 
Bourse  and  40%  in foreign markets,  and  whose  Bourse  transactions in 
listed foreigns  represented only  l%  of their Bourse business. 
The  main  reason  for  institutions dealing into foreign markets is the 
better information,  the better execution possible,  and  the  liquidity 
offered by  the broader  foreign markets.  For  such  reasons,  40%-50\  of 
their foreign investments  tend to be  made  in the U.S.  market,  and 
around  20%  in Japan.  The  failure of the Bourse to  capture  this 
business  (apart  from  that which is prescriptively placed with it)  is 
not basically due  to the structure of the French Exchange,  and it is 
a  Europe-wide  phenomenom.  On  the other hand,  adverse  comment  was 
received  from  the  investing institutions on  the way  in which the 
practices of the Exchange  had  caused  the  A~ents to be excessively 
orientated to the  domesticmarket. They  questioned whether  the  system 
was  responding adequately to the increased growth of international 
dealing. 
As  a  result,  the institutions appear  to have  taken a  more  positive 
role  themselve~,  in following  the  foreign markets,  processing 
research information,  and in setting up  so-called dealing  functions. 
'7nis  level of international activity is comparatively recent.  Before 
1973,  few  direct investments were made  in the  for~~~~ market by  the 
French institutions.  Their dealings were  in the  few  foreign stocks 
listed in Paris,  and other foreign markets  were  accessed through 
fund  managers  in foreign centres.  With  the recent trends towards 
more  international investment,  which  were  stimulated through the 
SICAVS,  the institutions have  tended to move  into direct foreign 
investment functions.  Their foreign  order-routing is supported by 
a  system of custodian banks,  inter-connected by Swift,  which  adds 
to the efficiency and identity of  the international market. 
This  development  implies  an erosion of  the potential functions  of the 
Agents  and  of the official market itself in the international field 
unless  the Bourse  responds  to the challenge.  This  does  not only  apply 
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brokers are  transmitting private client orders  in foreign securities 
to the market of origin.  While  the  former  convention was  to execute 
such business on the Bourse,  the administrative inconvenience of 
maintaining  two  sets of records,  one  for institutional orders  abroad, 
and  one  for private clients orders on  ~he Bourse in the  same  security, 
has  caused  them  to channel orders into a  single stream. 
~ further  though  less important  fact~r which is taking international 
business out of the hands  o·f  the French braking community  is the 
effect of Exchange  Control on portfolio management.  With volatile 
exchange  rates,  the institutional investor has  to  ~evote considerable 
effort to the management  of foreign  exchange  risks.  Due  to exchange 
controls,  the tools to  avert this are not available in Paris.  The 
fund&  associated with J.t  have  therefore to be  operated in a  capital 
centre outside  France where  the necessary  fleXible  currency  investJnents 
can be  effect.i.vely  undertaken,  so detracting  from  the development  of 
Paris  as  an  international capital centre.  Portfolio management  in 
general  i&  complicated by  the necessity to  treat  foreign  currency 
assets  under  the Devise Titre system,  and  by  the division of portfolios 
between French  Franc  investments  and  the portefeuille  financi~re, 
5.7  Bourse Trading  Procedures. 
The  tradinq structure and procedures of the Paris Bourse have until 
recently remained in their traditional form,  uncompromisingly 
orientated to  the domestic market,  and dedicated to  t~e provision of 
the fairest conditions of execution in a  market dominated by  p~ivate 
investors.  The  private investor remains  important in the French 
~narket,  and is thought still to be  responsible for  SO\  of turnover, 
with his interest increasing since  the Monory  measures.  As  elsewhere, 
however,  collective investment by  the thrift  in~titutions and 
international business are rising in significance and the Bourse is 
respondinq by  embarking  on  a  programme  of reforms. 
The  changes  so  far  i~plemented are only the first tenuous  steps in an 
evolution which  couLl  radically change  the  form  of the Paris capital 
market over  the  nex~ decade.  Consideration of the possible stance of 
'.  ,, 
•  I 
.. ~i~,.~·l  .~ Paris towards  Eu~opean linkage is complicated by the need to assess 
the effect of this evolution on  the existing structures and procedures 
of the Bourse,  and  the rate at which  the changes will take place.  The 
traditional Paris system had many  strengths.  Firmly  based on 
collective price  formation,  it assured  a  fair price so  long  as all 
transactions 'were  concentrated in the Bourse  fixing,  and  the single 
price for  the buyer and seller avoided the cost of intermediation 
through  a  principal operating in  the  market.  , 
The  'criee',  though 
crude  and based on personalised market expertise without computer 
pre-processing,  is generally agreed  to be  highly effective.  The 
opening establishes, within perhaps  twenty  seconds,  the  day~ price at 
which  large volumes  of transactions can  immediately  and effectively 
be executed. 
French opinion  appears  concerned at three possible inadequacies of the 
trading  system in  the  contemporary environment:  First,  as the 
Perouse  Report asserted,Bourse procedures  are complex.  They  a;e 
difficult for  the French small  investor to understand.  The  foreign 
professional  investor is at a  similar disadvantage,  and has difficulty 
in placing orders at fine  limits in the French market. 
The  complexity of the French market arises  from  the need to diversify 
any  collective price system to accommodate  the needs  of different 
lines of securities according to the volume  of dealing,  and ·at the 
same  time to provide facilities  for  forward  or cash dealing.  The 
Marche  ~ Terme,  in which are quoted  some  260 of the leading French 
and  foreign securities with transactions settled 7  working days before 
the end of the month,  has  been the most  important segment of the 
market,  and  the great majority of transactions are executed through 
it.  The  practice of dealing round lots in the Terme  market tended 
to complicate execution of transactions as  the shares had to be made 
.  .  '  up  in the cash market.  The  methods  of quotation are various,  a  la 
cri~e in the  forward market,  par easier',  in  the cash market,  'par 
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quoted in the forward market.  In each of these types of quotation, 
the capacity permitted to the  Agent slightly differs.  The market 1• 
further  complicated by  facilities of great local value such as the 
reports  and options markets,  but which have little relevance to 
foreign dealing. 
The  first major  move  towards  rationalisation of the Bourse was 
ca,rried out in October  1983 with the institution of the Marche Unique. 
The  new  market amalgamates  the previous Terme  ~rid cash-Terme markets, 
and unifies the quotations,  implementing special commission arrangements  , 
for  odd  lots which would  previously have been made  up in the Marche 
Comptant du  Terme.  The  new  system avoids  the costs of the arbitrage 
which was  necessary to balance  the cash market,  which  some  observers 
\ 
considered more  expensive  than the use of a  principal would  have been. 
The  step is significant as  the first move  to reconstruct trading 
procedures  in  line with the second set of recommendations of the 
Commission  Perouse .  This preliminary rationalisation of quotation will 
remove  a  minor  complication in international dealing,  but opinion 
appe~red to.be  that it would  not make  dealing in Paris notably easier 
for  foreign  investors.  1 
The  more  significant developments, related both to the  apacity of 
the  Bourse. as  a  market and  to international dealing,are likely to 
flow  from  the further objectives of the  second recommendation.  These 
envisaged institution of a  continuous market with screen transmission 
throughout the greater part of .the w?rking day,  of last price and 
quantity dealt,  the highest outstanding 'bid and lowest outstanding 
offer, with quantity of stock bid for or·offered 4t that price. 
Agreement in principle was  given by the Minister of Economy  and 
Finance  to the Chambre  Syndicale to carry out trials of such a 
continuous market. 
, 
As  yet, it appears  that discussions on  the Marche  Continu  are not 
complete, and  no information i.s 
1 
available on its proposed procedures. 
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of the system by  1986.  Before that time it has  stated that it will 
be necessary to resolve  the method  of dealing iu the continuous market, 
the equipment  needed by  the various intermediaries,  the procedure  for 
routing of orders.  The  confrontation of orders  and their screen 
display,  the scope  of participation permitted to the various inter-
mediaries  and  tne obligations  imposed  on  users of the system require 
definition.  The  transcending principle of design of the system will 
be  to attain transparency  and  liquidity greater than that normally 
found  in most of the world~ official markets.  While  this statement of 
the Bourse only defines objectives,  it represents terms of reference 
sufficiently precise to permit the system to be broadly visualised. 
The  target of increased liquidity with all transactions handled in 
a  re-centralised and  transparent Bourse  system appears particularly 
relevant to the weaknesses  of the present market.  The  Bourse floor is 
no  longer dominant in dealing in the international market,  but it 
retains its importance in French  securities.  Even  in these operations, 
however,  the market is considered to be  narrow  and  thereby illiquid by 
standards of modern  institutional needs.  Agents  de ·change  consider 
that only in the case of a  very  few  companies  could they go to the 
floor with  an  order of 10,000 shares. 
An  Agent de  Change  active in  foreign business  expre$sed  the  opinion 
that handling·  the  increased  flow  of u.s.  funds  to Europe was  likely 
to be  a  severe test of the Bourse.  A circular of a  leading Agent de 
Change  pointed out that for  such  investors  'the fundamental  criterion 
is the size of the market'.  The  international reservation  that the 
Bourse  floor is  a  narrow market  is much  off-set by  the skill of 
the Agents  de  Change  in arranging  off~market block transactions. 
Leading Agents  affirm that,  given the chance,  they are able  to meet 
most large u.s.  institutional orders.  But  the dual  system of floor 
and off-market dealing,  linked only by  the artificial device of 
observing the Bourse price,  cannot be  conducive  to  strong development 
of the market as  a  whole,  and  the proposals for the Marche Continu 
appear,  in this regard,  both significant and constructive. - 72 
The  Agents  de  Change  believe that the March: Continu  would challenge 
present procedures  in two  principal ways.  First ~1ere is likely to be 
conflict between  the  floor prices and  th.e  prices eetablished  outside 
the market  floo~  on  the network.  It would appear unrealistic to 
limit the  continuous dealing  system  to the limits of the  da~ 
official prices, if it is to develop effectively.  F'urther 1 the 
principles of price  formation will differ.  The  screen system,  as 
envisaged,  is based on bid and  offer prices,  and will make  a  continuous 
price.  This ap?ears  a  challenge to the present sacrosanct  collect!~ 
price.  The  equilibrium  which  should be  attained between the two  price 
systems is likely to present a  difficult problem. 
The  main  challenge,  however,  will arise if it materialises that the 
Marche Continu  will necessarily require a  strong contra-partiste 
function within  the official market.  Amongst  the Agents  there·appears 
a  str..:~~. :·  current of opL;ion  t:hdt  the Bourse  is now  embarked  on  an  , 
almost deterrni:1istic process whereby  the Marche  Unique will' lead 
inevitably to the institution of the  March~ Continu  ,  and  the Marche' 
Continu  will,  as  a  technical necessity,  require contra-partistes to 
make  it function.effectively.  If this were  to prove  the case,  a 
profound ohallenge would be posed to the  French broking  community. 
The  credibility of this prospect 1s  endorsed by  the contra-partiste 
function permitted in the Second  March~.  This role is carefully 
defined,  and must be  operated under  a  'contrat  de  liquidite'  under 
which positioning is only permitted for  the specific purpose of 
assuring liquidity of the market.  As  noted  above,  neither the 
brokers or the banks  have moved  with alacrity to form  the associations 
needed to operate the system.  The  Agents  are concerned about potential 
erosion of their  fun.ctions  and  the  banks  are insistent on 
commitment  of broker firm capital to ensure that there is a  mutual 
participation in the risk.  There is also concern about  the  system 
of dual management  implied.  Nevertheless  the need for contra-partiste 
activity has been  acknowledged  in an  important growth sector of the 
Paris market,  and it has been authorised under conditions which are 
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considered compatible with  the principles of the market.  The 
further extension of the function therefore becomes  a  credible 
possibility. 
As  implied  above,  the  fur~her area in which contra-partiste activity 
might prove  desirable is in arbitrage and  foreign dealing.  The  Agents 
are  concerned at their inability to respond to foreign dealers on  the 
normal  terms of international business.  At  present their pre-occupation 
with this problem relates to New  York,  but with the growth of European 
dealing  the  same  limitation will become  apparent in their liaison with 
the Conti·nental banks or the London  jobbers.  A proposal encountered 
in this field was  the institution of  'maison titres' which would be 
less heavily capitalised than the banks  and  thereby more  dependent on 
market operations,but which would be adapted  and permitted to carry 
out positioning functions. 
5.8  Summary  of Market considerations affecting European Linkage 
Summary  appreciation of the present situation in the Paris international 
equities market suggests  that the attitude of  the Bourse  towards  a 
European dealing linkage will be heavily conditioned by  a  number  of 
domestic  considerations. 
(i)  The  prime target of the French  Government  and  the Chambre  syndicale is 
to re-concentrate  transactions onto the Bourse.  At present this must be 
intepreted literally as  a  concentration of transactions on  the physical 
floor.  The  future may  call for  a  more  complex interpretation. 
Published policy has stated that in three to four years  from  now,  the 
March~ Continu  network will be  carrying the present off-Exchange 
business of the Agents.  Assuming  this occurs,  the  French official 
market,  at that point, will constitute some  form  of compromise between 
the floor and  the network  system.  Published statements  suggest that 
the  network will generate  continuous prices, while presumably the 
Bourse price formation  system will remain collective.  In one sense this 
may  be  disadvantageous  to European linkage,  for which  any_proposals will 
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internal negotiations  through which the continuous market in Paris 
must be progressed.  In another  sense,  the proposed development in 
Paris will be  conducive to European  linkage.  The  March~ Continu 
network,  though not primarily designed for  that purpose,  may  be  an 
ideal interface with the European  linkage under  the control of the 
Bourse. 
(ii)  The  second pre-occupation is likely to relate to the present limited 
ability of the Agents  de  Change  to operate competitively in the 
inte=national markets.  This,  however,  is secondary to the more 
important problem of whether  the French broking  system is adequate  to 
cope with  the future  needs  of the domestic market.  The  main debate 
on this question in Paris will be focussed on the role of the Agents 
(iii) 
in  French  stocks.  In the meantime,  until the problem is resolved 
and securities firms which  have  adequate  capital funds  and  functions  to 
be  competitive at lnternational scale  have  evolved in the official 
mark~L, proposals  LO  link  the  Bourse·w~th any  European network may 
simply be  interpreted as  increasing exposure. 
the  third pre-occupation may  relate to the banks.  As  noted,  the strict 
limitation of the Agents'  monopoly  and  functions  to commission-oriented 
dealing has caused the broader capital market functions  to be assumed 
by the banks.  The  search for a  re-adjusted equi'librium appropriate to 
modern  needs is being  explored constructively.  The  solution required 
however  is a  local one,  and the  entry of  the  European dimension which 
linkage might bring  into  ti1is  dialogue is unlikely to be welcomed. 
(iv)  The  Bourse might be  expected  to be  concerned at any prospect of 
incurring extra cost due  to European  linkage.  The  broking  community 
is not large.  The  rates of  commission are  low  by international 
standards.  The  recommendations  of the Commission Perouse  for  their 
revision to a  level which would permit the development of  a  wider 
range of securities services have  not yet been  implemented.  The 
resources available to  the Bourse authorities are likely to be  fully 
absorbed by  the  forthcoming  modernisation of the Paris market itself. - '  75 
{v)  The  interest of the Paris Bourse in European  linkage is likely to be 
dampened  by the exchange  control restrictions·  'n'le  inherent weakness 
of the Agents  de  Change  in international dealing has been exacerbated 
by  the Devise Titre system,  which  tends  to keep business in foreign 
centres once  an initial purchase hasoccurred.  It is likely that,  in 
any  planned European  linkage,  the Bourse would attach importance  to 
any  scheme  which  permitted the Agent  to re-introduce himself  into the 
routing of orders abroad.  A prime  example  could be  removal of the 
oouble  commission. - 76 
SECTION  6  THE  INTERNA'l'IONAL  EQUITIES  ~!ARKET IN  GREECE 
6.1  Intyoduction 
Cf all the  Et..ropean  Stock  Exc:-.anges  the  Greek  stock market is at present 
the  most  isolated  from  the  ~nternational securities markets.  However, 
it must be  remembered  that Greece  only  joined the E.E.C.  in January 
1981  and  that the  transitional period,  which originally should have 
terminated  in 1984;  was  later extended  to 1986.  The  modest  size of the 
G~ee)':  fina~I.CJ..al  mar.f.~t and  of  the gross  domestic  product and  the  serious 
economic  problems  with which  Greece  is encumbered  are  the  justifications 
given  by  :1atio1:.al  authorities for  the  cont~nuing imposition of currency 
restrictions  ~hich tot&lly prevent Greek  participation in the inter-
, national markets.  'l'he  restrictions even  limit portfolio investments in 
Greece  from  abroad,  apart  from  foreign  investments directed towards the 
open  o~ closed  end  investment  funds  which  were  established by  Security 
i...c.w  tvo.  608  in  1970. 
aowever,  although  the official figures  issued by  the  Bank  of Greece 
indicate that Greek  foreign portfolio transactions are zero,  the credit 
institutions and  the authorised  investment funds mentioned  above  have 
considerable  sums  invested abroad.  One  leading  banking institute declared 
~~at,it had  some  one  billion drachmas  invested in foreign  securities and 
total foreign  lnvestments by  investment  funds  are estimated  to be 
about  $15m.  As  in  some  cases  such values are still calculated at purchase 
prices they are,  in fact,  of much  higher real value due  to a  series of 
drachma devaluations.  The  last was  in January 1983,  when  the exchange 
rate of the  drachma  to the dollar fell  from  69  drachmas  to 93  drachmas. 
The  value  of  the portfolios has  been  further  enhanced  by the excellent 
performance  of most international markets,  particularly the u.s.,  where 
the greater part of Greek  foreign portfolio investment is concentrated. 
The  Greek population has  always  been  internationally minded  and it is 
believed that Greek  investors  remain  active in foreign markets,  possibly 
assisted by  foreign  intermediaries who  may  be  able to interpret the 
present  laws  and  regulations more  flexibly  than  the  Greek brokers can. 
,.,.,  " 
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This propensity fdr  foreign  investments is also fully understandable, 
bearing  in mind  that the  only profitable securities in recent years have 
been  foreign  ones  and Government  stock  aligned  to  foreign 
currencies  such  as u.s.  dollars. 
Leading  exponents of  the  Greek  securities market were  not optimistic 
that the situation would  improve  in the near  future,  and declared that, 
as  in many  other European  countries,  the  Greek  financial market is 
overmanaged  by  non-market  forces. 
Apart  from  the  formidable  competition to  the official market  and  to 
equity securities in particular  from  issues of short-term bank  bonds 
offering interest rates as high as  21%,  the  Greek  Government  now  intends to 
create new  public  investment  funds  the ct-.ief objective of which will be to help 
out large Greek  enterprises  in financial difficulties.  Though  this 
will help many  banks  to unlock  themselves  from  otherwise blocked  invest-
ment positions  in loss-making  ~ndustries,this will probably result in the 
indirect nationalisation of Greek  industry.  At  the  same  time,  it is not 
likely to stimulate any recovery of or growth  in the perenially depressed 
domestic  equity market. 
The  criteria on  which  the  Government will decide  on assistance to 
depressed industries will  be  the  contributions of  suc1,  Lr.dustries  to the 
national balance of payments,  the extent  to which  the  company's 
domestic production could replace  imports,  and its consequent ability 
to help reduce  ~he balance of payments deficit.  It is of interest to 
note  that the  financial problems  of most  such  enterprises are largely 
due  to bad  capital structures  and  over-gearing rather  than  to their 
inability to sell the finished products. 
Exchange control regulations are even more  longstanding  than  in  Italy and 
have  existed  on  and  off ever  since national  independence  in  1821. 
However,  in view of  the  need  to  adhere  to  the  European 
Community  provisions contained  ~n the Treaty of Rome  (art.68.2)  with 
regard  to  the  free circulation of capital  once  the present transitional 
period  has  elapsed,  disappointment was  expressed  that the last drachma 78 
devaluation  in eatly  1983  and  the  three month  period recently granted by 
the  Greek  Government  for  residents to open  foreign  currency accounts was 
not  exploited  by  the  Goverr~ent  to begin  a  process  of  opening 
the  Greek  financial  market to the outside  W)rld.  DUring  the same  three 
month  period  some  U.S.lOOm  dollars were  deposited  in foreign currency 
accounts  by  Greek  residents.  Most  of this capital was  thought to derive 
.from  the  abusive  accumulation of  the  foreign currency by  foreign tourism. 
6.2  The  ma~n characteristics of  ~he Greek  capital market 
The  Athens  Stock  Exchange,  the  only Greek  Exchange,  is a  self-managed 
public  inst:.l. tution regulated  by  j_aw.  It is chiefly financed  by  annual 
-List:in-;  fees  paid  on  both equity  and  bond securities by  the  one  hundred 
or  so quoted  companies.  Government  stock  is  exempt  from  such  charges. 
A contribution is made  by  thB  authorised brokers equivalent to  1%  of 
commission  fee  income.  The  Exchange  balance  sheet;  prepared by the 
S"cock  t:xchange  Council,  is duly controlled  by  the Ministry of Commerce 
and  every major  1.tem  o:  expense must  receive  the prior authorisation of 
the  same  Min1.stry.  'The present l.Jui lding is owned.and rented  from the National 
Bank  of Greece.  However  the Stock  Exchange  Council  hopes  eventually to 
have its own  bui·lding  and  has  already acquired  a  nearby property for  this 
project.  Plans  are at present held  back  by  a  lease on  the adjoining 
building  which  will have  to  be  acquired  in order  to provide sufficient 
space  for  the  planned construction. 
The  daily management  of  the Exchange  and  the admission  to listing of 
equities and  bonds  is  the  respons1bility of  a  Council  composed of  7  brokers 
elected by their colleagues,and a  Government  supervisor who  attends all 
Council meetings  in an  'ex-officio'  capacity.  The  Government  supervisor 
has  a  right of  veto on all  important matters  and may  postpone voting for 
twenty  four  hours  in order  to refer  any question to the Minister of 
Commerce. 
The  stock  Exchange Council  has  a  staff of forty  five  which  is responsible 
for  the daily organisation of  the three main  areas of Stock Exchange 
activities:  administration  and  the secretariat,  accounting  and clearing, 
and  statistics and  research . 
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A nine man  stock market consultative body was  also set up by the 
Government  in 1976,  called  the Capital  Market  Committee.  Representatives 
of  three Ministries,  the  Banks,  the  Chambers of Commerce  and brokers are 
duly appointed  to the Committee.  Its duties include  the regulation of 
all loan  issues  and  the suspension and de-listing of any  securities. 
The  present Official List of equity securities only represents about  25% 
of the  two  hundred  largest Greek  corporations  and  little over one hundred 
outofapproximately4,000  joint stock  companies  are quoted  on  the Official 
market.  These  equities,  together with  sane  forty  seven bonds,  are 
traded daily at one  ring  on  the Athens  Stock  Exchange  trading  floor.  The 
purchase  and  sale of securities is effected by  a  call-over system and  the 
equities and  bonds  are traded  by Sector*  in  twenty  minute  periods. 
During  each period securities appertaining to each sector  rna~ be called 
and  traded freely  in multiples of pre-arranged minimum  lots. 
Though  equities may  be  traded  forward  (15  days}  or  cash  (next day), 
the depressed  state of the Greek  stock market has discouraged any  forward 
trading,  due  to  fear  of provoking  further  weakening  of the market.  All 
transactions at. present are  therefore computer  checked  and  settled the 
next day with the physical  exchange of security certificates. 
This  system of clearing and  settlement is possible ·urt  <.  cash market owing 
to the bearer nature of most  securities  (only bank,  insurance  and  invest-
ment company·equities are registered securities)  and  to the limited market 
volume.  In  1981  aggregate market  turnover  in equities only represented 
about  1.85%  of total market capitalisation of listed equities.  The 
possibility of excessive price fluctuations is avoided by a limitation imposed, 
in exceptional cases,by  the President of  the  Stock Exchange,  when  such 
fluctuations  are  not considered  justifiable.  A further  cause of  the  lack of 
market volume  is the  narrow  range of stocks dealt,  which at the  time of  the 
consultants•  visit  (Octob~r 1983)  comprised only  20  or  30 of  the  115  listed 
~qu~ti~s._ 
*  The  Official List of equities is divided  into the following  five 
Sectors  for  trading purposes:  1)  Banking,  insurance  and  investment 
companies;  2)  Textiles,  3)  Cement,  ceramics  and fertilisers;  4)  Mining, 
metals  and electrical engineering;  5)  Commerce,  communications,  hotels 
and  miscellaneous. so 
Most  participants in the  G~eek stock market who  were  interviewed 
considered  the  main  shortcomings of  the  Athens  Stock  Exchange  to be  a 
lack  of  equity  issues  and ,the  limited degree of market liquidity and 
depth  in almost all listed securities.  TotalStockExchange equity market 
cap~talisation a~ the end  of  1982  was  approximately  135  billion drachmas 
against a  gross  national product of approximately  ;30  trillion drachmas. 
Though  limited national  industrialisation and  family dominated enter-
prist.-:::.  mdy  be  held partly respo::1sible  for  the  limited dimensions  and  lack 
of  expansion of  the Athens  e~uity market,  current legislation in favour 
of  loan  issues,  the forced  accumulation of  the greater part of bank 
deposits  by  the Central  Bank  of Greece  in order to finance  the growing 
public debt  and  the high interest rates offered·by short-term loan 
issues  are  p~obably the determining  factors.  The  greater part of 
savings  by  Greek  resident  investors,  who  are traditionally renowned 
~avers.  is 'ci.1e:cefore  directed  towards  property  and short-term issues 
which,  in the past,  nave  offered high returns and  absolute  security. 
The  general  lack  of enthusiasm  for  equity  investments  by  Greek  residents 
also derives  from  the  attractlve  21%  interest rates offered  by  short-term 
0onds  and  the safeguards  against  ~nflation and  currency depreciation 
oi:fered  by  Government  bonds  which  are  linked  to hard currencies  such 
as sterl:lng  and  the  dollar.  The  considerable favour  enjoyed  by  the 
short-term  loan securities is confirmed  by  the total market volume in this 
stock  which  is  twice  that of  the entire official market. 
Furthermore
1 most  of this volume  in short-term bonds  and,  in particular, 
in the primary market  for  such securities,  is executed within the 
banking  system,  as  such  issues are normally only quoted  on  the  Stock 
Exchange  some  two  or three months after their original placing.  Only 
d  very  limited  secondary market exists in these bonds due  to the fact 
that their short-term sale usually leads to a  loss of 3 rt01thly  ;;ccn.JE!\l  interest 
when  bought back  by  the  issuing bank,  even  tho~gh investors may  get a 
better ·ba·rgai-n  by going  through  the  broking profeosion. 81  I  -
6.3  The  operation of the Greek Securities Market 
Membership of the Athens Stock  Exchange  is  limited  to  stockbroking 
professionals of whom  there are at the present moment  twenty eight.  The 
present maximum  number  permitted  by  law is thirty five  and,  in accordance 
with  a  Security Law  passed  in 1971,  the maximum  limit could be  further 
increased  to fifty by  an appropriate ministerial decree.  However,  in 
view of the chronically depressed state of the Greek  stock market, 
largely neglected by political authorities,  this  need  is  not 
likely to arise.  The  existence of same  of the present brokers is 
probably only  assured  by  the voluntary surrender of  20%  of the daily 
commission  fees  by all brokers to a  common  fund.  The  accumulated  fees 
are  then distributed at the end of the month  on  an  equal  basis  among  the 
twenty eight brokers.  This  regulation  was  introduced  some  thirty years 
ago  to assist the broking profession and,  in particular,  newly  appointed 
brokers. 
The  Securities Law  also replaced the previously required professional 
experience  by  a  University degree.  All  applications to become  a  broker 
must  be  addressed  to  the General  Government  Commissioner,  following 
the  request  to  the  Stock  Exchange  Council.  All  applications 
must  also  be  accompanied  by  evidence  of  a  good  conduct 
record,  that military  servi~e requirements  have oeen uuly fulfilled 
and  that the candidate has attained the minimum  age  of thirty years·. 
The  Stock  Exchange Council  finally  submits all applicants to  an 
interview  and  a  test of their  sound  financial  standing and 
professional preparation.  Official appointment is made  by  a  Ministerial 
decision  following  a  proposal made  by  the General  Assembly meeting of 
Brokers. 
Prior to  commencing  business,  the  newly  appointed brokers must also 
deposit a  sum  of about  llm drachmas  (about $120,000).  This is allotted 
to  the Stockbrokers'  Common  Guarantee  Fund,  whicl: is managed  by  an 
appropriate elected Committee of Brokers of  the Stock  Exchange.  This 
sum  is subsequently returned to  the brokers  on  leaving the profession 
or  to their heirs  on  their death,  on  the basis Qf  their proportion of 
the accumulated value of  the  fund. 82 
Partnerships  and  companies are permitted as lonq as the main partner is a 
Stock. Exchange broker..  Brokers may in fact have only one representative who 
may  substitute  for  them  on  ~he official floor.  Consequently most,  if 
not all, of  the business activities are  limited to pure intermediary 
business • The limited capital of brokers generally precludes any possibility 
of position taking even though this is permitted.  The  brokers'  income 
derives  from  a  scaled commission  fee  which  amounts  to 1%  plus 0.3\ on 
registered shares  up  to lm  drachmas  as  shown  in the commission  fee  table 
in Section 18.  However,  as previously mentioned,  1%  of such commission 
is paid  to' the Stock  Exchange Council  as  a  contribution t6 financing  the 
organisation and  functioning  of the·Stock Exchange,afixed minimum  is 
award~d to the brokers'  pension fund·,  and  20%  of his daily commission 
fee  income  is credited to a  general  fund  for  redistribution among  all 
brokers  on  an  equal basis at the end of each month. 
o.4  The  Credit Institutions 
Traditionally'Greek credit instutions have  always  been active on  the 
domestic capital market and,  though not compulsory,  it is the custom 
for  bank  ser.urities to be·  listed on  the  Athens  Stock  Exchange. 
The  present day activities of  the  banks  in the national  stock market; 
are  heavily curtailed by  the  extent to  which  their deposits are frozen 
within their accounts  in the Central  Bank  to  finance  Government 
expenditure and  the public deficit.  An  estimated 71.75%  of aggregate 
bank deposits are  frozen  in a  special account at the Central  Bank 
earning  an  average  interest rate of about  14.5%,  whereas  loans to 
private  industries are charged at' 21.5%  for  working capital and  18.5% 
for  long-term  fixed  investments.  Furthermore,  all  loans granted  on  the 
remaining  30%  of  deposits  immediately require a  contemporary 
deposit of  20%  of their value at the  Central  Bank  and  are subject to a 
further  l%  charge  in  favour  of Greek  exports.  Such  20%  compulsory 
deposits are granted  no  interest whatsoever.  The  only exceptiQns  to 
such  regulations are  loans to small  industries which are als_o  encouraged 
by  the  author~ties inasmuch  as  12.5%  of the value of loans granted  to 
such enterprises  by  the banks  may  be  subsequently released  from  the 
obligatory deposits. - 83 
Such  a  draconian  pol1cy of  financial dirigisme  1s probably  tolerated by 
the  banking  system  due  to  the  fact  that the  four  biggest credit 
1nstitutions are either directly or  indirectly  (through  the national 
pension  funds)  owned  by the State.  The  Commercial  Bank  of Greece  was 
indirectly taken over  by  the State  1n  1977  when  only State pension 
funds  were  permitted·to subscribe  to  a  share  issue which  increased  the 
capital by  some  two  and  a  half  times. 
Nevertheless,  the banking  institutions have often  invested  in domestic 
industrial enterprises in a  disproportionate manner  in view of the 
limited dimensions of the Athens  Stock  Exchange.  These  holdings  have 
often been built up with the  aim  of supporting depressed industries and 
such capital is therefore often frozen  and  extremely difficult to 
divest.  For  instance,  the portfolio of the National  Bank  of Greece, 
which plays  a  mos~ active role in the domestic  securities market,  is 
estimated to be  about  25  billion drachmas,  which is equivalent to 
nearly  20%  of total market capitalisation of listed equities  (based 
on  end of  1982  figures).  If the capitalisation of the  listed equities 
of the  same  bank is also added,  the resultant value  far exceeds  20%  of 
the  Athens  aggregate market capitalisation.  However,  it must  be  borne 
in mind  that some  of  such  investments are in unlisted stock  and  the 
ratio of equi t.ies  to Government  stock in the total portfolio is 
approxirn~tely ten  to ninety. 
In  :963,  the National  Bank  of Greece also set up  a  subsidiary  inst~tution 1 
the  National  Investment  Bank,  whose  main objective was  to assist the 
development of  the domestic  stock market  and  to encourage the change  from 
loan  to equity capital in Greek  private industry.  The  respective ratio 
of  the  two  forms  of  finance  were  often as high as 80:20. 
Unfortunately the chronic depressed state of the Greek  economy  and 
political events  have  impeded  such developments  and many  of the share-
holdings  in  some  seventy national industrial enterprises remain 
caught within  the bank  secur~ties portfolio. 84 
Other  institutional investors are  the pension  funds,  insurance companies 
and  a  number  of friendly societies.  Though all but 10\ of the capital 
resources  of  the pension  funds  must  be  deposited  in the Central  Bank, 
the  funds' may  buy  up  a  limited percentage of securities,  other  than 
short-term bonds.  Insurance  companies may  also have certain resources 
invested  in securities,  but  they direct most  of such portfolio invest-
ments  to the bond  market. 
G.S  The  Investment  Companies  and  Mutual  Funds 
In  1970 a  legislative decree  vJas  passed authorising  the setting up of 
closed-end  investment  companies and  open-end mutual  funds  with the sole 
objective of  favouring  investments  in securities.  It was  hoped that, 
after the fiscal  concessions  and  encouragement granted to investors and 
listed companies  by  law  No.  148  of  1.967,  this would  assist the develop-
ment  of  the Athens  Stock  Exchange. 
After prior authorisation,  such  inveptment  companies  and  mutual  funds 
are permitted  t·o  invest  up  to one-fifth of all funds  or capital in 
foreign  listed securities,  and  non-resident  investors  who  invest in these 
funds  may  freely repatriate capital disinvested and all income  from 
dividends  and  interest as well  as capital gains acquired  from  invest-
ments  in such  funds. 
Furthermore all income  from  capital gains,  interest payments or interest 
on deposits paid  to investment companies  and mutual  funds  are  exempt 
from  any  income  tax,  while  income  from  dividends is taxed at the  low 
rate*,  after a  100,000 drachma  allowance  to all investors,  as  long as 
the-investor is not using  this privilege for  any other  investment in 
shares.  In addition,  transactions  executed  on behalf of  such 
institutions are exempt  from  all stamp duty charges.  However,  early 
optimism has  proved  unfounded  and  today  there are six  closed-end 
investment companies  and  only  two  mutual  funds. 
*  The  normal  withholding  tax  on dividends  is  43%  and  45%  respectively 
on  listed registered and  bearer securities .  Dividends on 
uolisted shares  are subject to  a  withholding  tax  rate of  47%  and 
~J% respectively. - 85 
The  reason  commonly  given  for  their lack of  success are present economic 
and political circumstances,  the acutely  depressed state of the domestic 
stock market,  the limitations on  foreign  investment  (in fact only  four 
investment companies  and mutual  funds  have obtained authorisation to 
invest abroad) ,  and  the fact  that the  setting up  and  development of 
such institutions may  only be  organised  and  administered  by  bank-owned 
or  controlled companies.  At  least  51%  of the capital of  investment 
companies  and  of the management  companies  of  the mutual  funds  must  be 
ba~ ~n~. 
Although  such  ~nvestment companies  and mutual  funds  were originally 
addressed  to private investors,  approximately  75%  of all shares and 
unit certificates issued are  estimated  to  be  in the hands  of 
institutional investors,  with pension  funds  alone possessing  32%-33% 
of  the  total value of the  investment companies  and mutual  funds. 
The  fact that authorisation to  invest up  to  20%  of capital or 
accumulated  funds  in foreign  securities has  been  suspended is 
particularly disappointing.  Only  four  such organisations can at 
present take advantage of the  promising performance of international 
stock markets.  This excludes  the biggest investment company  (the 
National  Investment  Company  of the  Nationa~ Bank  of Greece),  which  has 
a  share capital of 3.2 billion drachma  (approximately  $38m)  and 
comprise  approximately  30%  of the total capital represented by  the 
seven  investment companies  and  mutual  funds. 
Those  investment companies  and  funds  which are authorised to invest 
abroad  have  in fact  reaped  enormous  benefits  from  the concession.  The 
value  of each unit of  one  such  fund  which at January 1  1980 was  438.78 
drachmas,  was  valued at 698.23  drachmas  on  June  30  1983.  This 
represented  an  approximate  59%appreciationin a  period  in which  the 
index  of  the Athens  Stock  Exchange  had  dropped  by  about  24%.  The  20% 
concession is also extended  to annual  cash  flows  and  there is no - 86 
surrender clause  on disinvestments.  As  a  result,  the initial  20% 
investment of one  fund  now  represents about  46%  of aggregate portfolio 
val~e,  due  to the recent high performance  of international markets as 
well  as  the  benef~t which has accrued by  investing in hard currencies 
which  have  revalued  in respect of the drachma.  Though  the Head  Offices 
of  the National  Investment Company  is in Athens,  all foreign portfolio 
investments are directed through  foreign  investment advisers and 
fore~qn-owned securities are deposited at international custodian banks. 
6.6  Considerations with regard to the future and  to the-linkage of European 
Securities Markets 
While  those  interviewed  admitted that future market performance and 
development will greatly depend  on  Gove~nment policy,  they felt that 
the  long-term market  prospects  were  potentially favourable,  provided 
that the E.E.C.  capital markets wereeffectively liberalised and  that 
the  transitional period  for  Greece's  entry into the European  Community 
were not further extended.  Greeks  are well  known  for  their propensity to 
save  and  for  their international  att~tude to financial affairs.  With  the 
weakness  in  ~he property market,  a  preference for  investment  in 
securities  mig~t re-assert itself if an  ~.ttra.c+:ive  l'):_"'~"'(')rtunit:·  ::'-~c!1cmted 
itself.  ·The  opinion of. Greek_  financial exper:ts  was  that if the  Greek 
f1nancial  system were  freed  from  its present dirigiste constraints and if 
exchange  control,  at least betwe~n Greece  and  the other Member  Countries 
were  removed  in respect of equity investment,  the Greek  investor and 'the 
Athens  capital market,  possibly linked with Greek  communities  abroad, 
would  respond  strongly to  the  new  opportunity. 
The  Greek  authorities appear  to be  reflecting on  their ·attitude towards 
the  stock market.,  There  is a  growing  feeling  on  the part of the central 
authorities that membership of the Stock  Exchange  Council  should not be 
·restricted to brokers,  but  as  in  t:·.e  United  Kingdom,  should be  extended 
to  lay directors,  and  that the  banking  community  and  the  Chambers  of 
Commerce  should also  be  suitably represented on this body.  On  the'other 
hand  the brokers  feel  that a  more constructive alternative would be to 
make  the present Capital  Market Committee  play  a  more  positive and 
dynamic  role  in  the development  of  the Greek  securities market. - 87 
As  regards  the proposal  to link the European  securities markets,  the 
Athens  Stock  Exchange at present lacks any  form  of computer price display 
or dissemination  system and it is also without any  security depositary 
which would  eventually facilitate the  international clearing and settle-
ment  of security  transactions.  However,  perhaps encouraged by  European 
initiatives like  the present one,  discussions are already under  way  in 
order to  implement  such facilities by  a  recourse  to  European Community 
financial  resources. 
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'SECTION  7  - THE  INTERNATIONAL  SECURITIES  MARKET  IN  GERMANY 
Trading  and  issuing of  securities  in Germany  is undertaken  by  the universal 
banks.  This  makes  the  German  system  fundamentally  different  from  the  stock 
exchange  systems  in most  countries  where  investment  banking  is separated  from 
commercial  banking.  Since  in  Germany  the  banks  handle  all  aspects  of  secur-
ities business,  the  German  stock  exchanges  are  sustained by  the  banks. 
A further  major  difference  between  the  structure of  the  German  exchanges  and 
the  situation in  the  other  Community  countries  is that  as  a  result  of  its 
history  and  its  federal  political  structure,  Germany  has  a  strongly decentral-
ized  stock exchange  system.  In  Belgium,  France,  the  United  Kingdom,  Italy 
and  the  Netherlands,  securities  transactions  are  concentrated  o~ specific 
markets.  The  associated broadening  of  the  market  naturally offers more  favour-
able  conditions  for  improved  price  formation.  The  inherent  disadvantage  of 
a  decentralized  stock  exchange  system  is,  however~  largely eliminated by 
arbitrage between  the  individual  German  markets,  made  possible by  an  efficient 
communications  system.  The  r·eoional  ~tock  exchan~e system  also offers  advan-
tages,  which  will  be  dealt  with  in greater detail  in  Section 7.3. 
Under  the  Stock  Exchange  Att  <B~r~engesetz>,  the  German  stock  exchanges  are 
subject  to  the  supervision of  the  Land  regional  governments,  which  also give 
permission  for  a  stock  exchange  to  be  established.  The  general  task  of  super-
vising  stock  exchanges  consists of  ehsuring-that  the  relevant  rules  are  ob-
served  and  that  stdck  exchange  business  is  conducted  in  an  orderly mahner. 
Supervision  extends  to  stock  exchange  business,  bodies,  and  facilities.  It 
is,  however,  ~erely a  matter  of  maintain~ng over•tl tegal  supervision of self-
regulating  stock  exchange  bodies  within the  taw4  BeCfUSe  of  their  legal 
characte~, the German  stock  exchanges  are  to be  reuarded  as  public  instit~­
tions.  Accordingly,  the activity of  the  stock  exchange  bodies  must  be  evaluat-
ed  on  the  basis  of  ~ublic  law. 89  -
Any  proposals  for  closer  linkage  between  the  German  and  the  other  Community 
stock  exchanges  must  take  into account  not  only  the  fundamental  differences 
in  the  stock  exchange  systems  and  their  structure,  but  also the  basic  condi-
tions,  rooted  in  history,  under  which  they  operate.  Such  proposals  must  pay 
regard  in  particular  to  the  complex  inter-linked  legislation and  regulation 
which  governs  the  German  market,  and  to  economic  and  political objectives, 
in  particular  investor  protection,  which  has  absolute  priority. 
7.1  The  German  credit  institutions 
In  some  respects,  the  banking  structure of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  differs  substantially  from  that  of  other  industrialized 
countries.  Under  Article  I  of  the  Banking  Act  CKredietwesengesetz), 
credit  institutions  may  conduct  nine  different  types  of  banking 
business.  The  main  ones  are  deposit  taking,  credit, discount,  giro, 
securities deposit  and  investment  business.  Under  Article 1 of  the  Bank-
ing  Act,  undertakings  pursuing  any  one  of  these  types  of  business  are 
deemed  to be  acting  as  credit  institutions. 
Under  the  Banking  Act,  the  sale or  purchase  of  securities  for  a  third 
party  is  considered  to be  a  banking  function.  It  can  only  be  undertaken, 
therefore,  by  a  credit  institution which  has  received  the  relevant  per-
mission  from  the  Federal  Banking  Supervisory  Office.  Such  approval  is 
dependent  on  criteria  related  to professional  abilities, business  integ-
rity  and  adequacy  of  capital.  Once  approval  is ~iven, it  renders  the 
institution subject  to  continuous  supervision by  the  Federal  Banking 
Supervisory  Office  (Bundesaufsichtsamt  fur  das  Kreditwesen). 
The  commercial  banks  are  divided  into universal  banks  and  specialist 
banks  according  to  the  combination  and  breadth  of  the  services offered. 
As  a  rule,  the  universal  banks  conduct  most  types  of  banking  business 
under  one  roof.  These  include  not  only  deposit  taking  and  credit 
business,  and  the  handling  of  payment  transactions,  dealing  in  foreign 
currencies,  coins  and  precious  metals,  but  also all aspects  of  secur-
ities business.  They  act  as  issuers,  traders  on  an  agency  basis  and 
for  their own  account,  and  they  undertake  securities  custodian  func-
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The  term  universal  bank  covers  private  credit  banks  (major  commercial 
banks,  regional  banks  and  private  banks),  savings  banks  <savings  banks, 
Landesbanks  and  central  giro  institutions),  the  cooperative  sector 
(credit  cooperatives,  central  institutions of  credit  cooperatives,  and 
the  Deutsche  Genossenschaftsbank)  and  branches  and  subsidiaries of 
foreig~ banks.  The  private  credit  banks  account  for  some  30X  of  the 
universal  banks'  total  volume  of  business,  the  savings  banks  for  some 
50%  and  the  cooperative  banks  for  some  20%.  It  should,  however,  be  noted 
that  the  market  share  of  the  private  credit  banks  in  the  s~rvice area, 
in particular  in  securities  and  foreign  business,  is substantially high-
er  than  the  market  share  of  the  universal  banks  across  the  board.  This 
. is  particularly  true  of  commission  business  in  securities,  where  the 
private  credit  banks'  share  is  disproportionately  large.  The  major  banks 
hold  an  absolutely  dominant  position  in  the  issuing business. 
Alongside  the  unversal  banks  there  are  also  numerous  specialist  banks, 
whose  activities  are  concentrated  on  specific  areas  of business.  These 
include  the  private  and  public  Law  mortgage  banks,  instalment  credit 
institutions,  credit  institutions  with  specific  tasks,  e.g.  the  Recon-
struction  Loan  Corporation  <Kreditanstalt  fur  Wiederaufbau>,  investment 
companies,  building  societies  and  collective security-deposit  banks. 
The  market  share  of  the  specialist  banks  in  the  total  volume  of  business 
of  the  commercial  banks  is  just  under  a  quarter. 
Dominating  the  commercial  bank  sector  are  th~e major  banks,  Deutsche 
Bank,  Oresdner  Bank  and  Commerzbank,  and  their Berlin subsidiaries. 
These  three  are  among  the  world's  largest  banks. 91 
After  the  three  major  commercial  banks  come  a  group  of  private  banks, 
the  regional  banks,  whose  business  is  largely  carried out  on  a  regional 
basis.  Nevertheless,  some  of  them  have  branches  throughout  the  Federal 
teritory  and  in  West  Berlin.  They  are  also  very  act~ve in  international 
business.  This  applies  to  the Bayerische  Vereinsbank,  the  Bayerische 
Hypotheken- und  Wechsel-Bank  and  the  Bank  fur  Gemeinwirtschaft,  whose 
volumes  of  business  come  close  to  that  of  the  three  largest  banks.  Some 
way  behind  come  the  Berliner  Handels- und  Frankfurter  Bank  <BHF-Bank), 
the  Berliner  Bank,  the  Westfalenbank  and  the  Vereins- und  Westbank. 
At  the  end  of  1984,  the  unconsolidated  business  volume  of all  the  96 
regional  banks  - OM  316  000  million  - exceeded  that  of  the  large banks 
- OM  254  000  million- by  OM  62  000  million.  The  large  number  of  in-
dependent  regional  banks  and  their  financial  power  provides  strong  sup-
port  for  maintaining  the  regional  structure of  the  German  exchange 
system. 
Finally,  the  private  credit  banks  group  also  includes  the  72  private 
bankers,  whose  business  volume  at  the  end  of  1984  stoood at  OM  41  000 
million  and  represented  a  share  of  just  under  6%  in  the  business  volume 
of  all  private  credit  banks.  But  this  relatively smal 1  share does  not 
reflect  their  general  importance.  The  German  private bankers  are 
frequently  active  in  areas  which  are  not,  or  only  partly,  reflected 
in  business  volume.  This  applies  in  particular  to all  areas  of  secur-
ities business,  in  which  many  private  bankers  are  particularly active. 
Among  the  major  private  banking  houses  in  Germany  are  Sal.  Oppenheim 
jr. & Co.,  Trinkaus  & Suckhardt,  Merck,  Finck  & Co.  and  M.M.  Warburg-
Brinckmann,  Wirz  & Co. 
The  category  of  universal  banks  in  Germany  also  includes  the  credit 
institutions of  the  savings  banks  and  cooperatives  sector.  Germany  now 
has  600  savings  banks  with  approximately  17  000  branches.  At  the  end 
of  1984,  they  had  a  business  volume  of  OM  679  000  million as  compared 
with  a  total  business  volume  of  OM  684  000  million  for  the  private 
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Although  the  liabilities  side  of  savings  bank  business  is still  c~ncen­
trated  on  the  traditional  area  of  savings  deposits  and  the  assets  side 
on  the  long  term  financing  of  residential  construction and  public  au-
thority  investment,  the  savings  banks  are  also  becoming  increasingly 
involved  in  securities  business  and  in  securities  trading  for  their 
own  account. 
The  11  central  giro  institutions  are  the  central  regional  organisations 
of  the  savings  banks.  Together  with  the  Deutsche  Girozentrale their 
business  volume  totalled  DM  495  000  million  at  the  end  of  1984.  The 
central  giro  institutions  are  active  in  the  securities business  as 
traders  on  their  own  account  and  as  agents  for  the affiliated  savings 
banks.  In  recent  years,  a  growing  proportion of  their business  has  also 
involved  new  issues  - including  international  issues.  The  Westdeutsche 
Landesbank  Girozentrale  is  the  largest  of  the  German  central  giro  in-
stitutions.  At  the  end  'of  1983,  its  business  volume  totalled  OM  168 
000,  placing  it  third  amongst  the  universal  banks.  The  Bayerische 
Landesbank  and  the  Hessische  Landesbank  are  the  next  largest  of  the 
German  central  giro  institutions. 
Another  important  group  amongst  the  German  universal  banks  is  the  com-
mercial  and  agricultural  cooperative  banks.  At  th~ end  of  1984,  the 
business  volume  of  the  3  750  or  so  credit  cooperatives  and  the  9  central' 
institutions of  the  credit  cooperatives;  including  the  Deutsche 
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Genossenschaftsbank,  totalled  DM  493  000  million.  Like  the  savings 
banks,  the  credit  cooperatives,  in  collaboration with  the  central  banks, 
have,  in  recent  years,  increased  their  issuing activities and  own 
account  trading  in  securities.  The  Deutsche  Genossenschaftsbank  is  the 
leading  credit  cooperative:  at  the  end  of  1983,  it had  a  business  volume 
of  DM  51  OOD  million,  making  it  one  of  the  major  German  universal  banks. 
Since  movements  of  money  and  capital  across  Federal  frontiers  are  not 
restricted,  the  activities of  the  branches  and  legally  independent  sub-
sidiaries of  foreign  banks  and  securities  houses  have,  in  the  last  two 
decades,  become  increasingly  important  in  Germany.  This  applies  not 
only  to  the  handling  of  foreign  trade  transactions  and  the  business 
of  the  subsidiaries of  foreign  companies  in  Germany,  but  also  to  the 
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have  established  credit  institutions  under  German  law,  which  - like 
branches  of  foreign  banks  - are  eligible  for  membership  of  the  German 
stock  exchanges  without  any  restrictions  or  discrimination  as  compared 
with  domestic  credit  institutions.  At  the  end  of  1984,  28  of  the  97 
members  firms  of  the  Frankfurt  stock  exchange  were  branches  or  Legally 
independent  subsidiaries  of  foreign  banks  or  securities  houses ..  The 
United  States  and  Japanese  banks  are  each  represented  with  seven 
members.'  The  Community  countries  are  represented  by  four  British,  three 
French,  two  Italian and  two  Dutch  banks.  This  situation has  some  sig-
nificance  for  the  development  of  a  European  market  since,  as  a  result 
of  the  liberal  policies of  the  German  Government,  subsidiaries or 
branches  of  foreign  banks  and  securities  houses  may  be  admitted  to  the 
stock  exchanges,  subject  to  their  compliance  with  the  Banking  Act.  This 
has  already  put  the  stock  exchange  membership  of  foreign  firms  on  a 
broad  basis,  unparalleled  in  any  other  country.  To  that  extent,  it might 
serve  as  a  model  for  a  potential  European  system. 
This  total  lack  of  restrictions  equally  applies  to  the  admission  of 
foreign  issuers'  securities  to official  listing on  the  German  stock 
exchanges.  Here  too  foreign  and  domestic  issuers  are  on  an  equal  foot-
ing.  At  the  end  of  1984,  180  foreign  companies,  with  a  nominal  share 
capital  of  OM  82  000  million,  were  officially  listed on  t.he  Frankfurt 
Stock  Exchange  - which  has  an  exceptional  concentration of  international 
securities business.  In  the  area  of  officially  listed fixed  interest 
securities,  635  of  the  issues  were  foreign,  with  a  nominal  value  of 
OM  68  000  million.  Of  the  total  OM  121  000  milljon  in  business  done 
on  the  Frankfurt  Stock  Exchange  in  1984,  24X  related to  business  in 
foreign  securities. 
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The  regulations  under  the  Banking  Act  confer  a  monopoly  of  securities 
dealing  on  the  German  banks  and  permit  them  both  to  act  as  agents  on 
behalf  of  clients  and,  since  the  banks'  right  to deal  on  their  own 
account  is  not  restricted,  to  act  as  principal.  The  conditions  under 
which  banks  must  deal  with  their  clients  are  contained  in  the  General 
Business  Conditions  of  Credit  Institutions  and  the  Rules  of  the  Code 
of  Dealing.  The  banks  must  observe  them  and  must  ensure  that  the 
clients'  transactions  in  listed securities  are  carried out  at  the 
official  stock  exchange  price  prevailing at  that  time.  The  effectiveness 
of  this  legal  provision  was  enhanced  by  the  Gentlemen's  Agreement  con-
cluded  in  1968  between  the  Associations  of  Credit  Institutions,  under 
which  all  client  transactions  in equities must  be  put  through  the  stock 
exchange,  unless  the  client  expressly  requests  otherwise.  This  agreement 
was  included  in  the  General  Business  Conditions  of  the  Credit  Institu-
tions  <Allgemeine  Geschaftsbedingungen  der  Kreditinstitute - AGB)  <in 
the  case  of  private  banks,  Article  29  (1)  of  the  AGB). 
7.2  The  Framework  of  the  stock  exchange 
The  second  legal  pillar which,  together  with  the  Banking  Act  (Kredit-
wesengesetz>,  referred  to  above,  and  the  Securities  Deposit  Law  <Depot-
gesetz)  considered  in  Section  20,  forms  the  main  structure of  the  German 
securities  market,  is  the  Stock  Exchange  Act  (Borsengesetz)  of  1896 
in  its  expanded  form  of  28  April  1975.  This  Act  which  affirms  the  tradi-
tional  autonomy  of  the  German  exchanges,  vests ~he right  to establish 
and  regulate  the  Exchanges  in  the  Lander  Governments.  It further  lays 
down  principles  for  the  organization of  the  exchanges,  the  fixing  of 
stock -exchange  rules  relating  to  the  function  of  the  "Kursmakler" 
(accredited  broker  who  sets  the official price  for  the  stock  in  which 
he  acts  as  specialist  and  may  only  act  as  age~t  in other  stocks>,  the 
admission  of  securities  to  stock  exchange  dealing  and  forward  trading 
on  the  stock  exchange.  The  provJsions  on  the  fixing  of  prices  on  the 
Exchanges  (Article  29>  and  those  relating  to  the official  Kursmakler 
(Articles  30-34)  have  particular significance  for  the  German  secondary 
market.  The  system  whereby  the  stock  exchange  price  is officially fixed 
enables  stock  exchange  members  to  transact  client  business  at  this 
price,  without  having  to  give  the  client  any  more  detail  of  its execu-
tion  on  the  Exchange.  Accordingly  the  General  Business  Conditions  of 
the  banks  (Article  29>  states  that  all  client  orders  for  the  purchase 
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of  officially  listed securities  shall  be  executed  by  the  bank  acting 
as  principal,  whilst  charging  commission  to  the  customer,  and  also that, 
as  a  rule,  all  client  orders  in  officially  listed equities  are  to  be 
put  through  the  stock  exchange.  The  method  of  price  fixing  - single 
or  continuous  quotation  - is  not  prescribed  in  the  Stock  Exchange  Act 
itself,.but  has  its basis  in  the  relevant  stock  exchange  rules. 
The  Stock  Exchange  Act  requires  a  Board  of  Governors  to  be  formed,  on 
which  all  groups  involved  in  stock  exchange  trading  are  represented. 
The  Board  is  responsible  for  running  the  stock  exchange.  It  draws  up 
the  rules  of  the  exchange  and  the  business  conditions  applying  to  the 
transaction of  exchange  business.  Such  rules  and  regulations  are  subject 
to  the  approval  of  the  Land  authorities. 
The  firm  rules  of  the  German  Stock  Exchange  Act  must  be  taken  into 
account  when  designing  a  system  of  European  linkage.  The  membership 
structure of  the  exchange  and  the  system  of  official  Kursmakler  are 
tried and  tested  in  terms  of  the  requirements  of  the  capital  market 
and  investor  protection,  and  therefore  no  changes  in  the  structure of 
the  stock  exchanges  can  be  expected. 
A further  factor  to  be  taken  into  account  in  considering  European  link-
age  is  the  fact  that  Germany  is  hardly  likely  to  reduce  its high  level 
of  investor  protection  simply  in  the  interest  of  a  system  of  European 
'  linkage.  It  is  immaterial  whether  investor  protection  is governed  in 
detail  by  law  or  whether  it  is  brought  about  voluntarily  by  market 
participants as,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  rules  covering  insider 
dealing.  Lastly,  the  system  of  independent  regional  exchanges  results 
in  prices  in  principle being  set  by  the official  broker.s  on  each  ex-
change  independently  of  the  others.  Wide  differences  in  the  prices  of 
a  security are  in practice,  however,  avoided  by  exchange  members  carry-
ing  out  arbitrage operations  between  the  individual  exchanges. 
7.3  The  regionalization of  the  German  stock  exchanges 
Germany  has  eight  exchanges,  situated  in  Berlin,  Bremen,  Dusseldorf, 
Frankfurt/Main,  Hamburg,  Hannover,  Munich  and  Stuttgart,  each  of  which ·~ 
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has  its  own  regional  importance.  In  terms  of  stock  exchange  business, 
Frankfurt  and  Dusseldorf  are  the  leaders.  As  a  result  of  the  federal 
stock  exchange  system,  the  other  exchanges  have  developed  as  the  focal 
pqints  of  their  respective  economic  areas. 
A similar  development  has  taken  place  in  Frankfurt  and  Dusseldorf  as 
regards  foreign  securities  listed  in  G:rmany  :  in  terms  of  both  the 
number  of  such  securities  and  the  volume  of  business,  Frankfurt  and 
D~sseldorf have  a  considerable  Lead  over  the  other markets,  but  there 
too  foreign  equities  and  bonds  are  actively  traded. 
The  system  of  regional  stock  exchanges  has  its origins  in  history.  The 
spread  of  the  railways  and  the  industrialization of  Germany  boosted 
share  dealing  substantially  in  the  second  half  of  the  last  century. 
The  country's  increasing  economic  strength  formed  t~e basis  for  the 
further  expansion  of  the  exchanges  already  in  existence  around  t~e 
country.  This  federal  character  is  today still mirrored  by  the  constitu-
tional  status  of  the  German  exchanges.  On  the  basis  of  the  constitution 
(Article  74  point  11  of  the  Grundges~tz),  the  law  relating  to  the 
economy  - including  that  relating  to  banking  and  stock  exchanges  - is 
governed  by  Land  legislation,  insofar  as  there  is  no  need  for  a  consti-
tutional  rule  to  safeguard  legal  or  economic  unity.  In  accordance  with 
Article  1  of  the  German  Stock  Exchange  Act,  the  Land  governments  are 
responsible  for  authorizing  the  setting  up  and  supervision of  stock 
exchanges. 
In  1975,  the  Federal  Government  reformed  sections  of  the  Stock  Exchange 
Act.  The  preamble  to  the draft  law  explicitly states  that  regional  stock 
markets  have  considerable  importance  for  the  economic  area  they  serve. 
Even  then,  however,  the  legislator  was  predicting  that  competition 
between  the  individual  markets  would  Lead  to  further  technical  moderni-
zat~on; this  development  has  since  started - on  the  basis  of  electronic 
data  processing- but  is  still  a  tong  way  from  completion.  The  objective 
is  to  maintain  the  competitiveness  of  the  German  exchanges  - in partic-
ular  in  international  securities dealing- in  the  interests of  a  securi-
ties  market  as  varied  and  yet  as  united  as  possible.  There  are  therefore 
moves  afoot  to  develop  a  national.  market,  the  components  of  which  -
the  eight  German  Exchanges  - continue  to maintain  their existing  inde-
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This  programme  is  in  line  with  the  Federal  Government's  social  policy, 
which  aims  to  attract  an  ever-wider  section of  the  population  to  invest 
in  securities  - especially  in  equities  - so  that  ownership  of  the  German 
economy's  productive  assets  is  spread  more  widely.  As  the  central  market 
for  trading  in  securities,  the  Exchanges  have, ·  in this  respect,  an 
importa~t  role  as  intermediaries,  promoting  the  necessary  formation 
of  equity  capital  by  German  companies. 
To  fulfil  these  tasks,  the  Exchanges  must  have  close  contacts  with  the 
public,  since  the  saver  wishes  to  have  as  wide  and  as  sound  a  selection 
of  easily available  investment  opportunities  as  possible.  It  is  also 
in  his  interest  that  the  execution  of  his  orders  - especially  in  region-
al  securities  - should  be  as  easy  as  possible  for  him  to  follow  on  "his" 
local  exchange.  These  conditions  are  most  likely  to exist  where  invest-
ors  can  use  personal  contacts  to  obtain  their  information.  The  direct 
advice  and  management  of  "his"  own  bank,  which  is  itself  represented 
on  the  market,  is  another  important  factor. 
The  German  stock  exchange  system  is  more  strongly  federal  then  that 
of  other  European  countries,  where  trading  is  heavily  concentrated  on 
a  single  main  stock  exchange.  The  German  regional  systE::IIi  .:d.lows  the 
full  participation of  the  smaller  regional  banks  on  the  Exchanges,  and 
avoids  total  domination  by  the  large  commercial  banks  which  would  in-
evitably  occur  with  a  centralized market. 
Dealing  between  the  Exchanges  and  the  evening  out  of  prices  are  assured 
by  the  existence  of  the  strong national  bank  network,  whose  technical 
links  are  used  by  the  banks'  stock  exchange  departments.  This  highly 
effective  exchange  of  information  has  been  achieved  by  the  stock  ex-
change  members  themselves.  Secondly,  the  settlement  of  stock  exchange 
transactions  is  considerably  facilitated  by  computerization,  which  has 
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The  two  computer  centres,  Borsen-Daten-Zentral  (BDZ)  in  Frankfurt  and 
Betriebsgesellschaft  Datenver.arbeitung  fur  Wertpapiergeschafte  <BDW) 
in  Dusseldorf,  process  the  transactions  and  provide  linked  giro settle-
ment  through  the  seven  Kassenvereine  <security-clearing associations 
or  collective  security-deposit  banks>.  The  German  settlement  system 
is  considered  in  more  detail  in  Section  20. 
In  some  respects,  the  linkage  of  the  German  Exchanges  might  serve  as 
a  model  for  broader  European  linkage.  Close  analysis  of  the  characteris-
tics which  make  it effective  may  indicate  the  more  promising  lines  of 
advance·  at  a  European  level.  It  shoulc  be  noted,  however,  that  as  yet 
the  German  system  has  not  attained  full  floor  linkage;  only  the  member 
firms  - in  some  cases  admitted  to  several  or  all  German  Exchanges  -
are  linked  with  one  another.  The  Association  of  German  Stock  Exchanges 
<Arbeitsgemeinschafts  der  deutschen  Wertpapierborsen)  are  at  present 
studying  methods  by  which  the  unity  of  the  German  market  can  be 
strengthened  further.  It  must  be  assumed  that  any  proposals  for  European 
linkage  between  the  EEC  Member  States  must  respect  and  accommodate  the 
federal  system  of  the  German  Exchanges,  given  that  the  regional  struc-
ture  of  the  stock  exchange  system,  which  is  enshrined  in  law,  will  be 
maintained- at  least  for  the  present. 
7.4  German  Market  Trading  Procedures 
The  difficulties  in  linking  the  German  markets  with  the  other  Community 
Exchanges  might  be  grouped  into  three  areas  : 
the  rigorous  membership  requirements  of  the  German  Exchanges; 
their  commitment  to  the  "Kursmakler"  system;  and 
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Securities dealing  is  considered  to  be  a  banking  function  and,  apart. 
from  the  "Freimakler"  (brokers  trading  on  their  own  account  or  who  may 
act  as  a  form  of  jobber  between  credit  institutions),  the  dealing  mem-
bers  of  the  Exchanges  are  banks  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Banking 
Act  (KWG).  The  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Exchanges  grants  admission 
to  membership  not  only  to  banks  themselves  but  also  to  those  persons 
who  may  deal  on  their behalf.  In  doing  so  they  examine  the  applicants' 
reliability and  professional  suitability.  Such  persons  are  divided  into 
two  categories  :  those  who  may  deal  independently  and  clerks  only  au-
thorized  to  deal  on  behalf  of  their  firms.  The  level  of  investor protec-
tion  offered  by"  these  membership  criteria  is  higher  than  that  of  other 
European  Exchanges.  For  this  reason,  from  the  German  point  of  view, 
European  linkage  with  a  resultant  ~eduction in  investor protection  might 
meet  with  difficulties. 
Official  prices  may  only  be  established  by  the official  Kursmakler. 
Because  of  the  special  importance  of  this  price  fixing  for  the  banks' 
settlement  with  their  customers,  the  Kursmakler  functions  are  set  out 
in  the  Stock  Exchange  Act.  The  price  must  correspond  to  "the actual 
state  of  business  on  the  Exchange"  (Article  29<3)  of  the  Stock  Exchange 
Law).  The  general  principle  in  determining  the  price  is  tnat  the  of-
ficial  price  must  be  the  one  at  which  the  largest  number  of  ordets  can 
be  executed.  Prices  can  be  fixed  at  the official quotation or  - when 
the  more  active equities  and  convertible debentures  are  traded  - by 
consecutive  <variable)  quotation.  The  Kursmakler  calculates  the official 
quotation  once  a  day  by  comparing  buy  or  sell  orders  in  a  specific 
security  that  are  submitted  to  him  and  the  price  fixed  is  the  one  at 
which  he  can  execute  the  maximum  number  of  orders. 
As  well  as  the  official  quotation,  trading  under  a  system  of  variable 
quotation  tak~s place  on  German  Exchanges.  The  decision  to  include 
specific  securities  in  the  system  of  variable quotation  is made  by  the 
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Electronic  data  processing  has  considerably  simplified  and  accelerated 
the  settlement  of  stock  exchange  transaction.  Brokers  feed  details  of 
individual  transactions  and  all  daily  stock  exchan~e prices  via  an  input 
unit  to  the  computer  centre  :  the  data  is  then  processed  to provide 
the  necessary  documents  for  brokers,  credit  institutions and  security--
clearing associations  (collective  security-deposit  banks).  The  seiurity-
-clearing associations,  whose  account  holde~s are _the  dealer  credit 
institutions,  have  an  important  role  to  play  in  the  transfer of  secur-
ities  in  collect;ve  custody  :  the  settlement  of  stock  exchange  trans-
actions  and  the  relevant  transfer· of  ownership  from  seller to purchaser 
is  completed  simply  by  a  book  entry  in  the  securities accounts  of  the 
participants.  The  physical  transfer  of  share  certi~icates is  thus  avoid-
ed  and  the· securities  lodged  with  the  security-clearing associations 
remain  immobilised. 
Alongside  the  credit  institutions which  execute  client  orders  and  the 
Kursmakler,  there  are others  who  play  an  importan~  role.  There  are  the 
credit  institutions  who  deal  for  their  own  account  and  the  Freimakler 
- who  act  as  intermediaries  in  transactions  between  banks  and  trade 
on  their  own  behalf  on  the  stock  exchange  floor.  The  role of  these 
participants  is  to  observe  the  market  situation  and  to  use  their  own 
financial  resources  in  he(ping  to  ~tabilize the official  price  l~vel. 
In  Germany  it  is  unanimously  felt  that  universal  banking  - namely 
deposit-taking  and  Lending  and  own-account  and  third-par~y securities 
'  dealing -has many  advantages  over  a  separate·bankin~ system,  the  main 
one  being  that  securities dealing,  which  is particularly cost-intensive, 
can  be  handled  more  safely  by  a  credit  institution,  with  its diversified 
business  structure  and  broader  capital  base,-than  by  a  firm  of  brokers 
which  depends  exclusively  on  this  specialized  line of  business.  Under. 
the  universal  banking  system,  the  investor  also  ben~fits from  the iact 
that  the  bank  does  not  depend  on  producing  turnover  to  achieve  suf-
.ficient profits.  Unlike  a  firm  ~f brokers,  th~ universal  bank  is there-
fore  better able  to  await  market  developments,  and  thereby  exploit 
particularly  favourable  opportunities  for  its  clients. 
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The  German  floor  market  is  supplemented  by  continuous  markets  operated 
by  the  banks  throughout  the  day  outside  exchange  hours.  The  German 
system  therefore  already  ensures  a  linkage  between  the  individual  ex-
changes.  The  question  of  whether  and  to  what  extent  changes  in  its  in-
ternational  interface  recommend  themselves  will  be  examined  more  fully 
below  bY.  reviewing  the  role  of  the  universal  banks  in  the  international 
securities  markets. 
7.5  The  role  of  the  German  banks  in  the  international  securities markets 
The  activity of  the  German  banks  on  the  international  securities  markets 
comprises  : 
the  handling  of  large  institutional  orders; 
the  execution  of  private  client  orders,  and 
own-account  dealing  by  banks. 
Amongst  the  institutions,  the  insurance  companies  are  the  most  signifi-
cant,  pension  fund  liabilities being  in  the  main  met  by  reserves  built 
up  by  companies  and  shown  in  the  company  accounts.  According  to  Deutsche 
Bundesbank  statistics,  insurance  company  investments  at  the  end  of  1984 
totalled  DM  430  000  million;  of  this  figure,  DM  170  000  was  invested 
in  registered  bonds,  claims  backed  by  borrower's  notes  and  loans,  DM 
132  000  million  in  securities  <excluding  debt  register  claims>,  OM  11 
000  million  in  holdings  in other  undertakings,  and  OM  37  000  million 
in  land  and  equivalent  titles. 
This  means  that  almost  ?Or.  was  invested  in  securities.  Assuming  that 
most  holdings  in  undertakings  were  probably  in  the  form  of  equities, 
this  corresponded  to  just  under  3r.  of  total  investment,  but  it  should 
be  noted,  however,  that  the  equity  portfolio of  the  insurance  companies 
is  mainly  included  under  the  item  'securities',  and  its true  size  is 
therefore  unknown.  On  the  whole,  investment  in  fixed  interest  securi-
ties,  notes  and  the  like  is  by  far  the  Largest  category.  Investment 
in  foreign  equities  by  life  assurance  companies  is  restricted to  those 
securities  which  are  quoted  on  the  German  exchanges. 102 
The  investment  funds  are  another  large  group  of  institutional  investors. 
These  are  trust  companies  set  up  by  the  banks  in  the  legal  form  of  a 
private  limited  company  <Gesellschaft  mit  beschrankter  Haftung- GmbH). 
They  are  divided  into 
open-ended  funds  for  the  general  public  with  a  conventional  broad-
based  unit-holding,  and 
special  investment  funds,  designed  to  meet  the 'needs  of  individual 
companies,  usually  large  firms. 
Both  types  of  investment  fund  are  active  on  foreign  securities  markets. 
At  the  end  of  1984,  the  total  assets  of  the  German  security  funds  stood 
at  DM  72  000  million,  of  which  : 
DM  39  000  million  was  invested  in  funds  for  the  general  public 
(OM  10  000  million  in  investment  funds  specialising  in  equities 
and  DM  29  000  million  in  fixed-interest  security  investment  funds); 
and  DM  33  000  million  in  special  investment  funds. 
DM  2  000  million  or  211.  of  the  DM  10  000  million  in  total  assets  of 
the  funds  specialising  in  equities  were  invested  in  shares  of  foreign 
issuers.  For  fixed-interest  security  investment  funds  this  proportion 
was  only  0.11.,  and  for  the  special  investment  funds,  6.71.. 
Dealing  in  international  equities  is  of  increasing  importance  to  German 
institutional  1nvestors,  although  their  interest  Lies  overwhelmingly 
in  the  fixed  interest  markets.  The  Limited  availability of  German 
equities,  which  results  in  trading  being  heavily  concentrated  in  inter-
nationally  known  German  blue  chip  companies  w'dely  held  both  inside 
and  outside  Germany,  arises  out  of  the  fact  that  the  equities of  many 
major  German  companies  tend  to  be  concentrated  in  a  small  number  of 
hands  and  are  therefore  not  available  for  trading  on  the  stock  exchange. 
This  structure  of  the  German  equity  market  encourages  institutional 
investors  to  purchase  foreign  securities.  Block  transactions  in  foreign 
securities  tend  to  be  placed  directly  on  the  foreign  markets. 103 
Outside  stock  exchange  hours,  the  German  banks  are  permitted  to  trade 
in  German  and  foreign  securities  at  home  and  abroad.  They  are  subject 
to  no  restrictions  in  foreign  securities  business.  They  may  therefore 
deal  directly  with  foreign  banks  and  securities  firms,  either  to  execute 
customers'  orders  or  to  trade  on  their  own  account. 
The  attitude of  credit  institutions  to  own-account  trading varies  con-
siderab(y.  Notwithstanding  this,  the  international  market  operated  by 
the  German  commercial  banks  throughout  the  business  day  is  extremely 
effective. 
At  the  same  time,  in  so  far  as  the  bank  is  not  obliged  to  pass  via  the 
exchange,  Large  incoming  foreign  orders  relating  to  the  purchase  or 
sale  of  German  securities  may  either  be  handled  through  the  exchanges 
or  outside  them. 
The  stock  exchange  departments  of  the  banks,  which  execute  German  orders 
for  foreign  ~ecurities and  foreign  orders  for  German  securities,  trade 
across  the  international  markets  partly  on  their  own  account  and  partly 
on  behalf  of  clients. 
The  private  client  departments  of  the  banks  are  supported  by  their  ex-
tensive  network  of  branches,  which  are  responsible  for  advising  clients. 
In  this,  they  are  largely  supported  by  the  banks'  economists,  business 
consultants  and  financial  analysts.  While  large  private  client  trans-
actions  might  be  executed  on  foreign  markets,  small  orders  are  generally 
carried  out  on  the  German  exchanges.  This  system  is  in  the  interests 
of  the  client,  as  a  small  transaction  in  a  foreign  security  traded  on 
a  German  exchange  can  be  dealt  more  cheaply  for  him  on  the  German  ex-
change  than  in  the  market  of  origin.  This  is  accounted  for  by  the  fact 
that  minimum  fees  are  usually  high  in  other  countries.  At  the  same  time, 
the  Kassenverein  system  simplifies  his  holding  in  the  foreign  stock. 
The  international  dealing  of  German  credit  institutions  must  be  seen 
as  an  important  extension of  the  classical  German  market  system.  It 
is  clearly  identifiable  as  such  by  foreign  counterparties,  who  tend 
to  refer  to  "the  international  market  operated  by  the  German  banks". 
This  market  is  considered  to  be  an  effective  interface between  the 
German  domestic  markets  and  the  foreign  capital  centres.  It  is  not  con-
sidered  to  be  a  challenge  to  the  integrity of  the  German  domestic  market 
system.  To  that  extent,  there  is  no  need  to  change  anything  in  current 
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7.6  ~~mmary of  considerations  affecting  the  attitude of  the  German  Exchanges 
to  European  Linkage 
The  Likely  attitude of  the  Association  of  German  Stock  Exchanges  towards 
proposals  for  closer  Linkage  of  the  Community  Exchanges  may  partly  be 
deduced  from  the  statements  made  in  its Position  Paper  of  November  1982 
and  partly  inferred  from  the  general  situation described  above. 
In  respect  of  any  increased  internationalisation of  business  within 
the  framework  of  dealing  which  has  already  evolved  between  the  markets, 
the  German  position  is  extremely  strong.  The  capital  base  of  member 
institutions  of  the  German  stock  exchanges  is  generally  substantially 
broader  than  that  of  firms  of  brokers.  The  capital  endowment  of  the 
German  banks  equips  them  to  operate  on  a  scale  required  by  increased 
international  competition.  The  banking  regulations  to  which  they  are 
subject  provide  assurance  to  the  investor.  On  the  other  hand,  there 
is,  in  principle,  no  restriction  on  the  banks•  trading  capacity  in  the 
international  securities  markets.  The  limitation of  forward  dealing 
in  Germany  to  options  does  not  apply  to  the  banks
1  international  trad-
ing.  Apart  from  this,  the  banks  are  subject  to  no  restrictions  on  cross-
-frontier  capital  movements.  Their  activities  are  based  on  a  strong 
internationally active  domestic  market.  The  German  banks  are,  in.  con-
sequence,  in  a  much  more  free  and  flexible  situation  in  their  inter-
national  trading  than  are  almost  any  other  stock  exchange  intermediaries 
in  Europe,  and  can  exploit  this  advantage  from  a  strong  resource  base. 
The  equilibrium  between  domestic  security  business  and  the  international 
market  operated  by_the  banks  is  considered  satisfactory by  the  German 
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In  the  light  of  this  situation,  it  might  be  assumed  that  the  German 
banks  and  exchanges  are  not  interested  in  a  change  in  the  existing 
system. 
The  German  Position Paper  of  November  30,  1982,  confirms  this  to  be 
the  case.  The  Paper  further  affirms  the  belief  ~hat European  linkage 
will  develop  naturally,  through  existing  market  channels,  provided  the 
national  equities markets  are  permitted  to  develop  vigorously.  It 
stresses  that  the  real  priority  is  the  abolition of  fiscal  and  other 
artificial obstacles,  and  for  Government  action  to  encourage  equity 
inve~tment  by  tax  measures  which  would  increase  the  return on  equity 
and  the  ratio of  share capital.  In  this  way  the  equity base  of  companies 
could  at  the  same  time  be  strengthened. 
Developments  since  1983  show  that,  following  a  change  in  the  political 
environment,  the  banks  have  successfully  brought  a  number  of  new  issues 
to  the  market,  thereby  improving  company  financing  with  equity  capital. 
In  1984,  the  ruling  parties  in  Government  also  took  an  initiative  in 
Parliament  to  make  it easier  for  small  and  medium  sized enterprises 
to  gain  access  to  the  exchanges  and  at  the  same  time  to  create  the  pre-
conditions  for  the  supply  of  venture  capital.  Accordingly,  a  bill  amend-
ing  the ·stock  Exchange  Act  and  another  on  the  formation  of  finance 
companies  will  shortly  be  submitted  to  the  legislator. 
The  German  Bundesbank  has  also  stated  that  from  May  1,  1985,  it  is pre-
pared  to  allow  foreign-owned  German  credit  inst,tutions  to act  as 
syndicate  leaders  for  foreign  OM  issues  - which  also  includes  option 
contracts,  convertible  debentures  and  currency  option  contracts.  In 
doing  so,  the  Bundesbank  is  assuming  that  the  home  countries  of  the 
institutions  concerned  will  extend  the  same  facility  to  German~owned 
credit  institutions.  This  has  brought  the  liberalisation of  the  German 
capital  market  to  a  level  which  can  be  an  example  to others. 106 
Proposals,  which  might  lead  to  a  change  in  the  existing organisations 
of  the  Exchanges,  have  also been  under  discussion  for  some  time.  On 
the  whole,  it  remains  to  be  seen  how  banks  and  exchanges  will  react 
to  the  new  situation.  However,  there  is  no  prospect  of  a  departure  from 
the  traditional,  well-tried banking  system. 
The  German  stance  is  therefore  summarised  in  the  Position  Paper  as 
folLows:· 
"that  the  various  different  European  stock  exchange  systems  cannot  be 
harmonised  without  causing  Lasting  damage  to  the  workability  of  those 
institutions  that  have  developed  traditionally  and  historically.  The 
implication,  from  the  German  standpoint,  is  that  the  only  acceptable 
Linkage  would  follow  the  channels  of  the  existing  international  markets, 
which  in  the  case  of  the  Federal  Republic  permits  effective  internation-
al  dealing  and  at  the  same  time  preserves  the  traditional  and  legal 
characteristics  of  the  German  market." 
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SECTION  8  THE  IN~RNATIONAL EQUITIES  MARKET  IN  HOLLAND 
8.1  Corporate  Form  of the Amsterdam  Stock  Exchange 
The  structure of the Amsterdam  Capital market is unique  in Europe,  in 
that a  full  range of market  intermediaries are integrated into the 
membership of the  Stock  Exchange.  The  Vereniging  Voor  de Effecten-
handel  comprises  the banks,  the  'commissionairs',  the brokers  and 
'hoekl:i;"eden',,  the market specialists.  The  activities of  the 
Vereniging,  which is  the  corporate body  under  whose .articles of 
association the  Exchange  operates,  centre on  the  Stock  Exchange,  the 
Amsterdamse  Effectenbeurs  (A.E.B.). 
The  structure of the Amsterdam market  thus  occupies  a  middle position 
between the universal banking  system of Germany  and  the  'broker' 
Bourses  of Belgium,  France  and Italy.  The  .incorporation of the banks 
within the  Exchange is a  major  reason  for  the strength of  the 
international equities market in Holland.  In  any  consideration of 
possible  future  developments  in Europe  in response  to the increasing 
internationalisation of securities business,  the Amsterdam  precedent, 
and  the  ccnv~ntions under  which  the banks,  the brokers  and  hoekmen 
operate  together is of particular interest.  The  present trading 
system is not without  flaws,  and  the A.E.B.  recognises  that an order 
of modernisation is  requir~d.  As  discussed below,  these  changes  are 
being  implemented  and  a  radical  review of market organisation is 
currently in hand, -but  the  changes  resulting  from  these reforms  will 
be  technical rather  than  fundamental. 
Unlike  the broker Bourses,  the structures of which  are either laid 
down  or implied by  statute,  the A.E.B.  has  bee~ in constant evolution 
over  the last one hundred years.  Its form  has  reacted to the development 
needs  of an effective modern  market,  and its membership practices have 
evolved primarily in response  to concentration of the banking  system. 
The  present structure of the  Exchange  is based  on  the  1972 
Commission,  of which  the  ~ain recommendation was-to  strengthen the 
dealing system by  separating the capacity of hoekmen  from  that of 
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In 1981,  the  ~ast full analysis available to the Consultants,  there 
were· 144  member  firms  of the A.E.B.,  divided into 95  braking  firms 
and  49  hoeklieden.  The  braking  firms  divided into.59 commission 
brokers  and  36  banks.  A distinction of local importance is the· 
division by 'the Nederlandse  Bank  of the A.E.B.  brokers into 
Nie-e-krediet-instellingen  (NEKIS)  and  Effecte:rt-krediet-instellingen 
(EKIS).  NEKIS,  into which category fall  the majority of the non-bank 
brokers  and all the  hoekme~,  are not permitted to carry out financial 
functions or hold securities for clients.  These  functions  are under-
taken  for  them by  the Kas-Associatie.  Kas-Ass.is a  bank acquired by  the 
A.E.B.  in 1973  to operate as  an  'inter-professional institute'.  It 
provides facilities for  the brokers,  the  hoekmen,  and certain small 
banks which  cannot offer financial  &nd  stock deposit services  to 
clients.  At  the  same  time,  the monitoring  and audit role of theKas-Ass. 
provides  financial  ass~rance in the market,  and ·~ts central stock 
payment  function  allows it to act as  an important inter-face in 
fore~gn dealings.  The ·EKIS,  into which category most of the bank 
members  fall,  are permitted to carry out all financial  and  securities 
services in-house,  their  solvency being regulated under  the Credit 
System Supervision Act," and  thus  not requiring  assurance  under  Stock 
Exchange procedures.  In  1981  there were  39  NEKI  and  20  EKI  members. 
carrying  out commissionair  functions. 
The  main  concentration of membership occurred  on  the  A.E~B. in the 
twenty years between  1955  and 1975,  with the number  of firms  falling 
from  455  to 175.  Si~ce then,  the  tr~nd for  banks  and hoekmen  has 
been more  stable,  withthesecategoriesreducl.ngby 8%-9% respectively. 
The  percentage  reduction in br,oking  firms  since  1975  is highex; at 28%. 
One  qua!ter of the present  250 personal members  are believed by  the 
Exchange  authorities  to be  inactive. 
8.2  The  Dutch  Ba.r.ks 
Trading in the Amsterdam market.is dominated by  thL  banks.  No  figures 
exist to confirm the banks
1  share  of  the Amsterq.am  market,  but the 
known  proportion of commission  income  suggests that it is over 80%. 
Ba~~  members  include  the  large  commercial  banks  such 
as  A.B.N.,  ·  A.M.R.O.  or  N.M.B.,  for  whom  networks  of ...  ~(~-~ t•  .':;..  . 
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many  hundreds  of branches provide  the base  for  huge  retail business. 
Bank  client orders  are  normally  assembled by computer  in the 
Amsterdam  secur~ties departments of  the  commercial  banks,  and  are 
received in  th~ Exchange ·the  next day  for  execution.  Client orders 
given early in the morning  are  executed  the  same  day. 
The  commercial banks'  share of such  Dutch institutional business in· 
equities as exists  is. less than that in  the private client business. 
In spite of concentrated client orders,  the securities departments 
of the major banks  have not been profitable over  recent years,  and in 
1972-73 all the Danks  were  loss-making in their securities functions. 
The  reasons  for  this were  linked to settlement rather than dealing, 
and  are considered elsewhere. 
The  Dutch banks,  unlike  their German  counterparties do  not hold large 
equity portfolios.  This  does  not  appear  to be due  to any specific 
regulatory provision,  but to the general  beli~£ of the  financial 
authorities and  the banks  that such holdings  would not be  appropriate. 
This  situation  permits  banks  to  operate  a  full 
range of securities services which  are well-defined and  discrete 
operations,  and,  possi9ly for  that reason,  highly professional.  This 
is particularly the case with  the merchant banks.  The  positioning 
function  of the commercial  banks  is somewhat blurred by  the concept 
that the bank  is buying or selling in anticipation of bank client 
orders it expects  to receive.  In  the merchant banks  there is  no  such 
~~iguity and  the positioning,  particularly in the international 
dealing is a  technical activity. 
The  larger bankS  I  SeCUri t.ieS busineSS tendS tO be Split intO tWO organisa-
tional divisions.  The first handles 
1 the  Stock  Exchange business' , routing 
private client orders  to the  A.E.B ..  Related  to this  they offer 
portfolio management  services which  are  supported by  appropriate 
research capability.  The  second organisational division,  which is of 
central importance in considering  the present form  of international 
dealing in Amsterdam  and its relation to any proposed  linkage, 
transacts business  on  the banks'  own  account  ,  and  conducts its 
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arbi~rage and =ar~et-making.  These operations,  in which  the banks 
are at liberty to carry out net transactions with any  intermediaries 
in foreign capital centres,  - banks,  brokers or  jo~bers,  - both 
meet  the arbitrage needs  of the Amsterdam  market,  and extend.into 
active and  large-scale international dealing.  Continuous  two-way 
prices are made  in a  market which .ca:1 potentially  be  operated over 
twenty  four hours,  and no  commissions are involved.  ·The size of .the 
market is internationally competitive,  with,  for  example,  prices 
made  in Phi lips in  20 ,·ooo  or  30,000 shares,  though the  smaller 
domestic securities would  normally  be  quoted in  2,~5,000. 
Backed by their substantial capital,  the arbitrage departments of 
the  Dutch banks  are in a strong position to respond  to bids or 
offers  from  the North American market which is the  fulcr~ of  th~ 
international equities dealing system,  and with which  Amsterdam  has 
long  traditional connections.  They  link effectively with the Wall 
Street brokers handling u.s.  institutional business.  Spreads are 
held close by  competitive pressure,  though  they may  be  ~idened ~f 
immediate  execution is required.  Normally it is possible to obtain 
part execution,  with  a  continuation order  to complete  an entire 
large transaction.  The  Dutch  banks  are not afraid to take  and 
manage  large positions  and  to set their margins  according ·to risk. 
Their connection with  the  London  market,  both in respect cif  U.K. 
business  and of u.s.  business  m.:.naged  in or channelled through 
London,  is strong.  There .is at least one  case of  a  join·t stock 
account arrangement between  a  London  jobber  and  a  Dutch bank,  which 
permits positioning across  the  two  markets  and broadens·the  ba~"6·of 
dealing with the o .s. clients who  may  seek  to deal··in  la'X'ge ·sfze  .• 
The  Dutch banks  tend  ~o conduct  the~r arbitrage with  a  narrow  range 
of foreign counterparties,  and  accept that the business is based on 
a  limited range of contadts with institutions of  canpar~ble standinq. 
They  would  strongly affirm,  however,  that it is highly competitive, 
and  that the  arrangements  result in effective  internatio~al movement - 111 
of large lines of stock at fine  pri~es.  Moreover,  in international 
business at this scale,  reliability of information and  assurance of 
execution and efficient settlement are required.  These are most 
effectively achieved  through well-known contacts in an  established 
network. 
The  Dutch  banks  appeared to consider  that the problem of the European 
international market did not relate to dealing contacts or communica-
tion,  which were  adequate  and effective,  nor  to fiscal obstacles 
which were  invariably disregarded if a  strong economic  incentive to 
invest existed.  There  appeared general  agreement  that the main 
complication arose  from  the difficulties of international settlement 
and  from  covering  the money  positions arising from  them.  The  valuation 
of arbitrage contracts in face  of these  imponderables  could be 
difficult.  It was  accepted that rationalisation of dealing conditions 
was  a  pre-requisite to  improvement of settlement,  and  a  constructive 
proposal was  made  by  one  major  bank  that  European  international 
securities should be dealt and settled within a  single system  agreed 
by all the  Exchanges! 
It is apparent that the  arb~trage activities of the  Dutch  banks  perform 
a  dual  role.  They  provide  liquidity for  dealing  on  the  Exchange 
floor.  International dealing  tends,  at any  time,  to be  one sided,  i.e. 
heavy demand  for domestic securities by  foreigners or vice-versa.  This 
results in an  imbalance in the  local market,  which  can only be 
rectified by the intervention of the professional international dealer. 
Secondly,  the ability of the banks  to deal with  foreigners  from  their 
own  positions defends  the  Exchange  market  from  instability which might 
result from  the direct impact of large  foreign orders  on  the floor, 
all on  one  side of the hoekman's  book.  During  1982-83  the  system 
effectively accommodated  a  large  flow of u.s.  funds  into the Dutch 
market.  As  this international money  moved  to rectify the  unduly 
depressed price-earnings ratios of the  Dutch  stocks  (a process which 
is not yet over), the market tended  to re-concentrate in Amsterdam. 
Th~ Dutch  banks  ana  foreign  intermediarie£ were essential agents, 
re-cycling  stock  from  u.s.  sellers in New  York  to meet U.S.  buyers 
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The  foreign intermedtary mAy  deal with the bank  as  a  principal,  or 
may  require the bank to deal  on  the  floor.  The  Rules of the A.E.B. 
result in the clear definitiori and  de~limitation of the arbitrage 
function.  Any' orders  from  Dutch clients; private or institutional, 
mu•t  qc·· through the·  Hoekmen,  a's· des6r.ibed bE!l6\i'; J(n  important fUnc:tidti'1 of 
the  Dutch barlks'  foreign· dealing departments is the direct placing of 
the larger Dutch  client· orders  for  foreign securities abroad.  Neithei 
the'se  transactions  nor' the orders  transmitted tO foreign markets by 
the institutions themselves  are  included in the A.E.B.  statistics; 
The·se,  in conseque·nce1 give· a  false  and  much  understated picture of. tMi 
true  vO:lume  arid  patterns of Dutch  investmen-t in foreign equity.  sltall 
client Otd~rs' for  foh~igh SEit::llrit:.tei wi:fuld,  assuming  they are lis'ted' 
locally,  be carried· out on  the floor of the A.E.B..  Orders  for, 
possibly 00100,000 and  above will be transmitted abroad. Oe  Nederlands~ 
Bank  capital account figures  give  a  truer picture of the real  situation~ 
for example,  in respect o:f  German  secur'i ties in which  Dutch clients ana 
institutions are  heavi'ly invested1  than  the stock Exchange  figures, 
which give the  opposite impression. 
As  is the case in all the other Community  marke-ts,  no  figures are· 
available \'lhich accurately indicate the scale or scope of the AmsterdaJ11 
international' equittes market.  A consistent picture of the propOrtion. of 
transactions emerged· from  th~ discussions,  'Ahich,  though variable  fr~ 
one year t6 anothe'r,  suggested that· 30%-40%  of the business was  in u.s·. 
securities and  20%  in Japanese·.  runongst  thecommunity markets,  London 
and  the German·  Eltchatl'ges  we-i:'e  the most i'mportafit,  with Paris and to a 
lesser degree Brussels following.  Virtually all transactions in 
German  securi  ti:es are carr.ted out in Germany.  The  Paris  tra.riil'action~·· 
of the Dutch banks are largely carried·out off the Bourse. 113 
8.3  The  Dutch Brokers 
The  co-existence in the Amsterdam  market of the bank  members  and 
brokers is of relevance  to any proposed scheme of European  linkage 
between  Exchanges  which  tend to have  as  members  only banks or brokers. 
In terms  of financial  resources  and of share  of business the bank 
members  dominate  the brokerage market.  Rather  than having their role eroded, 
however,  the brokers are  demonstrating increasing resilience and 
capacity to survive,  and at the  time  of the study they appeared  to be 
increasing their share of  the retail business. 
The  reason  for  this appears  to be  that the broking  firms  have  to be 
more  entrepreneurial in their dealing.  They  tend  to be closer to the 
market,  and  may  thus be able to make  or respond  to  investment 
propositions more  quickly.  In the past  there has been  a  tendency  for 
the banks  to place insufficient stress on  floor dealing  functions. 
They  are  now  reviewing and rectifying this situation. 
Many  of the brokers,  though  not the  larger,  have  little or no  research 
functions  and are able  to operate at lower  overhead costs  than  the 
banks' securities departments.  The  banks  further  contend that the 
brokers are  subject to less  rigorous  regulation  than are  the banks, 
and  th~s gives  them  greater flexibility of operation. 
The  trends affecting  the  non-bank brokers  appear mixed.  They  attract 
a  certain amount of institutional business.  The  smaller institutions 
tend to acknowledge  the dealing expertise of the brokers and place 
orders  through  them.  Some  of the larger institutions are  ready,  when 
placing a  scale order,  to give  the brokers  several  days  in which to 
find  the necessary counterpart,ies.  The  base of their equities 
business,  however,  appears  to be  private clients, notably those 
who  prefer to relate to a  broker on  a  basis which  can be more  intimate 
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departments of the banks.  on the other hand, the relative importance of the 
private investor in the secondary market as,  elsewhere,  has declined.  At· the 
time of the study, it was  considered that the  Dutch private clients 
had become  disenchanted with equity investment and had been attracted 
to fixed interest securities by high interest rate's.  It is possible 
that the trend is being reversed in consequence of the present, 
striking revival of the Amsterdam  equities market. 
Amongst  the brokers are a  number  of large  firms which operate 
international dealing  functions  in much  the  same  manner  as the 
foreign dealing departments of the banks.  They  are,  of .course, 
permitted access to the  same  full  range of international contacts,  and 
are similarly permitted to deal net for their own  account.  The 
positions  assumed,  however,  are in more  immediate relationship to 
their own  anticipated business and  appear  less significant in the 
general  supply of the market than the arbitrage functions  of the banks. 
The  large Amsterdam  international non-bank broker may  only draw  20\ ot 
his business  from  Dutch  private clients.  Of  the  80%  of the business 
which is institutional,  more  than half may  be  from  orders placed 
directly with the  Dutch broker  from  institutions outside the  Netherlands·. 
The  Dutch  broker is able  to offer a  va:uable service to the foreign 
investor through his knowledge  of  the second-line securities,  the 
Amsterdam  market being markedly divided in this respect.  He  is also 
likely to be  expert at handling  the narrower trading situations 
which exist in  these  stocks. 
The  international brokers considered that the concept of a  network 
linking the international dealers was  constructive  but that at this 
point  any  scheme  to link the  European market floors would be 
impracticable. 
The  brokers were  somewhat critical of the adequacy of the present 
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It was believeo that the full  development of the continuous market 
would render the present practice of finding  counterparties for 
equity transactions  and  then  'moving the price'  unnecessary.  The 
brokers believed that any  technical  improvements  in the  liquidity 
of the market would without doubt increase their business. 
Foreign brokers in Amsterdam  are permitted access  to Dutch client 
orders  for foreign securities, but are required to sign  'a gentleman's 
agreement'  with  the  Stock  Exchange  that they will not seek business in 
local shares.  Apparently all except one  of the  foreign braking houses 
have  made  such an  undertaking,  and  the  convention is generally 
observed. 
8.4  The  Hoeklieden 
The  hoeklieden are the central and unifying mechanism of the Amsterdam 
market and its trading procedures.  Their present functions  remain 
based on  the  re-organisation of 1972.  This  excluded  the firms  which 
wished  to remain dealers  from  braking functions  and  likewise excluded 
t~e commissionairs  from  dealing.  The  market  system thus  operated isclose 
to  the model  of  the North  American  specialist system  though  there are 
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elements of the hoekman's  role which are similar to those of the German 
Kursmakler.  The  theoretical principle of  the system is to concentrate 
all orders  on  the A.E.B.  floor,  with negotiations carried on  in the 
hoeks.  Each  of  these contains  several hoekmen  designated,  more by 
tradition than by market rationale,  as dealers in certain stocks  and 
bonds.  The  system is competitive,  and up  to  four  hoekmen  may  exist in 
the major stocks.  In the strictest application of the principle,  the 
hoekmen  takes all orders onto his book,  establishes  the equilibrium 
price which maximises  the satisfaction of demand,  makes  up  the minor 
balancing sale or purchase at this price,  and  executes all possible 
transactions at the official price.  The  positioning function in this 
traditional procedure is minor,  and  the hoekmen  revenues are derived 
principally from  the  11%  of the commission which  he  receives on 
either side of the transaction.  Under  the system,  the seller and  the 
buyer self-evidently receive or pay  the same  price. 116 
In fact, it never proved practicable or desirable to apply  the 
collective price system in its full  rigour,  and it appears  to  have 
been  implement~d fully only in the  'closed hoeks'  for  the  less active 
securities.  Unlike  the  German  Exchanges,  in which  the collective price 
principle can be preserved in its purest form  due  to  the ability of  the 
banks  to ignore it in the continuous  market  they operate outside  the 
Exchanges  {other than for their private client transactions),  the 
Amsterdam market is, at least formally,  centred on  the  Exchange.  The 
concept of  'Exchange business',  which is central  to' the organisation 
of Amsterdam  trading,  is founded on  the  1947  law which provides that 
all securities transactions in Holland must be  undertaken  throuqh a 
bank or broker.  As members of the Stock Exchange, the banks and brokers have 
undertaken that all securities transactions in Holland shall go  through  the 
Exchange except for  the previously mentioned professional net-trading.  A 
further clarifying definition is that all client transactions, either private 
or institutional., must go through the Exchange.  The  clear right of 
the  Hoekmen  to  see  and  appropriately handle all local transactions 
is thus apparent,  and it is respected by  the members  of  the Exchange. 
The  right is mirrored by  an obligation on  the part of the Hoekman 
and  the market in which  he  operates to accommodate  and provide the 
necessary  deal~ng facilities required by  the various sides of the 
Amsterdam  capital market.  The  history of trading procedures on the 
A.E.B.  over the last ten years has  b8en dominated  by  the attempt to 
develop  the  hoekman  in~o market  intermediaries  capable of this role. 
The  nature of this evolution,  which has  led to a  continuous market 
in all major  stocks. dnd  to  the  final moves  which  are the major 
current pre-occupation of  the A.E.B.,  was  first visible in the 
institution of the open hoek.  It was  recognised that the collective 
price system  alone  c::>uld  not respond  to the needs  0f  the market in 
'internationals',  the  group  of  five  or  six  D~tch  stocks 
of world scale,  which are dealt in overseas markets as heavily as 
they are in Holland.  In the open hoek  trading,  set up for  dealing in 
these securities and state bonds,  a  single  collective  price  was 
made  in the hoekman's  books  (at 11.30),  essentially as  a  facility for 
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trading was  possible between commissionairs or between commissionairs 
and  the hoekmen.  As  designed,  this trading was  to take place in the 
hoek.  In fact,  market realities asserted themselves,  and the 
brokers and banks  found it easier to telephone the hoekmen  and  the 
concentration on  the floor was  not attained.  The  hoekmen  however, 
retained their technical role in this more  diffused trading.  All 
transactions whichwerenot dealt with  them  had  to be reported to them, 
the prices accepted  ~y them  and as  appropriate  the  commission paid to 
them.  While either the banks or brokers can and normally  do 
find  the other side of a  large equity transaction and  'take it across 
the office',  such  transactions  mus~subject to the provisos mentioned 
below,  g~ through  a  hoekman.  Technically,  brokers and banks are 
supposed to show  the full  extent of their bid and offer to the 
hoekman,  but this idealistic requirement is,  not unnaturally,  not 
observed. 
The  continuous  trading principles applying to the open  hoek  were 
extended  to  'continuous  trading  closed hoeks'.  More  recently they 
have  been  a~plied to all the first and  second line equities, with 
opening  collective prices at  1000 hours and closing prices at 1315 
hours,  but with continuous  trading 1000 hours  to 1630 hours.  The 
A.E.B.  anticipated some  rationalisation of this arrangement. 
Concurrently  the  Exchange is studying the adequacy of the present 
role of the hoekman  system to meet  the needs  of  the future market in 
the  context of the full development of Amsterdam into a  modernised 
international capital market.  This  involves  several inter-related 
problems.  The  first is whether  the hoeklieden,  as at present 
organised,  are  strong  enough  to perform their essential function of 
genuinely concentrating  the market.  While  the  form  of reference to 
the hoekman  is followed,  and  all transactions  in this sense  'go 
through'  the market,  there must be  some  doubt as  to  the validity of 
his price  formation if that  function  is based primarily on  the 
collective price established across  a  less  and  less  important segment 
of  the market's business.  There  is not a  strong tradition of domestic 
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equities.  As  a  result the main  problem in equities dealing of  any 
scale is to  find  a  counterparty.  In this situation the  narrow base 
of  floor  dealing  in equities has  tended  further  to drive  large 
business  away  from  the market floor.  Both brokers  and banks  have  in 
recent years  become  more  aggressive  in seeking both sides of 
arranged business,  and  ::...t  appears  likely that this  trend will 
l.ncrease  unless  something  ::...s  done  to  strengthen  the role of the 
hoeKmen. 
•rhe  type  of situation which  can  result is  that,  for  example,  a  bank 
might  receive  a  selling order at a  limit. price  from  an  institution. 
The  bank  might  then  approach  the hoekman,  wno  would  not be  able  to 
deal  because  the  limit was  outside  the permitted margin  of  the 
Exchange  price·.  The  bank  would use  1. ts international contacts to  find 
buyers at the  selle~s limit,  which it might well be  able  to do.  The 
procedure  for  completing  the transaction would  require the bank  to go 
into the  Amsterdam market as  a  buyer  to  the  limited extent needed  to 
raise  the  Exchange  price  to  the seller's limit.  It would  then be 
possible to execute  the transaction  through  a  hoekman  who  would 
receive  commission  on  one quarter of the  transaction.  This  type of 
case  causes stress within  the  local  system,  since  the bank  dealer 
resents  pay1.nq  tr,e:  ~ loor  commission  under  such  circumstances,  and 
it must  also ral.sP  a  qut;st.ion  as  to  the validity of  the priee  formation 
system which  will  become  mc·::-e  acute  unless  the market  floor  can be 
established as  the genuine  cen~re of  continuous  trading. 
It proved extremely difficult to obtain any  real  feel  of  the extent of 
block  bus~ness off the market  floor.  It is considered that there is 
virtually none  in  the  small  group of  '1.nternationals',  in which 
quotation  ~n  any  s1.ze  can be  found  in  the  floor market.  The  A.E.B. 
officials  cor..~.ldered that  (in  1982)  there had  beer.  'ess  than  twenty 
such  transactions in the last two  years.  These  Bou  .... - ·><=  estimates 
relate only  to floor business,  and  cannot take  account of the 
professional  inter-bank market.  One  major merchant bank  carried 
~Ut  SO~ of 1ts bUSln9SS  net and  50~  gross.  The  former 
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how  much  represents  local business.  The  definition of  a  put-through 
is a  transaction in which  a  bank  or broker  has  ~ buyer and  a  seller 
at a  transaction value  of more  than  DGSOO,OOO.  It was  further 
stated that much  of the off-market business related to foreign 
holdings of Dutch securities.  .. 
The  problem of attaining adequate  confrontation of  large equity 
orders  on  the market  floor is compounded  by  the  limited scale of 
operation of the hoekmen  as principals.  One  solution is seen as  the 
emergence  of  hoekmen  with stronger capital base,  who  would be  able  to 
undertake more  extensive positioning.  This  would  involve  no  change  in 
the rules.  The  hoeklieden  are permitted capital infusion so  long as 
such capital does  not come  from  a  bank  or broker.  Non-member 
participation is permitted so  long  as  there is no  association with 
any  company  in which  the  hoekman  deals.  Hoeklieden  are permitted to 
operate  under  limited liability corporate  form.  The  problem in 
developing  firms  of adequate  size is less technical  than historical. 
As  the  re-organisation into single capacity dealers  took  place 
over  th~ last ten years,  much  of the status quo  had  to be  accepted. 
Due  to  the1r  ~nevitable commissionair role no  bank  could be permitted 
to act as  a  hoekman.  There  were  initially many  small  hoekmen.  The 
vested  rights of the dealers  under  the re-organisation to deal  in 
particular securities with particular hoeks  had  to  be  respected  and 
rat1onalisation of  the  specialist system  has  been  a  slow process. 
Re-allocation of existing stocks  was  not possible,  and  there  had 
been virtually no  new  issues  through which any progress towards rationalisa-
tion could be  achieved.  At  the  same  time,  the combined  role of the 
Effectenclearing and  the Ka3.Ass. in managing  the hoekmen's position and 
facilitating and  monitoring  their liquidity had  assisted the survival 
of  the small market-maker. 
The  hoekmen  appear  to believe  that the  system is in fact  responding 
adequately  to current  need  and  that there is more position-taking 
than  is generally believed.  It is possible that as  the growth of 
the continuous market progressively removes  the need  for  brokers 
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market-making will  automatically  strengthen in response  to  the 
increased  flow  of orders.  The  banks  appear  to  be  ln  two 
minds  about  the continuous market,  appreciating its potential  to 
strengthen  the present market,  but concerned that it might  erode 
some  of their own  off-market activities.  This  v~ew appears  to endorse 
the  mo:z::·e  positive role which will become  apparent for  the hoekmen  in 
the  new  continuous market. 
The  role of  the hoekman in foreign  securities is stronger  than that of 
the price-official type  specialist of other continental Exchanges. 
Hoekmen  are highly active in  U.S.  securities,  supported  by  the A.S.A.S. 
system,  and  do  take  substantial positions  in  these stocks.  The  dual 
listing permits  them  to deal directly on  New  York.  Alternatively,  the 
local prices are determined  by  arbitrage.  The  hoekman  has  freedom  to 
trade with professionals  but,  of course,  not with clients.  He  is 
free  to go abroad  to markets  of origin,  and  for markets  in the 
European  time  zones  normally would  do  so.  His  ability to do  this 
cross-cuts  the arbitrage  functions  of  the banks,  who  tend  to question 
this practice.  The  banks  are  likely to retain their hold  on  arbitrage, 
Foreign  exchange  factors  in which  they  are expert are significant in 
dhis business,  and  other relationships between  the  banks  and  the 
hoekmen  w~ll tend  to restrain the  hoekmen  from  too much  initiative in 
this field.  In international  transactions,  it appears  fair to say that 
the hoekmen,  although  technically  a.ble  to cover all necessary  functions 
play  a  role which is responsive  to that of the banks. 
8.5  Current Reform  of  the  Dutch Capital Market 
The proposed  new  Stock  Excha.nge  law,  which  has  been under consider:  a tion for 
some  time,  does not directly affect the  hoekmen,  Lut as  the legislation 
aims  to consolidate  and  concentrate  the market,  it implies  a  stronger 
market-making  ro:...e  for  them.  Meanwhile  t:"1e  Members  -d  the Officials 
of  the  A.E.B.  are  engaged  on  a  step-by-step review of  --~xchange 
structures  and  procedures.  Three  Committees  have  been  set up.  The 
first is revlewing  the  formal  structure of  the  Exchange  and  has  a 
brief to modernise  the rules.  The  objective of the  second is to speed  up 
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procedures  in  the light. of future demn.nds  dnd  the  increc1sed  1nternat1onal-
isation of  the market.  The  function  of the hoeklieden  is seen as  the 
central question.  Alternative  foreign  systems  are being  reviewed. 
The  ultimate  aim is a  system which will achieve  a  single price in a 
unified market on  which all trading will be  concentrated.  Until 
this Committee,  which  is balanced  in composition between brokers, 
banks,  hoekmen  and officials,  reaches its conclusions  and  its findings 
are  accepted or otherwise,  the  ult1mate  stance of  the  AEB  towards  any 
proposal  for  European  linkage will not be clear. 
8.6  Swmnary  of market cons1derations affecting European  linkage 
(i)  The  Amsterdam  Stock  Exchange  is,  of all  the Exchanges, -possibly  the 
best adapted  to participate in European  linkage.  Within  the  A.E.B. 
the  problem  of co-existence of broker  and  bank  membership  has  been 
resolved.  A  strong international market exists,  supported primarily 
oy  the  capital resources of the bank  members,  but in which  the 
brokers  also  play  n  significunt role.  The  organisation of the 
Exchange  is flexible,  and  1t has  proved its capacity to evolve 
effectively to meet current needs.  Any  weakness  of the A.E.B.  has 
ar1sen  from  the  fiscal,  economic  and  social environment in which it 
has  operated,  rather  than  from deficiencies of  the  Exchange  or  the 
machinery  of  the Amsterdam  capital market. 
(ii)  The  type  of linkage  for  which  the A.E.B.  is likely to opt may  be  indicated 
b)' the proposal for  a .new  Stock  Exchange  Law  and  by  the current local 
initiatives to modernise  the market.  The  key-note of  the proposed 
developments  is  clear,  - to  strengthen  the central market functions, 
concentrating all Amsterdam  transactions within it to  the fullest 
extent possible.  The  aim  1s  to secure  convergence  of transactions 
into· a  single price  system.  Having  open-mindedly  reviewed  the  role 
of  the market-floor in the modern  context,  the view of the A.E.B. 
appears  to be  that  whatever  the  future may  hold  the physical market 
floor  should for  the  present  remain  the  fulcrum  of  the  more  concentrated 
market  and  of its price  formation.  The  consequent  need  to strengthen 
the  hoekman  specialist role is acknowledged,  as is a  requirement  for (iii) 
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market-mak~ng on  a  scale  wh~ch relates to the larger scale dealing 
to be  attracted onto  the floor. 
Concentration of  the Amsterdam  market will present a  two-level problem. 
The  first-level solution will  aim  to establish a  bona-fide  and 
effective function  for  the hoekman  in  the domestic market.  The 
present trend of finding  counterparties outside  the market  for  large-
size transactions,  with nominal  association of  the hoekman  in the 
bargdin,  possibly with  a  'moved'  pri~e as it is put-through him, 
would  be  substituted by  a  central continuous market of adequate 
liquidity. 
The  second  level solution would relate to the attraction into this 
central price  system of the professional dealing of the banks  in the 
listed securities,  and  as  far  as possible,  of the  Amsterdam-based 
business in foreign  equities. 
(iv)  This  latter solution would  be  more  complex,  and  has  bearing  on  the 
general  prob+em  of European  linkage.  In  attempting  to integr.ate 
the present  telephone markets with  a  more  concentrated floor  system 
it might be  found  that a  ':."-zvised local market  system  was  required which 
combined  conventional  floor  facilities with  an  electronically-
assisted dealing  system covering  the banks' local operations in 
international securities.  Such  a  solution has  already been 
posed  theoretically in Paris,  where it would be  far more difficult to 
implement.  If such  a  system  we=re  t_o  emerge  in Amsterdam, the  interface  for 
European  linkage would  be without complication.  The  link would  be 
with a  integrated local market  system which  comprised both tele-
communication  and floor dealing,  making  central prices and  under  the 
control of the  Amsterdam  Stock  Exchange. 
{v)  In the present  s~tuation,  i.t is difficult to assess  ,,;1ether  the A.E.B. 
would,  in the event of a  choice,  favour  linkage baseo  on  the market 
floors or on  the arbitrage network.  As  stated above,  the Exchange 
authorities are,  in the interest of a  concentrated market,  likely to 
favour  a  form  of linkage which will assist their objective of 123 
,increased  concept~~tion of  bu~ine,s on  the  floo~.  on  the.other hand, 
it is ltkely that the banks and  i~te~nati~nal hrokers would  insist 
that the  European  linkage should accommodate  their present international 
dealing channels.  This was  reqarded as essential by  all the Dutch 
bank members  interviewed  who,  in general,  were  scepticaf about any 
immediate prospect of inter-community floor  linkage.  If, however, 
the concentration of the present dual market,  i.e.  on  and off floor, 
in Amsterdam  is resolved,  there will be  no  problem  finding  an 
appropriate point of entry for  linkage with the other European Exchanges. - 124 
SECTION  9  THE  XNTERNA'l'IONAL  EQUITIES  MARXJET  IN  ITALY 
9.1  The  paralysis of the  International EqUities Market 
Althouqh Italy was  one of  the feunder  States of  the European Community 
and has  always participated actively and constructively in most area~in 
the financial sector ,Italy is one of the most isolated European member countries. 
Its securities market has  remained at an  almost embryonic  level of 
development  in spite of the fact that it has become  the  seventh or 
eighth  industr~al power  in the world.  Italy has  essentially become 
an  industrial and  not an  industrialised economy.  There is therefore 
little to say about international dealing methods  and activities. 
The  total abyss  between Italy's industrial economy  and its capital 
markets  are due  to both technical and political reasons,  the latter 
being by  far  the more  important. 
The  permanency  of Exchange  Controls-in total transqrelsion of the 
Treaty of Rome  -which even apply to investments within European Community 
member  countries,  is undoubtedly  the main  impediment  to  the development 
of  an international market in securities. 
Exchange Controls in Italy have  existed on  and off since  they were first 
introduced in 1917.  When  the  special  branch  of  the  Bank  of 
Italy,  Officio Italiano Cambi,  was  set up  1n  1945  to replace the 
previous institution  (I.  N.C. I.), it was, howevodr,  hoped that once post-war 
reconstruction was  completed,  such restrictions would  be gradually and 
finally phased out.  In 1955  the Lira was  made  a  fu~ly convertible 
currency and,  in 1962,  Italian residents  and  companies were finally 
allowed to deal in foreign securities,  provided that the securities were 
officially quoted  on  a  recognised foreign  Stock Exchange.  Many  ·leading 
banks  and insurance  companies  subsequently developed  _Jreign security 
operations and  investment funds  based in Luxembourg.  ~nitially interest 
was  mainly concentrated on  fixed interest securities,  particularly after 
the bitter experience of the debacle of the offshore investment· fund 
organisation  IOS.  All  such  trading was  however  executed outside the 125 
official market as no  foreign  securities  (bonds  or equities)  were 
listed on  the Italian Stock Exchange. 
At the beginning of the seventies,  a  certain number  of  foreign 
companies,  many  of which already had  close industrial relations with 
ItalY)·beoame  interested in listing their shares on  the principal Italian 
stock market,  the Milan  Stock Exchange.  There was  a  list of over  ZO 
European,  American  and Japanese companies potentially interested in 
such  a  quotation.  The  development was  unfortunately  killed at its 
birth by  the re-introduction of Exchange  restrictions in July  1973,  as 
a  temporary measure  to counteract the  run  on  the Lira.  In fact only 
one  foreign holding company,  C.T.  Bowring of London,  gained entry before the 
doors were  finally closed to foreign investment by  Italian individual 
and  corporate residents. 
such dispositions,  established by  a  Ministerial decree  and effectively 
enacted by  an  appropriate circular of Ufficio Italiano Cambi,  require 
the  deposit of  a  sum  equivalent  to  50%  of  the  amount 
invested in foreign securities,  whether  European or otherwise,  at an 
agent bank  of the  Bank  of Italy.  Such deposits  bear  no  interest 
and are only reimbursable on  the sale of the  same  securities. 
The  same dispositions  obliged ·  the  fourteen  Luxembourg-based 
investment funds  which had been developed in the preceding years by 
leading Italian banks  and  insurance companies  to invest all sums 
dis-invested in Italian securities.  Previously they  had  been permitted 
to operate in Italy provided that at least SO%  of available  funds  was 
invested in Italian corporations.  The  only concession made  was  that 
sums  acquired  from  dis-investment in foreign securities could be 
re-invested in other foreign securities with an identical or earlier 
date of redemption.  This obviously excluded any  re-investment in 
fqreign equities.  In addition,  all profits had  to be  repatriated and 
were subject to a  30%  withholding  tax. 
This  was  particularly damaging in a  period of a  rapidly depreciating 
Lira.  It also prevented such  funds  from  investing in foreign  ~tock 126 
giving good yields and was  obviously also detrimental to the Italian 
balance of payments.  The only exception to such rcstrietions ano C(lt'Dpulsory 
deposits are investments in f:i.xed interest stock issued by authorised European 
Community bodies such as E. I .B., Euratom and the European Coal & Ste~l  Community. 
These restrictive measures,  authorised by European Community  authorities 
only on  the understanding that they were  temporary,  were  later made  even 
more  severe in 1976 when  penal sanctions were  also  imposed  for  even 
minor  transgressions. 
The  measures  largely closed Italian frontiers to investors in both 
directions.  In order to demonstrate  the extent of the negative 
consequences,  it is sufficient to say that,  prior to 1973,  a  leading 
Milanese broker earned  about one-third of his total commission  income 
from  investments  from  abroad.  The  restrictions resulted in total loss 
of this business.  Nevertheless it is far  from  true to say that there 
has  been  no  Italian activity in foreign securities.  In fact,  data 
provided by the  Bank  of Italy shows  that,  over the period 1976-1982, 
the activity in foreign securities equities by Italian resident investors 
averaged  16%  of the value of total equities trading on  the Exchange  over 
that period.  In  1977  the value of this foreign dealing relative to 
equities trading on  the  Exchange  was  80%.  It fell in the exceptional 
boom  year of 1981  to 8%,  rising again in 1982  to 30%. 
If portfolio investment in Italy by  non-residents is also added,  as  a 
legitimate dimension of the international market,  the resulting volume 
of  foreign business  is equal  to  almost  50%  of  that carried out on  the 
Exchange. 
As  most outward business is effected abroad,  little or nothing of this 
tends  to be  transacted by  an official Italian marke'  intermediary. 
Though  most inward investment was  directed -cowards  ec,.·Jities,  to  judge 
from  broker comments  little of this business has  tended  to be  executed 
through  the brokers,  apart from  during  the boom  year,  1981. T
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This ia completely contrary to development• in other important European 
market places where  ever closer links are beinq formed  between lourse 
members  to facilitate international security transactions.  As  the 
compulsory  SO%  deposit  requiremen~ is generally waived in the case of 
direct investment,  the greater part of the value of such deposits 
(Table 9.2  )  obviously refers to portfolio investments.  It is there-
fore surprising to  note that,  in  spite  of  the  detrimental 
financial effects of such measures,  outward  investment has generally 
continued to expand  and,  in 1981,  reached a  figure which was  more  than 
ten times  the value deposited in 1973,  when  such restrictive measures 
were first introduced. 
Such  1nformation may  justify such  a  so-called  'temporary'  restriction. 
Otherwise  the outflow of capital would  hav~ been much  greater than it 
was.  This may  be true,  but the  abandonment  rather  than the 
conservation of monetary measures  and  currency restrictions would  seem 
to imply  the exact opposite.  ,The  fortunate  adherence of Italy to the 
European  Monetary  System has played a  considerable role in awakening 
Italians and national authorities,  including Trade  Unions,  to the need 
to regain industrial and  commercial efficiency and profitability, as  the 
X.ira has been inexorably devalued with all t;le dire consequences at 
both  social  and  economic  level.  There is also adequate proof of the 
many  advantages which  have  accrued  to the United Kingdom  after the 
abolition of Exchange  Control  ~n 1979,  which had  no adverse effect on 
the  ~sition of Sterling. 
In  1981,  the  first year in which the beneficial effects of the 
liberalisation of capital movements  were really feLc,  the United  ~i~gdom 
attained the third strongest balance of payments position in the WOrld, 
preceded only by  the United States  and Switzerland.  Its surplus in 
invisible earnings deriving  from  investments  abroad ·1uadrupled  to 
reach the  figure of  $3.4 billion. 1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
!980 
1981 
1982 
TAB-LE  9.2 
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NON  INTEREST  BEARING  DEPOSITS  ON  FOREIGN  INVESTMENTS  BY 
Year 
ITALIAN  RESIDENT·COMPANlES  MJD  INDIYIDUAL§ 
(in billions of lire) 
Cumulative 
credits  Debits  Balance at 
end 
11.5  2.1  9.4 
20.6  17.4  12.6 
14. 1  16.4  10.3 
31.7  18.1  23.9 
36.7  32.0  28.6 
27.7  27.1  29.2 
18.8  18.2  29.6 
44.1  16.3  55.6 
80.1  38.6  97.1 
91.1  144.3  43.9 
\ 
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9.2  The  Attitude of the Foreign Investor to the Italian Stock Market 
In Italy,  the inability to make  reciprocal  investments  has  paralysed 
Exchange  trading in foreign securities.  There  is constant fear, 
bearing  in  mind  exFeriences  in  other  countries,  that 
restrictions  imposed  on  resident  investors  might  be 
extended to non-resident investors.  This was  in fact a  point which 
was  repeatedly raised at a  recent promotional meeting organised by 
the Milan  Stock  Exchange  in London,  directed towards 
American instititutional investors. 
British and 
From  a  purely technical and  Stock Exchange  viewpoint,  there has  in 
the recent past been little interest in Italy from  abroad,  e.part  from 
certain short periods when  interest was  aroused for purely speculative 
reasons,  such  as  in 1979,  1980 and  1981. 
This  has been due  to. the excessive volatility of Italian stock prices, 
the general depressed level of security prices,  limited  timely 
corporate disclosure and,  above all,  the Lira risk.  Other aspects of 
the Italian political and  economic  situation have  contributed to this 
lack of foreigh interest.  successive political regimes  have  created a 
political climate in which  companies  and credit institutions have all 
shown  little interest in risk capital and  the stock market,  and  have 
preferred to favour  debt capital.  Special and  advantageous  fiscal 
concessions  for debt  financins  h&ve  Peen g£anted. 
For many  years,  the public authorities have preferred to  favour  the 
development of loan capitalon  special conditions,  and  companies 
have  preferred this  form  of  finance  to issuing  new  shares  and  thus 
diluting  the share  ownership  and control of the  companies. 
Consequently,  the public authorities acquired extensive control over 
the industrial secto:c  and  the  corr:panies  remained in  ·'-he  hands of a  few 
majority shareholders.  At  tht::  same  time,  individual  :;avers  and 
investors were persistently offered high interest rates  on  the bond 
market  and in bank  current and deposit accounts,  and  had little 
incentive to  invest in equity. 131 
The  result is that  although  the gross  domestic  p~oducts of the United 
Kingdom  and Italy are broadly similar  (respectiv~ly £270,97om  and 
£l98,898m in 1982),  the number  of listed companies  on  the  London  and 
Milan Stock  Exchanges at the end of 1982  were respectively  3,232  and 
155. 
There is an  obvious  need  to expand  an  official list of a  mere  190 
equities  (end of 1982)  and  a  total market capitalisation which barely 
exceeded  the value of a  monthly  issue of short-term treasury bills in 
1982. 
The  situation is further  aggravated by the limited public ownership of 
all but ten or twelve  leading  companies.  The  investment interests of 
potential foreign  institutional investors are therefore very much 
restricted.  A case was  quoted where  a  U.S.A.  offshore  fund  agreed to 
buy  a  large unit  (3%)  of a  leading Italian enterprise in the early 
eighties.  Owing  to  the  narrowness  of the market such  a  holding  had 
to be built up  over  a  period of about three months.  Subsequently,  on 
the first symptoms  of a  possible price slump,  which materialised in 
June  1981,  the  foreign  investor was  only able to sell off half of his 
holding before  the  feared price fall actually took place.  A loss was 
therefore suffered on  the sale of the further half,  which was  only 
l1mited  due  to the  intervention of a  domestic  institution interested 
in defending the  price of  the  shares.  This  illustrates the  problem of 
large··scale portfolio investment  from  abroad  in  the Italian securities 
market. 
9.3  The  need  for  Modernisation of the  Stock Market 
The  limited and  occasional interest of foreign investors in the 
Italian stock market has  deprived the market of the obvious advantages 
of the pressure which might otherwise  have  been exerted on  national 
authorities and bodies  to bring about the much  discussed reforms. 
These  were  clearly outlined in the conclusions of the Senate 
Commission  of Inquiry on  b~e functioning  of the Italian stock market 
which reported in 1977.  Ther~ is still no  regulation of takeover bids, 132 
public offers for sale, mergers or block orders.  Th~e has been  no 
opportunity to put into effect thf!  codes of  conduct  carefully 
prepared by  the  Executive  Committee of the  Milan  Stock  Exchanqe,  the 
leading national marketplace,  based on  the experience of its 
international colleagues of the Federation Internationale des  Bourses 
de Valeurs.  ~~ere is also no,concentration of transactions  in 
domestic securities  (either bonds  or equities)  and practically total lack 
,:,f concentration of  all dealings in foreign  stock  (mainly bonds).  The 
E~opean Code  of Conduct  approved in 1977  is not observed.  The  three 
E.E.C.  Directives, with regard to listing requirements,  prospectuses 
and after listing disclosure requirements,  and which  have been already 
introduced in many  other European countries,  h~ve, in Italy, been  th~ 
subject of unending procrastination. 
It is in fact estimated that frequently as much  as  75%  of trading in 
equities and over  90%  of trading in fixed  interest stock is matched 
within the banking  system,  and this exacerbates the illiquidity of the 
official market in most securities. 
The  isolation of the Italian securities market results in lack of any 
external pressure  to bring about the type of market reforms  and 
innovations which  are  b~ing vigorously  implemented  on other European 
stock markets,  which  ~re subject to foreign  intervention and interest. 
A detailed description of the activities of the main protagonists 
(stockbrokers,  banks,  commissi~n dealers  and  ~nstitutional investors) 
will serve to illustrate the present  l~mitations and malfunctions of the 
national securities market. 
9.4  The  Italian Stockbrokers 
The  functions  and  act..ivi-cies  of  the Italian stockbrc._:..ng fraternity 
are still basically defined by  the  Securities Law  No.  272  of March  20 
1913  and  integrated by  the  'Usi  e  Consuetudini delle Contrattazioni di 
Borsa'  (Uses  and Practices Regulating Dealing on  the Stock  Exchange) 
of the  ten national Stock Exchanges. 133 
Italian stockbrokers are public officials and,  like their French 
colleagues,  are appointed by Presidential decree after having 
successfully passed a  competitive examination.  The maximum  number  of 
brokers  for  each Stock Exchange  is stipulated by the Ministry for  the 
Treasury  (140  brokers in the case of the Milan  stock Exchange). 
Stockbrokers  are often accused by  the  banking sector of  limiting 
their interest to commission business and  not supplying other services, 
available  from  many  of their foreign counterparts,  such as  research and 
investment analysis.  This  is hardly SUrprising when  the constraints 
imposed  upon  them  by  law are considered.  They may  only act as pure 
intermediari'es.  In fact on buying shares or private bonds in their own name, they 
are obliged to communicate the purchase to the local Inspector of the National 
Commission of Control, CONSOB,  and are also obliged to  keep  such securities for 
a  minimwn  period of 6  months.  They  are also obliged to communicate  the  sub-
sequent sale.  They  are therefore unable  to take professional positions in 
securities.  They  are forbidden  from  forming  companies or  ~artncrahi?O, 
though  some  have  formed  associations in order to share office expenses. 
They  may  have  ~P to a  maximum  of three official representatives 
(procurator!)  who  may  act on  their behalf on  the trading floor,  -
regardless of the fact that there are some  seven  trading rings which 
function  at the  same  time  during  the morning  session.  An  average  stock-
broking  firm has  fifteen to  twenty personnel. 
The  Italian stockbroker is therefore precluded  from  any possibility of 
developing  an  adequate capital and  operating capital base  from  which  he 
might provide professional services such as  financial analysis  and 
portfolio management,  even  though  such  needs are now  pressing.  This 
lack of  ability  to provide medium  to  long-term investment strategy, 
nased on carefully accumulated data,  has  tended  to preclude all but 
short term speculative investment.  Few  banks  have  attempted  to cover 
this void,  and  it is only in recent years  that the larger brokers have 
begun  to provide the range of investment services needed. 
The  stockbrokers'  monopoly  in trading in listed securities only covers 
floor  transactions,  and  the greater part of actual  turnover is in, fact 
executed outside the official market. 134 
The  auction  system  whereby  listed securities,  bonds  and shares,  are 
called in turn at trading rinqs  tends  to  discourage  the concentra-
tion of  tradimg  on  the  floor  as  the market is only capable of 
absorbing small to medium-sized orders.  The  banks  themselves  admit 
that it is a  'mercato  de1  saldi'  (a  market for  the balances between 
b~ds and offers).  Share  dnd  bond  securit1es are  traded  term  (one 
month)  and  cash  (three days)  respectively. 
It would be unjust to say that the stockbroking profession has been 
oblivious to the  need  for market  reforms.  In the late sixties 
technical visits were  organised to leading international marketplaces 
to reap the benefit of the greater expertise of foreign colleagues. 
These investigations  led to official proposals  to the national 
authorities. 
A Government Bill in favour of the setting up of stockbroker  companies 
dates back to the sixth legislature and  May  1973.  The  representative 
Stock  Exchange  bodies have  participated actively and  continually in 
the many  Parliamentary initiatives and  inquiries,  such as  the Senate 
Co~ission of  ~nquiry in 1976  and  1977  mentioned above. 
The  brokers  themselves  are  the first to admit the need  to reduce  the 
number  of the present 120 individual stockbroking  firms  to about 
forty  stockbroking  companies with daequate capital bases to cater for 
the continuous market procedures of the  type which are being 
introduced on  other European  stock markets. 
The  inadequacy of the capital resources of Italian brokers led the 
security depository Monte  Titoli,  set up  in November  l981,  initially to 
refuse to accept the direct participation of the broker community  in 
the activities of the  new  institution.  They  first  ::~quired the 
provision of guarantees against possible contestatioD or demands  for 
damages  from  third parties. t 
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9.5  The  Italian Banks  and  the  Commissionari  (Commission  Dealers) 
The  leading participants in the Italian securities market are 
undoubtedly the credit ins.titutions.  Most  significant are the top  four 
banks  which are indirectly controlled by  I.R.I.  (Istituto per la 
Ricostruzione  Industriale}  which is a  Government-owned  agency. 
The  credit institutions have hundreds of branches  located throughout 
the Italian peninsula.  Many  of them  have  developed inter-bank 
computer facilities to match the greater part of bids and offers 
within the same  credit institution,  and  therefore only  take  the balances 
to the official market floor.  As  opposed to brokers,  credit 
institutions are also permitted to hold short-term positions in stock 
~n order to satisfy possible client demands.  They  may  hold  long 
positions through  financial subsidiaries. 
It is believed that as much  as three quarters of trading in equities 
is conducted in this manner.  The  banks  also service the  great~ part of 
business from foreign institutional investors.  This is due  to their Iu11-I:.Aork of 
foreign branches and  to the  fact that all foreign owned  securities 
must either be ~eposited at an  Italian bank or exported through the 
banking  system  stamped  'circolante all'estero'  (certificates 
circulating abroad).  The  general preference of foreign institutional 
investors to invest through  an Italian credit institution also derives 
from  their obligation to open either a  special or capital account at 
an Italian bank  from  which to finance  all purchases of Italian 
securities.  This  requirement was  established by  Law  No.  43  of 
February  7  1956,  in order to safeguard the rights of foreign  investors 
to repatriate all investments at the commercial  rate of exchange  on 
the temporary introduction of a  financial  Lira market. 
One  such major bank  has  some  442  branches in Italy alone and has  some 
42,000 clients in the City of Milan with securities portfolios with an 
average value of about Lit.9om per investor.  The  same  credit 
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investors,  who  are principally interested in equity  inves~~ents, and, 
as  opposed to resident investors,  usually prefer. to place orders 
'al meqlio'  (at best). 
The  same  bank  however  admitted that it had developed no effective 
research or analysis departments  and  advised its investors mainly on 
the basis of'opinions and market  'feel'. 
Foreign institutional  ~nvestors appear to adhere quite willingly to 
Italian trading procedures  and  the one  month  settlement of transactions 
in equities.  It must be  borne in mind  that only  a  handful of Italian 
equities are quoted  on  other  European  Stock  Exchanges  and  there  ~s 
therefore little chance of arbitrage.  In all p~obability,  the  40\ 
and  6o\ deposits which' are  respectively required on  purchases  and sales 
are temporarily  financed by  the credit institutions dealing on behalf 
of the foreign client.  On  the other hand  the Italian banks  are quite 
capable of effecting seven day  settlement in their foreign market 
activities in Eurobonds  and authorised E.E.C.  fixed interest issues, 
which  they are also permitted to underwrite. 
In  ~ddition to the banks  and the brokers,  commission dealers 
(commissionari)  are also permitted to operate on the Italian stock 
market.  The  membership  of  commission dealers  to  the  local Stock  Exchange is 
limited to a  maximum  of one-l:hird c.:  the  number  of brokers and all securities 
transactions  of conunissionari  must  be  effected  through  the services of a 
broker.  Although at present there are only  121  stockbrokers who  are members 
of the  Exchange,  the maximum  is  140.· There  are some  44  commission dealers 
operating on  the  Milan Bourse and most of  them  are organised in the  form  of 
partnerships or  joint stock· companies. 
The  commissicnar~ mainly cater for  a  private cli'ente_- and manage 
average portfolios of about Lit.200m.  Thanks  to  theL:  l,arger capital 
resources  such dealers have,  however,  also developed into other 
financial sectors and are often involved in the money  market,  leasing 
and  trading  in other financial instruments. 137 
9.6  The  Italian  In~titutianal Investors 
The  final participants on  the Italian Stock Exchanqe,  thouqh mainly 
dormant at present,  are  the institutional investors,  the most 
important of which  a~e the  insur~nce  companies.  A distinction must 
be made  between life'and non-life insurance activities, which are 
under  separate regulation.  The  life funds  may  only invest in short-
term  (maximum  five years)  bond issues.  Non-life insurance funds have 
greater freedom in investing in securities.  Maximum levels of investment exist 
for all types of investment  in securities and minimum  amounts  are 
established only for certain stock such  as mortgage issues.  The 
insurance companies,  as opposed to other institutions, may  invest 
abroad without the  50%  deposit requirement as  a  form of hedging aqainst 
re-insurance risks. 
A leading insurance  company  explained that they have  largely 
ignored investment in equities in recent years and  rarely  use  the 
greater part of the quota permitted,  owing  to the limited number  of 
listed equities and  the  low  marketability of most such securities.  In 
their activities  in foreign securities,  they generally prefer to 
execute  such  ~ransactions, particularly in American securities, 
directly on  the domestic market and  through the services of a  foreign 
broker.  In their activities in domestic securities,  they normally 
prefer  to go to the brokers direct  for  equity transactions and  to 
the banks  for  the purchase  and sale of fixed interest securities. 
There  is 1
howeve~ a  degree of optimism in the  stock market that the 
present lack of interest and  involvement of institutional investors 
in the equities market may  soon be  a  thing of the past.  Law  No.  77 
of March  23  1983 has  created the  long-awaited investment  funds.  The 
first such institutions, of an open end nature,  should begin to 
operate in early 1984. 
The  investment  funds  had been  the subject of numerous  initiative's and 
Parliamentary Bills since  the early sixties, but their introduction 
was  delayed owing  to concern at the failure of an offshore  fund in the 138 
early sixties,  and  the  fear that such  funds  might have diverted capital much 
needed to  finance growing public deficits. 
Though  the investment  funds will initially be obliged to direct most· 
accumulated money  towards  fixed interest securities,  some  funds  should 
overlap the equities market,  and create the necessary pressure on  the 
public authorities finally  to  deal with all present organisationa·l and 
functional  shortcomings of the Italian stock market. 
Optimism is also motivated by  the gradual realisation of the public 
authorities,  industry and  the  work  force of  the  need for a  more 
competitive  and viable economy. 
The  investment  funds  should also create the necessary conditions for  a 
gradual  opening of Italian financial horizons at least at E~opean 
Community  level.  One  leading Italian bank.  has  already suggested that 
any  investments in wholly-owned Italian foreign subsidiaries should 
be  exempt  from  the  50%  depository requirement. 
9.7  Stock market reform 
It would be unfair to say  that the participants in the Italian 
securities market are indifferent to the need  to reform  and modernise 
present market structures.  It is hoped  tha~ thanks  to the changing 
political climate, it will finally be possible  to  tackle the much 
denounced inefficiencies of the market.  All interested sectors, 
including the companies,  now  agree  on the  need  to promote  and develop 
the stock market and  concentrate trading on  the official market. 
Proposals are also afoot to introduce continuous  trading procedures, 
regulate block  trading,  takeovers,  public offers for  sale and to 
protect the interests of minority shareholders.  The 
. banks  and brokers have  each made  separate proposals which,  in view of 
long-standing  and  deep-rooted Italian political attitudes,  have 
unfortunately little hope of success.  These proposals may  lead,  as 
frequently occurs, to compromise solutions which will be to the detriment 
of all market. sectors and, abov·e  all, to the investing  community  in general. 
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In their proposal  for  stnck market reform,  for  example,  the National 
Association of Italian Banks,  while admitting  the existence of off-
market matching of stock market orders  and  the fact that the official 
market is a  'mercato dei saldi',  lays  equal blame on  the broking 
community,  in spite of its lilliputian dimensions.  The  banks also 
propose that broker activities should be  limited to pure price-fixing 
functions,  and  that all broking  and market-making  functions  should be 
assigned to appropriate separate banking institutions. 
This  appears to be in complete contrast with present international 
developments  and  the present effort to create ideal conditions  for  a 
more  integrated European securities market. 
The  justification for restricting stockbroker activities in such  a 
drastic fashion is the  need  for greater market solidity and  guar~1tees. 
However,  in. recent years, it is the Italian banking  sector which has 
more  often had  to deal with  the consequences of bankruptcies  whereas 
the  stockbrok~ng community  has  already made  efforts to improve  on 
present guarantees  against market insolvencies.  Bearing  in mind  the 
close affinity,in the organisation and  functioning of the Italian 
stock market with  the French Bourse,  the Italian financial  community 
might be well advised to  take into careful consideration present and 
forthcoming  reforms  on  the French market.  These have  the objectives 
of increasing market liquidity by  the development of continuous 
trading and of developing contra-partiste capacities of the stock-
broking fraternity in co-operation with  the banking sector. 
: ,. 
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SECTION  10  THE  INTERNATIONAL  E0UITIES  ~~RKET IN  LUXEMBOURG 
10.1  The  Eurobond  Market 
Geographical,  economic,  financial  and  political considerations have all 
determined  the  international orientation of the  Luxembourg  Stock 
Exchange  right  from  its foundation  in April  1928. Its subsequent 
expansion was  however delayed by  the  economic  depression followed  by 
the Second World  War,  and  the market only really developed in the 1950's. 
Liberal securities and  banking  laws,  particularly with regardtoforeign 
investments,  freedom  of capital movements,  advantageous  corporate  taxa-
tion,  and  the general  lack of  any prohibition from  acquiring majority 
shareholdings in Luxembourg  companies  have all contributed to make 
Luxembourg  an  important international market centre. 
A tax  law  passed in 1929  exempts all Luxembourgholding companies  from 
incom~ capital and  capital gains  taxes,  as well as  any  taxation on 
dividends  or interest.  Such  fiscal  concessions were  later extended to 
include  investment  funds.  Furthermore  there  is  no  withholding 
tax  on  interest· paid on  bonds.  Consequently,  Luxembourg  banks  are 
very  active paying agents  for  international bond issues floated in 
Europe. 
The  event  which  probably  determined  the  developmen~  of 
Luxembourg  as  a  leading international securities market was  the passing 
of the Interest Equalisation Tax  in the United States in 1963  which 
impelled American corporations  to finance  their foreign  corporate 
developments  and activities abroad,  and  which  led to the massive growth 
of the Eurobond market.  Luxembourg,  with  the facilities it offered for 
international banking  became  the principal centre for  the Eurobond 
primary market. 
This has  led  to a  situation in which in 1982  the  amounts  outstanding 
of international bonds  quoted  on  the  Luxembourg  Stock  Exchange 
were  of  a  value equivalent  to  Flux  3,412.6  billion.  Of  this 141 
amount  only Flux  53.6 billion were  issued in Luxembourg  francs.  In  1981 
alone,  some  206  Eurobond  issues were admitted to listing on the 
Luxembourg  Stock  Exchange  at fortnightly intervals,  after the prior 
approval of the  Board 9f Directors.  80%  of the  2,000 securities 
listed on  the Exchange  are  Eurobonds,  some  86%  in value of which  are 
u.s.  dollar issues. 
The  fully  international character of the  Luxembourg  Stock  Exchange  is 
well illustrated by  comparison of this  amount outstanding in Eurobond 
issues with that in Luxembourg  Government  bonds,  which  in the same  year 
was  Flux 8. 5  billion. 
It would be inappropriate not to note the pre-eminer::t position of several 
Luxembourg  banks  in the Eurobond  primary market,due  to  the inherent importance 
of this market and because it  forms the context of any  comment on equities 
dealing in Luxembourg.  The  bond markets do not have  any direct relevance  to  the 
Consultants'  study of  the  equ1ties market,  and  therefore this major 
activity of the  Luxembourg  capital market  lS  not covered in this Report. 
The·  only  relev~nce of  the  Eurobond  market is indirect,  in  terms of the 
implications that certain efficiencies of that market may  have  for  the 
development  of  the  international equities market. 
10.2  The  Luxembourg  Equities  Market 
Luxembourg  has not,  at least as  yet,  established any position for itself 
in the international equities market  comparable  to that which it holds  in 
Eurobonds.  In  1982  the Bourse quoted  thirty one  Luxembourg  companies, 
which  included only six  commercial  companies.  The  remaining  25  were 
Luxembourg  holding  companies.  At  the  t1me  of  the study 1  f.loor  dealing 
tended  to be  concentrated in  ~minority of high capitalisation stocks. 
In  1981,  some  70%  of  flo01::  equities dealinq  in Luxembourg  stocks was 
concentrated in  ~  securities,  and  the  shares of  larger companies  tend  to 1,42 
dominate  trading.  The  development of an  adequate market in local 
securities has  presented difficulty and is a  pr~sent concern of the 
Bourse  authorities.  Very  few  securities of local industry are avail-
able  to the market.  Most  local enterprises have  a  large proportion of 
their capital in foreign  hands.  Many  of the companies have  limited. 
issued capital,  and are,  in the main  financed  by  bank  loans.  Formally 
within the domestic market also is a  relatively strong sector of some 
fifty Luxembourg  investment !unds. 
In addition  to the  local  shares, the  equ~ty of  some  30  to 40  European 
securities  companies is  quoted  on  the  Luxembourg  Exchange,  three 
North American and'57  Far East stocks.  The  most actively traded 
stocks are  Dutch multi-national$,  together with  some  U.S.  and  German 
investment  funds. 
The  foreign equities are  often dea1t on  the  Exchange in Luxembourg  francs, 
as  a  service  to  local investors who  prefer  this  form  of quotation,  in spite 
of  the marginally unfavourable price compared with that of the market of 
origin.  At  the  end 'of  1983,  the equity of 3 companies  was  listed in foreign 
currenc.-].  'l't'.ere is, however, subfltantial holdin~  by non-resident5  of 
Luxembourg  accounts  in foreign  currency.  Orders  for  foreign securities 
related to these accounts  tend naturally to be  executed in the  foreign 
markets.'  While  the  Luxembourg  banks  handle  the  cash settlements  for 
these  transactions,  the share movements  have  no  relevance  to the 
Luxembourg .Bourse.  The  arbitrage and  foreign dealing is in the main 
carried out by  the members  off  the Bourse.  Its volume  is not known. 
Linkage of the  Exchanges,  under  a  principle of re-concentration of 
European international business onto  the official Exchanges might offer 
an opportunity for  the  Luxembourg  Bourse,  a~ an element in the linkage, 
to rlay an important roie in inter-market dealing. 143 
As  matters  stand at present,  the  Bourse authorities appear  to prefer to 
maintain  the present system of floor quotation of foreign  shares in 
Flux,  attuned to local  investors,  thus  maintaining  a  small 
but assured local market  in  these  stocks.  It is considered that local 
quotation in the original  currency would  cause  this  floor market  to  lose 
its identity,  and  that its business would be  absorbed  in the off-floor 
trad~ng of members  in markets  of origin. 
In  terms  of approximate  balance of equities trading volume,  on  the 
Luxembourg  Exchange,  45%  is equally diyided between  Luxembourg  and 
foreign  equities,SO~ is in investment funds  with  foreign  funds  twice  the 
level of the domestic funds ,while the remaining 5% is dealing in bearer certificates. 
The  recent success of various  laws  giving  incentives  for  investments in 
equities in Belgium  (Monory  and  de  Clercq)  has  led  to  some  reflection 
on  the part of  the  Luxembourg  authorities  on  the opportuneness of 
introducing  si~ilar fiscal  incentives  in  Luxembourg  to encourage  the 
listing of  some  domestic equities which,  at the present moment;  are 
traded over-the-counter or at  th~ occasional  'ventes  publi~ues'. 
Difficulties of  international  clear~nq and  settlement of  transactions 
in equities,  (as  opposed  to bonds),  are  somewhat  aggravated in the  case 
of Luxembourg  by  the  limited dimensions  of the domestic  equity 
market.  This  is a  further  reason  for  the clear preference allocated to 
fixed interest stock,  which,  in  contrast  ,  is settled with ease in a 
unique  seven day settlement period  through  a  large  network  of  interme-
diaries who  are all members  of  the  local international securities 
depositary CEDEL.  This is more .fully considered in Section 20. 144 
10.3  The  organisation of the Stock Market in Luxembourg 
The  Luxembourg  Stock  Exchange  was  established as  a  self-regulated public 
company  with  a  ninety nine year concession by  a  special  law decree 
approved  on  December  30  1927.  The  Exchange officially  opened on May  6  1929, 
just four  months  before the Wall  Street crash which  heralded the 
beginning of the great economic depression. 
The  management of  the Stock  Exchange  is  the  responsibi.li  ty of  a  fourteen 
man  Board of Directors  elected at the annual General  Assembly.  The  day-
to-day organisation of  t.he  Exchange  acti  vi  t~es is assigned  to  a 
technical body,  the Commission  de  la Bourse. 
The majority of member  firms  are credit institutions.  The 3 main banks account 
for  an  estimated 80%  of aggregate market  volume.  Only  12  of. the  46 
appointed member  'f~rms  are pure  brokers,  wh~reas before  the  law of 
December  1927,  stockbrokers  had  a  total monopoly  over  trading in 
securit~es.  In addition there are many  other non-member  Luxembourg-
based banks  which are also licensed to do  business in securities out-
side the  Stoc~ Exchange.  A  law  passed in  1970 strictly prohibits the 
door-to-door  canvassi.ng of securities and,  in particular,  o~ invesbnent 
funds. 
The  Bourse  considered only  sixteen of  the members  to be  active in the 
market at the time of the study,  the others acting maihly as soliciting agents, 
passing orders  to other act.ive floor members.  In  the main,  the  small  local 
client orders  are·picked  up  by  the  banks.  The  great majority of  the broker 
firms  are local offices of  foreign  firms  and  have  foreign clientele.  There 
is one·Japanese broker with a  Luxembourg  office as  ~ell as  four  Japanese 
banks;  but they do  not seek  local client  business,  and  a  'gentleman's 
agreement'  ex~sts with  the  foreign  banks  that they  should  not open their 
offices  for  resident' business.  If they obtai'n  such  orders  they  tend ·to 
pass  them  to floor  members  of  the  Exchange. 
The  conditions  for  the admission of member  firms  to the Stock  Exchange 
were set out in the original  law  ,  in  the decree  of enactment dated 145 
May  1928,  as well as in the  'R~glement d'Ordre  Int~rieur'.  Though 
individual broker membership is still foreseen in the present Bourse 
regulations,  all broker  firms  are  joint stock companies.  Brokers must 
have  a  Flux  Sm  minimum  capital and effect a  guarantee deposit with the 
Luxembourg  Stock Exchange  of Flux  250,000.  They  may  operate in an 
identical fashion as  banks  as  far as securities business is concerned. 
Though  self-governed,  the Stock  Exchange  is subject to the control of 
the State Commissioner of the Ministry of Finance and all changes  in 
stock market rules must receive  the prior approval of the Minister of 
Finance.  ln addition,  the bank members  of the Stock Exchange are also 
subject to the supervision and control,  as banking institutes and  not 
as members  of the Bourse,  of  the  Luxembourg  Monetary  Institute.  This 
body is also responsible for  the regulation and control of all open and 
closed-end investment funds  and  companies  falling  under  the  law of 
August  25  1983,  whether  they are listed or not. 
10.4  Equities  trading on  the  Luxembourg  Exchange 
"  Floor  trading of equities is carried out in Luxembourg  under  the criee 
system,  the pri'nciples  and  procedures of which are officially specified 
under  the  1928  regulations  and  subsequent Orders.  The  minimum  quantity 
of quotation is  ten shares  or Flux  5,000. 
Price fn:ing  is  carried out in trading sessions on  the Stock 
Exchange  floor  which  commences  at 11.00 hours,  the dealing members 
seated  ~n a  single ring presided  by  a  market official  (greffier) 
who  calls each  stock in turn.  The  dealers  then indicate vocally 
whether  they wish to trade,  and  from  the bids and offers made  a  price 
is fixed at which  the majority of the orders  can be  executed.  All 
orders declared must then be  executed at this price,  insofar as  the 
balance of bids  and offers permits.  As  the dealing proceeds it is 
permissible to make  further  bargains  in a  security already called,  the 
price of such transactions being notified to  the Market Official by 
slip,  who  acknowledges  them.  Several prices may  be made  in a  security 
during  a  session,  and  a  broker  not  finding  a  counterparty may  declare 
a  price as  'seller'  or  'buyer',  which will stand in the list for that 
day. )tj(, 
Luxembourg  securities  laws  do not require thc'lt trarhng  takes  place  through 
a  broker or on  the Stock  Exchange  floor.  Most  official market prices, 
particularly for  Eurobonds,  are  for  small  market lots for  transactions 
on  behalf.of private investors,  and  therefore may  have  little or  no 
relation to off-market prices  for  large blocks of securities which are 
normally effected over  the  telephone. 
Nevertheless,  Stock  Exchange  officials believe  that the increase in 
Exchange  trading  volume  figures  in recent years  ~s a  sign of an 
increased concentration of  trading on  the  Stock Exchange.  The  volume 
of dealings  on  the  Luxembourg  Stock  Exchange  in 1982  rose  by  47.65~ 
compared with the previous  year.  Fixed interest securities increased 
by  53.5%  and variable income securities by  27.2%.  The  expansion of the 
Exchange  is being achieved by vigorous promotion  and by  the provision 
of  enhanced  services,  particularly in the field of computerised 
information.  The  market data available  from  the  Luxembourg  Exchange 
is of the highest quality. 
10.4  Considerations affecting  linkage 
The  aspects of interest arising  from  review of the present Luxembourg 
markets  relate  +ess  to the  existing floor market in foreign securities, 
which is an efficient service  to local investors but is not significant 
in European  terms,  than to developments which may  in the  future  take 
place  ~n Luxembourg,  or which are happening  there  now  and  have  indirect 
relevance  to equities linkage. 
It is argued elsewhere  in  th~s Re?ort that the  Luxombourg-based  clearing 
system CEDEL  is already  setting important precedents,  to which those 
responsible  for  international equities settlement should pay close 
attention.  It is of some  interest that both CEDEL  and  EUROCLEAR 
operate  from  within the  Union  Economique of Belgium  and  Luxembourg. 147 
The  development of ECU  issues in the international  bond markets 
may  have significance in future multiple quot&tion of equities in a 
linkage system.  Luxembourg  has  long experience of this development 
which began with the creation of the European Unit of Account 
(EOA),  to  provide greater  currency  staP.~lity  to  investors 
and,  at the  same  time,  to increase the stability of the individual 
European currencies.  Other basket currencies were later introduced 
such as  the European Composite  Unit  (EURCO),  Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR's)  and  the European Currency  Unit  (ECU). 
The  ECU,  now  based on  the  European Monetary System,  has  developed 
remarkably since 1981  when  the first bonds,  linked to the European 
Monetary  System,  were  issued.  Already,  by the end of 1962,  it was 
.the second biggest underlying  currency utilised in new  issues on the 
Eurobond market  (see Tables 10.1 and 10.2).  As  opposed  to the other 
previous basket currencies,  the  ECU  which is the keystone  to a  new 
monetary  system,  is not linked to the  U.S.  dollar. 
The  utilisation of this currency in international listing and quotation 
of Euro-equities has already been proposed by  a  leading Italian bank in 
its efforts to break  the perennial  impasse with regard to Italian 
resident investments  in foreign equities. 
The  success of the  ECU  bond  issues has proved remarkable in light of 
the relatively short period since their introduction on  the EurobOnd 
market.  The  first ECU  denominated bond,  linked to the  European  Monetary 
System,  was  launched as  recently as  Spring  1981  and,  already by  the end 
of 1982,  ECU  issues were  third in number,  preceded only by U.S.  dollar 
and Canadian dollar denominated  bonds.  By  the end of 1983,  ECU  issues 
had already far surpassed listed Canadian dollar securities and the 
aggregate value of ECU  listed bonds at the end of 1983 was  equivalent 
to  ECU  4,483m,  and total market turnover  in such issues in 1983  was 
equivalent to a  par value of ECU  56;923,500.  In the period from 
January  to October 1983,  thirty one  ECU  issues were  included in the - wa 
classification of the one  hundred most actively traded bond  issues 
and all top six performers were  denominated in this currency. '
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SECTION  11  THE  'INTERNATIONAL  EQUITIES  MARKET  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 
11.1  Corporate Status and  Self-Regulation 
Valuation of the  factors  in the  London  market which will influence the 
views  and  the attitudes of  the  Stock  Exchange  towards  European  linkage 
is rendered difficult because of the present rapid rate of change of 
the  U.K.  capital market.  While  the  same  problem  appl~es in all the 
other European markets,  any  likely changes  in  them  are predictable and 
are unlikely to result in immediate  and radical alteration of market 
structures.  The  current course of events  ip  London  is widely  considered 
to  imply  fundamental  change~ of  the  traditio~al structure of  the  U.K. 
market~  and  of  the manner  in which it has  operated during  the present 
century.  It should  be  noted,  therefore,  that descriptions of the 
regulatory and,  dealing  systems  in the U.K.  which  follow rela·te to the 
time  in which  the study was  being  made  (1982-83). 
The  Stock  Exchange is a  self-regulating institution,  operating under 
a  Deed  of Settlement,  which  constitutes it as  a  mutual  association. 
Traditionally it has been governed by a  Council  comprised of and 
selected by its members  of whom  there are  some  4,000 brokers  and 
jobbers.  The  Rules  and Regulations  of  the Stock  Exchange,  which are 
the responsibility of the Council,  regulate not only the admission  and 
activities of members  and member  firms,  and  the operation of the 
Exchange,  but also·,  througll  the  linked  Listing Requirements,  broader 
aspects of the securities industry.  At the time of the study there was  no 
securities legislation in the generally accepted  sense of that term  in the 
u.  K. •  The  position of the  Stock Exchange was acknowledged in certain statutes 
but it  was not incorporated or directly regulated under  any.  There 
existed a range  of minor  legislation related to the prevention of fraud 
and  licensing of dealing,  the  substance of which  is under current 
Government  review.  There was a  substantial body  of case  law  relevant 
to securities dealing,  to the rights and obligations of members  of the 
Stock  Exchange  and clients.  The  Listing Requirements  of the Stock 
Exchange were linkt;d with, and in various aspects enhanced the Companies  Acts, 
but were independent of  them.  The  Stock  Exchange  has  traditionally 
operated in close liaison with  the Bank  of England  and Government 154 
departments,  and'more  recently has participated in the Council of the 
Securities Industry,  but none of these agencies  had  any  formal 
day-to-day control over it. 
The .system of self-regulation is considered  to have  a  number of 
justifications.  It is flexible .. At  operating level,  procedures can 
be  rapidly altered to meet  the  needs of the market.  OVerall,  the 
system allows  the market  to respond more  dynamically to new  financial 
or economic  requirements  than would  be  the case if its form  were 
constrained by  legislation.  The  self-regulating system permits control 
by professionals.  The  securities industry is highly technical.  Its 
problems  are  considered most effectively resolved and  its 
potential best developed by its participants.  Given that the Rules 
are fair,  discipline of  the market is best secured by professionals and 
peers  who  are able to operate a  system alert in its detection of abuse 
and,  in mutual self interest,  rapid  t.o  rectify any default.  In recent 
years the Stock Exchange has  taken  steps to assure that its 
disciplinary actions receive  full publicity. 
11.2  Sinqle Capacity 
The  capacities in which members  of the Stock Exchanqe  are able to 
operate are  thus,  under this  system,  not determined by  law,  as is the 
case in the majority of the Community  Exchanges,  but are determinable 
by decisions of. the Exchanqe  itself. 
Since  the first decade  of this century,  the  London  market has  been 
characterised by the  separation of  those member  firms  permitted  to deal 
as aqents  (brokers)  and  those permitted to deal  as principals  (jobbers). 
The  sinqle capacity system has  determined  the structure of the London 
market and  the physical nature of the market  floor and its operations. 
In the domestic market  (i.e.  U.K.  Sterling-denominated securities)  the 
principle is strictly observed.  All  client business must be  taken by 
brokers  to  jobbers,  who  as  a  corollary,  have  no  access  to clients. 
Other  than in exceptional circumstances,  broker-broker dealing is 
prohibited.  The  jobber,  who  is. obliged in normal  circumstances  to make - 155 
a  continuous  two-way quotation in the securities in which  he is 
authorised to deal,  makes  a  market between  the selling and buyinq 
brokers,  and by managing his securities and money positions provides  the 
li~uidi  ty of the market.  Fairness of price is assured by cornpeti tion between 
r~e jobbers,  of whom  there must not be  less  than  2  in any  security. 
The  single capacity system,  with its avoidance of conflict of interest 
and its development of market-makers with a  large capital base  has 
resulted in a  near-total concentration of the U.K.  domestic market 
without any legislation of the type which  induces  such concentration 
in the  con~inental markets.  This is consonant with  the attitude of 
the  London  market,  which considers its strength to lie in its open  and 
international character,  and its freedom  from  legislative  reg~lation. 
11.3  Adaptation of  the  Single Capacity Rules  to  International  Tradi~ 
The  London  Rules have,  however,  always  acknowledged  that the rigorous 
separation of capacity observed in'the domestic market cannot be 
applied to members'  arbitrage  and  international dealing.  During  the 
whole period of single capacity operation,  concessions  have  been avail-
able permitting brokers to deal as principals,  with  forms  of dual 
capacity operation  in international dealing,  and,  until  the unification 
of  the  U.K.  and  Irish  Stock  Exchanges  in 1973,  in  transactions between 
the provincial  U.K.  Exchanges. 
Throughout the 1960's  and  more  intensely during  the  1970'~ linked 
with the entry of the United Kingdom  into the E.E.C.,  the Rules 
~overning members'  international dealings  have been  under constant 
review.  Although  the  re-establishm~nt of the role of the Stock Exchange 
as  an  international capital market was  not a  realistic issue until the 
abolition of the U.K.  Exchange Control  in 1979,  an active debate  on  the 
various  formulae through which members  might competitively establish 
their position in international business had  been going on  for  twenty 
years.  Rules  changes  which  began  to  impl.ement, :the new  pattern of dealing 
were  made  during  the period of  the  Consultants'  survey. 156 
The  increasing !nternationalisation of equities business appears to have 
been first acknowledged  by  a  Council  Committee  :i.n  1968-69,  set up to 
review  the issues  involved in an  application of an  N.Y.S.E.  broker to 
become  a  member  of the London  Exchange.  Although  the Committee 
reported in favour of creating a  category of membership which would 
accommodate  this,  the Council did not accept the proposal.  In  1973  the 
Hamilton Committee  proposed  an alternative formula  for  foreign member-
ship which it considered of particular importance if the London  Exchange 
was  to play an  appropriate role in the  E.E.C ..  Its findings  were 
deferred.  In October  1974  a  Committee  inconclusively considered  the 
admission of British registered banks.  A major  and possibly definitive 
contribution to the debate came  with the Marriot proposals  for 
1nternational dealer members,  under which  limited corporate members 
might be  formed  by the brokers  and  jobbers  together to deal  in registered 
international stocks  for  settlement in currencies other  than sterling. 
Forty nine per cent outside capital would  be  permit~ed in these firms, 
and  their business would be  out~ide the protection of tne Compensation 
Fund.  The  Marriot proposals were  at the time considered to constitute 
too great a  challenge to the single capacity  syst~, and were  no't 
progressed. 
Following  a  series of Council  Committee  reports which  indicated 
increasing awareness of the growing activities of foreign brokers in 
London,  the Planning Committee  of the Council  in 1977  made  advanced 
proposals  related to the concept of a  European market  (the Wills Report). 
This envisaged  an  international market which would be part of,  but 
separate from,the  Stock Exchange.  A dealing network with market-making 
and  an  information and  recording  system was  proposed,  to which 
institutions or institutionally-controlled firms  would have  secondary 
·but privileged access.  The  proposals,  which might have done  much  to 
formulate  and  supportmembersinternational market activities which  were 
becoming dangerously diffused,  were  not accepted.  The  Council  turned 
in effect to  d  solution of retaxation of international dealing rules 
which would offer greater opportunity  to members  to compete  in inter-
national off-market business.  The  proposals of the Steel  Committee  to 157 
offer the membe+s  broader access  to  a  register of market-makers  limited 
to non-banking members  of foreign Stock Exchanges which made  continuous 
prices in foreign  currency securities were  accepted as an alternative. 
The  system in  ~orce during  the period of  the Consultants•  study was 
based  on  these  'designated dealer'  rules.  The  concessions were  defined 
in two  dimensions.  First they identified  'overseas securities•  in 
which,  under certain conditions,  brokers might deal outside  the market. 
Thi9 categorisation was  essentially by  type of security,  and  not based 
on whether the security was  listed or not,  as  opposed  to the case in 
other Community markets.  Secondly  the  rules identified designated 
dealers with  whom  such  transactions might be  undertaken. 
The  register of designated dealers was  constructed by  applications  from 
member  firms  and,  rising immediately to  some.  300 major  foreign 
securities houses,  proved more  comprehensive  than had  been anticipated. 
Any  London  firm  was  permitted to deal with any  securities house  on  the 
regi~ter.  The original intention of limiting the register to category 
one  'members  or member  firms  of overseas'  Stock  Exchanges  based overseas 
excluding banks'  proved inappropriate  for  the.European markets. 
A  category  'member  or member  firms  of  Stock  Exchanges  within  the  E.E.C. 
including banks  and  associates of banks  provided that the ultimate 
control lies within  the country within which  the Exchange  is situated' 
was  inserted.  London  offices of designated dealers which made  a 
genu~ne market in the specified securities were  also permitted on  the 
register.  In light of the activity of banks  in  international securities 
dealing in  those  E.E.C.  countries  where  banks  are not members  of 
Stock Exchanges  ,  a  further.category  was  added  which  gave  the 
Council discretion to  i~clude such institutions.  In practice this 
covered Belgian,  French and Italian banks. 
Under  these arrangements  jobbers were  freed  to deal as principals with  any 
of the designated dealers,  and  their previous restriction to a  single 
arbitrage correspondent in each  centre was  removed.  While  this 
concession meant  that the  jobbers were  able to deal with any of the 
designated intermediaries in the major  overseas market,  including 
those of the Community,  the provisions of Rule  88a were primarily 
framed  to permit them to compete  effectively in  the overseas markets 
in which  the  Stock  Exchange  had  stron~ traditional business  connections, 158 
in particular !n the U.s.  and  the gold markets.  The  international 
dealing rules continued  to prevent  the  jobbers  from  having  any  access 
to clients or institutions. 
From  the  standpoint of the brokers,  the most  significant aspect of the 
arrangement was  that,  subject to Rule  88b,  they  could deal  outside the 
Stock Exchange  in non-sterling securities with  a  wide  range of external 
market-makers.  Before dealing with such  an  external  London market-
maker  or in an  overseas  centre,  the broker was  obliqed to ensure that 
the price was  more  favourable  to his client than that quoted by  the 
London  jobber,  but  an alternative clause permitting  the broker  to deal 
abroad if he  considered it in the interest of his client left the 
situation very open.  The  extent to which  the intent of this Rule  was 
respected was,  at the  time of the survey,  a  point of contention between 
jobbers  and  brokers.  As  discussed eisewhere,  although  the  jobbers make 
effective  markets  in the  whole  range of major  European securities, 
they only see  a  minority of U.K.  brokers'  European business.  on  the 
broker side,  the old  type of arbitrage operations traditionally carried 
out by  them  has been superseded  by  the increased access of the  jobbers 
to  the.foreig~ markets.  But other external factors,  such as more 
effective communication  had  already  eroded arbitrage.  In  the  European 
markets  there is virtually no  position-taking by  the  London  brokers. 
The  designated dealer arrangements  introduced greater regulation into 
members'  international dealing,  and permitted  increased member  access 
to such business  in a  way  which protected the domestic market and held 
it firmly within the single capacity system.  It nevertheless  imposed 
strains between  the brokers and  jobbers  and  only questionably met  the 
full  force  of competition  from  overseas'  brokers established in London. 
The  foreign  securities houses  were  able to operate in  London  under 
several significant advantages,  being backed by the strong natural 
business of their own  market,  having offices in appropriate  time  zones. 
Under  the  'designated dealer'  arrangements  they were  able  to deal with 
both clients and  Stock  Exchange  firms  and offer negotiated rates of 
commission. lSS 
Th~ unstable aspects of the  'designated dealer'  system were  apparently 
recognised in the Council decision of December  1983  to set up 
international securities houses,  under  a  scheme  which  is likely to be 
definitive as  long as the domestic market retains its present form. 
International Dealer  (I.D.)  firms,  for  the purpose of dealing in 
overseas securities,may now  be  set. up  by  a  member  firm,  or by  a 
consortium of brokers,  jobbers or brokers  and  jobbers together. 
Non-members  may  participate in such  a  consortium,  provided that it is 
more  than  SO\  owned  by  one  or more  member  firms. 
The  I.D.  firm-s  may  deal only as principals.  Though  under. Stock  Exchange 
regulation  in respect of  such matters  as minimum  capital requirement 
(which is provisionally set at £500,000) and  financia.l  regulation, 
the  new  firms ·  will  be  dealing  mainly  in  telephone 
markets with professional counterparties,  and  they will not be 
permitted to deal  on  the Stock  Exchange  floor.  The  !.D.'s will be 
subject to rules in respect of checking and  settlement of bargains,  and 
their  transactions must  be  recorded  for  inspection by  the Exchange 
Quthorities when  called for.  Internal transactions,  those between  an  I.D. 
and its parent.Member  Firm  must  be  repor~ed to  the  Exchange  the  same  day. 
Other  than  in exceptional  circumst~rices, 1t is not intended that trans-
actions or  any  other activity 1n an  l.D.  firm will be  covered  by  the 
Stock  Exchange  Conpensation Fund. 
Although  the  I.D.  firms  are limited to acting  as principals,  they appear 
to be  a  new  dimension  in the London  market.  Operated  jointly by 
jobbing and  broking  firms  they will permit  the promotion of international 
markets,with principal  and  client business  integrated in a  way  which 
was  impossible  under previous  drrangements.  Not  only brokers but 
also  investors  may  deal with  the I.D.'s.  While it is anticipated  that~ 
in the main,  such  inves.tors will be professionals,  it is acknowledg.ed 
that general  investors may  have  access  to the new  firms. 
Under  the  new  scheme  the designated dealer  arrangements  are abolished. 
The  Rules  have  been  amended  to permit member  firms  to execute business 
with  any  member  of a  recognised overseas  Stock  Exchange  or approved 160 
association,  wh~ch is interpreted to include any existing designated 
dealer  (such  as  a  French  bank)  which  does  not  q~alify under  that 
definition. 
The  London  international equities market  studied by  the Consultants in 
1982  and  1983  was  in a  state of transition.  This  culminated  in the 
I.D.  firm  system which is 'likely to provide  a  stable arrangement for 
development of  London  international business.  The Consultants have 
considered it worthwhile to note briefly  the nature of this transition 
in the Report,  as  they believe aspects of it may  have  relevance  to the 
general problems of the  European Stock  Exchanges  in their approach  to 
linkage. 
First,  the London  example  confirms  that modification to Rules can be 
made  to create,  within the regulatory  framework  of an Exchange, 
modified arrangements  for  international dealing compatible with the 
domestic market.  Second,  it is an  illustration of a  gradual  and 
progressive approach to this problem.  Third, it makes  clear that the 
definition of such  arrangements  by  security type  and by  type of foreign 
counterparty  c~n,  in market  terms,  result in a  workable  scheme. 
Moreover,  the mechanisms  of the London  European  securities market, 
developed  through  these arrangements,  are worthy of review as  a 
successful initiative in European equities dealing. 
11.4  The  London  European Equities Market 
The  natural business of the London  brokers  in European equities is 
predominantly institutional.  The  pension  funds,  the life and general 
insurance  funds,  and  the unit and  investment trusts provide  a  stronger 
flow  of  funds  for  investment  than is available in any other Community 
market,  and,  in face  of declining direct individual  investment,  are 
primarily responsible  for  the comparatively large value of London 
transactions.  The  increased investment of  the U.K.  institutions in 
foreign equities,  figures of which  are given in section 12.4,  clearly , 
Hil 
indicates the  g»ewing  importance  of the international market.  In  1979, 
of institutional assets of  El03.7 billion,  only  6%  was  invested in 
foreign equities.  By  1982  the proportion was  11%  of total assets of 
El96.9 billion.  In absolute  terms  this represented an  increase of  3.5 
times  in foreign equities holdings,  involving  £15.7 billion new 
investment.  The  activity level of this foreign  invest~ent implies 
dealing business of at least twice  this figure. 
If present trends continue,overseas equities will be  a  more  important 
element of U.K.  institutional portfolios than  U.K.  equities by  the end 
of the decade.  If this were  to be  so,  institutional dealing in 
foreign equities would  exceed  that in U.K.  equities well before that 
time due  to the different local activity levels of  the  two  types of 
securities. 
I 
There  are no discriminate figures which permit the proportion of 
investment in  Community  securities to be determined.  Those available 
from  the Stock  Exchange  stat1stics are,  for  reasons discussed in 
Section 12,  partial,  and  are positively misleading as  the growth has 
occurred off the floor  and,  in the main,  is not included in Stock, 
Exchange  transaction records.  On  the other hand,  there tended to be 
consistency,  not only  in the  U.K.,  but also across  Europe,  in the 
structure of portfolios with  regard  to outward  investment  in equities. 
Among  the institutions interv1ewed,  a  general position emerged, 
within  foreign equities,  of  50%-60%  in U.S.,  15%-25%  in Japanese,  10% 
in Far Eastern  and  5%-10%  in second-country  European securities.  The 
cu~rent transaction levels  related to this are submitted  in 
section  12. 
The  lesser interest· in second-country  European securities is much  due 
to the fact that the institutions are  committed  to hold the iarger 
proportion of their investments  in Sterling,  against Sterling 
liabilities,  and  have  tended  to  see little incentive in acquiring 
securities of countries which  are considered to have  the  same  problems 
of  economic  structure as  the  U.K ..  To  this are  added  the  disincentives 
of narrower markets  in which  dealing operations. are restricted  and  in 162 
which  limited ranges  of securities offer less potential for diversified 
investment. 
During  the  surve~ a  considerable change  in attitude to European  invest-
ment  was  evident.  In  1982  c~ents by major  London  investors were 
highly coloured by  ten years inactivity and  turgid performance in the 
European markets.  By  1983  however,  several of the Community  markets, 
notably  Denmark,  the Netherlands,  West  Germany  and  Francehadout-performed 
the major  world markets,  and  investment in European equities again 
became  attractive.  During  1983,  while  bhe  number  of  London  investors 
in the ·European markets did not markedly  increase,  the  sums  invested 
became  much  larger.  This,  and  the relative rises of  the European 
stock market indices  and capitalisations,  presumably  increased the 
proportion of European equities in the assets of the U.K.  institutions 
in 1983. 
A further  important source of  London  European business are the  funds 
managed by  the  U.K.  merchant  banks  on behalf of foreign  institutions, 
such  as  the American pension  funds.  Flows  of ERISA  funds  through 
London  have  contributed considerably to  the resurgence of the European 
markets during the last year. 
No  figures exist  to  indicate the participation of the private 
investor in London  European equities dealing.  In  the main it is 
assumed  that,  relative to the institutions,  this is of low and 
decreasing·significance.  'The  private investor shares of the overall 
equities market fell,  between  1975  and  1981,  from  37.5%  to 28.2%. 
Moreover  only  the  larger  and more  informed private investor is likely 
to take direct holdings of European  shares.  At  least one of the 
London  brokers specifies  a  minimum  marketable quantity which,  in the 
case,  for  example,  of a  major German  stock represents  a  transaction 
of  £5,000-£6,000 value.  There  has  been a  growth  in specialist European 
unit trusts,  but these,  at an  aggregate capitalisation of some 
E30-£40m  are not  sig~ificant in comparison with the institutional 
investment. .  11.5 
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London  Jobbing in European  EqUities 
The  growth rate of foreign equities business in London  has resulted in 
t~e  emergen~e of a  small but strongly organised activity which  has 
attained an  informal  identity as  the  London  European equities market. 
Four  jobbers,  of which  three are major,  have  been active in it for  some 
·ten years,  and  in 1983  a  further  jobber entered the market.  As  has 
been observed,  the European  equities market operated by  the  jobbers is 
an  Exchange  market,  within  the  single capacity system,  and  fully 
regulated and  partially serviced by  the  Stock  Exchange. 
The  jobbers quote conti.nuous  two-way  prices in securities listed on  any 
European  Exchange  whether  listed in  London  or not.  They  are able to 
quote major secu7ities in sizes  comparable with  their normal  U.K.  scale 
of operation.  London  institutional comment  acknowledged  the value of 
the  jobbing  system  in this respect.  Although  the price information  from 
the  competitive  Jobbing  system was  inevitably less  transparent than 
that available  from,  for·  example,  the specialist system on  the N.Y.S.E., 
~t was  recognised that this permitted the  jobbers· to handle  very  large 
transactions without excessive effect on market price.  It was  suggested 
that occasionally large lines of stock  could be moved  more  easily in 
London  than  they could in  New  York.  In  the European market,  the 
operation of  a  joint stock account  by  a  U.K.  jobber and  a.Dutch bank 
broadens  the market.further in a  manner  which may  be  a  constructive 
indication of  future  European  trends. 
The  jobber's European market  is operated off the Exchange  floor  in 
dealing  rooms  appropriately equipped with  lnformation and  telecommunica-
tions  dev~ces for  ~nternational business which could not be  accommodated 
on  the present market floor.  Normal  floor  conventions are observed in 
this  telephone dealing.  The  normal  course of business is to receive  an 
approach  from  a  broker  in an  E.E.C.  stock,  establish a  price  and  deal at 
that price,assuming a long or short position as the case may be,and then undo 
the  transactio!! on the ctppropriate continental market.  There is little  genuine 
~1rbi  trage,  due  t:o  the  effl  ciency of commun~catio~ and immediacy  of dealing. 
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running  a  foreign  exchange  book  and  absorbing  the currency risk.  The 
jobber not only satisfies the London  European business,  but executes 
total  foreign business by dealing  in  the  European markets  within their 
prices. 
The  international market is highly dependent on mutual  advice of 
foreign counterparties and,  within its.conventions, it is normal  to 
open  a  dealing position more  than would  be  the case in domestic  business. 
The  market  thus  relies heavily not only on  formally  transmitted price 
information,  but also on personal  contacts established by  telephone, 
whichconstitute the normal dealing channels.  The  London  European 
market is thus  ambiguous  in  terms  of the  two  alternatives  in which 
European  linkage has  tended  to be  considered,  - via members  or via the 
floor.  While  the  jobber's European dealing  is off the market,  it is,  in 
all senses integral to the Stock Exchange dealing  and the inclusion of 
the  jobber dealing  rooms  in  any  European  scheme  based·on  floor  linkage 
would he both necessary  and  correct. 
There  appears  evidence  that the  London  jobbers have made  an effective 
sally 1.nto  Eur,opean  market-making.  Their  success  in this respect is 
assisted by  the under-development or diffusion of this  function  on  the 
Continental Exchanges.  One  major  jobber reported that on  certain days 
his  firm  had  transacted more  business  in the securities of a  given 
country than that reported on  the  foreign  Stock  Exchange.  The  efficiency of 
the  system is vouched by the ability of the  jobbers both to operate 
their positions,  and at the  same  time quote prices which  are fully 
competitive with those derived  from  collective prices which,in theory, 
should be  finer.  Comparison  of the  London  Sterling quotations with the 
Continental market prices,  using  current spot exchange rates,  suggests 
that the  jobber's prices  are rarely more  than  l%  away  from  the price of 
the  main  market,  and  the  jobbers ability to position allows  him  to 
quote  competitivdly in moving markets. 
Although  the  jobbers' European dealing represents a  small proportion of 
their overall business, it has  in  recent years  risen  to a  significant 
proportion of their foreign dealings,  with  a  very high rate of growth. 165 
The:  European  dealing  was  little  affected  by  the  adverse 
effects  of  the  designated  dealer  system
1  effects  ~1hich 
arose  more  from  access  available  to  the  brokers  than  from 
competition  from  the  London branches of forei0n securities houses. 
The  jobber~ counte~parties in the other Community  capital centres  tend 
to be  the  Stock  Exchange  intermediaries carrying out comparable roles, 
normally  the banks.  An  inherent weakness  of the London  system at the 
time of the Consultants'  survey was  that the split in capacity  inhibited 
the development of the full potential of  the business.  Jobbers  who  had 
invested in professional expertise and facilities to develop  the 
European market had  no  access  to clierits.  The  market could therefore 
be  promoted  and  developed  only  through  the brokers,  on whose part no 
great commitment  could·be  assumed,  and  only if the brokers  took  their 
business  to the  U.K.  jobber.  Both  these factors  presented difficulty. 
11.6  London  Broker Activity in European Equities 
Until  recent years  the  European markets  have  been of  limited interest 
to  the broker.  members.  Europe  did not constitute  a  traditional area of 
business.  While  an  acknowledged  function of the  London  brokers has 
been  to  'open•·  foreign  ~arkets to U.K.  investors,  as  was  notably the 
case with the  Scandinavian markets,  the initial attempts to develop 
European business in the early 1970's,  in anticipation of E.E.C. 
membership,  both  fellupon  unfortunate  times  and,  in the case of  the 
funds,  were  badly-mismanaged.  At  the same  time it _was  recognised that 
dealing  and settling in  the  European markets was  complex· _and  called for 
specialist brokers  and staff.  Thus  during  the  1970's although 
substantial dealing  took  place in various  securities such as  Dutch 
internationals,  and  in particular the  two  switching  stocks  R.D.  Shell 
and  Unilever,  European dealing  tended  to be at a  low ebb,  subject in 
the main  to currency-driven vogues.  Under  these circumstances  only a 
small nucleus  of committed brokers maintained their expenditure  on 
European  specialisation. 
The  situation appeared  to change  with  the  removal  of Exchange  Controland 
by  1982,  evidence  suggested  tnat about  30-40 of the  London  brokers, 166 
including most of the large brokers  and certain of  the smaller brokers 
active in the European markets,  maintained  some  form  or other of 
European  specialisation in research,  dealing  and settlement. 
Typically,  the larger London  brokers' European dealing is office-based,. 
The  dealing desks,  possibly operated by  six to ten dealers,  are  likely 
to be divided between the old Sterling area markets  - South Africa and 
the Far East,  - the U.S.  market  and  the  Dutch  and other European markets, 
with the dealers specialised in one  or other of these fields.  The 
operation is likely to be  fully active  from  0800 hours  to  2100 hours 
daily,  taking  advantage  of the favourable  London  time  situation,  which 
falls  in the middle of  the major  international markets. 
Little of  the business is in  the arbitrage  functions  which predominated 
twenty  or thirty years  ago,  the  scope  for  which  has  been  eroded by  tight 
dealing  and  communications.  The  majority of  the dealing effort 
comprises  constant contacting of foreign correspondents,  in the 
European  case mainly  banks,  advising  them  of prices and  of the market, 
and  generating business  in this manner.  The  expertise and goodwill of 
such  foreign correspondents is a  vital  element of the market.  The  London 
brokers  carry out research on  the major  Continental companies,  but for 
such  investment analysis to be  s·ucaessfully  applied,  day  to day 
knowledge  of foreign markets is necessary and  this has  to be  achieved 
by close contact with trusted correspondents. 
Random  quantitative evidence  from  several of the  more  active brokers 
indicated that growth of European equities business  exceeded that both 
of other foreigns  and  of  the market as  a  whole.  As  the brokers are 
permitted access  to the  foreign markets  and can deal,with any of the 
designated Continental brokers  and  banks,  the greater part of this 
increased agency  business has  tended to go dir·ect  to the markets of 
origin.  The  value of this increased business  cannot  be  obtained  from 
Stock  Exchange statistics, as  such transactions are not London-dealt. 
It is submitted in Section  12  that it might  be  deduced  as  a  ratio of 
the  jobber5 transaction figures. - 167 
Two  factors  limit the extent to which  the  London  broker can fully exploit 
his  local institutional market.  The  first  ~s the internationalisation of 
portfolios which may  have  been  an  important factor breaking the link 
between the  local broker  and  the local institution.  As  long as  the 
institution was  investing either in  the  U.K.  market or in related 
markets,  in which  the skills and  contacts of the  London  broker  and  the 
services of  the London market were  unquestioned,  there was little need 
for institutional research  functions  and  no  need  for  institutional 
dealing.  Once  investment strategies diversified and  institutional invest-
ment  moved  into markets with which  London  brokers did not have  first-hand 
familiarity,  fund  management  became  more  dependent  on  foreign advice  and 
services.  An  apparent need  t~en arose for  functions  within the 
institutions to process  such  advice  and,  more  arguably,  a  'dealing• 
function  to give  the instructions.  The  emergence  of  the  institutional 
dealer facilitated direct transmission of orders to a  broker or  bank  in 
a  foreign centre,  by-·passing  the  local broker.  While  the London 
~nvesting institutions are not  unready  to.accept advice  from  brokers who 
are expert in the European narkets,  and  place possibly  30%-40%  of their 
European  equitl.es busjness  on  this basis  in London,  the majority of 
business is  p~aced directly abroad.  The  proportion placed abroad  by 
the  London-managed  fund.s  is higher. 
A factor  compounding  this loss of business  to London  brokers is tneir 
obligation to charge  a  minimum  commission  to  the institution,  which  thus 
incurs  a  double  commission  on  the  transaction.  As  indicated above, 
this does  not totally cut out the London  bl·oker,  and  the disadvantage 
can be offset by quality of service.  It represents nevertheless a 
consi.derable basic disadvantage.  Negotiable  commissions were  permitted 
in non-Sterling securities  from  May  1984. 
The  U.K.  brokers  are permitted,  under  revised Rules promulgated in 1980 
to set up overseas  organisations controlled by  London  firms  which may 
operate according  to the rules of  the. foreign  Exchange  subject to 
provisos protecting the U.K.  market  and,  at present,  the  commissions 
structure.  These  have little relevance  to the situation in the European 
markets.  There have  been  one  or ,two  att11mpts  to establish offices  in • 
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Europe,  but,  t6 the knowledge  of the Consultants,  these have  only 
survived within  the.Eurobond market.  The  maintenance of offices in 
Europe  was  found  to be  expensive  and unnecessary  to cover markets in 
the  same  time  zone  serviced by  effective international telecommunications. 
The  attraction of business  from  foreign  investors  to the U.K.  domestic 
market - the main  justification of  an overseas office,  - was  not 
feasible,  or in some  cases  impossible,  in the European markets. 
Business has  in consequence  developed  through  the network  of counter-
parties on  a  reciprocal basis.  Notwithstanding this,  certain of the 
more  active broker  firms  with  long  standing involvement  in Continental 
ma~kets consider that development of  some  form  of associate membership 
between  the European  Exchanges  would  be  a  constructive plan.  It is 
appreciated that such membership  links  would  raise complex problems. 
They  would  technically be  most easily achieved  under present 
circumstances  between  the  Exchanges  in which the broker  function is 
defined· similarly to the  U.K.  convention.  There  was  scepticism as 
to whether  ~n these cases effective membership  concessions  could, 
in fact,  be  obtained in the  foreseeable  future. 
Current and  future  development  of the  London  International EqUities Market 
Fully effective linkage of  the  European  Exchanges will be  a  long process 
which,  on  the most  optimistic construction,  will  t~e a  decade  to 
achieve.  Durinq  the period,  the structure of the Stock  Exchange  is 
likely to  change  so radically that its influence  on  linkage plans must 
be  assessed  from  a  hypothesis of its likely future  form  rather  than  from 
the present situation. 
In  recent years,  the  structure of  the Stock Exchange  has  been  faced  by 
a  double  challenge.  The  first was  from  the Government's  reference of 
certain procedures  fundamental  to the present operation of the Exchange 
to the Restrictive Trade Practices Court.  The  second,  was 
from  the  competition  to  which  the  members  have  become 
.subject,  in an  open international market,  from  foreign  intermediaries 
free  to establish in London  and  free,  in their operation,  from  the 
constraints of  the single capacity system. - -169 
·rn 1973,  the Restrictive Trade Practices Act,  originally passed  in  1959 
to combat producer cartels and  responsible  for  much  of the concentration 
of  U.K.  industry in the 1960's,  was  extended to cover  services.  The 
first matter to be referred to the Court was travel agents' commission, and second 
the  Rule  Book  of the  Stock  Exchange governing  one  of  .thew~rld's largest 
and most  complex  capital markets.  Many  key  elements of the Rules  and 
Regulations were  registered as  'restrictive practices•.  Amongst  these 
the most  important were  the minimum  commission scales and  the 
restriction of capacity in which members  might act,  i.e.  the broker-
jobber system.  The  Stock  Exchange  strongly  and  consistently opposed 
the reference to the Restrictive Trade Practices Court,  not on  the 
grounds  that-no review  of the market was  necessary,  but because both 
the Act  and  the nature of  the  jurisdiction of  the Court were  inappropriate 
to  proceedings relating to  the capital market  and its future.  During 
the  extended period prior to and  during  the  case,  all documents 
relating to changes  in the practices registered were  considered 
'discoverable',  thus  severely inhibiting any  re-organisation of the 
London  market  ~n response  to the urgent competitive situation which 
confronted it.  Moreover  the Court  had  jurisdiction only to require 
termination of  the practices adjudged restrict!  ve,  and  no  powers 
to advocate  any  constructive alternative procedures . 
. After  some  three years of extensive  legal preparation by  the Office of 
Fair Trading  and  the Stock  Exchange,  at the cost of  several millions of 
pounds  on  what  promised  to be  the most  expensive  case  in.British legal 
history, which;it was  becoming  increasingly  obvious·,  was  deferring  the very 
changes it was  designed  to secure,  the  Government  conceded  that it 
would  legislate to remove  the Stock Exchange  from  the  competence  of .the 
Court,  subject to certain specified conditions.  The  most explicit of 
these  required that the, minimum  commission  scal~s should be abolished 
by  December  31  1986,  and  that the Council  of  The  Stock Exchange  should 
be  opened  to a  minority of lay members.  An  indication appears  to have 
been given at the same  time  that the  system of  single capacity should 
be  prese.rved as  long  as it was  commercially desirable.  The  Stock  Exchange 
~hus became  free  to  re-organise  the maxket,  with the Bank  of  England  and 
Department of  Trade  and  Industry monitoring  developments. \ 
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The  removal of•the Stock  Exchange  from  the  jurisdiction of the Court 
acknowledged  that the pressures  on  the  U.K.  market  from  normal  open 
competition were  more  significant than  legal threat,  and  that the Stock 
Exchange  would  be  likely to respond  rapidly to  the  need  for  change, 
once'the dead  hand  of legal action was  removed.  The  real nature of  the 
threat to the traditional  form  of the Stock Exchange  lay in the 
increasing and  substantial activities in London  of foreign banks, 
investment banks  and  securities houses which,were  tending 
progressively  to  erode  the position of  the members  in  the  international 
markets.  The  prime  example is that of gold shares,  in which  London  and 
the  members  of the Exchange  once held a  dominant position,  but which, 
due  to the more highly-resourced  and  more  flexible operation of 
international off-market operators,  had  been  largely lost to the Stock 
Exchange. 
At  the  same  time,  the scale of competition increased,  re-inforced by 
the  North  American development of even  larger  and diversified securities 
firms  following  May  l  1975.  The  London  firms  and the Stock  Exchange  as 
a  whole  faced  local competition  from  u.s.  and Japanese securities 
houses,  each  ~ble to offer  a  full  range  of securities market services 
from  a  strong capital base,  able to access  U.K.  institutional clients, 
jobbers and brokers alike,  and  able  to deal both as principals and 
agents. 
By  the end of the 1970's,  the  structure of  firms  of the Stock  Exchange 
had already  responded to a considerable degree to the  need  for  concentration. 
Concentration of broker  and  jobber  firms  had  been evident  for  twenty 
years.  The  permitted capital participation of a  non-member  in a  member 
firm was  raised to  29.9%  in 1982.  At  the same  time,  the  long standing 
concern of the Stock  Exchange  over  bank  or  institutional  involv~ent 
appears  to  have  been modifiPd,  and  such  holdings  by  banks  and 
,  institut~ons Ln  member  firms  are  now  permitted,  subject to an undertaking 
relating to  the proportion of business from the owner flowing  to the firm. 
In parallel with these pressures  from  international operators  ,  .the 
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institutions  began  to  show  signs  of  change.  The  ba.nks 
have  1n  recent years,  increased their capital market activities. 
Each of the major clearing banks  has either an  in-house ora subsidiary 
merchant bank:  Concurrently  there has  been  a  degree of pressure  from 
investing institutions for  closer access  to the market.  The  traditional 
form  of the Stock  Exchange,  and its division into broker  and  jobber 
functions,  has  stood as  a  deterrent to such  access  or participation. 
Durin9  the period of the reference  to the Court,  a  delicate equilibrium 
existed whereby  the  twin pillars of the existing market  system,  single 
capacity of 'members  and  the minimum  commission  scale,  protected the 
Stock Exchange  against both  the full  impact of London  based inter-
national competition andany radical change  in the domestic equities 
market.  International securities firms  who  had  no  need or wish  to 
suffer these competitive disadvantages  were deterred  from  serious 
incursion into the official market.  At the same  time,  the broker-
jobber  system offered no  obvious  point of access  to the  m~rket to any 
subsidiary organisation of  the. U.K.  banks  and  institutions. 
Three basic points  emerge  from  this summarised  review of the present 
situation in 'the  London market.  First,  an  array of competitive  forces 
suggests that the market could be  poised  for  abrupt change.  Second, 
while  the single capacity system has  been  justified primarily on 
grounds  of ethics and market effi'ciency,  it has also been  the keystone 
protecting the domestic market  from  both  international and  local 
pressures.  Third,  without minimum  commissions it is  wi~ely believed 
that the broker-jobber  system cannot be  sustained,  at least in its 
present form.  The  Stock  Exchange  by  vote of its members,  has  agreed  to 
abolish minimum  commission  by  lq86.  The  reasonable assumption might be 
t:.hat  a  scheme  for  European  linkage,  wh~ch will  take several  years,  will 
be  faced  by  a  London  market which  is in significantly re-cast form.· 
The  first moves  towards  the  new  structure were  already evident  towards 
the  end of  the  ~tudy.  Several institution5 had already  taken  a  29.9~ 
stake in Stock  Exchange  member  firms,  and it was  strongly  rumoured  that 
the major  U.K.  commercial  banks were  considering  links with leading 172 
member  firms*.  It seemed  likely that the U.K.  merchant banks,  who  had 
been closely watching  developments  from  the  to~ch-line for  some  years 
would decide  that the  time was  ripe  to move.  It was  already widely 
thought that these  acquisitions  anticipated relaxation by  the  Stock 
Exchange of the  29.9%  participation rule with holding  up  to and 
beyond  SO%  permitted in due  course. 
The  potential  impact of negotiated commissions  on  the floor of the 
Stock Exchange  was  soon recognised,  and became  the subject of public 
debate.  A City Capital Markets  Committee paper of  November  1983  argued 
that the  jobbing  system was  unlikely to survive  negotiated commissions. 
The  Stock  Exchange  in November  1983  formed  two  Committees,  each under 
a  Deputy Chairman.  One  studied the constitutional changes  required 
in return for  exemptioR  from  the Restrictive Trade Practices Act,  the 
other studied  the  implications of change in the market,  and matters 
related to outsiders acquiring permitted participation in,  or possibly 
control of member  firms.  The  Discussion Paper  issued in April  1984  gave 
the  resul~s of these Committees'  deliberations and  acknowledged that 
negotiated commissions  would  be  likely to change  the entire structure 
of the London  trading  system  and  the procedures of its market floor. 
* The  first such  link,  between National Westminster  bank  and  the 
jobbers  Bisgood,  Bishop  & Co.  Ltd.  occurred during  the preparation 
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11.8  Key  London  considerations affecting European  Linkage proposals 
Tne  implications of the  London  situation briefly reviewed  above  for 
any  scheme  of European  linkage may  be  summarised  as  follows:-
First,  any  antic~pated changes will  have  a  beneficial impact on the potential 
dealing interface between  the  London  jobbers  and brokers  and  their 
Community  counterparts.  As  described,  the existing arrangements,  now 
consolidated by  the institution of international dealing  firms,  allow 
both brokers  and  jobbers  freedom  of access  to any  necessary counter-
parties in the Community  capital markets.  Any  further move  towards 
dual  capacity would,  from  a  London  standpoint,  simplify rather  than 
complicate  the European dealing interface. 
Second,  although  the  London  European market is developing  strongly as  a 
growth  area of international equities dealing,  it is most unlikely to 
be  accorded highest priority by  the  Stock  Exchange  during the next  few 
years.  The  Stock  Exchange  is entering what  could well prove  to  ~e the 
most  significant period of change  in its history,  with  negot.iated 
commissions bringing  an  enormous  impact  on  the  structure  of  its 
domestic· market and  on its international position.  Nor  is this. 
situation in the  full control of  the Stock  Exchange authorities.  Much 
of their action will be  responsive  to financial  forces which,  in the 
ultimate event will determine  the  form  of the future market.  In  such  a 
situation, it would be realistic to assume  that the attention of both 
Council  and  members  will be  on matters related to  the domestic market-
and  the development of members' major overs'eas  markets. 
Third,  in the  long  term,  assuming  the premises of present capital market 
policy in London  are correct,  and  that the  U.S.  precedents may  be 
validly treated as  an  indication of what is likely to happen  in London, 
the differences between  the  Lon~on Exchange  and  most of its Community· 
counterparts will in  the  short-term become  intensified.  In  the  longer-
term,  as  argued  elsewhere  in this Report,  these developments  may  prove 
~to take  London  on  a  convergent course with  the other Community  Exchanges. 
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In the first instance,  a  number  of present elements of commonality with 
other Community  Exchanges,  in which  monopoly  pr:l.vileges  and restriction 
of capacity tend to prevail,  would  go.  It might be  assumed  that the 
Stock  Exchange would be  unwilLing,  and possibly be  technically unable 
to support  a  linkage system which was  based  on,  or which  unduly 
accommodated  practices which it had itself by  force  of competition been 
compelled  to abandon. 
Fourth,  in  the  longer-term if the dual  capacity• system were  to go,  the 
form  of trading  on  the  London  floor·  would  certainly change.  While  no 
confident prediction can be  made,  there  appears  at least a  possibility 
that,  within  five  years,  London  market procedures might move  to a  form 
more  compatible with the other Community  Exchanges,  assuming  that they, 
in turn,  modernise  the functions  of their  floor price officials and 
concentrate members'  transactions  in central markets. 
Fifth,  the  implementation of negotiable  commiss-ions  in London  is likely 
to pose  a  serious obstacle  to  floor  linkage.  Floor  linkage will require 
either a  common  scale or negotiable  commissions  throughout  the  system. 
Fixed or minimvm  commission  scales are  an  integral element of the 
structures of  several Community  Exchanges. SECTION  12 
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THE  PROBLEMS  OF  QUANTITATIVE  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  PRESENT 
COMMUNITY  INTERNATIONAL  MARKET  IN  E.E.C.  SECURITIES 
12.1  Introduction 
An  attempt to  establi~h the value of dealing  in E.E.C.  equities between 
the Community  Stock  Exchanges  is clearly essential to the  study of 
linkage.  An  accurate qu?ntitative assessment of  the  E.E.C.  inter-
national-equities market  and  its apparent rate of growth in relation 
tc other business would  be  of highest reievance to decisions of the 
Commission  and  the  Committee..  It would  penni  t  them  to assess  the 
relative significance of present trading  and  its apparent potential. 
The  examination of  the differences  in patterns of European,  foreign 
and  total equities business  in  the different Exchanges  would  have 
bearing  on  the  nature and  the  degree  of interest of each  Exchange  in 
the  development of a  more  effectively linked European market.  Such 
figures  would  also permit  sound decisions  on  the extent of  the 
financi-al  resources  appropriate  to  the project,  using  conventional 
analysis  of cost and  benefits. 
Regrettably,  the statistics available are either misleading or 
fragmentary.  The- Consultants nevertheless believe that the available 
quantitative.evidence  should be  submitted  for  two  reasons.  The  first 
is that,  despite deficiencies of  the data,  llhere it is possible to piece 
evidence  together,  consistent indicators  of the real volume  of the 
market  tend  to emerge. 
Second  and possibly more  1mportant,  the deficiencies  in  the statistics 
may,  of  themselves,  be  of interest to the  Stock  Exchanges  and  the 
Commission.  The  European  Stock  Exchanges at present have  two principal 
problems  of policy,  which  are closely related  - the existence of off-
market trading,  especially by Members,  and  the  stances of the Exchanges 
towards  the international market.  The  statistics required to evaluate 
the  European  linkage proposals  are precisely those required  to  support 
judgement  on  these  two  local  issues.  A significant aspect of this Section 
of the Report is that the inadequacy  of  the statistics which ,it should be 
note~ relates not only to its immediate  topic,  but also to wider  issues 
with which  the  Exchanges  and  the Commission  are presently concerned. - 176 
The  figures  are ~herefore included  in the Report,  with fully stated 
provisos,  for  evaluation by  the Commission  and  the  Committee. 
12.2  Data  Sources 
Two  sets of data are available to the study.  They  are  independent-
collated by different agencies  from  different sources.  The  first are 
the official statistics of the  Stock  Exchanges,  whic~ for ·present 
purposes, are treated in the  summary  form  available  from  the F.I.B.V. 
and  the Milan  Stock  Exchange*,  supplemented  by  the responses  to the 
questionnaire of the Chairman  of the Committee  of Stock  Exchanges 
February  1983. 
The  second set of figures  is the gross  transaction data o! portfolio 
equity investment used  to compile  the balance of payments  on capital 
account of each country.  The  Consultants are obliged to M.  Lancetti 
of the Statistical Office of  the European  Community  and  to Dr.  Wolff 
of  DG  XV  for  their help in obtaining  this data. 
Given  that the  two  sets of data were  validly-based,  standardised, 
complete  and  consistently dis-aggregated to the  level required,  only 
basic statistical analysis  would  be  required to present an  important 
picture of transactions  on  and off the  floor  by  Stock Exchange  members 
from  the Stock  Exchange  figures,  and  the overall market,  from  the 
balance of payment  figures.  It would  be possible to establish the 
proportion of foreign  equit~es dealt in each centre  on  the floor by 
members,  off the floor by members,  off the  floor  by  non-members,  total 
dealing by members  and  the  total market.  These  dimensions  are of 
considerable significance  to many  of  the questions being considered by 
the  European  Stock  Exchanges  at the present time.  There has  been  no 
serious attempt  to set up  this data  in  any  of  the Community  capital 
markets. 
*  "F.I.B.V.  Statistics" prepared  for  the F.I.B.V.  -New York  Stock 
Exchange,  and,  the  E.E.C.  Stock  Exchanges  "Dimensional  Aspects  -
Borsa Valori di Milano"  (Annual  Reports)  - both of  which constitute 
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The data  availa~le to the Consultants,  though useful,  does  not fill this 
gap.  Both sets of data suffer from  severe.deficiencies in the present 
context.  Those  from  the  Stock  Exchanges,  though precisely compiled  and 
more or less complete  in terms of what  they  express,  are of little help 
to establish the real level of international dealing.  The data is,  in 
fact,  demonstrably misleading  and,in its under-expression of the 
importance  of international  and  E.E.C.  dealing
1 may  account for  the  low 
interest of some  of the Stock  Exchange authorities in European  linkage. 
The  Stock  Exchange  figures  cannot be  used  to express  the size of the 
European  international equities market.  The  figures  comprise  only 
those  transactions which go  through  the official market,  normally  where 
seller and buyer are in that market.  A foreign order executed on  thefloor 
of,for example,the market of origin,  though  in fact international 
business,  would  be  concealed  in domestic  turnover  figures.  Further,  the 
off-floor business which  members  are permitted to carry out cannot be  in 
any  way  deduced  from  the  floor-based  Exchange  figures.  The  nature of 
th~s bias  var~es from  market  to market,  so comparative  use  of the 
foreign dealing  figures might be misleading.  A significant point is 
that no·.inference  of growth  of  foreign equities dealing  can  be  made  from 
the  Stock  Exchange  figures.  It cannot  be  assumed  that the proportion of 
floor  and  off-floor business in foreigns  has  remained  constant over  the 
period.  Indeed,  there is wide  evidence  that,  in European  business  much 
of  the growth  is occuring outside  the floor  trading. 
The  second data set,  the balance  of payments  figures,  are, theoretically, 
of much  greater use  as  an  expression of  the international market,  but, 
regrettabl~ the responses  to the E.E.C.  questionnaire were  incomplete. 
In many  cases they  failed  to provide  the  degree  of dis-aggregation 
sought and  thus  form  an inadequate basis for  a  full  comparative  analysis. 
The  transaction  figures  collated by  the  Community  Statistical Office 
from  the balance of payments  data nevertheless represent the best base 
for estimat~onof the size of the European international equities market. 
The  Office  sought  to obtain  from  the appropriate central banks  or 
statistical offices  two-way  figures  (inward  and  outward)  of gross - 178 
securities transactions  (discriminating  foreign  and domestic  securities) 
between  the  reporting country and  the  'World',  the ten E.E.C.  countries, 
the U.S.,  Japan  and  Switzerland  for  the years covered by  the Stock 
Exchange questionnaire,  1975  and  1981-82.  Information  on  four 
categories of capital movements  was  sought - portfolio and direct 
investment in corporate securities,  and  long  and short-term bonds.  Of 
these  only the first,  corporate securities portfolio  investmen~has 
relevance  to the potential volume  of business available to the Exchanges 
in foreign equities.  The  assets side of this account gives bought  and 
sold transactions by nationals  (i.e.  'residents')  in foreign  stocks; 
the liabilities side,the transactions by  foreigners  in domestic  stocks. 
The  Statistical Office  asked  that the returns  should be  compiled 
according  to the Balance of Payments  Manual  standards*. 
Had  the  information sought by  the office been  fully available, it would 
have  permitted  the construction of a  matrix based  on  the assets side of 
the statement which  would  have provided  a  comprehensive picture of the 
international portfolio investment  flows  in equities between Community 
member  countries. 
This is not possible due  to incompleteness of data.  While certain 
countries,  notably Belgium  and  Luxembourg  (U.E.B.L.~ Denmark  and 
Germany  were  able  to provide  full  responses,  the data  from  certain 
other countries might best be described as vestigial.  Beyond this,  the 
data contained certain complications.  While  the  international 
market might best be  expressed by  taking  the assets and  the liabilities 
side of the account together  (i.e.  international business in a  capital 
centre in both  foreign  and domestic  securities), it appeared correct 
only  to use  the foreign  securities side.  The  liabilities side  (i.e. 
purchase  and  sale of domestic  securities by  foreigners)  is already,  at 
least to a  degree,  in the published  Stock  Exchange  figures of domestic 
trading.  The  Report  thus  limits the  f~gures to trading by nationals in 
*  Balance  of  Payments  Manual.  Fourth Edition,  International Monetary 
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foreign securities only,  nevertheless  aware  that it involves  some  un~er­
expression of the total international market. 
A further cause of understatement is that transactions  wh~ch do not 
involve foreign exchange,  e.g.  a  transaction in a  foreign security on  a 
local floor  in local currency,  naturally do  not enter the balance of 
payments  figure.  Such  transactions may  be in the Stock Exchange  foreign 
transactions statistics which  are therefor.e,  to an  unknown  proportion, 
additional to the balance of  paymen~s figures.  A further understatement 
of the true  level of foreign dealing is that stock  and  funds  in foreign 
currency held abroad  and  re-invested abroad  involve  no  foreign  exchange 
transactions  and  therefore may  not figure  in the  account.  For  these 
reasons  the figures  used  from  balance of payment sources in this Section 
might be  considered  a  lowest estimate of the  international market. 
The  deficiencies of the statistics have  been  stated at some  length,  to 
make  clear that they are recognised by  the Consultants.  They·believe 
however  that they are in some  respects illuminating  and,  on balance, 
worth  submitting  to the Committee's attention.  Sub-section 12.3 
considers  the  Stock  Exchange data which are  then in Sub-section  12.4 
related to the balance of payments .figures. 
12.3  Review of the Stock  Exchange  figures 
12.3.1  The  general perspective 
The  diversity of  form  and  funct1ons  of  the Stock  Exchanges  in the E.E.C. 
is immediately  !~plied by  consideration of the  two  basic dimensions  of 
market capitalisation of listed dome·stic  equities  and  total share 
turnover.  The  relation which might  logically be  expected between  them 
and  the size of the national  economies,  using  the  G.N.P.  indicate~ does 
not exist.  The  activity of the markets,  expressed by  turnover  as  a 
percentage of capitalisation,  bears  no  relation to either the relative 
size of the Stock  Exchange  or to the scale of equity turnover itself. 
Table  12.1 illustrates that apart  from  a  weak  relationship between  the 
scale of capitalisation and  value of turnover,  all other values are 180 
random.  Even  this basic data illustrates the lack of homogenity of 
the Community  Exchanges,  and  implies  the variance in the  economic 
role they  perform. 
Table  12.1 
Belgium 
Denmark 
F'rance 
Germany 
Greece 
Holland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
U.K. 
1.  Market 
Capitalisation 
8,346 
5,546 
29,646 
68,953 
1,907 
25,713 
19,927 
1,574 
197,798 
1  as  a  % 
of G.N.P. 
10.4 
10.3 
5.6 
10.2 
5.2 
18.8 
5.8 
39.0 
43.5 
1982- $m 
2.  Total Equity  2  as  a 
Turnover  % of 1 
1,815  21.7 
57  1.0 
9,285  31.3 
16,963  24.6 
35  1.8 
10,339  40.2 
2,752  13.8 
n.a.  n.a. 
30,260  15.2 
Source:  E.E.C.  Stock  Exchange  Dimensional  Aspects  1982 
While  validly  indicating the relative scale of the Stock  Exchange  floor 
operations,  the above  figures  are a  more  questionable  statement of the 
magnitude of the domestic capital markets,  due  to the omission of off-
Exchange  business.  An  extreme  comparison is between U.K.  and  Denmark. 
The  high  turnover  figure  for  U.K.  total equities trading reflects the 
effective concentration  secured within  the stock market of U.K.  shares. 
'In Denmark,  at the  time  of  the survey,  the  informed general estimate was 
that 90%  of domestic  equit~es dealing was  off the floor.  The  French and 
German  markets,  to a  much  lesser degree,  are understated in respect of 
off-market de.alings  in which  th.e  members  are  involved  but which do not 
enter Bourse statistics.  As  no  Exchange  has  any  figures for the off-
market dealing  by  its members,  bias  towards  understatement is discernib1e, 
even in the above  overall transaction figures. 
The  picture becomes  more  seriously distorted when  the Exchange  figures 
fordealingsin  foreign securities are considered.  The  significance to 181 
any Exchange  of  any given  level of trading in foreign  securities will 
much  depend  upon  the proportion which it apparently represents of its 
total trading volume. 
Tab~e 12.2 
France 
Germany 
U.K. 
Belgium 
Eire 
Holland 
Luxembourg 
Denmark 
(Italy,Greece 
1.  Value  of transactions 
in foreign equities. 
2,476 
2,123 
2,219 
850 
387 
243 
41 
1 
0 
1982  $m 
2.  1  as  % of total 
equities trans'actions. 
29.5 
12.8 
7.0 
44.5 
n.a. 
4.8 
n.a. 
1.9 
0 
Source:  Stock  Exchanges. 
It might be questioned whether this table,  even  though  confined to the 
foreign equities dealings of members,  presents  a  credible statement of 
the relative levels of activity.  It is accurate  in respect of  Italy and 
Greece.  It also correctly represents  the  situation in the Danish 
Exchange,  on which  foreign dealing was,  in 1982,  only permitted in three 
anomalous  foreign  stocks.  The  table  affirms  the  strong 
local market in foreigns in Brussels relacive to the size of that 
Exchange, and it  may give  a  valid impression of the situation in France. 
But in respect of the  three markets  that are generally  considered the 
mosc  active in foreigns,  Germany,  U.K.  and  Holland,  there appears  to be 
substantial under-expression of foreign  business.  The  fact that foreign 
equities dealing in London,  an  acknowledged  equity-oriented and inter-
national centre,  is in value  below  that in France  and  Germany  has  little 
face  credibility.  A statement that only  4.8%  of Amsterdam  equities 
business is in  foreign  stocks does  not  seem  consonant with the  large-
scale activity of Dutch member  banks  in that field.  The  German  figures 182 
appear very  low in light of the substantial international dealings of 
German  banks. 
A disturbing interpretation which  emerges  from  this table is that the 
more  active  the international business of  a  Stock Exchange  becomes, 
the  less will it be carried out on  the Stock  Exchange  floor and  be 
reflected in the official Stock  Exchange statistics.  The  evidence  of 
the  London  market,  considered  belo~ supports this point.  The policy of 
The  Stock  Exchange  Council has  been  to release members  from  the 
constraints of domestic  floor dealing to permit  them  to compete  fully 
in international business off the market.  Similar  freedoms  in  foreign 
securities business are available to the German  and  Dutch banks.  An 
unfortunate effect of this is that the Stock  Exchange statistics not 
only fail to include this business,  but,  if this business moves 
increasingly off the market floors,  may  actually give  an  inverse 
reflection of the true development. 
12.3.2  Value of transactions in second-country E.E.C.  equities 
The  Committee questionnaire of  February  1983  sought the proportion 
of the total  ~alue of foreign equities business  represented by E.E.C. 
securities.  Not all the  Exchanges  were  able to supply the breakdown,and 
Table  12.3 below  sets out the data received. 
Table 12.3 
U.K. 
France 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Holland 
Italy,  Greece 
1.  E.E.C.  equities trans-
actions value. 
395 
340 
205 
14 
6 
0 
1982  $m 
2.  1  as  % of all foreign 
equities transactions. 
17.8% 
13.7% 
24.1% 
34.1% 
2.5% 
0% 
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The  German  Association supplied  a  figure  for  the Frankfurt Stock  Exchange 
only.  While this cannot be  included in the above  table, it should be 
mentioned,  due  to the pre-eminent position of the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange  in German  international dealing.  In 1982  dealing in second-
country E.E.C.  equities in Frankfurt was  of $294m  value.  This 
represented  a  proportion of  20.6%  of all dealing in foreign equities on 
that Exchange  in that year. 
The  E.E.C.  transaction figures  are likely to be  a  more  marked under-
expression of  the real business  transacted than the total figures  for all 
foreign equities.  The  increasing institutional practice,  in European 
dealing,  of direct recourse to the markets of origin can be  expected to 
exclude  the bulk  of their E.E.C.  equities  transactions  from  the  Stock 
Exchange  ~igures of dealing in foreigns.  The  ability of Exchange  members 
to go direct to the  foreign markets  has  similar effect.  A proportion,  of 
unknown  level,  of  such  transactions would  be within the reported domestic 
business of the main markets,  but it would not be  identifiable within it. 
The  aspect  of  the table which may  be  of some  validity is the percentage 
of total  fore~gn equities dealing represented bydeals  transacted in E.E.C. 
countries.  It might be  argued that, in the case of  each  Exchange,  the 
same  order of shortfall in 'the reporting will tend  to apply both to 
'total foreign'  and  'E.E.C.  transactions'.  This  would  be valid regardless 
of the varying practices of each  Exchange.  The  figures  in this respect 
have  a  certain face  credibility,  as  they illustrate the known  activity of 
the Belgium  and  Luxembourg  Exchanges in European equities.  ~e settlement 
currency  and  amount have been used to compile the statistics.  Ideally, however, 
the settlement figures given for European transactions  should not be in a  non-
European  currency (eg .dollars) .  This is common  practice but can falsify the 
statistical results.  The  percentages  shown  for  UK  and  France bear arelation-
ship to  the institutional portfolio structures in these stocks.  The  figure 
for  Amsterdam  is anomalous ,possibly confirming the known practice of the Dutch 
banks of dealing direct in the other European markets, ::1otably the German market. 
in Section  12.3  below it is submitted  that  these proportions might  be 
applied  to  the  broader  est1mat.e  of  the  foreign equities markets obtainable 
from the balance of payments figures to g~ve a truer idea of the real Ccxnmuni ty 
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12.3.3  Growth  Rates of total,  total foreign  and E.E.C.  equities business. 
The  Committee questionnaire of February  1983  sought figures  for  total, 
total foreign  and  E.E.C.  equities business  for  1975,  1980,  1981  and 
1982.  Not all the  Exchanges  were  able to providefiguresfor 1975. 
The  responses  for  the  3  year period  1980 - 1982  were  also incomplete 
and,in any case,the period is too short and  insufficiently typical to 
provide  any  analysis of trends.  A further problem exists in choice 
of currency in which to express comparative growth.  While  standardisa-
tion to U.S.  dollar would base comparison  on  uniform values,  the 
volatile appreciation of that currency  over  this period would give 
a false understatement of such growth  that may  have occurred in Community 
markets  in local currency  terms. 
Table  12.4  Growth  of Foreign Equities Transactions 
Countr}:  Growth  of total  Growth  of foreign  Growth  of E.E.C. 
equities  equities  equities 
transactions.  transactions.  transactions. 
Belgium  +17.6%  +  .25%  +9.2% 
Denmark  +20.1%  n.a.  n.a. 
Eire  +53.8%  n.a. 
France  +  5.2%  +l0.8!ti  +3.4% 
Greece  -16.7%  0  0 
Germany  +10.8%  .1%  n.a. 
Holland  +13 .5%  +12.7%  -5.7% 
Italy  -28.8%  0  0 
Luxembourg  +30.4%  +30.0%  -7.2% 
U.K.  +10.2%  -15.4%  +2.3% 
(Spain)  +18.6%  0  0 
Source:  Stock Exchange Statistics 
As  these compound  annual  rates of growth  are based on  the Stock  Exchanges' 
official figures,  which,  as  argued  above,  understate the level and 
falsely express  the trends of international dealing in Europe,  the 
·table has  no  real meaning.  It appears  to  show  that the rate of / 
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increase of foreign business  (with  the  exception of U.E.B.L.)  falls 
below that of total business.  In  the  U.K., it suggests that there has 
been negative growth  of foreign dealing.  Within  foreign transactions, 
it implies that dealing within the  E.E.C.  has failed to keep  up  with 
such  growth  as  overall  foreign dealing has attained. 
Such  assertions are a  travesty of fact.  There is little doubt that 
the real truth this table asserts·is that international dealing is 
leaving  the  floor markets.  The  actual situation is considered in 
Sub-section 12.4,  against the full  balance of payments  figures . 
. The  only useful purpose in presenting  the  above  table is that it may 
offer an  explanation for  any  ldck  of interest in the. European  initiative. 
If the  Stock Exchanges  are  influenced by-their own  deficient statistics, 
and  thus  have  in mind  a  s~tuation as  implied in the  above  table,  this 
would  more  than explain any  reluctance  to attribute significance of 
priority to European  linkage. 
12.4  Comparison  of the  Balance of Payments  figures of Portfolio Investment 
in Foreign Corporate Securities with  the Stock Exchange Statistics 
12.4.1  The use of the data 
From  the standpoint of international dealing,  the foreign,equities 
market can be defined in three dimensions:-
{i)  Transactions on behalf of nationals in foreign securities,  executed 
abroad  and  normally  involving  a  foreign  exchange transaction. 
(ii)  Transactions on behalf of foreign clients in domestic  securities, 
executed in ·the local market  and  normally  involving  d  foreign 
exchange  transaction. 
(iii)  Transactions in the  local market between  nationals  in local currency, 
in which  an intermediary active  in .foreign equities is iikely to be 
involved  but which does not involve a  foreign  exchange  transaction. 186  -
To  establish the full dimension  of the  European market,  as it is 
presently developing,  and  therefore  the full potential for the 
linkage system,  each of these sides of the market  should be 
considered.  All would guarantee  network  traffic of one  type or 
another.  The  third category  represents  the  ~ffieial figures of 
t.~e  Exchanges.  The  first two  categories correspond to the assets 
and liabilities sides,  respectively,  of the  statement sought by  the 
Community  Statistical Office  and,  insofar as  they are available in 
the national responses,  can be  used  to determine  the potential 
market.  The  Repor~  howeve~ limits consideration to the first 
category  - transactions  on  behalf of nationals  and  foreign 
securities.  Thi~unambiguousl~ is international business  and  the 
omission of  the  second  category  - transactions  on  behalf of 
foreigners  and domestic securities - avoids  any  ambiguities that 
might arise from  the partial inclusion of such business in the existing 
Bourse  figures of domestic business. 
The  approach  taken in the paper is to sum  up  the  purchase  and  sale 
transactions by nationals  in  foreign  securities  and  to divide  the 
result by  2.  In the F.I.B.V.  statistics,a sale plus purchase is 
considered to  b~ one  transaction.  The  balance of payments  figures are 
thus rendered  comparable with  the  Exchange statistics to establish 
the relative size of the  local  international markets  and  the domestic 
markets. 
Definition of portfolio investment in corporate securities  is provided 
in Paragraph  425  of the  I.M.F.  Balance of Payments  Manual  and is 
summarised as stocks,  shares,  parti·cipations or other similar 
documents.  Whether  the purchase  or sale is of equity  newly  issued  or 
on  the secondary market is not distinguished,  but it is not 
considered that this is significant in the equity markets. 
Due  to the  courtesy of the Banque  de  France,  which maintains precise 
statistics, security by security,  in this field  which are provided 
by  the computer  systems of the authorised banks,  the Consultants - 187 
were  able to examine  the  source data  and  the construction of the balance 
of payments  statements.  Such  study  assured  them  of the relevance of  the 
data to the practical problem of establishing the  international market 
potential.  The  Consultants were  further assured by  the Community 
Statistical Office that it would be  reasonable  to assume  that the 
responses of other national authorities,  where  available,  would  have 
been constructed on  the  same  basis. 
The  only real  flaw in the balance  of payments data is that it is not 
complete.  Full  responseswereobtained only  from  Belgium  and  Luxembourg 
(the  U.E·.B.L.  figures  included  a  breakdown of capital movements .within 
the E.E.C.  which went beyond  the data sought),  Denmark  and 
Germany.  Most  countries had difficulty in providing even  an overall 
E.E.C.  figure.  Only major  agg~egate figures  were  provided by  the U.K., 
with portfolio investment in equities given  for one year only.  The 
general  conclusion might be  drawn  that the E.E.C.  is. as  inadequately 
equipped with data to determine its capital market policies,  as  are  the 
Stock  Exchanges  to determine their policies towards  international 
business.  The  Cons~tants wish  to stress that this comment  refers to 
the qualiti of ?ata generally available at national level  and  not to 
the quality of the Commission's  services. 
Despite  the inconsistent  cover  of these balance of payments  figures 1 
the  consultants believe that they are informative,  that the. impression 
they convey is valid.  They  appear  to consistently demonstrate that the 
foreign dealings in all the capital centres are considerably above  the 
volume  implied by the Stock  Exchange statistics. 
12.4.2  Summary  comparison of·the Balance of Payments Portfolio Investment 
Figures with the Stock  Exchange Statistics of Foreign Dealing 
(i)  The  most significant disparities between  the  two  sets of figures  emerge 
in the statistics for  the United  Kingdom  and  Hetland. 
The  comparison  emerging  from  the U.K.  1981  figure of portfolio investment 
in all foreign  securities  (the only one  the Central Statistical Office 
was  able to supply)  and  the equivalent Stock  Exchange  figure is as 
follows:-I  ., 
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Table 12.5  1991  $m 
United Kingdom  Portfolio Investment in Foreign Equities 
C.S.O.  Portfolio Investment 
in.equities  (the World) 
50,233  X  0,5 = 25,117 
Stock  Exchange  foreign 
equities dealing  (total) 
3,027 
The  Government figures  suggest that the London  market in foreign 
equities must be  some  8  times  the size implied by  the  figures 
given in the Stock Exchange's  response  to the Committee questionnaire. 
In light of the known  facts of the  London  market  and  the 
international dealing arrangements set up  by  the Stock  Exchange,  this 
finding is not surprising.  The  detailed investigation by  the 
Consultants of the E.E.C.  business in the  London  market,  summarised in 
12.6  indicated a  disparity of the same  order between the Exchange 
statistics and  the  reality. 
Evidence  from  other sources points in the  same  direction.  The  change 
in the  struct~re of institutional edtity portfolios in the United 
Kingdom  over the past 4  years has been  a  powerful  force driving the 
Stock  Exchange  firms  to internationalise their activities. 
Table  12.6  U.K.  Instititional Portfolio Structure 1979  - 1982. 
Em 
Year  Total Assets.  U.K.  Equities.  Overseas Esuities 
1979  103,665  37,798  6,203 
1980  130,810  48,884  10,868 
1981  151,833  55,262  14,655  ($29,720n) 
1982  196,930  70,066  21,928  ($38,382m) 
Source:  C.S.O./Stock  Exchange. 
Investment in foreign equities is seen  to have  increased during this 
period by  3.5  times,  as  opposed to a  1.85  times  increase in U.K. 
equities.  The  compound  annual growth rate of the  U.K.  and overseas 189  -
equities is respectively 22.7%  and  52.3%.  The  1981  and  1982  figures 
indicate the growth of overseas equities may  be  a  continuing 
phenomenom  and  not solely related to the removal  of Exchange 
Control restrictions in 1979. 
The  implication  in terms  of securities transactions associated with 
these holdings is even  more  striking.  The  activity rates  (i.e. 
turnover of securities within the portfolios)  of  U.K.  and  foreign 
equities markedly differ. The  opinion of institutional investors was 
that,  broadly,  it was  about  30%  for  U.K.  equities,  which  tend  to be 
institutional core holdings,  and  60%  for  foreign securities,  on which, 
often due  to current currency movements,  a  shorter view  tends  to be 
taken.  The  business  implied  from  U.K.  institutions thus  comprise~ 
for  each year,  the activity rate of the existing holdings plus  the 
incremental  investment.  A crude calculation of the business in this 
way  gives  a  rate of growth for U.K.  equities of  18.2%  and  a  rate 
of growth f()r foreign equity of 39.2%  in current value  terms.  It is 
of  intcrc~t that the growth rates of iorcign cquiticn buoincns of  the 
leading brokers  and  jobbers which  are active in international equities 
was,  in the cases where  they were  given  to the Consultants,  of the 
same  order.  In U.S.  Dollar  terms,  to permit comparison with  the Stock 
Exchange  figure  above,  institutional foreign  transactions,  on  this 
basis of  calculation 1 mi~ht represent  $20-25,ooou.,  or  7  to 8  times  the 
Stock  Exchange  figure,  according  to the F.I.B.V.  method  of count. 
On  present trends,  the  London  equities dealing will be primarily in the 
international market by  the  end of  the decade. 
An  inestimable  segment  of  the  London  market  in foreign equities,  which 
may  constitute an  element of  the c.s.o.  figure,  is the business related 
to overseas  funds  (for  example,  American  pension  funds),and  foreign 
dealing  channelled  through  foreign  intermediaries  in London,  which 
involve Sterling foreign  exchange  transactions.  This  component of  the 
figure  is largely irrelevant to the Stock Exchange. - 190 
The  purpose of'the brief comment  above  is not to attempt to establish 
the value of the London  foreign equities market  but to make-the point, 
which  the Consultants consider in general  terms  irrefutable,  that the 
Stock  Exchange  figures  under-read the real market very considerably, 
possibly to a  factor which may  be between five  and eight times. 
Comment  from  the market in respect of E.E.C.  securities,  reported in 
Section  1~ confirms  the general point. 
The  2  sets of figures  from  the Amsterdam market appeared to display a 
similar disparity.  A problem of interpretation arises in the  Dutch 
statistics.  The  figures  required in response to the Community 
Statistical Office questionnaire are published,  to 1981,  in De 
Nederlandsche  Bank  n.v.  Kwartaal  Bericht 1982.  The  layout is the 
same  as  the data  for  the other countries,  i.e.  the figures 
discriminate purchase of foreign  shares (bynationals),  country by 
country.  The  bank  cautions  however  that no  conclusion is warranted 
as  to the country of issue of the  (foreign)  securities  and that the 
country indicates only where  the other party was  resident for 
Exchange  Control purposes.  This is assumed  in the main  to be the 
foreign  count~y of the transaction.  If this is so, it might further 
be  inferred that normally dealings in foreign shares in a  foreign 
market would  imply dealing in shares  issued in that market.  It might, 
therefor~be argued that the  Dutch  statistics can certainly be  used 
to establish overall Dutch  purchases of  foreign  shares,  which are 
entirely clear in the statistics,  and that the national  figures give  an 
indication of the relative  importance  of  each market to Amsterdam 
trading.  Summary  comparison of the Nederlandsche Bank  n.v.  and  AEB 
figures is as  follows:-
Table 12.7  Dutch portfolio investment in foreign equities. 
1981  US$m. 
N.B.  n.v.  Total  transactions 
Foreign shares. 
6,247  X  0.5 = 3,124 
A.E.B.  Total  foreign 
equities trading. 
325 191 
The  level of business is seen  to be  10  times  that recorded on  the 
AEB.  As  with London,it appears  that the vast mdjority of Amsterdam 
foreign equities transactions are off the market.  This appears  to 
concur with the high level of activity of the Dutch  banks  in the 
international market,  and also the  tendency of both investors and 
members  of the Exchange  to deal direct into foreign markets with 
which Amsterdam,  as  a  major international centre,  has  long-standing 
connections.  The  high off-market proportion of all foreigns  other 
than u.s.  securities, is confirmed by  the apparent distribution of 
types of foreign business  on  the Bourse  and  the off-market. 
Table  12.8 
United States 
European 
Other Foreign 
Percentage distribution of Foreign Securities 
Transactions in Amsterdam  - 1981. 
N.B.  n.v. 
45.6% 
13.6% 
40.6% 
94.6% 
1.8% 
3.6% 
The  Nederlandsche  Bank  figures are seen  to give  a  far more credible 
pattern of activity in the foreign markets,  which is broadly consonant 
with the portfoliostructuresand the interests of investors in the 
major  foreign markets.  They  follow,  expectedly,  the European pattern 
·as a  whole.  The  AEB  figure reflects the efficient ASAS  scheme,  which 
has  developed Exchange business in U.S.  equities.  The  figure=  ~uggc~t 
that the Exchange  docs  not  ~ee the ruropenn  or other  forei~n business 
which,  presumably is placed direct. 
The  balance of payments  figures  tend to indicate that London  and 
Amsterdam  are  the most international of  the  Community  capital markets. 
In both cases,  it appears  that the  Stock  Exchange statistics, which  do 
not identify this characteristic,  are misleading  and  should be 
disregarded.  The  invalidity of the  figures  appears  to arise frorn·the 
reticence of Stock  Exchange  members.  For  reasons discussed  elsewhere 
in this Report,  the international activities of members  have  tend~d to 
be  on  the fringe of the official markets.  Such activities are 192 
entrepreneurial,  and  in some  respects costly.  The  members  have little 
enthusiasm to disclose  them.  As  a  result,  this busineas is not captured 
within  the Exchange  statistics. 
(ii)  The  statistics,  expectedly, identified a  second well-defined group of 
Exchanges  which carry out no,  or very little, dealing in foreign 
securities,  due  to Exchange  Control restrictions. 
The  most  unambiguous  situation is that of Greece,  for which  both the 
returns of the Bank  of Greece  and  the  response  to the Committee 
questionnaire confirm total absence  of any portfolio investment by 
nationals in foreign  corporate securities.  While,  as pointed out in 
Section 6,  this does  not accord with  Greek  financial  realities, it does 
accord with  the realities of the Athens capital market. 
The  figures of  two  of the other Exchange  Control  countries,  Italy and 
(in  respect of this historic  information)  Denmark,  reflect a  similar 
situation. 
Table  12.9  1982  - $m 
Italian Portfolio investment in Foreign Equities 
Bank  of Italy 
2,022  x  o~s = 1,011 
Bourse 
0 
The  Bourse  figure is expectedly  zero,  there being no  foreign  securities 
quoted  on  the Italian Stock  Exchanges.  This  situation is unlikely to 
change  as  long as  the present sanction of the  50%  non-interest bearing 
deposit on  the value of !oreign equities purchased remains.  The 
balance of payments  figures do,  however,  indicate substantial Italian 
transactions in foreign equities. 
For  the year quoted  abov~ their value  was  equivalent to  30%  of that of 
total local equities dealing  on  the Italian Exchanges.  Over  the 
period 1976-82,  these foreign dealings averaged  16.4%  of  the value of 
equities dealt on  the  Exchange.  This average is heavily affected by 193 
the exceptional  1981  year  and  for  the  other years it was  22.3%. 
During  the Exchange  Control period, Italian transactions in foreign 
equities have  risen substantially.  The  value  of international stock 
transactions by  Italian residents which  in 1976  was  930 billion Lira 
had,  by  l98~risen to  2,299 billion. 
The  Exchange  Control measures  have  not  stopped Italian portfolio 
equity  investment abroad.  One  definite effect which  they  have  had 
has  been  to totally exclude  the Italian Stock Exchanges  from  any 
possible participation in this  foreign  sector. 
These  figures understate  the full  extent of lost business.  As  pointed 
out earlier in the Report,  if the  inward  investment in Italian 
securities by  foreigners  is included in assessing the  'international 
equities market'  in Italy,  the proportion of  business lost by  the 
Italian brokers rises to  some  30%  of Bourse  equity  turnover.  Being 
dis associated with  the outward  investment,  the brokers  see little of 
the  reciprocal  inward business.  Only  28.3%  of the outward capital 
flow quoted  for  1982  represents institutional transactions,  i.e. 
credit institqtions,  finance  and  assurance  companies. 
A similar situation applied in Denmark,  where  the Exchange Controls  were 
more  rigorous  than in Italy,  and  involved,  at the  time  of  the  survey, 
total prohibition of acquisition of foreign  equities by  Danish  nationals. 
Table  12.10  1982  - $m 
Danish Portfolio Investment  in Foreign Equities 
Danish  Statistica~ Office 
97.8  X  0.5  ~ 48.9 
Stock  Exchange 
0.6 
Foreign securities,  in general,  were  not quoted  on  the Copenhagen  Stock 
Exchange  apart  from  three securities with which  Danish investors have 
traditional association.  Each were dealt in the appropriate foreign 
currencies  - Bahama  Dollars,  Malaysian Ringits and  South African  Rands. 
Dealings  in these securities  wer~ not substantial.  It was,howeve~ - 194 
evident that,  in spite of Exchange  Control,  there was  considerable 
dealing in  foreign equity  in Copenhagen.  This  was  presumably due  to 
the switching facilities available to Danish holders of foreign 
equity and  growth of foreign assets.  Relative  to the turnover in the 
Copenhagen  Exchange,  foreign dealing is seen to have  been considerable 
and  was  equivalent to 86%  of the  $56.8m  total trading for  that year. 
It is a  much  lower proportion of  the  real  Danish domestic equities 
market,  90%  of which at that time  lay outside the Exchange. 
As  in Italy,  the  growth  of this foreign  equities trading has been 
conspicuous,  having  increased  some  thirteen times between  19.75  and, 
1982.  Expected!~ the purchase of  Danish  securities by foreigners 
exceeds  Danish.purchases of foreign securities,  in  1982  to a  factor 
of 3.4. 
The  figures  for  the fourth of the Exchange  Control  countries,  Eire, 
pose  a  problem of interpretation. 
Table  12.11 
Eire Central Statistical 
Office 
0 
1982  - $m 
The  Stock  Exchange  (Irish) 
387 
The  zero return  from  the Irish Central Statistical Office is 
presumably due  to the fact that the Irish transactions specified by 
the  Exchange  are  switching  operations,  the only  type of  foreign 
transactions  for which  Irish investors,  other than certain funds, 
presently have  consent.  It ~s further  presumed  that in this situation 
the Central Statistical Office has  reported  the net balance of payments 
effect,  rather  than the gross  transactions requested.  Interpretation 
of the dealings in Eire are further  complicated by  the  linkage with the 
Dublin  and  the London  Stock  Exchanges.  The  likelihood is that much  of 
the  Dublin  foreign equities dealing,  insofar as it is permitted,  is 
carried out using  the  London  jobbers.  The majority of Irish 
institutional business  in  foreign markets is,  as is the case in other 
Community  countries,  placed directly  in  the main markets. (iii) 
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Between  the  two  above  groups of Exchanges  which are highly active,  and 
relatively inactive in the  international markets,  and  in all of which, 
for different reasons,  the bulk  of  the  foreign equities business is 
off the official markets,  there is' a  third group comprising  Belgium 
and  Luxembourg  (U.E.B.L.  in respect of balance of payments  figures), 
France  and  Germany,  in which  there is a  much  closer relationship 
between overall  foreign equities trading  and the Bourse statistics. 
Table 12.12  1982  - $m 
U.E.B.L.  Portfolio  Inves~~ent in Foreign Equities 
Banque  Nationale de  Belgique  Bourse 
2,414  X  0.5 = 1,207  817  +  41 
Fifty per cent of Brussels  floor  trading  in equities during  the year  was 
in foreign stocks.  With  the  Banque  and  Bourse figures  lying  so close, 
the extent to which  the  Bourse  trading  forms  part of the balance of 
payment  figures,  or does  not,  becomes  important.  This is not easy to 
determine.  Much  of the Bourse dealing  in Belgian Francs might  be 
between BelgiaJ! nationals and  would not require  a  foreign  exchange 
transaction.  The  estimate of the total Brussels market  in foreign 
equities thus  lies between  $1, 207m  and  $2 ,024m  and in all probability at 
the higher end  of that range.  At  the  lower  estimat~ 43%  of Brussels 
foreign transactions would be off the market  floor at the  higher estimate,  58%. 
The  figures  not only confirm  the  known  fact that,  of all the Community 
Exchanges,  Brussels has  been most  successful  in establishing a  local 
floor market in foreign equities,  but also that this market  represents 
a  substantial proportion of  the overall transactions  in  such  stocks  in 
Brussels. 
The  comparison with Amsterdam  is of interest.  The  balance of  payrne~ts 
· figures  suggest that the Amsterdam  international equities market is 
ten times  the  value of the comparable  Bourse business.  On  the other 
hand,  the Brussels local  floor market in foreign equities is almost 
three  times  that of Amsterdam.  An  important distinction emerges between - 196 
the  local market  ~n foreigns  in Brussels  and  the  international market 
in Amsterdam.  The  two  situations well  illustrate that  two  quite 
different angles might  emerge,  from  m~mbers of  the  Amsterdam  and 
Brussels Exchanges,  on  the  approach  to development of international 
business  and  the steps that would be appropriate to  improve  European 
linkage.  Discussions  in  these markets  confirmed this to be  the case. 
The  French situation is,  in principle,  similar to that of  Belgi~ 
though  the much  stronger base of French domestic  securities diminishes 
the relative importance of foreign  equities trading. 
Table  12.13  1982  - $m 
French Portfolio Investment in Foreign EqUities 
Banque  de  Franc~  Bourse 
6,382  X  0.5 = 3,191  2,477 
A similar range of total foreign equities dealing may  be  imputed,  between 
$3,19lm,  assuming  that all Bourse  transactions involve  a  backing foreign 
exchange deal,  ~nd a  figure  towards  $5,668m,  which would  assume  that most 
Bourse  transactions in  foreigns  do not  involve net foreign exchange 
movements.  In  the  Paris case,  it was  possible to confirm with the Banque 
de  France,  which until recently kept statistics on  this point,  that only 
a  minute  fraction of  the  transactions  recorded in their capital movements 
figures  were  dealt on  the  floor of  the Bourse.  Assuming  this to be  the 
case,  the figures  indicate that some  50%-60%  of transactions in foreign 
securities originating in Paris are off  the market.  This accords with 
fragmentary detailed evidence  obtained during discussions in the Paris 
market. 
The  Deutsche  Bundesbank  figures  show  less disparity with  those of German 
Stock Exchanges.  An  unexpected  low  level of activity by  German  investors 
in foreign equities is revealed.  While  this is consonant with German 
investment preferences discussed  in Section  7,  it is surprising that 
international equities dealing  in Germany  is no  larger than,  fer  example, 
that in Holland. - 197 
Table  12.14  1982  - $m 
German  Portfolio Investment in Foreign Securities 
Deutsche  Bundesbank 
6,054  X  0.5  3,027 
Association of German 
Exchanges 
1,896.5 
The  Consultants  are  obliged to Drs.  Wolff  and  Sentt of the Bundesbank 
for  a  memorandum  which  confirms  the basis of  the  two  sets of statistics. 
In  summary,  the balance of payments  records  every purchase and sale of 
securities between  residents  and  non-residents,  regardless of whether 
banks or non-banks are  involved,  whether  the  transactions are effected 
through  German  or  foreign  Stock' Exchanges  or outside a  Stock  Exchange, 
whether  payment  takes place via an  accoun~ with a  German  or foreign 
bank  and  whether  the  security is deposited in Germany  or abroad.  A well-
defined  and  comprehensive  system of  reporting exists to assure this. 
The  Stock  Exchange  statistics do  not reflect the securities transactions 
with non-residents executed  by  their banks  for  their own  account.  They 
contain only securities transactions which  have  been effected by  the 
banks via the German  Stock  Exchanges.  In  the Exchange  statistics it is 
not possible to discriminate whether residents or non-residents are 
involved.  The  memorandum  confirms  that it is not possible to determine 
what proportion of  the  transactions registered in the  Stock  Exchange 
statistics is included in the balance of  payments. 
On  the basis of  the  above  figures  the  total of German  portfolio trans-
:ictions  in foreign  equlties  lies in  the  :range  between  $3,027m, 
assuming  that the Stock  Exchange  transactions are  totally within the 
balance of payments, and  $4,923m,which  assumes  that none  of  them  are. 
Even  in the  lower  case,  60%  of  the  German  international equities market 
appears  to be  off the Exchanges  in the year  concerned. 
(vi)  The  following  table  summarises  the  two  sets of  figures:-198 
Table 12.15  1982  - $m 
Size of foreign equities market  implied by  the Balance 
of Payments  figures  and  The  stock  Exchange  statistics 
Balance of Payments  The  Stock  Exchange 
Transaction Figures  Figures 
Belgium  1,207  817 
Luxembourg  41 
Derunark  49  1 
Eire  387  387 
France  3,191  2,477 
Greece  0  0 
Germany  3,027  1,896 
Holland  3,124  325 
Italy  l,Oll  0 
United Kingdom  25,116  3,028 
'I'OTAL:  37,112  8,972 
Interpreting the  international market  only as transactions  in foreign 
securities of which  one  side is in a  European  capital centre,  the 
market  would  appear  to  b~ using  the  lowest base of estimate,  about  four 
times  the  level  suggested by  the Stock  Exchange  statistics of floor 
dealing.  If the London  figure,  which  may  contain Sterling foreignexchange 
transactions which  represent  London  routing  rather  than  London 
business,  the balance of payments  indicate  an  international market for 
the  remaining capital centres  twice  that of the floor dealing in foreigns. 
The  Consultants would  like  to stress that the statistics used  are not 
intended  to support  a  serious quantitative estimation.  Their  purpose is 
to demonstrate  the general  truth that the bulk of international trans-
actions in Europe  is  carried out off the floor market.  They believe that 
the figures  strongly support this case  and  do  broadly indicate the 
dimension of the problem. 
In  summary,  this review of overall foreign business in  the European 
capital centres makes it evident  that the main  issue likely to be 
raised by  European  linkage is the role  to be  played by the floors  and 199 
to be played by  linkage  related  to  the  present  off-market 
patterns of business.  This pointisfurther developed  in later Sections 
of the Report.  Varying  s~tuations noted  in respect of each Exchange 
make  it similarly clear that they  are likely to hold different opinions 
on  whether  the  focus  of any  linkage system  should be  the market floors 
or whether it should  be based on  a  wider  concept of which  the market 
floors  form  only  a  part. 
12.5  Estimation of Foreign Transactions in E.E.C.  Securities 
Estimation of the  E.E.C.  proportion of the  real  foreign market involves 
a  series of difficulties.  The  Stock  Exchange  figures  have already been 
observed to understate the market.  The  increasing practice of placing 
orders in the main  national market means  that much  international dealing 
will be masked  in domestic statistics.  The  only possible method  of 
estimation may  be  to attempt to establish a  likely proportion of all 
foreign dealing which is in E.E.C.  securities  and to apply that propor-
tion to the inflated value of the international market available  from 
the capital movement  figures.  The  proportions  from  the Bourse  figures 
are suspect in the cases of one  or  two  Exchanges,  but the general 
indication thus obtained is confirmed  by  other approaches  which can be 
taken  to this estimation.  The proportion of E.E.C.  business in the 
active  Exchanges,  as  stated in the replies to the questionnaire,  is as· 
follows:-
Table 12.16a 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Holland 
Luxembourg 
United Kingdom 
.Transactions in E.E.C.  equities as  a 
proportion of all foreign securities 
Foreign equities  of which  E.E.C. 
total  eguities 
350  205 
2,476  340 
1,427  294 
243  6 
41  14.8 
2,219  395 
1982  - $m 
% 
24.1 
13.7 
20
_
6
(Frankfurt 
only) 
2.6 
34.6 
17.8 
Source:  Stock  Exchange/F.I.B.V.  data 200 
It appears that  ~he proportions of business  recorded  in the balance of 
payments  transactions give  a  more  credible  breakdown.  Regrettably 
the  U.K.  Central Statistical Office  was  unable to supply  a  figure  for 
E.E.C.  transactions. 
Table  12.16b  1982  - $m 
Foreign Equities  of  which  E.E.C.  % 
total  e9uities 
U.E.B.L.  1,207  437  36.2 
Denmark  49  14  28.6 
France  3,191  478  15.0* 
Germany  3,027  ~3  13.0 
Holland  ('81)  3,124  426  13.6 
*  based  on  the  first three quarters 
Source:  E.E.C.,  c.s.o.  data 
An  order of consistency is apparent  in  the  two  results.  Proportionately, 
Belgium  and  Luxembourg  have  greater interest in E.E.C.  securities.  For 
reasons  discussed  abov~ the Amsterdam  involvement  in E.E.C.  trading is 
understated by 'the  Bourse  figures.  The  weighted  average proportion of 
the  two sets of figures gives  a  very  similar result:  17.3%  for  the 
Bourse  figures  and  16.5%  for  the balance of payment  figures.  The 
omission of the  U.K.  from  the  second  table  has,on this basis,very 
little effect. 
The  17%  proportion bears  a  sensible relationship to the portfolio 
structures of foreign equity  investment.  In  their discussions with 
institutional investors,the Consultants  sought this information.  While 
the data obtained cannot be  regarded as  systematic,  the pattern of 
foreign equity  investment,  regardless of country,  showed  a  notable 
consistency,  with the E.E.C.  proportion of all foreigns  tending to lie 
at about  10%-15%.  Dealing activity based on  this portfolio structure 
would be higher.  This portfolio pattern obtained  from  the interviews 
is broadly confirmed by  the distribution of  trading available  from  the 
Community  Statistical Office figures.  For  those countries active in ! 
• 
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foreign  investment,  for  which  figures are available,  ti1is result is 
as  follpws:-
Table 12.17  Geographical  Dis.tributior. of Foreign Portfolio 
~uity Investment  1982 
E.B.C.  %  u.s.  %  Japan  %  Switzerland  %  other  --------
U.E.B.L.  36.2  39.5  10.5  6.3  7.5 
France  15.1  49.9  17.3  0.9  16.8 
Germany  13.0  ::)2.4  18.5  J.S  12.3 
Holland  13.7  44.2  28.1  3.2  10.8 
Weighted 
16.5  47.7  20.3  3.0  12.5 
% 
average  Source;  E.E.C.,  CSO  data 
Applicat.ion of this 16.5%  to the estimate of total foreign equities dealing 
in  t.hc  Corur.unity  (T.:ble  12.5)  would  yield  a.  minimum  estimate of the E.E.C. 
international  equities market of  some  $6,0CO million in 1982. 
These  aggregate proportions  approximate  to  the  very consistent 
strc.cture of foreign equity portfolios quot.ed  to the Consultants 
throughout  the study by  institutional investors.  The  table introduces 
a  further  important_perspective of  the small  relative  importance of 
foreign  E.E.C~ equity investment compared  ~ith the  2  major  foreign 
narkets.  The  reasons  for  this art:=  discussed elsewhere in this Repo!:t. 
'.J.'he  strong imp1.:occation  of this pattern of  de2.1.lings  for  linkage is that 
it is important that the  linkage  arrangements  are constl .:u:.'c~d  ~r/1. thout. 
compromising business  opportunit~es of  Stock  Exchange members  in the 
u.s.  and Japanese markets. 
Tne  table  dppears  to suggest  that the inclusion of Switzerland in the 
European equities linkage  system would  not .be  essential,  a  point 
endorsed by  n;uch  market  comment.  The  table may,,  however,  inadequately 
reflect deals  arranged  in foreign markets  i.:wolving  Swiss  banks  and 
the desirability o£  including  S\olitzerland  i:n  any  E.E.C.  settlement 
arrangements  is a  quite separate question. 
The  patterns of business observed in 1982  may  be  ascribed to the 
indifferent performance of most of the European markets  over  the 12.6 
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greater part of the previous  decade,  which  had  resu~ted in mutual 
dis-interest.  The  principal  change  which  had been occurring over 
che  period 1975  to  1982  in  investment structures was  the greatly 
incre·ased  flow  of  funds  to  the Japanese market.  Although in 1982, 
.J.n  qL;3.nt.l.tative  terms,,  the  flow  of funds  to the U.S.  market were  far 
-;rc&·.:.er  t.~1an  investment in Japan,  in proportionate  te·rms  the  level 
c·f  investmen·t  in the  U.S.  had not chan9ed since  1975.  'l'h.Ls  is made 
cl:=·~r  bj the  compound  annual  rates of growth,  at current value, 
'::>btair.ed  from  three of the  four  ccrnplete  :x:eturns  obtained.  ·nerunark 
i:::  0rr·~t:.t:.~t1,  a.s  the volu1ne  is not consequential  and  the pattern of 
Tdblc  l'L . .  W  Gz-N.'th  rates of pcrti:ol:Lo  fc.ceign  equity  investment 
by  majo~- rr:ar'.~<.ets  197~ -. l._9_8_2_. ________  _ 
Inv£·stins;  Country  Total  foreign  E.E.C.  u.s.  Japan  Switzerland 
\)  ,:~. 3. L  +  1.0.9~ 
.J..  8.7%  +9 .9%  +47.1%  +b.O% 
Ge.tt,la.ny  +  10  ..  2~  -t- 1.2%  +1.0.3%  +41. 8%  -2.3\t 
holland  +  >.2.1+  - 5.  ~16  ../,.12.7%  -r)9.0~  +12.8% 
Source:  E.E.C.,  c.s.o.  data 
'I'he  growth  ra  <:.e  o.f:  French tot  a 1  ioreign  f:qui ties trading,  the  only 
figure  in the  Banque  de  France  response  to the Community Statistical 
Office,  appears  somewhat higher  than  other national markets at 15.1% . 
.  :m  ironic  :~esul  t  of  the analysis of growth, of  fc~eign equities trading 
~s that the  two  h:ighe:st  rates,  ovP.r  this period,  were  achieved 
by  two  countcies under  Exchange  Control  restrictions.  These  were 
Denmark  and  Italy with  compound  annual growth rates of  43.5%  and 
40.7%  respectively. 
T~e London  European  Equities  Marke~ 
The  London c.s.o.  was  unable  to provide  any data related to U.K.  invest-
ment  in other  E.E.C.  coun~ries.  Evidence  from  the market,  however, 
suggested  the  proportion of this E.E.C.  business,  relative to other 
foreign  investment,  was  consistent with  the pattern indicated above. 
As  has been demonstrated  above,and  as  is well  known  in the Stock 203 
Exchange,  the official market statistics  <...•f.  aeall  ng  i.n foreign  equities do 
not convey  the. scale of  the  London  i.nternational market.·  Nor,  more 
1mportantl.y, do they indicate  th~ extent of members'  participation in it. 
The  1981  London  figures  supplied in response to the Conununity 
questionnaire  indicate that,  ~n recorded dealing,  foreign equities 
represented  9.2%  of total equities tradinsr  in 1981,  falling in 1982  to 
7.0%  and  increasing slightly by  March  198]  to  8.1%. 
Within  this general  understatement,  howevE~r, it is possible that the 
proportionate distribution of this busine:;s  between  the  foreign markets 
lS  a  little closer to reality.  The  same  :factors  tend to take  dea:U.ng 
off the  floor  in most of the dealing with  foreign markets. 
Tabl~ 12.19 
1981 
1982 
Geographical distribution of the London  Foreign 
Equities Trading. 
E.E.C. 
14.8\ 
17.8~ 
other Foreign 
85.2% 
82.2% 
Source;  The  Stock  Exchange 
By  March  1983,  the E.E.C.  proportion had  risen further  to 19.6%. 
This  statement of the relative  importance~ of the  ~  E'. C.  b;,:si.ness,  although 
apparently consistent with  that of  other European  Exchang.:;:::,  is :t:ial":ed  by 
two  factors.  The  first is that it includes substantial element of 
dealing  in Irish securities  and  the  defj_ni tion of this business as 
I  < 
'European  1 ,  in the sense of  the  figures  c:onsidered  for other 
Exchanges,  is questionable.  Without  the Irish figure,  the E.E.C. 
proportion for  1982  would·be  12.1%.  The  second,  more  significant 
factor,  is that the detailed  figures  for  the major  continental markets are 
very  low  and  endorse  the direct dealing  abroad,  and  fail to x-eflect 
the  real  London  business volume.  The best example is that of Germany, 
which  according to these figures  attracts only  1%  of London  European 
equities business.  The  fig~res exclude both orders placed directly in 
Germany  and  U.K.  jobber transactions which because of their nature 
fall outside the London  bargain recording. .. 
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In  the  London  market  the Consultants were  able to offset the 
deficiencies of both  the market and  the  Government statistics by 
_,_nformation  obtained informally  and  confidentially  from  several 
JObbing -and  braking  firms  ac.tive  in European equities.  The  figures 
_,f  b·:s  ~r.::!ss  obtain.ed are not comprehensive  and, for  obvious  reasons 
•.)£  conf.l..denti-:~lity, cannot be  presented.  It was  possible to obtain 
~Jooi.)·~T  turnover  and  estimates of the market shares .  It  was  also 
possl..ole  to  confirm~from a  range  of _brokers.the proportion of their 
E..1ropean  business  they placed with  U.K.  jobbers  and  the proportion 
L:e:,r  placeq directly on  the  foreign markets.It was  possible to obtain 
e3t:...;uates  from  a  range of institutions of the proportion of their 
ol·de"::":o:;  which  they placed with  the London  brokers,  as  opposed  to directly 
rcu~ing abroad.  Approximately  assessed on this basis,  the  London 
n·.arkt': c  may  be  some  eight to nine  times  the  figure quoted  in the 
o~ficiq: statistics, or  some  $3,000m  a  year  in the F.I.B.V.  idiom. 
As::;u;n.Lng  that European equities comprise  about  15%  of  the U.K. 
•.r-.sti  ti.~tional  foreign equities transactions,  a  similar estimate of 
the  ~arket is obtained at about  $3,000m  (Tables 12.6,  12.16a,  12.16b, 
and  :•_2 .17) •  The  order o: dif:erence between the Stock  EXchange  figure 
of  t.he  E.E.C.  business and  the  size of that market estimated fran 
member  firm  and  ~nstitutional data  is·similar to that between  the 
·Stock Exchange  figure of total  foreign equities business  and  the 
balance of paYments  figures  of capital transactions.  Lpndon  appears 
to  have half the  European  equities market. 
A point of  cons~derable interest in  the  London  study was  the rate of 
growth  of dealing in European  securi  ti'es.  Growth  of business in 
European  ~ecurities had been  strGng  in London  even during the mairt 
per~od of the  study when  many  market authorities were  alleging 
a  total and  general mutual  disenchantment  in the European equities 
market.  One  of the  leqding brokers  in this market had  experienced a 
growth  of European equities business of  38.8%  per annum  between  1977 
and  1983.  While  the major  uplift had occurred  in· 1982  ana 1983, 
business had  fncreased steadily since  1977-78. The  European equities 
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trading of one of the major  JObbers  had  increased at the rate of  84.6% 
per  annum  between  1980 and  1983.  E.E.C.  equities had  become  a 
significant element in  th~ total foreign  equities dealing of  the 
London  jobbers. 
12.7  Conclusion 
Despite  the minor  technical provisos related to  the balance of 
payments  figures  and  the  fragmentary  nature of  some  of the detail, 
the Consultants believe that these figures provide the best broad statement at 
present available  of the  international  e~uities market.  An  approxima-
tion of. the market might be  derived  from  t.hem  by  applying  to the 
overall estimated total foreign  business  in Table  12.15  the weighted 
proportion derived  from  Table  12.17.  If a  15%  proportion was  accepte~a 
conservative estimate of the dealing in  the Community  capital centres 
in foreign  E.E.C.  equities might be  some  $6,000m.  Such  a  market would 
be  four  times  the  size of  that implied  by  the  Stock  Exchange  statistics. 
Three  independent  approaches  t.o  estimation indicate .a  London  market of 
some  $3,000rn  in  second  country E.E.C.  equities. 
The  Consultant~ wish  again  to stress that  this Section of  the Report is 
not intend.ed  to attempt  a  precise quanti tat.ive  estimation of the real 
size of  the Community  international market  ~n foreign E.E.C.  equities. 
Its intention  i~ solely  to demonstrate  that this marke~ is bigger,  by 
a  most  considerable  factor,  than  the  Stock  Exchange  stat~stics imply. 
This  level of understatement is such  that the  Stock  Exchange statistics 
are positively misleading. 
The  current policies of at least some  of the  Stock  Exchange~ are 
~ncomprehensible in terms  of their statistics  of  foreign business. 
For  example,  the  London  Exchange  is about  to undergo  possibly the most 
profound  revolution in ics history with  the ostensible aim  of orientating 
the market to international business  and  competition.  This would 
hardly be  likely if its present dealing in foreign  stocks represented 
less than  10%  of its domestic equities  turnov.er.  In light of the 
balance of payments figures,  which  are  a  far  truer expression of the 
real situation,  the present London  poltcy pre-occupations become  more 
explicable. 
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The  Consultants  b~lieve that this is a  point of importance  because the 
true dimensions of the  European international_ me.rket  may  be masked  to the 
r1uthon. ties of  the  Stock  Exchanges  who  may  in  consequence  be  prone  to 
.. hsreqard it or accord it little priority.  To  put this point in 
~cr~~8ctive,  the  =apital movements  data  imply that,  at minimUm 
·:.:>t.u:J.::.te,  t.:]·,~t:  international European  equities market may  be  about the 
value of  Lurnover  of a  substant:ial  European  Exchange,  for  example of 
.P.sr1sterdam.  The  real volume  is likely to lie far  above  this.  If this 
is sv,  from  some  quarter  there  should be  both official recognition of 
t:r,e  ;..xistence  of this market as  a  significant element  in European 
sec  uri  ties  t.rading  and ·support for it at  the  level of resources  and 
equ.i~ment wbich  trading of this volume would  appear  to merit. 
,t,_s  a  final  observation it rrught  be  noted  that it is curious,  at a  time 
whE:n  :nest  of the  Eu:::-opean  Exchanges  are pre-occupied with their 
''-Y-'L1di~g  i;, ir,ternati.onal  busines:>  &nd  in  face  of  foreign competition,. 
t:.bo.t  S·:J  little is  known.  across  all.  c.r1e  .t:xchar.ges,  of  the,volume  and 
valu<.C  cf members'  international business.  Estimation of the size of 
tbe international market wiLi.  always  be  a  problem and. will be 
controvers~al.  Its overall dimensions  would be  adequately  available 
1f the capital movement  statistics were  kept ln all Community  countries 
with  the  same  effici~ncy as  they are  at present kept  in  some. 
The  Stock  Exchanges  could,  without  undue difficulty,  assemble  the 
statistics of  the off-market foreign  dealings of their own  members. 
The  Commission  would  be  i.n  a  better position to  formulate  and monitor 
tbe  Corr~unity's capital market policy.  The  Stock  Exchanges  would  be 
in a  better  pqs~tion to appreciate  the dimensions  of the international 
market,  the participation of  their members  in it  and  the adequacy of 
t~eir regulatory  function  over developing  areas  of their markets. 
...  • • SECTION  13 
- 207 
GENERADISED  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  PRESENT  E.E.C. 
INTERNATIONAL  EQUITIES  MARKET 
13.1  Importance of acknowledgement of the present International  Srr~.:.i ties 
Market 
From  the  information presented in earlier Sections on the national 
Exchanges,it is apparent that they are diverse  and that the devices 
whereby  the members  adapt their procedures  to foreign business vary 
according to the different regulatory regimes  ~overning ~heir 
dOmestic  business.  As  established in Section 12,  there is already 
substantial activity between the  Community capital markets.  Members' 
participation in it has,  in the main,  been  achieved by permitted 
deviations  from  procedures  and  rules of their domestic markets.  The 
present international market comprises  two  elements.  First,  floor 
dealing in locally-listed foreigns  and  second)  off-floor international 
dealin~which now  appears  to  be  the bulk of the market  and without 
which  the local floor markets in foreigns  could  not operate. 
In presenting the results of  the survey to the Commission  and  the 
Committee,  the Consultants attach importance  to the empirical evidence 
of the manner  in which  the  European  international equities-market has 
developed,  spontaneously,  to date.  The  designers of  a  Community  equity 
market linkage  do  not have  ·a  blank  sheet of paper  nn  their dra\J'ing 
board.  Any  practical approach  to linkage must take into account the 
actualities of the present markets. 
This  done,  it is possible  that the  situat~on might be  steered towards 
the  o~jectives of the Commission  and  the Committee,  but such directive 
power  is limited.  Each  national market is a  vast organisation, 
involving directly or indirectly some  thousands of participants in the 
securities industry.  'T1e  Stock  Exchanges  may  control operating 
features of the markets  but their broad evolution is the result of a 
complex  combination of ceaseless  financial  developments within the 
markets  and  economi~ and social determinants,  which  impact on  them 
externally.  ·A  notable current acknowledgement of this is the present 
situation in the United  Kingdom,  in which  the Government had  to 
\.. 
• •• 
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acknowledge  that•the ponderous  and  rudderless litigation by  which  they 
had intended to contrive changes  in the Stock Exchange  was  less 
effective than the simple exposure of the City to competitivepressures 
which,  in reality,  were  bound  to be  the driving  force  in re-alignment 
of  th~ London market.  If this general premise is accepted,  then to 
develop  any particular market strategy,  such as  international linkage, 
;,.'i thin the Community,  significance must be attached to current develop-
ments  in the markets  themselves.  Discriminate measures can then be 
taken  to encourage  or discourage·aspects of such developments. 
Sc~·:e;r:,ltic  illustration of the International Eaui tie:, Market 
Desp1.te  tc.e  many  variances at national  level, it is.possi.ble to depict 
a  .:;ynthesis of the present:.  European  int~rnatiorial equities market. 
The  ~ssential elements of the situation are schematically illustrated 
1.n  diag·cam  13 .1.  This  sketches  the relationship of::.. 
(~J  the market of origin in a  secur1ty  {Stock  Exchange  'B'), 
presumed  in this general  case  to be  the main market for 
the security,  and; 
(ii)  another of  the Community  Stock  Exchanges  on  which  the  same 
security is listed and  dealt. 
The  diagram is intended to  illus~rate the  following  situation:-
(i)  Floor  markets  are made  in the security in both  Exchanges.  The  character 
of these  two  markets  in the security differ.  In Exchange  'B'  the 
£ecurity is dealt in a  presumably broader market as  a  domestic  stock. 
In  Exchange  'A'  an  effective floor market is presumed  for it as  a 
'fo~eign listed'  security.  This market in Exchange  'A'  will tend  to be 
narr?w,  with dealing in small size  and  the security possibly dealt as 
a  transformed  local  ins'trurnent  {i.e.  local bearer or local depository 
receipt).  Due  either to the attracti:ver,ess  to  the smaller local 
investors of quotation in a  local  form  and in local currency  or to the 
lower  cost of a  small  transaction in a  foreign equity on  the  local 
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Exchange,  private client and  sm.all  institutional business in the 
security will tend to be dealt in the local market.  This operation 
has  the advantage of both  sides of the  transaction being on  the one 
flocr,  and dealing will be effectively supported by  information and 
sett:ement services of the national Exchange. 
(;d)  The  ::.nstitutional and  large-size business  in the security in Country 
'7\.'  will  tend to go direct to the market of origin, market 
1 B',  as 
the broadest and most  informed market.  There are notable exceptions 
to this in e1e genuine  'international'  stocks, such  as  the five or six 
ffiajor  Dutch  securities,  but  the general case stands.  The  strength of 
ti:is  tendency depends  on  the strength of  the broking  in the market 
wh'"x·e  t.~e  order originates and also on  th:e  efficiency of  the market of 
origin. 
T"nere  appears  pverwhelming  tv~deriCe that the preponderence of large 
::;us.:L.-~""ss  goes  direct to the  foreign market,  normally without a  local 
nrcker being associated.  The  diagram illustrates the distinction and 
the  l-inkage  between -the  floor markets  in Country 
1 A'  and  Country 
1 B'. 
The  international market,  on  the periphery of both Exchanges,  is off 
the floors,  carried on  in dealing  rooms  driven by  and operated  through 
telecommunications.  Insofar as such locations are within member  firms; 
they may  be  considered to be  carrying out Stock  Exchange  transactions 
under  loose regulation,  though  as.observed in Section 12  such·trans-
actions are not recorded.  An  unknown  proportion of dealing of this 
type is carried out by banks  or  foreign  brokers who  are not members  of 
the Community  Exchanges.  The  diagram omits  the variant whereby  an 
institution might deal  through  the  !~cal branch of the foreign 
intermediary,  in this case in market  ·~·,  rather  than direct to the 
foreign centre.  This  does  not  nor~mally apply  in European securities 
as, for  the reasons  discussed  in Section  16  below,  European brokers  do 
not set up branch offices in other Community  market.:s  and,  as yet,· the 
European  banks  have  not exploited  th~ir potential to use  their foreign 
subsidiaries as ::.nternatiohal equities dealing  networks. I  o  ~~· 
(iii) 
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The  brmker in market  'A',  unless protected by total monopoly of dealing 
(which would,in any case only apply  to  the small  segment of foreign 
securities locally listed)  is disadvantaged in two  ways  in respect of 
orders  in the security.  If he  receives  the ordex·,  double  commission 
would  normally be payable because of duplication of the agency  function 
in the  two  markets.  Secondly,  unless  he is a  large,specialised broker 
who  has  invested considerable resources  in contacts  and  research in 
market  'B',  he  is less likely to be  expert in the security than  the 
brokers in the main market.  Nor  will he  be  as  sensitive to likely 
behaviour of the market itself  - the other essential dimension of 
advice  to the investor.  This situation influences  the  larger 
institutional orders  to the markets of origin. 
\iv)  vvpile  the  d.bove  assertions are totally true in respect,  for  example,  of 
dealing in u.s.  securities,  their application to the Community 
Exchanges requires qualification.  Due,  in the main,  to use of 
collective price systems,  the markets in most Community  countries  tend 
to be  narrow.  The  floor trading  systems  are,  in genera~not capable of 
direct absorption of foreign 'institutional orders.  This  problem  tends 
to be overcome.by  a  perimeter of  international-dealer brokers or banks 
who  are  ready to deal,  on  their own  account,  in the size required in 
the international market.  They  then are able  to control the other side 
of  c.he  transaction on  the  local market in such  a  ;.~.:,: .,,.t,~r  t..:1a t  it does 
not exceed the capacity of the floor dealing  or,  alternatively,  de.9l 
in size off the market.  The  problems of this situation are discussed 
below  but,  in this summary,  it should be  noted that the floor trading 
systems  in domestic  stocks  on  most of the  Exchanges  a're  able  to 
survive due  to  'buffer'  activities,  off the market,  carried out by the 
larger brokers  and  the banks. 
In  the case quoted of a  security of Exchange  'B'  which. is traded 
heavily internationally,  the  'centre of gravity'  of the market for  the 
stock in Exchange  'B'  might thus vary.  It might,  as would certainly 
be  the case in any  U.K.  domestic  security,  be on  the Stock  Exchange 
floor.  It might,  however,  be  off the  floor in the international 
dealings  of the major  members.  It might in extreme cases be off the ~Jfi'· ~  •,  :,1 
tt: 
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floor  in the hands of non-member  banks.  The  diagram does  not attempt 
to illustrate this complex point. 
\v)  ~he diagram  shows  the Stock Exchange  member  intermediaries of market  'A' 
dealing with those of market  'B'.  Their ability to do  this would, 
however,  be  governed by  the regulations of their own  Exchanges.  These 
transactions, with one side in one market·ard one  side in another,  are 
not generally.recorded in the official  stati~tics of  ~le Exchanges, 
r-.nd  their value  and volume are not known.  A major  consequence of a 
European  trading  network  would  be  to capture both sides of inter--
Exchange  cransactions in a  sir.gle  information system.  The  diagram 
illustrates "'.:ha't inter-Exchc:mge  dealing  between members  is normally 
undertakP.n  under  special  'international dealing'  conventions,  which 
differ from  those  to which members  are restricted in their domestic 
markets. 
(•.ri)  Tht:  o:cd~r-routing links between  ~ntcrnationa  1-ciealer members  in the  two 
rr,arkets  may  be  arbitrage or direct internatio11al dealing;  The  general 
market view  appears  to be  that  'classical' arbitrage  (i.e.  the 
assumption of  ~ position as  a  principal  in one market to  undo it in 
another, with the effect of  equalisation of prices)  is no  longer possible 
between  European Exchanges.  ~urope is virtually in a  single  time  zone. 
Its ·telecommunications are effective  and pure arbitrage would be 
swamped  by  the  large international stock movements  that can be  under-
taken directly by big investors.These  factors  have  combined  to reduce 
arbitrage margins  and  to increase its risk.  The  exception to. this is 
the continued need  for arbitrage to service local markets which,  either 
due  to private investor preferences or  to monopoly,  have discrete 
characteristics. 
(vii)  The  diagram  suggests  that the main price effect,  in the general case, 
would be  exerted by  the market  of origin.  It might be  a·ssumeq,  all 
things being equal,  that a  price  lag  ~ill exist between  the  two  markets. 
As  the international market tends  to involve  one-way trading,  this 
situation normally  favours  the client ordering in the market Of  origin. 213 
Assuming  the  eff~ciency of the  two  markets  to be equal,  a  finer  spread 
of price should be obtainable in the  larger markP.t  'B'.  Recourse 
directly to market  'B'  also  avoids  the. client  ~ncurri.ng  any  indirect 
cost of moving  stock to market  'A'. 
The  price  communication  system in the  example  shown  is in the  form of  a 
broken loop,  with the weakest  link between  the institutional investor 
in Country  'A'  and his national market  'A'.  Given that the 
institutional investor orders in market  'B', his  transaction will affect 
that market price.  In  fact,  in the  Am~rican case,  information systems 
are sufficiently sensitive to permit a  major  European investor to see 
the effect on price of his own  New  York  transaction,  virtually when it 
occurs.  In the  following  trading session on  ~,e floor  in Country  'A', 
the change of price on  the main market will be  the major  determinant of 
the  local price.  The  local price will not be  significant to the 
insti-tutional client in Country  'A'.  He  may  indeed find it more 
difficult to obtain and worse  specified than the price in the main 
market. 
(viii)  The  diagram  ack~owledges distortion of demand  for  the security  (possibly 
reduction to zero)  by artificial cbstacles  lying across  the national 
frontiers.  Statutory,  fiscal and  exchange  cor:.trol obstacles  introduce 
severe imperfections  into the  demand  .for European  secux~tie&  ar~ 
therefo;e into local price.  Technical factors,  su~h as difficulties of 
international settlement,which  impede international dealing,are facets 
of the  same  problem.  These are discussed in later Sections. 
(ix)  In the case illustrated,  the pattern of international business relates1 
as  stated above,  to a  security issued on  Exchange  'B', which is presumed 
to have  the largest mar]~et in the  stock.  With regard to a  security 
issued on  Exchange  'A'  and presumed  to have its main market there,  the 
situation would  be  the exact reciprocal of that discussed above. 
(x)  It shot:.ld be  noted that depicting only  two  markets over-simplifies the 
dealing,  in the case exemplified,  of members  and  investing institutions 
of Exchange  'A'  in the security  of Exchange  'B'.  It is likely that large 
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orders might be  only partly met through Exchange  'B'  and would be made 
up  by parts of the order placed in other Exchanges.  A network of 
internAtiona:l contact exists through which  this may  be done.·.  This  adds 
an  important element to the  system illustrated, which is confined to 
the more  normal  situation of recourse to the main market. 
13.3  The  main Policy  Issues of Linka9e 
Diag::am  ·13.1  attempts ·only to schematise  the general situation. 
T..:.lu:;t::ra.tion  of the exact relationships between the individual European 
capital markets would call for  more  complicated expression.  The 
d:t.a.;:.:..::n  does,  however,  adequately depict the general  framework  within 
which proposals  for linkage must  be  consioered.  Notably, it permits 
two  main  issues of  linkage policy to emerge. 
(i)  1~e first relates  to  the  increasing practice of direct recourse to the 
mar~e~ of origin  or main market in the  stock.  This might appear  to 
ac.:.ieve  one  of the major  airus  of linkage  - confrontation pf all orders 
.;.:1  a  particular stock  - by  the  tendency  of  the large orders to 
concentrate in this market.  As  discussed  elsewhere in the Report,  such 
ideal concentration is not achieved as,  ~n most of the capital centres, 
a  dual market  for  foreign  stocks,  part on  and part off the floor,  exists. 
There is no  doubt  that an  approach  to linkage based on  the floors  o·f · the 
markets of orLgin would  be  favoured  by  the Exchanges,  whose  prime 
concern remains  the protection of their domestic markets.  A negative 
•  example of this attitude was  the European Options  Exchange,  which was 
originally conceived as  a  genuine  European Options market  but of which 
development has been  impeded by  the  fears of other Exchanges  that 
underlying markets  in their securities might be built up  in Amsterdam. 
A less ·favourable aspect of the  trend to use markets of origin is that 
~~e practice disturbs  the relationship between  the local brokers and 
their natural clients,  the  local institutions.  It encourages  the 
development of dealing  rooms  and  supporting  research within the  investing 
institutions  themselves.  This  erodes  the brokers'  financial base for  the 
development of  these functions,  which  should,  more appropriately and 
efficiently, be  concentrated  ~11 thin the broking  firms. 
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It is further questionable  whethe~ in the  longer run,  an approach 
which  concentrated dealing in major  European securities in their 
markets of origin would achieve  the prime  aim of the Commission  - to 
develop a  genuine  European capital market broadly based across  the 
Community  countries,  reflecting  the  combined strengths of the national 
economies in its scale of operation.*  If Exchanges,  under  the  linkage 
system,  simply consolidate their local hold on major domestic 
securities,  the potential to make  markets  on a  European base would not 
be  exploited.  Dealing would  tend  to be constricted by the narrowness, 
or other limitations,of each individual market.  The  system might also 
be  to the disadvantage of  some  of the smallest markets,  which would 
have difficulty in playing the role of the main market in their major 
domestic  securities.  Examples  of this exist at present. 
In  terms of practical policy decision,  this question translates into 
whether  the European  linkage will be  so contrived that it encourages 
market-making or price formation across  the broad base of the markets 
as  a  whole  or whether,  through maintenance of many  existing practices 
and constraints, it does not. 
{ii)  The  second1 and possibly more  important,issue illustrated by  the diagram 
is whether  the linkage between  the  Stock Exchanges  should be based 
exclusively on  the carket floors,  exclusively on  the peripheral 
international dealing  network  or on  a  combinat~o~  0~ bot~.  The 
greater part of this Report is aimed at  demonstrating  that the t1rst 
solution,  though in many  ways  ideal,  cannot be achieved until the 
longer term.  The  second is undesirable in principle.  The  practical 
short and medium  term action,  therefore, lies in the third alternative 
the design of a  network  which  encompasses  the Stock Exchange  element 
of the entire system illustrated in diagram  13.1,  but which is biased 
to reconcentrate as much  business as possible on the Stock Exchange 
floors,  or floor  systems. 
*  An  exposition of this concept relevant to the Consultants•  study was 
given by Christopher Tugendhat,  Commissioner of the European 
Communities,  in his address in Milan  - January  25  1980. 216 
Much  of this Report is concerned with advancinq  information which 
might assist the Commission  and  the Committee  to resolve this question. 
The  essence of the problem may  be  summarised as follows. 
The  Stock Exchanges still consider  their physical market floors to be 
the  fundamental  base of their organisation and  struct'ure.  Although  the 
floors originated at a  time  when  concentration of transactions and the 
interaction required for  the dealing could only be attained by  a 
concourse of dealers in close physical proximity,  a  situation now 
superseded,  the Stock Exchange  remains  firmly committed to ·floor 
trading·. 
The  reasons  for  this are complex.  In part,they arise from  interest. 
The  present business of  most  members  of the Exchanges is,  in the 
main,  conducted  on the floors.  In most cases,the floor  trading is the 
exclusive privilege of the broking  community,  endorsed by  law,  and  the 
:nembers  of the  Exchanges  would not wish to see this position changed 
or  eroded. 
The  more  serious and valid  justifications,  however,  relate  to the 
regulation and efficiencies of securities trading.  The  rules of the 
Stock Exchanges  and the underlying  legislation1where it exists,  are 
rooted in the belief that a  transparent,  concentrated  and well 
regulated market can best be  secured through dealing on  a  physical floor 
of a  Stock  Exchange.  This is strongly endorsed by the conviction of 
Stock Exchange  members  that securities trading is a  personalised 
business  and  that both efficiency and integrity in dealing is best 
assured by  the personal  contacts which  face  to face  trading· make  possible. 
The  lack of  success of  forms  of automated  trading both in Europe  and 
outside it endorse this attitude of  the Stock Exchanges.  A further 
argument,  advanced by  the  Co~~iss~on in favour  of floor  trading,  is that 
it constitutes tangible evidence  to the small private investor of a 
transparent and properly cpnducted market. 
On  the other hand,  it has  been observed  that international dealing has, 
to a  considerable degree,  'left the floors'.  The  obvious relevance of 2U 
modern  telecommunications to international dealinq,  and  the advanced 
information and on-line computer facilities supporting it, haa  tended 
to move  international business  from  the conventional trading floor  to 
dealing·roams in member  firm's offices.  These are more easily able 
to accommodate  the equipment,  operate through all hours  and generaily 
provide a.suitable environment for conducting  foreign business. 
These are the facilities which .presently provide the essential inter-
mediation between  the different market floors of Europe.  The  extent to 
which  such dealing, if conducted by Stock  Exchange  member~,  should be 
defined as  'off-the-floor'  requires careful definition .. It'cannot be 
considered off the Exchange,  as  the members  conducting it are subject 
to Exchange  regulation,  even  though this is looser in this area of 
business.  The  status of such dealing varies from  Exchange  to Exchange. 
The  dealing rooms  of the London  jobbers are most appropriately considered 
extensions of the London  market floor re-located for operation 
convenience,  on  the other hand,  those of the German  banks or French 
brokers could·not be considered Exchange dealing,  otherwise they would 
fall under  the various  local  legislative requirements  and  their 
operations would  become  compromised  and perhaps impossible. 
Any  central regulation and  development of this element of members' 
business by  the Stock Exchanges  is difficult for  two principal reasons. 
Firstly,  although it is necessary  to permit members  to operate in the 
international market,  such ·concessions  are invariably at variance with. 
the strict application of the rules of the  domesti~ markets.  It is a 
grey area of Stock  ~xchange regulation.  Secondly,  although Jt is 
essential that the Exchanges  be active in the international market 
··both to remain competitive  and  to permit foreign access  to the domestic 
market,  only the large brokers and banks  tend  to operate in this expert 
field.  The  Stock Exchanges  are democratic  bodies,in the main 
comprising  Small brokers whose  activities are centred on  the local 
floor dealing.  A  problem might,therefore,be anticipated in achieving 
any positive,  officially-supported development of the off-floor 
international market  which might,  at least superficially,  appear  to bein 
the interest of a  minority of members.  It naturally arises from  the 
different market· situations that the Stock  Exc~anges themselves will take 
differing standpoints on  the  two  approaches  to linkage. - 218 
The  essential problem of effectively lj.nkinq the Community  Exchanges  is, 
therefore, to find  a  solution which will accO!IInlOdate  the COIIIDission  and 
those of the Stock  Exchange  authorities which are pre-disposed to any 
solution which will enhance  the position of the Stock Exchange  floors, 
yet which will,  at the  same  t.i.nle,  effectively embrace  the off-market 
~nternational operations and consolidate  them  within th& frameworks of 
the official markets. 
Before this question can.be developed,  it is necessary to review 
briefly the series of obstacles which  stand in the way  of linkaqe of 
the Community  Exchanges.  These are considered in sections 14 .to 18.· 219 
SECTION  14  OBSTACLES  TO  LINKAGE  OF  THE  STOCK  EXCHANGES  AT  GOVE!WMENT  LEVEL 
14.1  The  Economic  Context 
The  obstacles to linkage presented by  the impositions and restrictions 
of national Governments  lay outside the Consultants'  terms of reference 
and  no detailed study of these was  attempted.  The  adverse effects of 
such fiscal or  legal obstacles are  the subject of other Community-level 
initiatives.  However,  these obstacles,  of which the most draconian is 
Exchange Control,  are  so important an  impediment to  the emergence of an 
effectively linked equities market in Europe  that brief mention of 
them must be made,  to reflect market  comment  received. 
During the period of the  study,  the economic  and  financial environment 
influencing the national Governments  in their attitudes towards  the 
capital markets radically changed.  The  last decade had  been 
characterised,  in virtually all member  countries,  by  economic  and 
social  i~fluences hostile to  the equities market.  The  economies  had 
moved  into recession,with  low  or  zero growth,  through which  the 
Governments  of the  time maintained heavy  social expenditures.  The 
priority of Governments  had  been to  f~nance consequent deficits. 
Interest rates rose to unprecedented peaks  to permit heavy Government 
funding,  reduction of internal liquidity and protection of currencies. 
In  an inflationary situation, with  industrial performance depressed, 
the return to equity capital had  been  far below  tiu.tt  <wailal::·le  from 
secure  fixed interest instruments.  Government bond  issues, on  a  mass.ive 
scale and at interest rates against which equity capital could not 
compete,  had  crowded  the issue of equity out of the capital markets. 
During  late 1982  and  1983- the latter part of  the study- in response 
to  signs that the  world  economy might be  slowly moving  out of recession, 
interest in the Community  equities markets  sharply revived  and  strong 
bull markets were  experienced in almost all the Stock Exchanges. 
Possibly the main  force  in the regeneration of the markets was,  however, 
the  flow of U.S.  funds  to Europe,  notably  the  E.R.I.S.A~ foreign 
investment.  The  encouragement revival in the markets  should not 
obscure  the fact that most of  the restrictions,  which contributed to 
U.S.  foreign  investment  now  considered within the guidelines of  the 
Employee  Retirement  Income  Security Act  - 1974. 220 
the weakness of'the European Exchanges during the recession and which 
presented obstacles to inter-Exchange  trading,  remain . and will tend 
to arrest the· full development of both the  individual markets  and of 
an effectively linked market at European scale. 
i4.2  Capital Market policies 
Tne  overall attitude of Governments  to the capital markets  is 
undoubtedly  improving.  Until the  end of the  1970's there was  little 
sign  ~ongst the Community  national Governments of any consciousness 
of the need  to promote  the equity capital markets as  a  prime instru-
ment of industrial re-structuring and  economic growth.  Due  either to 
complacency arising  from  a  former but lost industrial primacy,  or to 
undue  respect for  the sanctity of traditional institutional forms,  or 
to mistaken identification of the capital market with one side of 
partisan politics,  European Governments  were  slow  to develop positive 
capital market policies.  The  results of  such measures in Far Eastern 
~arkets,  to which substantial European financial resources were at 
w~at time  flowing,  appeared  a  matter of indifference to European 
Governments. 
During  the later 1970's this situation changed..  The  sequence of 
important French  commissions  culminating in the P€rouse Report,  which 
led the way  in Europe  in reviewing  the role of the Stock  Exchanges  as 
an  instrument of combined  economic  and social policy,  resulted in the 
Monory  measures  and,  possibly more  significant!~ in the programme  of 
Bourse reforms  which  are now  in progress.  The  French  law was  followed 
by the deClercqmeasures in Belgium  which,  aimed both at stimulation 
of investment  and at improvement of  industrial performance,were wider  in 
concept than their French model. 
While  this type of scheme  provides no  incentive for  increased equity 
investment by  the gross  funds,  which in several countries(e.g.  Holland) 
is required to secure effective portfolio re-structuring, it i~ never-
theless, valuable  to regenerate public interest in  the equities markets. 221 
In Germany,  the efficacy of the present capital markets  system in 
securing industrial renewal  is being widely questioned  and  a  series 
of Commissions,  with wide financial  industrial and Government  involve-
ment,are in course of considering changes.  The  Italian Exchanges and 
banks  are discussing a  new  and modernised structure for  the market. 
In Holland,  a  new  securities law is emerging.  In Denmark,  the  limited 
role of the central market is being questioned and  the Government has 
expressed readiness to support concentration of transactions in the 
Exchange if this can be  technically achieved.  The  Luxembourg 
Government has,  over a  long period,  demonstrated its readiness to 
support an  evolving  and versatile capital market. 
The  United  Kingdom  Government  has  set  in  train  a 
process  which  will  permit  the  London  market  to  face  the 
full  force of foreign competition. 
There  is now  considerable evidence  that,  at the  level of capital 
market policy,  the Community  Governments  ar~ in their individual 
countries,prepared to take  steps  to re-activate their equity markets. 
In fact,  the  Governments  might be  considered to have been at least as 
dynamic  as  the Exchanges  themselves.  Following  the Perouse Report,  the 
complex fiscal proposals of the  Monory  law were  in effect by  1979. 
The  Bourse re-organisation,  elements of which had  b(~~  auvoc~t~d by 
Commissions before Perouse,  is only  now  in progress,  with .the more 
fundamental  changes still unresolved. 
From  the standpoint of European  linkage,  the most  important point 
related to developments is that they all focus  solely on national 
needs.  There is no effort being made  to ensure that the re-organisation 
of the  Exchanges at national  level  should cohere to produce  a  realistic 
and progressive equities market policy  for  the Community  as  a  whole. 
The  European dimension is not only absent  from  these measures but some, 
such as discrimate encouragement of national investors, militate against 
it.  The  first prerequisite of international investment interest is the 222 
vigour and health of the domestic market  and,  to that extent1 Government 
policies to develop  the national markets will stimulate  cro•a~border 
transactions.  Conversely,  as  the Perouse  Report pointed out,the 
effective development of national markets,  in the modern  context,  calls 
for international involvement,  of which  foreign dealing by nationals 
is an essential element.  This  far-sighted comment  remains to be 
reflected in the capital market policies of member  Governments. 
14.3  Fiscal inequalities 
Notwithstanding  any  change  there might have been in the .general 
attitude of  Goverr~ents to their capital market,nothing has as yet 
been done to remove or ameliorate the wide  range of fiscal obstacles* 
which stand in the way  of linkage of the European  Exchanges  into a 
single market system.  ·Progress in this field is rendered difficult by 
reluctance to lose revenue,  though  such loss might well be compensated 
through increased market activity and effectiveness,  and  by inertia 
aristng from  the complexity  and inter-locked effects of fiscal changes. 
One  of the most basic fiscal obstacles is the differences in systems 
and  levels of corporation tax in the  Community.  The  countries of the 
Co~unity have  not yet achieved  standardi~ation of corporation tax, 
either in terms of the fiscal  system under which it is levied  or of 
the effective level of the tax itself.  As  a  result,  the yield on  any 
given security differs in the hands  of nationals of the different 
countries  and  an  element of  irnpe~fection  ~s  introduced into demand. 
Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Denmark,  Italy,  U.K.  and Eire operate various 
forms  of imputation systems,  while  Luxembourg  and Holland  adhere  to the 
classical procedure of double  taxation.  The  basic rates of corporation 
tax vary  from  54%  to  37%.  Tax  credits on  net declared dividends,  in 
the case of the imputation systems,  vary 
of dividend and  tax. 
with  regard to the percentage 
*  A comprehensive  statement is available in the O.E.C.D.  Council  Paper 
C(80)13  of February  19  1980  "Review of the 'experience of member 
countries with controls on  international portfolio operations in 
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The  withholding tax levels governing  the dividend  payments  to non-
nationals are less disparate,  ran~ing from  20%-30\.  Th~se must be 
considered in relation to bilateral tax treaties which set the level 
of withholding  tax allowable in the  country of receipt.  Different 
levels of withholding  tax may  determine the  location of deposited 
stock  and,  for  reasons discussed in Section  2Q,  may  prove an 
obstacle to rationalisation of settlement.  The  reluctance of Belgian 
investors to deposit stock in the  C.I.K.  is a  prime  example. 
The  Commission has  in hand  an initiative to harmonise  corporation tax  and 
withholding  tax payable  and  the  tax  allowable on dividends.  An  ideal 
range of corporation tax of  45-55%  has been proposed,  which would 
accOmmodate  most countries but which would  be  too high for Italy.  The 
Netherlands have  bee~ reluctant to  abandon  their classical system but 
are currently reviewing  their stance.  The  Italian CONSOB  has declared 
support for similar fiscal treatment across Europe_.  There are,there-
fore,promising  moves.  Any·attempts  to rationalise  ar~  howeve~ 
complicated by  dependencies between corporation tax and other aspects 
of the fiscal structure,  for  example  the huge  field of personal 
taxation.  Standardising corporation and withholding taxes alone.would 
not rectify,  and in fact might make  worse,  other international fiscal 
equalities affecting share prices.  The  Commission'.s  proposals  for 
harmonising  systems of corporation tax  and of withholding  taxes on 
+ 
dividends  were  put forward  in 1975  and  remain unresolved.  The 
Consultants ,consider  the conclusions of the CommissioL's  1980 Report 
to the Council* of highest relevance to linkage of the Stock  Exchanges •. 
Member  Governments  are further responsible for many  fiscal inequalities 
which directly affect the securities markets;  Possibly the most 
significant is non-deductability of the cost of share capital from 
taxable profits while  loan interest is deductible.  Imposition of stamp 
duty  tends  to discriminate heavily against equity in favour of bonds. 
In  the  U.K.  equity  transfers  are  stamped  at  l%  , 
+  O.J.  Nr.  C253,  November  5  1975 
*  Report  from  the Commission  to the Council on  the scope  for  convergence 
of tax  systems in the  Community;  Bulletin of the European Communities; 
Supplement 1/80. - 224 
while  Gilts  pass  free  of·  stamp.  In  Italy  the  stamp 
duty on  equities is nearly  twice  that for  bonds.  The diaparitiea 
between the rates might be considered to have  som•  effect on where  a 
bargain is executed- ccmparing  the  1%  u  .K.  level with' the German  o. 2\, 
for  example.*  The  general practice of ·l"evying -stamp duty on securities 
transfers in the Community  exposes all the markets  to foreign 
·competition.  Much  loss of London  business to North  American inter-
mediaries may  be  attributable to it.  'With  any forthcoming  incursion 
of' large u.s.  securities houses  into the London  Stock Exchange  the 
removal  of the U.K.  stamp duty on  securities transferswouldbecome 
essential. 
Indication of the extreme difficulty in progressing  even modest fiscal 
harmonisation is given by  the fact that proposals  relate~ to indirect 
securities taxes were  presented by  the Commission  to  the Council of the 
European Communities  on  April  2  1976 but  had not yet been discussed at 
the  time of the Consultants'  study. 
A further  range  of  fiscal inequalities has  impact on  ~nvestment 
preferences.  Tax  concessions  relat~d t~ certain forms  of insurance 
or to investment in building societies  favour  indirect investment at 
the  expense of individual holding of equity.  Such  conc~ssions arise 
from  consideration of social factors;  their,effect on  the share markets 
is rarely considered. 
Fiscal impositions with too adverse an effect on industry tend to 
distort balance sheets and profit and  loss accounts.  In acute cases, 
they·may  lead to distortion of corporate finance,  undue retention of 
profits and  inadequate  dividend policies.  In Germany  fiscal charges 
payable  and  legislative requirements related to corporate structure 
.have discouraged re-incorporation to public  company  status.  The  poor 
equity ratio of German  companies  appears  largely attributed by  German 
capital market experts to tax considerations.  The  seriousness of this 
problem is well indicated by the fact that in the 25 years after 1946 the equity-
*  In  Belgium,stamp duty to be paid both by the purchaser and seller is as follows:-
0. 7%  Government  Debt. 
1.4'b  t. 7here  the  loan is classified as  "indirect debt". 
3,5%  Corporate bonds  and  shares  (Cash market). 
No  stamp duty is levied on public sector issues but 3.5%  is applied to 
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debt ratio of  the  German  companie$  changed  from  46:54  to 21:79.  A tax is 
levied on  the issue of capital and public re-incorporation of companies is 
not  encouraged by  obligations incurred in respect of  company  structure. 
Fiscal measures exist which  impose discrimination between nationals and 
non-nationals or non-residents.  The  German  reforms of 1977  made  higher 
tax credits available to German  than to non-resident holders.  Tax 
concessions  in equity investment which  are available to  residents only, 
as  in the case of  the French and  Belgium  schemes,  though  constructive 
in the domestic markets,  introduce  an element of distortion into the 
international demand  for securities. 
An  'offshore'  approach  to receipt of untaxed profits may  distort the 
natural market location of  companies  and  unduly  encourage  the develop-
ment of  a  foreign market at the expense of the bona-fide capital centre 
for  the stock.  A considerable amount of  secur~ties dealing in Europe 
is moved  from  its natural market for  reasons related to taxation.  The 
close  link between high  taxation,  flight of capital and  Exchange 
Control  should be  noted.  The  Belgium market is considered to lose 
substantial bonds business which is routed around Brussels,  through 
London  or Zurich,  to avoid the payment of withholding  tax. 
The  type of fiscal obstacles reviewed  above  do  not kill the markets. 
Inter-Exchange dealing has  developed in spite of them.  They.  have had, 
and will continue to have,  a  depressing effect on  the development of 
international trading in Europe.  Overall,  the fiscal discrimination 
against risk capital,  which is universal,  has  had an adverse effect 
upon  the development of the equity markets of Community  countries. 
1.4.4  Exchange  Control 
The  ultimate level of interference by  Government in international 
business is the imposition of Exchange  Control regulations which 
prohibit or  impede  international transactions in securities.  Within 
the  Community  this cannot be  justified by  the philosophy that domestic 226 
financial resoutces  should be applied to domestic capital formation. 
Article 67  of the Treaty of Rome  requires  free movement of capital 
between member  countries.  The  only legitimate justification for 
Exchange  Control is allegedly essential protection of a  national 
economy.  The  force of Article 67  is mitigated by  the transitional 
period permitted on entry and  those  ~rticles which  enable restrictions 
to be  imposed under certain  circumstance~ such as balance of payments 
deficits  (Articles 108  and  109)1 or  to rectify disturbances in the 
national capital market  (Article 73).  The  provisions  of the Treaty 
were  reinforced by  the publication of  two  Commission  directive~ in 
May  1960  and  December  1962 1requiring further  liberalisation of capital 
movements.  Under Article  169  the  Community  can  take  a  member  country 
to the European  Court if the  country defaults in these requirements. 
The  Exchange  Control situation differs across the  ten member  countries 
of  the Community  and,  to  summarise  the situation,they can be divided 
into three groups:-
(i)  Group  one  - The  Restricted Countries;  Greece,  Ireland and  Italy 
Greece still remains  in the  five  year  transitional period of admission 
into the  Community.  The  Exchange  Control  laws  which existed before 
entry still continue in force  and it is not poss'ible for Greek 
citizens to buy  foreign securities before an assumed date of 1986. 
E.E.C.  citizens are able  to  invest in Greek securities  but require 
permission  from  the  Central Bank  to repatriate the proceeds of sale of 
any  inves.tments.  No  foreign securities are dealt in Greek  Stock 
Exchanges  and  no  Greek  securities are dealt in  o~~er E.E.C.  Exchanqes. 
Apart  from  deprivin~ the  smaller Greek  investors of participation in 
equities of other Community  countries,  the regulations have  the effect 
of ensuring that the Athens  Stock Exchange  and its members  can play no 
part in the management of the substantial foreign assets in the hands 
of the cosmopolitan Greek  business community. - 227 
In Eire,  within a  rigorous  system of Exchange  Control which uniquely 
discriminates against transactions in securities,  Irish residents are 
not permitted to acquire additional foreign currency securities. 
Switching is permitted within three months of sale.  The  discriminatory 
nature of these restrictions is illustrated by  the fact that, 
illogically,  the Irish regulations  do  not apply to use of foreign 
exchange  for purchase of consumer durables,  holidays,  shares in race 
horses,  precious metals or property for  personal purposes.  Within  the 
Irish system  there is discrimination also between the private and  the 
institutional investor.  Irish institutions have  the option of either 
investing  10%  of their net cash  flow  in foreign currency securities 
or holding foreign securities up  to 10%  of net actuarial liabilities. 
The  Irish Stock  Exchange  has  cogently  argued  the case against 
Exchange  Control in a  submission to the Eire Minister for Finance*.  In 
summary,  the paper points out the highly discriminatory nature of the 
Irish Exchange  Controls.  It advances  evidence that the regulations do 
not achieve  their publicly-stated objectives in that they are irrelevant 
to  achieve their avowed  aim  of protecting Ireland's external reserves. 
It refutes the,implied allegation that purchase of foreign securities is 
an efficient form  of currency speculation.  It makes  a  case that the 
existing controls hinder portfolio management and prevent overseas 
earnings.  Finally the extent to which  the regulations damage  the Irish 
Stock  Exchange is described. 
The  Ir~sh institutions confirm distortions introduced into portfolio 
management  by  the controls.  There had always  been an  understanding with 
the Department of Industry and  Commerce  that the Irish insurance 
companies  should not hold more  than  20%  of their assets overseas 
(though this did not apply to Pension Funds) •  The  most radical effect 
of the 1978  measures was  the break with Sterling resulting in the redefinition 
of  U.K.  as  a  foreign market and U.K.  securities as  foreign securities. 
*  ''The  Need  for  Change  in Current Exchange  Contr·ol  Regulations; 
The  Stock  Exchange,  Irish;  October  29  1982". 228 
To  summarise  an  extremely  complex situation,  Exchange  control,  apart 
from  the 10\ concession,  implies that the main  source of equity 
investment for the Irish institutions should be  the Dublin Exchange. 
Yet  the market is too narrow  to support such  demand.  In  1982-S~two 
major  bar~s represented more  than one  third of market capitalisation 
and  the  addition of a  single  large company  took  the proportion 
represented  by  three securities to  50%.  TOtal market capitalisation 
was  £900m  in 1982  yet the institutional cash  flow  per annum  was 
E4oo-£500m.  Thus  no  proper asset mix with appropriate equity exposure 
wa:::;  possible to the insurance companie·s.  While it is true that the 
~ethod of valuation,  in which  income  is more  important than capital 
gains,  will influence insurance  investment into gilts, adequate invest-
ment in equities is essential for  the growing with-profits policies. 
The  inadequacy of supply of equities had not resulted in high equity 
prices because of professional investment discliplines,  and  large 
institutional savings had  tended  to flow  into property.  With  P.S~B.R. 
J.t  24~ of G.N.P.,  Irish  equit~es •.vere  depressed at the  time of the 1 
study.  The  Exchange  Control measures  had prohibited the private  and~ 
to  a  lesser degree, the institutional investor  from acquiring further 
foreign securities, without,  at that time,  any stimulus to the local 
equities market. 
In Italy, although Exchange  Control has  been intermittently imposed 
since 1917,  the present controls date from  the crisis of 1973  when 
Italy invoked the use of the  'escape clauses'.  The  principal require-
ment of the present Italian controls is deposit,  in a  non-interest 
bearing account in Italy,  of  50%  of the consideration of any portfolio 
investment in foreign securities.  Since  l97~compulsory financing of 
foreign exchange deals by  the purchaser in foreign currency has been 
required.  Law  159  of  19~6 also re-introduced penal  sanctions  for 
contravention of the regulations.  A significant concession in outward 
investment exists in respect of assumption of a  major participation 
(i.e.  20\+)  of a  foreign  company  in a  related line of industrial 
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The  1973  and  1916 measures  have  resulted in the exclusion of  foreign 
equities from  the Italian Stock Exchange  and deprivation of the 
private investor of participation in the securities of other Community 
countries.  As  indicated in section 12,  the overseas'  equities 
holdings of the Italian investors have  increased considerably  during 
the recent period of Exchange  Control.  Effective management of the 
insurance institutional portfolios  i~  howeve~cripplednot only by 
the  50%  deposit rule  but also by  the fiscal discrimination against 
foreign  investment,requiring payment of  30%  withholding  tax on  the 
coupons.  The  regulations further affect availability of foreign stocks 
or bonds  to be  used as  an alternative to cash guarantee  in foreign 
insurance activities. 
Investments abroad  can only be  switched wit..11out  re-aeposit if the 
maturity of the proposed  investment is not longer than the maturity of 
the original investment.  Thus it is impossible to switch from  equity 
to equity.  Nor  is it in effect possible to switch between bonds of 
permitted maturities because the withholding  tax would  then have  to be 
paid.  Although the insurance companies are eligible for  fiscal credit, 
this might take  three to five years  to  recove~ over which period the 
tax costs would  have  to be  financed. 
The  companies'  equity investment is therefore channelled to the lSo--160 
stocks in the Italian market,  of which  very  few  (noss.ibly ten or twelve) 
are genuinely marketable at an  institutional scale of  investme~t 
Similarly, their fixed interest investment is confined_to the local 
bond market which is free of tax.  As  a  result1Italian insurance experts. 
assert that many  of the portfolios cannot be managed  at all.  The 
results within the equities market are a  shortage of good  stock in the 
handful of securities which are in prime institutional demand,  an 
illiquid market  through  the consequential  tight holding  and  a  tendency 
for price-earnings ratios to rise to unacceptably high levels. 
Informed opinion amongst capital market professionals in Italy,  in the 
institutions,  the banks  and  the Stock  Exchange itself, appears 
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restrictions.  ~his view,  to some  extent,  is shared in official quarters, 
though  in that case the intellectual agreement on  the adverse effects of 
the measures is tempered  by  the priority of assuring the Governments 
massive  financing  needs. 
Two  developments  in Italy offer slight promise of relief.  Law  159 is 
at present under  review.  The  operation of  the  long-awaited  investment 
fu~ds is expected to start in mid-1984.  Local opinion is that this new 
investment pressure on  the narrow Italian market will force  the 
authorities to liberalise capital market policy and permit the funds  to 
invest abroad,  possibly within the Community. 
Under  present regulations,  all three countries,  Eire,  Greece  and  Italy, 
will  effectively be prevented  from  participating in an  improved  linkage 
of the European  Exchanges.  The  arguments  for  and  against Exchange 
Control are complex.  The  essential reason  for it is the unwillingness 
of Governments  to take  the rigorous measures  required to strengthen 
their currencies.  The  essential reason against it, or against its 
long  term continuation, is that it is an artificial protection which not 
only does  noth.ing  to eradicate  the underlying weakness it purports to 
protect  but through its protection renders  the weakness  endemic.  The 
essential  U.K.  case for its removal  was  that the most significant 
currency movements  'controlled'  within  such  systems are those related to 
industrial direct investment.  In the  U.K.  case,  as  indeed is the 
fact with thethreecountries presently discussed,  the Exchange  Control 
authorities admitted that they never had effective control of this 
level of capital movement.  At  the same  time,  the infliction of petty 
controls on  the private investor and  the public at large made  the 
U.K.  system  immensely  unpopular,  involved huge bureaucratic costs 
and was  of no  consequence or significance as  far as  the protection of 
sterling was  concerned.  The  system  did  not  achieve  its 
aim  and it proved  incapable of preventing a  series of recurrent 
sterling crises.  It had many  adverse  and yet no  positive results. (ii) 
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No  consideration appears to have been given in thethreeExchanqe .-
Control countries to relief of the restrictions in the specific case 
of equity investment in other Community  countries.  This would  be a 
constructive proposal,  isolating obligations under  the Treaty of Rome 
from  the deeper questions of maintenance of a  general Exchange  Control 
regime.  The  concessions would  have  only the most minor effect on 
balance of payments.  It has been observed that,  at present,  inter-
country portfolio investment in European equities constitutes only 
some  15\ of dealing in all forefgn equities.  Portfolio equity 
investment itself is a  minor proportion of all investment,  portfolio 
and direct,  bonds  and  shares.  That. such a  discrimination is practical 
is evidenced by the relaxation of this type  implemented by the U.K. 
prior to the total abolition of its Exchange  Controls. 
Group  two  Partial Exchange  Control;  France 
The  Exchange  Control situation in France might be considered to stan9 
midway  between the three countries considered above and  the remaining 
countries,  wh~ch are free  from  restriction.  The  original interdiction 
of NOvember  25  1968  was  modified by  numerous  legal and Banque  de France 
regulations  1n 1969,  December  1971,  March  1974,  December  1976  and 
May  1981. 
The  present position is that French residents may,  subject to use of 
an intermediary authorised by  the Banque  de  France dtul in foreign 
securities  which are quoted on  the Exchange,  are the subject of 
regular transactions and of which  the price is reported,  and also in 
all investment and unit trusts.  They  are not permitted to deal in 
securities issued by  foreign governments of less than  5  years to 
redemption.  Permitted dealings can be either  cas~ or forward. 
Most  significant,  in  view of the current situation,  are the 
regulations of 25  May  198l,which specified that if the security concerned 
is denominated  in foreign currency  then  the currency must be obtained 
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currency might be acquired at the official rate of  Exchange.  · Stmilar 
and reciprocal currency arrangements apply to the  subaequent.1ale 
transaetions. 
The  French regulations of  198~ are in effect a  system of blockage of·the 
flow of French  savings into foreign  investment,  on  the prtnciple that, 
~f such movement  is discouraged,  these  funds  will flow  into French 
shares.  The  policy has  tqe double  aim  of  supporting the currency 
and of discriminating in·  favour  of  the domestic  capital  market. 
The  Oevise,Titre system contains  an in-built gearing whereby  a  w~aker 
franc will increase the premium  of Devise-Titr_e over the official rate 
and .thereby  impose greater disincentives to move  currency into fore:.t.gn 
securities. 
The  main element of flexibility in the present si  tuatic;:m  arises  from  the vast 
foreign  as5;ets in the hands of ?rench Lnvestors,. which  notionally sets. the 
boundary of the Devise-Titre pool, . and  from  the continued  freedom  from 
regulation in switching.  As  a  result,the French institutions have 
considerable  latitude to continue to manage  the foreignelements of 
their portfolios.  The  regulations,  however,  require that the 
interests and profits deriving from  the  'pool'  should not be.  invested· 
abroad  and  the details of the regulations have removed  local tools 
for covering against currency risk. 
1Such cover may  be possible 
through subsidiaries held in other Community.countries. 
Despite the freedom of the French  instit~tional investors to move 
their foreign assets  (as was  the case in the U.K.  under  Exchange 
Contra~, any  increased flow of  f~ds into foreign securities from 
France will be  arrested by  the Devise  Titre system.  French portfolio 
investors will be deprived of the opportunity to  attain  a 
financially effective proportion of foreign securities.  On  the other 
hand1 the very substantial foreign assets in French hands,  combined 
with  freedom  to deal  such securities, will continue  to constitute a 
broad base  for  the Paris international market.  Th~s will be further 
strengthened by  the fact that non-residents can freely acquire any 
French or any  foreign security in France. (iii) 
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Similarly, since 1980  direct.invest~ent has  been between France  and  the 
Community  countries.  The  regulations  for  such investment are,however1 
elaborate  and there are allegations of delay in the official process-
ing of proposed acquisitions,  due  to the established tendency of 
French Governments  to use  the capital market as  a  tool of international 
policy.  This criticism has  now  been met by  a  procedure whereby  a 
simple declaration is made  to the Ministry of Finance,  after which 
authorisation is automatic if there has been  no  response  from  the 
Ministry within one month. 
Group  three  The  Community  countries free of Exchange  Control 
Little comment  is required on  the  remaining countries  (i.e.  Belgium, 
Denmark,  Luxembourg,  Germany,  Holland and  U.K.)  in that they are all 
in effect free of significant Exchange Controls. 
Under  L'Union  Economique  established between Belgium and  Luxembourg, 
of which monetary union is the most  important element,  the Exchange 
Control  arrangements  for  the  two  countries can be  considered integral. 
A double market system is operated,  access  to which is governed by  the 
nature of the transaction.  Payment  for goods  and services are made  at 
an  ~fficial exchange rate regulated by  the Central Bank;  all other 
operations are carried out at a  free market or financial rate,which is 
determined purely by  demand  for  and supply of Belgian Francs.  Within 
this framework a  resident is free  to buy  and sell any  foreiqn securities 
and  a  non-resident is likewise free  to operate in Belg~um.  Incoming 
direct capital can use either market  but any repatriation of the funds 
must be by  the same  route.  The  system is liberal, to the point that it 
may  leave  ti)e capital balance unprotected in a  heavy deficit situation. 
The  system appears,  however,  to have operated successfully since the 
War  with the premium  moving  in both directions,  positive and negative. 
The  strains within the  system between Belgium and Luxembourg  arising 
from  common  monetary arrangements without common  tax and banking 
legislation appear  to have  been withstood. 
The  position  ~n Denmark  changed  immediately prior to the submission of 
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investors to  a~quire foreign securities in January 1994.  The  actual 
situation in the Copenhagen Stock Exchanqe will remain,  for  acme 
time,  heavily conditioned by  the former restrictions,  which had 
contributed to the narrowness of the Danish equities market  ·and  had 
resulted in at least one  Danish company listing and establishing  its 
main markets  abroad. 
In Holland,  Exchange Control is slight to a  point of non-existence. 
'  The  only restrictions relate to issues,  by  domestic  issuers,  in 
Guilders in a  foreign market. 
Germany  is free  from  Exchange  Control.  Residents may  invest  f~eely in 
any  s~curities  and may  hold foreign  currency accounts abroad.  There 
is a  slight restriction implied by  laws  rela~ed to  forms  in which 
German  securities may  be  held,  by  increasing de-materialisation of German 
Gov~rnment securities  and,  as  has  been  noted,  by discriminative 
wi th.'1olding  cax •• Although  the  c-errnan  <;..-,vernmen t  has  powers related 
co  direct investment under  the  law  on  Foreign  Economic Relations,  no 
use  has been made  of  them,  other than  requirement for notification 
when  20%  or mq:r:-e  of a  company  is acquired  from  abroad. 
The  U,K.,  since  1979,  has  been  free of Exchange Control restrictions. 
In  summary,  it can be  observed that present Exchange  control restrictions 
discriminate against the residents of three of the ten Community 
countries to a  poi:-t which  effectively excludes  them  from  participation 
in any proposed  schemes  of linkage of the Exchanges.  In all the 
countries  concerned the development of  the capital markets,  from  a 
domestic  as  well  as an international standpoint,  has been damaged 
rather than assisted by  the restrictions.  In at least one of the 
countries,  Italy,  there appears  to be  a  consensus of professional 
scepticism en the value of the Exchange  Control  system.  Exchange 
Control  imposed on  these countries,  with the possible exception of 
Greece,  appears  contrary both  to general and  specific intents of the 
Treaty of Rome.  The  restrictions are obstacles to the ultimate 
achievement of monetary  union and  caa~on currency.  For these reasons, 235 
it appears of greatest importance that pressure, at national and 
Community  level,  continues to be applied for  ~~eir removal. 
The  impact of the Exchange  Control restrictions on the proposals for 
European linkage is adverse in two ways.  In the first case, it 
self-evidently deprives issuers and investor& in tbe four countries 
canc.e.rned._of  . .equitable participation  in the benefits of the system, 
despite  their current rights under  the Treaty of Rome.  Secondly,  and 
of more  immediate  importance, it deprives  the Stock Exchange  and the 
capital market authorities of the three countries concerned of any 
real role in the formulation of the system.  The  development of linkage 
will suffer,  as it will be  deprived of the moral  and  technical support 
of these member  coWl tries. 
14.5  Summary 
The  Consultants again wish  to stress that study of the fiscal and 
regulatory obstacles at Government  level was  not within their brief, 
nor do they consider this section to have done more  than refer  to 
these questions.  Each of the areas mentioned is itself a  field of 
complex  study~ as reference to any of the documents  noted would 
quickly confi:rm. 
The  Section is, however,  included for  several reasons.  Firstly, it 
acknowledges  the awareness of these obstacles  amonq~t the practitioners 
in the markets.  They  have  to work  amidst the practical difficulties 
they involve  and their comments  to the Consultants require reflection 
in the Report. 
Secondly,  the state of progress  in removal  of these Government-level 
obstacles offers an  important perspective on  the rate at which 
harmon1sation of the Stock  Exchange procedures ought to be achieved. 
The  Stock Exchanges  are the central intermediaries of each national 
financial  system which  they service.  As  long as  the different financial 
systems  impose different requirements  on  the national Exchanges  ,  the 
characteristics of the Exchanges will continue  to differ.  As  a 
European  financial  system gradually emerges,  the Exchanges must respond 236 
and service it thr~ugh a .harmonised capital market.  But it would be 
illusory,  and technically unsound,  to consider that harmonisation of 
the.Exchanqes  should,  or could1move  ahead of the general prcqress of 
European financial  integration~  During  the course of the 
Consultants •  studY,  an  important paper on Financial In.<teq,ration* was 
. sent by  the Commission  to the Council of the European CQmmUnities,  the 
conclusions of which relate closely to. the obstacles discussed in this 
Section.  There are grounds  for hopinq for more positive movement on 
this front. 
*  Financial Integration;  COM(83)  207  of April  20  1983 SECTION  lS 
237 
OBSTACLES  TO  LINKAGE  RELATED  TO  INVESTOR  ATTI'lUDES  AND 
RESTRICTIONS  ON  INSTITUTIONAL  INVESTORS 
15.1  Attitude of the investors 
The  demand  in the European capital markets for equity  s~curities of 
other community  countries is heavily affected by  the situation 
described in the previous Section  but it is ·primarily determined by 
investor preferences.  Insti  t~tional portfolio structu_res in most 
Community  countries are determined not only by  investment decisions 
of the managers  but also by Government regulation,  and 'both may 
constitute a  constraint on  the development of a  vigorous and effectively 
linked European equities market.  Amongst  all the investment manaqers 
met by  the Consultants,there appeared a  remarkable  consistency of view 
towards European  investment and  of attitude towards individual 
European markets.  ·Nor,  on  the whole,  did the foreign view of  ~ 
particular market differ from  that held by nationals operating in it. 
This Section attempts to summarise briefly the general attitudes 
towards  inter-European investment met in the market. 
The  Consultants,do not consider it relevant to include in the Report 
investors'  ephemeral views  on  European  investments.  'l'haae were  not 
consistent through the study,  reflecting unrelieved qloom  in 1982  and 
unbounded  euphoria in 1983.  The  truth of  sane of the more  general 
observations,  however,  persists  and  these are worthy of comment. 
Considering the situation from  the  standpoint of the professional 
institutional investor,  the small emphasis  on  second-country European 
business,  in terms of proportion of portfolios and associated trading, 
arises from  two  prime  causes. 
The  firs~ that the liabilities of the institutions tend to be mainly 
in national currencies.  Either as a  matter of actuarial prudence  or 
due  to Government  regulation,  the preponderence of institutional 
equities holdings  tends  to be  in domestic  securities.  These constitute 
core  investments  in which  the institutions cannot deal fluidly,  due  to 
the size of the holdinqs and  their commitment to them. 238 
The  second cause is that  European investors have  tended to regard 
the securities of other Community  countries in much  the  same  light 
as  those of their own  economy.  The  mutual attitude has  tended  to be 
that all the European countries are beset, to a  grea·ter or lesser 
degree,  by  the same  problems of social and industrial strucuure and 
are within the  same  economic  environment.  To  offset the hiqher risk 
and  cost of foreign  investment,  the incentive of potential return 
markedly higher  t~an that anticipated in the domestic market must 
exist.  Institutions already heavily invested in their own  domestic 
securities;, therefore, have  tended to direct their foreign investment 
into non-European countries,  in which  a  different economic  situation 
might prevail and  which offer wider. investment alternatives such as 
resource or specific technology stocks. 
Institutional investment,  assuming  that there is no  Exchange  Contro~ 
tends in e1e first place  to be based on·World-wide analysis-with 
views  taken on  economic growth,  currency factors etc. -which then 
,dictate the proportions.of financial  resources  flowing  to different 
markets.  For  the past ten years,Europe has  assumed  low priority in 
such comparative analysis.  Inter-country investment in Europe,  a  few 
genuinely international stocks excepted,  has  no stable base  and has 
tended to fluctuate  according  to investment vogues,  linked in the main 
to a  view on  the  currency. 
This situation may  change  as revival of the European equity market 
progresses.  It does,  however,  explain the build-up of portfolio 
structure to this point.  The  general observation that other European 
equities tend to be  no  more  attractive than the domestic securities 
may  imply a  con~inuing problem in stimulating cross-border  investment 
at the level which a  Euro-equity market will require. 
15.2  Inadequacy of research and market information 
Interest in cross-border investment in Community  equities would be 
increased if more  adequate research information and promotional 
material,  developed  from  it, were available.  The  statutory require-
ments  governing published company  information vary,  although national 239 
measures  and  E.E.C.  Directives are gradually  tmproving  this 
situation.  Profession~! analysts require more  than formal reports 
and  accounts,  and provision of data for  fundamental  analysis is a 
basic requirement of international institutional business.  The 
German  banks,  for  example,  insist on  consLderable depth of company 
information.  It was  broadly accepted that European firms,  if 
approached,  are in general extremely co-operative  in provision of 
information beyond basic statutory requirements  but such approaches 
are costly,  involving  travel and  expenses of a  skilled analyst.  At 
lower  level,  foreign private investors do  not normally get the 
companies'  reports and accounts.  There  is no  adequate European 
service of company  information to simultaneously report important 
company  events. 
The  situation is steadily improving  as  in all the major markets  the 
value of the professional analyst is recognised.  More  information is 
available internationally and  the difficult problem of languages is 
being  overcome.  But all levels of  information on the international 
European markets  compare  unfavourably withthoseavailable in 
North America  ~  According  to one  Belgian  bank,  the  p~omotional 
activity of the American brokers was  so superior that some  u.s. 
securities were better known  locally  than  the important Belgian stocks. 
Investors appeared generally satisfied with existing market price 
information services  such as Reuters,  Extel,  Telekurs,  Telerate, 
Standard and Poors  ,  subject to comment  on  the quality of price 
information available from  the different markets •.  It was  evident that 
thescreendata from  these professional services was,  in the case of 
active investors,  strongly supplemented by direct and often immediate 
information  from  foreign market counterparties. 
Investment analysis across the markets is rendered difficult by absence 
of standard tools of analysis,  such as  comparable  formula and weighting 
of indices,  or use of adequately-defined  standard ratios of company 
performance.  A deeper,  related problem was  how  contrived depression of 
earnings,  due  to fiscal factors,  should be  treated in comparative 
international analysis. 240 
One  result of this situation is a  preference of the foreign investor 
for  a  limited range of major  European  comp~nies.  In the past,  choice 
of the companies  has almost been a  matter of indifference once  the 
view on the market had  been  taken.  This has been one  factor confininq 
European international equities trading to a  narrow range of stocks. 
There is now  evidence of wider  and more  selective investment.  Never-
theless, the cases in which  second-line or situation stocks play a 
role tend to be  exceptional. 
A further result is that,  as  the investment is more  based on a  general 
view rather than on  conventional evaluation of company  performance, 
the large investor tends to withdraw immediately  from  a  falling market 
rather than  'follow it down'  taking appropriate action,  as might be the 
case in the North American market.  Large U.K.  fund movements  are 
alleged to  have  increased instability in the Italian market. 
A related poi11t is the imbalance of coverage of share  information in the 
national press of the different European countries.  This is well 
exemplified by  the share price information published in the  London 
Financial  Time~.  w~ile acknowledging  the formidable contribution to 
market intelligence made  by  this paper  and  the progress made  in 
summary  publication of the'reports and  accounts of European companies, 
there is marked  lack of balance in the reportinq of European prices and 
in the volume  of market canment.  Although  sane of the Continental 
markets may  be  narrow,  a  situation in which  the price of over  2,000 
securities quoted on the  London  Stock  Exchange are published daily, 
while only thirty nine on  the Frenchmarket and  forty seven on  the 
German  are  followed,  hardly seems  correct across three European 
economies of comparable size.  Moreove~ even in the small group of 
securiti~s for  each European  country, it is open to question whether all 
the stocks are  those of the most representative and significant companies. 
The  situation in the other national financial  journals is similar, or 
worse. 
Althou9h it is not directly  i~ the Consultants'  brief,  they consider it 
important to emphasise that, parallel with any  technical initiative to 241 
instal linkage of equities dealing,  there  should be  joint effort by 
the Exchanges  to  improve  the mutual availability of  adequate and' 
comprehensible  research material and current company  information  on 
which cross-border investment decisions might be confidently based. 
This is essential for  the generation of business.  It is understood 
that the Societies of Investment  Analyst~ are making  progress in this 
field.  Arrangements  for reciprocal exchange of research  informat~on 
between brokers of the different  m~rkets  might be considered.  At 
the  same  time,  the European brokers might adopt promotional activities, 
along  the lines of those  used to good effect by their North American 
counterparts. 
15.3  ~utual view of the Community  markets 
The  views of major  investors and brokers,  banks and  jobbers,  obtained 
in the European markets,  were  heavily influenced by  the previous years 
during which  the  performance of all the markets had been indifferent. 
Attitudes changed in 1983  but the earlier observations may  retain an 
inherent validity.  Detailed comments  by  investors on Stock Exchange 
operations are incorporated into other Sections_of this Report.  In 
summary,,  the  U~K. market was  regarded as volatile by Continental 
standards.  The  German  market was  considered as safe1 but dull by 
non-German  investors  and  simply dull by German  investors.  The 
Frankfurt index had1until 1982,  hardly risen since  the  1960's.  German 
institutional investors considered that the market  ten~~d to'have an 
undue  stability, which deprived  them  of opportunity of technical 
dealing of the type available for  example  to u.s.  investors.  During  the 
period prior to the study,  the A.E.B.  had become virtually a  bond 
market,  with no  new  issues of equity for several years.  Investor 
attitudes to the French and  Italian markets had  tended,  up  to the time 
of the study,  to be dominated by currency considerations.  The  Paris 
market was  considered difficult for  a  foreign investor to use,  obscure 
in various of its procedures related to foreign orders  and requiring 
excessive latitude of order price.  Due  to Exchange Control and the 
impossibility of reciprocal business,  interest in the Italian market 
had almost totally faded,  an attitude re-inforced by  lack of confidence 242 
in the Lira,  and all contacts between it and  the other'C9Mmunity  . 
markets had been lost. 
In more  general  term~ there was  growing  acknowledgement  that most of 
the Continental  stock markets did not reflect the size or strength 
of their national industries.  This was  considered most true in the 
cases of France,  Germany  and  Ita~y.  Appropriate breadth of investment 
was  not available. 
The  European markets  as a  whole,  were  not suited to respond to the 
increasing  tendency of  institutional investors,  World-wide,  to follow 
sect:or performance  (i.e.  gold or resource  stocks,  electronics etc.'). 
·It is difficult to  c~rry such strategies into European  in~estment. 
Outside  North  Sea oil,  there are few  resource stocks,  in comparison 
with other areas of the World.  The  identification of companies  in 
growth sectors, .such as electronics or  chemicals, is often difficult 
in the Continental markets,  particularly in the German,  due  to high 
lndustrial concentration.  The  assumption until recently was  that the 
innovative  growth  in the  German  electronics  sector,  which  was  . 
comparable  to  the current  notable developments  in the U.S.,  was  taking 
place within the large German  companies  and was  thus not directly 
accessible to the investor.  Informed German  opinion is now  questioning 
whether it was  successfully occuring at all  and is acknowledging that 
venture capital in this field has  had  to be obtained in the  United 
States.  Foreign  investing institutions have  largely  had to accept 
that their investment access  to German  growth salients  must be  through 
securities of  the major. German  companies or financial institutions. 
The massive  support available across  Europe  when  medium-sized  companies 
of such  'sector'  interest1such as  Novo,  break  through,  serves to 
endorse  the point. 
Most  of the criticisms of the European Exchanges made  in 1982/83  rela~ed 
to operating factors,which  are  consi.dered  in Sections  16  and  20.  Many 
of the points were  currently being met by  vigorous-initiatives in most 
of the Stock, Exchanges  to modernise their trading systems,  as described 243 
elsewhere in the Report.  It is probably fair to  commen~however1 that 
none of them  have  as  yet secured changes sufficiently radical to 
invalidate the  comments  made  by  investors in course of the Consultants 
discussions. 
15.4  Restrictions on  institutional investment 
The  portfolio structures of certain investing institutions in'some 
Community  countries are constrained by Goverrunent  regulations which 
dictate the types of securities they may  hold,  the proportions of 
such securities and other aspects of portfolio balance.  Some  details 
of  such requirements  have been noted in tpe Sections of the Report 
covering  the individual capital markets. 
The  requirements  for most of the mutual  funds,  such as  the U.K.  Unit 
Trusts or German  Investment Funds  demand  in the main sensible 
conformity to sound principles of collective investment.  They  specify 
the maximum  participation in any  canpany by  the  fund  and  the max.illlum 
proportion of overall investment which may  be constituted by  the 
securities of any one  company.  The  regulations for  the French SICAV's 
are more  discr~minatory.  Foreign investments may  generally not exceed 
fifty per cent and the Monory  SICAv•s  are1 in  effec~confined to French 
equities.  The  Fonds  Communs  are restricted to French securities for 
five years. 
Apart  from  the French case the mutual  funds  are neutral on  th~ question 
of European investment.  A constructive possibility, not gener<~lly 
exploited but which would  do much  to interest the  pri~ate invea1tor in 
European securities,  would  be  the general development throughout the 
Community  of mutual  funds  in European equities,  along the.lines of  the 
existing London-based European  Unit Trusts.  such Trusts might have an 
element of fiscal support  from  Governments  and might be relieved from 
Exchange Control restrictions in countries where  these exist. 
Across most of the markets,  the most·important regulations constrai11ing 
the  form  of institutional investment are those related to the insurance 
companies.  The  regulations apply to  the  technical reserves of the 244 
companies,  not the free reserves,  but tne  former represents the great 
bulk ofthe companies'  assets.  The  regulations tend to differ,  the 
requirements for  the life of the funds being the more rigorous• 
In France1for  example,  Article  332  of the code d'Assurance specifies 
the portfolios structures of the  technical reserves,  of which  33\ 
must  be in  Government  bonds  issued in P.aris  (in effect, French 
Government bonds),  not more  than 40\ in real estate  and the remainder 
placed in any  securities listed in Paris.  Thu~while any or all of 
this  residual proportion may  be made  up of foreign equities,  such 
provision has  the prime aim  of increasing business in foreign stocks 
on  tha Paris  Bourse.  In Germany,  similar regulations  limit  the 
German  insurance  companies'  foreign equity investment to securities 
listed on the German  Exchanges,  though  the Special  Investment FUnds 
are used to mitigate the full impact of this constraint.  Despite their 
aim,  in neither case are  the regulations successful in confining 
institutional transactions in foreign equities  to the national Exchanges. 
The  regulations are,  however,  effective in distorting,  and possibly 
reducing, return to insurance portfolios. 
The  investment of the Italian insurance companies  is under  even tighter 
regulation.  Both maxima  and minima  are specified for  the proportions 
of bonds  and corporate securities in their portfol·io  and  the 
proportion of real estate is similarly defined.  The  life funds  are 
subject to the  further restriction that onry stocks listed for at 
least five  years are eligible.  The  Exchange Control regulations 
hampering  the companies'  operations in foreign securities,  which often 
render foreign portfolio management  impossible,  have already been noted. 
The  Belgian insurance  companies are freer  to operate in foreign shares. 
The  regulations require  SO%  of investment to be  in state,bonds  and 
specify maxima  of  40%  for  corporate bonds  and  20%  for  Belqian shares, 
with a  5%  maximum  holding  in any one  company. 
The  Dutch  investing insti  tution.s are free of regulations controlling 
portfolio structures  but this  has,regrettabl~ been offset by an almost 245 
total disinterest in equity investment in recent years.  At  the time 
of the study, the last real interest _in  equitie·s  had  been in 1973 •.  A 
Dutch pension  fund might  typically be  80%  in bonds  and only  5%  in 
equities. 
Apar't  fran the U.K.,  the pension  funds  do  not figure as  a  major  force 
in any of the European equities markets.  In France,there is reliance 
on  the Securi  te  Sociale  and  such pension schemes  as exist tend to be based 
on  current receipts  financing.  Those  which hold investments must  have  50% 
of their assets in public bonds or state enterprises.  In Germany, 
private occupational pension  schemes  tend  to be  financed within 
company  accounts  and  the state pension  scheme  is 90%  invest~d in 
bonds.  In Holland1 the largest investor is the state civil servants' 
pension fund  but only  i%-3%  of .its assets are in shares. 
As  a  g~neral observation,  it might be  suggested that the greater part 
of this regulation of institutional investment structure is obsolete 
and that,  in some  ways,  its effect ~s contr~y to its underlying 
purpose. If the reasoning  behind  it  is alleged  to be assurance of· 
ready liquidity of institutional funds,  the situation has  long passed 
the stage at which it can be  presumed  that this is most readily 
obtainable in the local market.  Until  the European markets are 
broadened  and  linked,  immediate  large-scale liquidity of equity invest-
ment is more  easily available elsewhere.  If the iustification for the 
regulation is the belief that Government is better equipped  than 
investment professionals to specify sound portfolio  structure~ it 
would  appear  outmoded.  If the regulations are based on a  thinly-veiled 
I 
intent to protect the local capital market,  they are  contra~y to the 
I 
principles of the Community.  Detailed regulation of institutional 
portfolio structure would appear  to have little relevance to  the 
modern  circumstances of the securities industry.  The  effects of the 
regulations are riot great  but they may  have helped to foster  an 
attitude amongst major  European  investors.which is adverse to risk 
capital in general,  and  foreign equity investment in particular.  It is 
also a  form  of regulation which constitutes a  direct obstacle to 
developing an effectively linked European equities market. - 246 
SECTION  16  OBSTAC!ES  TO  LINKAGE  ARISING  FROM  THE  OPERATIONAL 
DIFFERENCES  BETWEEN  COMMUNITY  EXCHANGES 
16.1  Introduction 
The  set of obstacles to which  the Stock Exchanges might pay  clQsest 
attention are those arising  from  the differences in the dealing rules 
and procedures of their market floors,  as  these,  to a  varyinq degree, 
are within their control.  If,  by historical accident,  the Exchanges 
had  evolved  common  floor procedures  and membership rules,  any 
initiative to secure  ~inkage of the floors  would present less 
difficulty.  Within  the Community  there would  have  been a  natu;ral  and 
spontaneous development of cross-border  trading  through which  a 
market at European  scale would be  in course af achievement.  The 
situation is  faz:·  otherwise and virtually aJ l  existing  forms  of Stock 
Exchange  structure and  trading  procedurE's  are represented within the 
Community.  Given  a  will  with~n the Exchanges  to promote  linkage, 
these  o~sparities will  req~ire to be  progressively  removed or 
re~onciled.  Much  of  the  necessary  change  could be  achieved by the 
Stock  Exchanges  themselves. 
In reviewing  the characteristics of  the  European Exchanges,  the 
C~nsultants do  not intend to infer that any  one  national system is 
'better', in any  absolute. sense,  than  any  other.  'l'he  alternatives 
are  simply evaluated in respect of their relevance to the current 
needs of the international equities markets.  The  characteristics of 
each market have  developed  from  local needs,· in the main over previous 
decades or centuries,  when  domestic  secur;i.ties totally domina-ted most 
local markets  and  when  the private client was  the principal investor. 
Expectedly,  there is an element of conflict between  the  form  of 
market operation required to _preserve  domestic business and that 
require~ for  the development of international trading.  This Section 
attempts  to present a  brief analysis of the main variations in 
operating procedures which  stand as obstacles to  the development of a 
vigorous linked Community  equities m-arket.  Any  evaluative comment is 
limited to that received  from market participants interviewed by the 
Consultants. 247 
16.2  Price formation  systems 
The  most significant of the differences between  the dealing procedures 
of the Community, Exchanges  is, without question,  whether the market is 
based on collective price formation  or  on  continuous prices involving 
the intermediation,  on the floor,  of a  market-maker.  The  superficial 
interpretation of the division of the Community  Exchanges  is in this 
regard  somewhat  invidious,  as it would  appear  that nine of the 
existing national stock markets operate on  the first principle  and 
only one,  the London  Stock  Exchange,  on  the  second.  This apparent 
overwhelming majority does  not,  however,  readily or. automatically 
resolve the appropriate system for  European international linkage for 
two main reasons:-
(i)  firstly,  me London  Stock  Exchange  dealing  in equities is, 
in broad terms,  equal  to the  sum  of dealings  on the 
other floors- which is not without significance if the 
relative merits of the  tw.o  systems  are to be  compared; 
(ii)  secondly,  this apparent division is far  less categorical 
than it first appears.  Virtually all the Continental 
Exchanges  have made  concessions  acknowledging  the  need 
for continuous quotation and  the market-making  by their 
members,·either on the market floors  or in the off-markets. 
16.3  Collective price formation;  the Theory  and  the  Pr-:~:i  cc:; 
The  floor operations of most of the European  Exchanges are deeply and 
traditionally committed to trading procedures based on  collective price 
formation.  In some  cases  they  are  constrained to it by  law,  either 
explicitiy ~n the case of  German~, or  implicitly~s is the case in 
France~  Though  the detail of floor  procedures may  vary,  the collective 
price systems are,  in essence,  the  same.  They  all imply  the 
simultaneous confrontation of all buying  and selling orders assembled 
over  a  specified period  (e.g.  one  day)  in a  scheduled trading session 
at an  appointed time.  Given  this,  by  a  mechanistic process  an 
equilibrium price can be established at which  the maximum  number of 
orders can be satisfied. 248 
In its full  and~ost rigorous application,  the  system has unquestioned 
merits.  First  and  foremost  in the minds of Continental proponents of 
the  system,  there is no  floor  intermediary interposed between buyer 
and  seller.  The seller therefore receives  the buyer's  price. 
Secondly,  the  system of declaration and  confrontation of all orders, 
at a  given time,  allows  a  single equilibrium price to be determined at 
which all equal or higher bids and all equal or  lower offers may  be 
satisfied.  The  official price is obtained,  although  the offer or bid 
may  have  been  unduly favourable. 
Given  that it is sound  to assume  that orders can be pre-assembled over 
a  period  to  form  a  price in this manner  and,  secondlyt  that full 
confrontation of all orders  can in fact be  secured,  collective price 
formation clearly has considerable theoretical strength.  The price 
forming process is not normally transparent  but the fact that the 
method of price formation is known  gives  the public an impression of 
fairness of the market.  The  by-product of the single official price is 
important in certain countries,  notably in Germany,  to  enable  the 
Stock  Exchanges  to discharge  their formal  obligations  to the general 
investing  publ~c. 
A further  advantage of collective price systems is that they are well 
adapted  to computer support.  The  arraying of bids and offers and  the 
determination of price at which  transactions  can be maximised is an 
ideal and  relatively elementary computer application.  The  Exchanqes 
have  been understandably cautious in pursuing  automation of this 
type,  believing that the mechanised  approach would be inferior to  the 
present techniques of floor  dealin~.  There is no  evidence yet in 
Europe  of the North American  and  Far East applications to clear small 
transactions by  such computer matching.  The  Brussels  compromise, 
whereby pre-processed computer listings and an indicative equilibrium 
price are provided to price officials, both illustrates a  valid current 
usage of computer  support  and indicates the further potential of 
computer processing in this type of system. 
There  are,  however,  a  number  of difficulties in applying the theoretical 
perfection of the collective price system to 'the actual situations in - 249 
the European securities markets.  Possibly the most important is that 
the collective markets  can only relate with difficulty to the 
continuous price operations which prevail abroad.  This applies not 
only to world-wide  international trading in securities which are 
foreign to a  particular Exchange,  but also  to dealing with foreigners 
in its own  domestic securities. 
With  modern  communications providing instantaneous  information all over 
the world,  regardless of the time  zone,  the international equity markets 
today operate continually over  a  twenty-four-hour cycle.  To  participate 
in them  effectively,  either  in respect of  foreign or domestic  sectJ.ri ties, 
implies a  constant readiness  to quote or to respond to continuous prices. 
Under  the formal  floor  collective price systems  this cannot be achieved. 
In recognition of this,  all the European Exchanges  active in the 
international markets  have  ~n one  way  or  anothe·r  adapted  their rules or 
turned  'blind eyes'  to permit their members  to deal at continuous prices 
outside official Bourse  hours.  In  some  cases  (for example,  in 
France,  or  in Germany  in respect of private client transaction~, such 
prices are linked with those of ·the Exchange.  In others, .such  as  in Belgium 
or Holland1there is more  flexibility. 
There is now  general  evidence of  an effort to adapt  the collective price 
floors  to continuous  tradin~.  In dealing in major  stocks  on all the 
Exchanges,  there have been  longstanding precedents  for  the making of 
individUal prices during  the  trading session,subsequent to the price 
fixing.  The  most notable recent initiative has been in ~sterdam, 
where  the  system of continuous quotation on the  f1oor  has  now  been 
extended to all major securities.  An  initiative  in Italy,  the 
durante  marke~has a  similar purpose but has little current role aue  to 
the restrictions on international business.  The  more  normal  situation 
in the internationally active Continental markets is that activity in the 
continuous market is carried_out by  the members  off the floor,  as is the 
case with the powerful continuous-price off-market operated by  the 
German  banks.  In  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  this function is shared by the 
larger brokers  and  the banks.  Such  market~ are  interrupted by  the 
formal  trading  sessions. - 250 
This  situation  ~mmadiately highlights  the  second problem of collective 
price formation  in a  modern market,  that is that the essential condition 
of confrontation of all orders is not met.  The  need  to carry out off-
market transactions in continuous  trading is only one  of many  reasons 
for  this.  Collective price fixing,  to be,  effective,  requires a 
bal~nced trading situation.  The  syst~ rests on  the supposition that 
it can be  normally  expected that for  any  sold offer of a  given quantity 
at a  given price there will tend  to be an opposite bid  of more  or 
less Slmilar quantity and price.  Expectedly,  as  the system has  a 
mathematical-type logic,  this does  hold true for the generality of 
orders.  The ·system accommodates  the  norm  and is extremely effective 
for  handlinq  a  mass  of  averag~~-s~zed orders.  It is self-evidently ill-
ada~ted to orders of above  average  size.  Particularly in situations 
in which  the markets  are one way,  there is an obvious  danger  that a 
large order may  unstabilise  the price.  The  nature of the price-
iorn:.ing  process  dema.nds  that any  order entered into the fixing must 
seek  imruediat:e  match.  No  form  of discret1on can be  interposed in what 
is a  purely mechdnical price determination to moderate  the impact o'f 
_ such  a  transaction" 
As  a  result,  fluctuation  limits  have  been set  up  to  protect  the 
collective markets.  This must,however,be  recognised as  a  negative  device 
which  can,and  frequently does, lead to suspension of  fast~moving.markets. 
16.4  Collective price  system;  Transactions in Large  Size 
The  natural result of the  sd  tuation described above is that the large 
transactions  tend not to be  entered into the price fixings  and this 
business is lost to the floors.  The  extent to which this·is likely to 
occur clearly depends on·market activity.  It might well pe  argued, 
from  the  evidence of the last few years,  that a  feed back  type model 
exists,  whereby  the collective price system in time of recession 
drives the  Continent~l market floors  to  lower and  loWer  levels of 
business,  while over periods of recovery the reverse occurs.  As 
business declines,  the market will become  more  and more  thin.  In 
consequence brokers  and banks will be  increasingly reluctant to expose 25i 
such business as  they have  on  the floor.  The  worse  the situation gets, 
the greater that reluctance,  and  the  wors~ the situation becomes.  The 
extreme example of this might be  Denmark  prior to the recent revival of 
the Copenhagen equities market,  where,  as quoted  above,  brokers 
considered their equities market too  thin to conduct any  significant 
· business,  with the result that 90%  of the dealing was  kept off the 
floor.  The  theory would appear further borne out by  the exceptional 
levels of increasing business volume  experienced by certain of the 
Continental Exchanges when  business revived. 
Evidence  appears to suggest that,  in general,  a  collective price market 
tends  to  have  a  low  threshold beyond which orders must be considered 
beyond  the capacity of the market.  In general,block transactions are 
carried out off the markets  and  no  formal  system of block positioning 
exists in any of the Continental markets.  The  actual situation varies 
from  one  country to another.  In Italy,the trading of blocks is 
carried out by  the banks  outsid~ the  Exch~nges  and is totally off the 
floors.  Acquisition of blocks normally involves a  premium  rather than 
a  discount,due to scarcity of dealable stock.  In France,  the involve-
ment of an Agent de Change  in trading blocks of listed securities is 
required and  the transaction must be  linked to one of the current 
Bourse prices.  Foreign investors acknowledge  the nffective role played 
by  the Agents  de Change  in the development of this off-market block 
trading, but the procedure is complex  and involves uncertainty of 
price and execution.  The  limitation of the Belgian monopoly  to trans-
actions up  to BFlOm  results in a  big telephone market in the main forward market 
stocks in which the  large Belgian transactions are not tied to the 
Bourse price.  The  leading Belgian brokers play a  considerable role in 
arranging big institutional transactions.  In  German~ the large scale 
transactions are carried out by members,  but normally as  inter-bank 
operations.  ..The  German  fund  managers  consider the domestic market 
narrow and  lacking in depth.  The  position in Holland is a  variant of 
that in Germany,  but with  a  formal  link of large transactions with the 
hoekmen.  In Luxembourg,due  to a  longstanding liberal tradition of 
membership  and  large-scale admission of foreign banks,  off-Exchange 
trading is at a  high  level. 252 
It mightreasonably be  questioned whether  the European official markets, 
which were  ideally  design~~ for  the service and protection of the 
private  investo~ are well  adapted to handling  large-scale institutional 
business.  This  is increasingly dominating  the markets.  ·and·already 
constitutes the bulk of international trading. 
Comment  from  international investors suggested that  t,heir interface 
with  the collective price markets  was  crude  compared, for  example, to 
that with  New  York.  It was  suggested that it was  impossible to set ~ 
fine price limit on an order.  Flexibility of  2%-3%  of price h,ad  to be 
given to  th~ Continental counterparty.  In one major market both foreign 
and national opinion confirmed that operating  limit transactions was 
virtually impossible.  The  inability to deal at sensitive price and 
with assurance of execution is one of the factors  inhibiting a 
higher  volume  pf  inter-Exchange dealing in Europe. 
The  gen8ral  existence of the off-markets  in blocks must pose  a 
question as  t.o  the validity of  the  floor  collective price fixings.  It 
is clear that r.he  large and  professional  transactions should be within 
floor  trading .and  should  influence the official price.  The  potential 
danger of the present situation is well  evidenced  by  the generally 
acknowledged  need of  a  dealer,  trading on  behalf of a  large investor, 
to occasionally  'move  the market'.  This  implies that he manipulates  a 
price on  the floor which will enable  him  to execute a  large transaction 
off the floor,  at a  price which is realistic in the local block or the 
international market. 
It is not inferred that the floor prices derived  from  the smaller 
bargains are unrealistic.  The  significance attached by  the inter-
national ma~et to  the Continental price fixings in the local stocks 
refutes any  such suggestion.  Nor  is it inferred that the collective 
price systems are ~anipulated to the disadvantage of the general 
public.  The  actual circumstances of the operation of these systems 
do  howeve~ demonstrate that defence of the collective price system 
on  the qrounds  of its theoretical validity  and  thereby of its 
absolute fairness,  is naive in context of the way  these markets actually 16.5' 
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operate.  Under  modern  circumstances,  the collective price on  the 
Exchanges  represents an  important signal maintained by  expert 
professionals operating in the market,  rather than an absolute equil-
ibrium price determined  from  all orders.  This,however,is not a 
transparent effect  •. It cannot be  expected  to be understood by  the 
non-professional investor  and evidence  from  the Consultant's 
discussions  suggested that it was  not understood by the professional 
foreign dealers.  The  situat~on is vulnerable to misconstruction  and 
it is not liked by local professional investors.  For example,  the 
Italian banks,  who  are caught in a  situation of this type,  would  like 
to replace it with a  totally concentrated,transparent market which 
would  handle all transactions. 
Collective price systems;  Narro~ness of the markets 
A factor which compounds  the disadvantages of the collective price 
markets is that they tend to be  narrow.in respect of the number of 
securities quoted  and the markets in individual securities lack depth. 
In comparison with the world  Exchang~s at large,  none of the 
Continental markets appropriately relate to the size of the economy 
they service.  'The scale of their operations does  not relate to 
economic  indicators such as G.N.P .• 
In the Paris Bourse,  41\ of market equity capitalisation is accounted 
for by  twenty five leading  stoc~s  (198l)and  51.8%  by  the first fifty  (1982). 
In 19821 30.8%  of official market equities dealing was  in the twenty five 
most active stocks. 
The  case of Italy,  one of  the  larger economies,  in which  this problem is 
acute,  might be  taken as  an  example.  In Italy,  informed opinion 
is that there are only some  thirty corporate securities effectively 
available to institutional investors.  One  company  alone,  Assicurazioni 
Generali,represents 12\ of market  capitalisa~ion and averaged  14\ of 
current transactions in 1982.  Although,  technically,  20\ of the issued 
securities should be available for  trading,  in some  cases  less than  5% 
is effectively available. 
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:rn  Holland, leaving aside the five or six major internationals,the greater part 
of the remaining dealing is in the next thirty major  companies,  after 
which there is a  considerable gap in magnitude.  In ·Eire,  where  the 
Dublin floor is a  form  of  c~llective price market,  six companies 
represent 70%  of market equity capitalisation.  In Belqium1 93%  of 
trading  volume  tends  to be  concentrated in one  hundred  securities out 
of  the five  hundred  listed.'  Taking German  examples,  47%  of the share 
turnover of the Rheinisch-Westfalische  Borse in 1981 was  concentrated in 
eight major  securities.  Fifty eight per cent of the Frankfurter Bhrse 
domestic  share  turnover  was  in twelve securities ·  and  the  importance 
of foreign  shares in  broadening  the German  markets  is indicated by  the 
lesser concentration of this dealing of which  30\ was  in the leading 
twelve  stocks.  The  shares of quoted companies are extensively held 
by  the banks1 which contributes to narrowness  and illiquidity of the 
market
1
•  This tight holding is reinforced .by  the general practice of 
r~:isnce on  fixed interest finance  and of issuing new  equity to 
shareholders in the form.  of rights.  Regulations  awarding fiscal 
privileges to major participations apply in several markets  and1 
similar!~ tend to restrict market liquidity. 
The  narrowness  and  lack of qepth of the Continental markets cannot be 
attributed to their price formation  and  trading procedures alone.  The 
deficiencies of  the markets  arise from  more basic external causes 
related to corporate finance practices and  the attitude of Governments 
discussed in Section 14.  On  the other hand,·it should be recognised 
that the collective price  system,  under which  securities are dealt 
sequentially by  the whole market,  tends  to place a  limitation on the 
number  of securities which  can,  in practJ.cal  terms,  be traded.  The 
system itself tends  to focus  market dealing on  a  narrow range of 
major  securities.  As  the Stock  Exchanges  have  to absorb ever-increasing 
institutional cash flows,  this problem will become  more,  rather than 
less,acute  in the future. 
16.6  Collective Price Systems;  Complexity·of Floor markets 
The  differing efficiency of collective price formation at different 
volumes of busi.n'ess ·is acknowledged  in the existing market floor 
I • 
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systems.  According to their activity levels, different securities are 
assigned to different segments of the market  - terme,  comptant  , 
corbeille,  parquet etc  ••  This is necessary  becau~e different variants 
of the  technique are appropriate  to active.and inactive stocks.  This 
has had the adverse consequence of unduly  complicating  some  Continental 
market floors.  Authorities  such as the Perouse Commission  and the 
Italian CONSOB  have criticised their markets  on these· grounds, 
pointing out that such complexities  tend  to make  the  floor operations 
incomprehens-ible  to the public .at large.  The  segmented market  and 
the complicated,and often multiple. assignment of securities across  them 
results in complex  floor operation.  A major purpose of the present 
French market reforms is simplification of  the trading  system.  The 
German  system of the official,  the free regulated and  the unregulated 
markets,  with their attendant pricing techniques and varying market 
and  off-market procedures,  is difficult for  the non-professional investor 
to understand.  The  same  applies to the Italian division into the 
official,  the ristretto,  the inter-bank and  the intra-bank markets.  The 
requlatory position of these market  segments may  not only vary but also 
be  anomalous,  as is the case in Italy.  The  complica·ted division of the 
markets is reflected in a  complexity of member  and official roles 
associated with them.  In at least one  case, it was  considered that, 
in· consequence,  ordering techniques had become  unduly elaborate. 
16.7  Collective Price Systems  and  European  Linkage 
It is clear that,  in determiniRCJ  the ;rice for.:ation  s~:stsn and  thereby 
the structure of trading for  th~ European  linkage,  a  very considerable 
problem exists in that the great majority of European Exchanges operate 
procedures of floor  trading which are not well adapted to international 
dealing. 
It is not beyond the bounds of imagination,  from  a  technical standpoint, 
to conceive an  inter-Exchange  telecommunications and processing network 
w~ich would  elevate collective price formation  to European level.  But a 
moment's  thought on  the implications of such a  system makes clear its 
impracticability.  It would set up  a  European  trading mechanism which - 256 
was  incompatible with the World''s  international securities markets. 
The  formation of a  European price once  a  day would  be an ineffective 
punctuation within a  World-wide  system of twenty-four-hour dealing. 
While  more  frequent fixings  could be contrived  (for ex5mple  each hour 
of the trading day),  adequate volume  of trading would not be a\ttained1 
due to reluctance of investors  and  their dealers to commit  themselves 
blindly to the system price or  the possibility of non-execution.  The 
factors which  have  caused larger transactions to become  excluded  from 
national price-fixing'would apply with even greater force at this 
remote level.  The  commitment  to  trade1 which is essential to 
collective price formation,would  not be obtained. 
A further objection of market participants would  be that such a  central-
ised European price-fixing system would  necessarily be totally 
computerised.  The  market floors  would  be uninvolved,  their orders 
being streamlined into a  central system.  It is subnitted that a 
European  coll~ctive price system would be undesirable and unacceptable 
to the Stock Exchanges  and  that any proposition of this type does  not 
merit serious consideration. 
16.8  The  Jobber  System 
It is similarly questionable whether  the  London market,  the only other 
alternative in the existing European precedents,  would be acceptable 
as the model  for  a  European  linkage.  The  London  system successfully 
meets many  of the criticisms made  of the collective price market. 
Dealing is continuous  and  may  at any  time of day be  influenced by 
company  announcements or financial and  economic  developments.  The 
London market floor is better  adap~ed than any of the Continental 
floors to handle  large business.  Quotations in the Continental 
markets,  outside a  very limited range of major  stock~ tend  to· be in 
small size,  possibly 2,ooo-3,000 shares.  A O.K.  jobber would,  in the 
normal course .of  trading, .be ready to make  a  two-way  price in 2o,ooo-
3o,ooo shares of any  large company  in which he deals.  A more 
significant point is that in executing a  transaction of this size,  he 
would, in general, expect the price to move·by  not more  than about 0.2\-0.3\.  • - 257 
The  prime  advantage of the  jobbing system,  within which the  jobber is 
permitted to maintain a  confidential stock position,  is its ability 
to absorb large transactions immediately and without excessive effect 
on price.  This characteristic of the  system was  acknowledged by 
London  investing institutions in discussions with  the Consultants. 
The  view was  expressed that,  in spite of the smaller scale of the 
London market;  it was  frequently easier to execute  large orders 
throuqh London  jobbers than large orders in comparable stocks on the 
American market.  The  fact ,that the  jobbers cannot,  in course of 
normal market business,  accommodate  the largest institutional trans-
actions· does not invalidate this general point.  No  floor  system exists 
anywhere  in the world that  c~n.  The  existence of the  jobbers 
facilitates  'put through'  procedures,  whereby transactions beyond the 
capacity of the market can be effectively related to market price and 
operation., 
The  jobbing  system may  be  subject to criticism on several counts.  It 
is questioned whether  the existence of a  market-making  intermediary on 
the floor is necessary  and  whether the  'turn'  derived  from  the  jobbing 
transaction  1~ a  necessary charge on the  investor.  The  freedom  of the 
jobber.to set the spreads of his buying  and selling prices, which is 
essential to _his  operation,  is viewed with  suspi,::-i.on.  There is concern 
at the alleqed reduction in the competition on which efficient jobbipg 
depends,  due  to the concentration of  jobbing  firms  as ever-increasing 
capital is required to accommodate  large institutional business.  The 
future of market-floor  jobbing is seen to be in question. 
16.9  Market-making  and  European Linkage 
The  Consultants concur with  the view,  which  they found generally held 
by members  of the Exchanges,  that continuous dealing requires some 
form  of market-making  to assure the constant liquidity of the market. 
If it is accepted,  as  argued above,  that both logic and present· trends 
suggest that linkage of the Exchanges will be achieved  through a 
continuous market,  then design within it of  some  form  of market-making 
is required,  whether  this be  through contre-partistes,  jobbers, 258 
specialists or any other  form  of positioners. 
At present,  of all the  Community  Exchanges,  only Londoh  has  full-scale 
floor market-making.  In the other Exchanges,  Stock Exchange members 
are confined to agency  functions,  modified only by specialist-type 
market-makers,  whose ability to  posi~ion is strictly limited.  The 
hoekmens  position-taking is restricted to ten times  the value'of a 
required cash deposit.  The  kursmakler may  only take minor positions 
required  to fully balance the price.  Unde+  the proposed''second Marche'' 
system,  the principal transactions of the Frerich.contra-partiste will be 
tmder  a 
1
contrat de liquidi  t~ and be strictly limited to assuring  the 
liquidity of the market. 
It might be  observed,  however,  that this apparent extreme contrast 
between  London  and the COntinental markets is more  apparent than real 
when  the  total structure of  the Continental markets is taken into account. 
The  absence  of  market-making  on  the Continental floors is compensated 
by  tr.e availability of large broker and bank positions in securities 
which  supply the necessary liquidity for  floor  trading.  The  German 
and Italian inter-bank markets are  the most  striking  examples~  The 
contention  th~t the banks'  positioning is no  more  than anticipation 
of their clients'  buying and selling orders raises only a  question of 
academic definition.  It cannot obscure  the reality of  an actual off-
Exchange market-making  function by  the banks.  The  view  was  expressed 
by one of the German  bankR  that if this was  openly acknowledged,  the 
function would  become  more professionalised and efficient. 
The  international dealing at net price underlying this European market-
making  by the banks  and  the  jobbers is large-scale and efficient.  In 
a  share in which  the opening  Exchanges price may  be made  in,  say,  4,000 
shares,  a  transaction of 80,000 to 100,000 shares might be executed 
through  the  bank and  jobber  network.  On  both the sale and purchase 
side the transaction would be  likely to be  complex  - a  proportiqa of 
the seller$ own  book  or on risk to the buying intermediary,  a  proportion 
from  the main market  and  a  proportion made  up  from  other European - 25CJ 
markets.  There•would be little variance  from  the opening price  but 
on occasion the main market intermediary may  have  to enter the  floor 
market and move  it, as discussed  elsewhere. 
Effective floor  linkage will not be attained until a  standard approach 
is accepted by all the Community  Exchanges  to the question of market-
making  and the related question of the conditions under which 
participatin~ Stock  Exchange  members  may  deal as principal or as agent. 
As  one  of the constraints in the design of  linkage is that changes 
should not be required in the operation of the  local floors,  this 
would  appear  to be an intractable problem.  A solution aligned to the· 
realities of the present trading would  be to link not only the floor 
operations-where possible,  but also  the off-floor activities of 
members  in the equities secondary market.  This would have  the general 
effect that linkage would  embrace both  the functions of the U.K. 
jobbers  and  the off-flocir market positioning functions of the 
Continental banks.  It would  provide  a  linkage commonly  based on  the 
capital market systems,  rather  than on  the varied components of  such 
systems  which have,  by  tradition,  become  floor activities in the 
different countries. 
Assuming  that participation in  the linkage will be  limited to Stock 
Exchange members,  even  this  approach,howeve~ contains complications. 
It might be effectively applied to  the U.K.,  Holland and possibly to 
Belgium and  Luxembourg.  Technically,,  the  German  system would be well 
adapted to it  and,for  international purposes, it would unite  the 
German  floor  and  bank markets.  A legal problem might exist if the 
German  banks were  to formalise  their off-market activities. An  attempt 
to do  so might bring  thei:r:  international markets under  the provisions 
of the German  securities  law  and might constrain the off-market to 
the official local form,  thus destroying the banks  international market. 
The  French and Italian situations pose greater difficulty,  in that the 
banks,  which  in these countries carry out significant off-market 
positioning func'tions,  are not members  of the Exchanges.  If 
particip~tion in the network were  to be based on Stock  ~xchange members 16.10 
260 
only,  the  trading functions carried out by the banks would be excluded. 
Local  developments  in both of  these countries,  however,  acknowledge 
this problem  and may,  in due  course,· result in formulae  which may. 
resolve it. 
The  need  to accommodate both existing. segments  of the  European 
International Equities Market  ' 
·In general,  two  ~ypes of international dealing exist,as has  been noted 
in Section 13.  ln all the internationally active  Excha~ge~major 
EUropean  stocks  are mul·tiply  listed  and  there is1 to  a  greater or 
lesser extent·,  a  floor  market in these European securities,  normally 
with quotation in local currencies.  These are the markets identified 
in the Stock  Exchange  stat1stics of  trading  in foreign securities. 
They  have  been  shown  to be  small,  relative to other international 
busi~ess transacted in each of the capital centres.  A notable exception 
to this generalisation is the Brussels  lucal market in foreigns,  which, 
supported by issue of local bearer,  has been. extremely successful  and 
in two  recent years has  exceeded the value of dealing in domestic 
securities on  the Bourse.  Amsterdam is an exception to the general 
practice of quotation in local currency  and  the A.E.B.  is at present 
changing quotation of foreigns  to the currency of the market of origin. 
Trading in these  floor markets,  in general,  conforms  to the  local 
procedures of  each floor.  The  obstacles  to linking  them  are primarily 
those of price formation  system  and capacity -floor linkage is 
discussed more  fully  in Section 21. 
The  other main  segment of the international securities markets in 
Europe  comprises  the off-floor dealings,  both of the members  of the 
Exchanges  and of other non-member  traders.  This market has its origins 
in traditional arbitrage  ~unctions which  intermediated between the 
different markets,  supplying or taking  up  securities and  undoing  ~he 
transactions elsewhere,  with  the effect of equalising the price.  This 
classic arbitrage  function,  1n Europe,  now  tends to be merged  wi~  and 261 
be  largely indistinguishable from, international dealing,  due  to speed  t 
of communication,  the ·single time  zone  and  the direct activity of 
investors in the foreign markets. 
As  long as the European markets retain different characteristics, 
different securities instruments  and different currencies,  the  need 
for  some  form  of arbitrage will remain.  Some  market theorists appear 
to have  an  emotive attitude towards  the arbitrageur and  towards 
professional international  de~ling as  a  principal,  considering this 
activity redundant and an unnecessary  cost imposed on  the investor. 
It is difficult to see how  this argument can be  sustained.  The 
international dealer  takes considerable risks and he  h~s to bridge the 
differences of the  two markets,  all of which involve cost.  He  provides 
a  service in assuring  liquidity of  transactions in foreign securities. 
A major  Dutch  bank considered the present system very efficient,  with 
arbitrage deals struck in two  minutes  a'nd  the prices flattened in ten 
minutes.  Until the European markets are  fully harmonised,  which  appears 
a  distant prospect,  intermediation will be  required between  the trading 
on  the national market floors. 
From  these  arrangements  a  dealing  network  has  resulted which  has  the 
advantage of permitting individual member  firms  vZ  ~ach ~change 
virtually unrestricted access  to foreign  counterparties,  but wh1ch  is 
extremely complex.  Diagram  16.1 schematically illustrates the 
situation.  Due  to absence of any market organisation,  members  operate 
individually,  normally,  for  reasons discussed below,  through carefully 
identified  'friends'  in the markets. 
The  Consultants advocate that within this market,  a  European identity 
is established by  the linkage of the international dealing of Exchange 
members.  Otherwise,  the international market,  which is infinitely 
more powerful  than any of the European Exchanges will continue  to 
erode  first their international dealing  and  subsequently  the base 
of their domestic activities.  There is already evidence of such 
developments • D
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The  nature of dealing operations in the International Equities Market 
Although  the  reasons  for  international dealing leaving  the Stock 
Exchange  floorsareprimarily due  to the membership  concessions 
which have been made  (i.e.  who  may  deal with who),  operating factors 
are an important consideration.  In every European Stock Exchange, 
international business.has  tended-to move  off the market floors 
because  they do  not,  at least at present,  provide an appropriate 
environment for it.  The  floor trading is essentially face-to-face 
dealing,  often of considerable sophistication,  but in a  well-understood 
and  fully standardised market.  The  international securities dealer is 
in a  completely different situation.  His potential counterparties are 
far  away;  his main knowledge  is of his  own  market.  He  requires both 
personal contact in the foreign market,  all possible methods of 
communication ensure this,  and as wide  a  range of supporting market 
information as possible.  He  requires  telecommunications,  video equip-
ment·  and,  possibl~ computer-processed  information immediately to hand. 
These  facilities can be better provided off the market floors  in 
dealing  rooms  in member  firms'  offices.  In this environment,  the 
dealer will not only have  the  information he  requires,  but he will be 
in a  better position to liaise with his foreign counterparties.  FUrthe~ 
the convention of international dealing differs  from  the abrupt and 
formal bid or offer on  the market floor.  The  dealers mutually seek 
help  and are ready  to open  their position to their counterparties to 
a  far greater degree  than in normal  floor  trading. 
To  make  the point explicit,  the exacting nature of  int~rnati~nal 
dealing is illustrated by  the dealer's task in an international trans-
action in which he must:-
(i)  refer to the market price displayed on  the screen; 
(ii)  refer to the  currency'exchange rate; 
(iii)  communicate with his potential counterparties; 
(iv)  carry out the currency conversions  to establish the local 
currency position; 
(v)  take into account  the settlement factors  and  financing costs; 264 
(vi)  possibly communicate within his own  dealinq room; 
(vii)  execute  the transaction; 
(viii)  initiate confirmation of  the transaction. 
At  the risk of stressing the  obvious,  the physical requirements of this 
procedure are worth  noting:-
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v~ 
(vi) 
he must constantly watch  the  screens; 
he  requires  a  hand  to control the information display system 
and,  if the most advanced  information systems are not used, 
to display exchange rates; 
he must  use his left hand  for  the  telephone; 
he  requires his right hand  to operate a  desk calculator to 
obtain currency conversions; 
he must enter  the transaction into the dealing book  and in any 
position record which  he  may  be maintaining,  or possibly key 
this data into a  computer; 
he  must originate a  confirmation slip for  the transaction, 
which would not normally be  c~vered by the  Stock Exchange 
reporting systems. 
Tnese operations,  which are normally achieved with great skill and  speed, 
are clearly best carried out sitting down  at a  desk  surrounded by the 
necessary equipment  •.  The  more  advanced  firms  are installing devices  to 
assist the international dealer  in his complicated task.  Computerised 
dialling facilities are  sometimes available,  though  there is not as yet 
much  evidence of in-house  systems  in Stock  Exchange  firms  to supply 
processed supporting information  of the  type available in banks'  bond 
dealing rooms. 
In respect of any  trar.saction executed,  the international dealer is 
involved in a  complex  chain of PoSt-dealing  communication,  which is 
much  assisted if the dealers are in the office,  rather than on  the 
market floor.  An  inter-Exchange transaction may  typically involve the 
following communications:-
(i)  any necessary  telephone calls and  telexes to set up and 
execute  the transactions  and establish,  where  necessary, 
the  'charges'  element of the net price; 265 
(ii}  telex to  foreign  bank  with which  the broker dealt to 
confirm  the deal; 
(iii)  telex  to broker's clearing agent bank in the foreign 
centre informing  t~em of  the deal; 
(iv)  telex to client confirming  the deal  (plus, later, contract 
note); 
(v)  pro-forma  completed  g~vJ.ng broker's international settlement 
team all the data  they require; 
(vi)  (if local currency)  - instructions  to client for  acceptance 
of stock  and  effecting  paym~nt to seller; 
(vii)  instructions to clearing agent to receive shares and effect 
payment  to  the seller bank; 
(viii)  instructions to selling bank  to deliver to clearing agent 
bank; 
(ix)  notification to clearing agent bank  to receive stock and  pass 
to client's local bank,  to be held to account of client's 
bank- sub-account client,etc  •• 
If the settlement is not in the  local currency the procedure becomes 
somewhat  more  complicated.  The  procedures in the international equities 
market are widely recognised as antiquated by  the participants, 
particularly by  those  familiar with  the international bond markets. 
A  further reason  for  the interna  tiona! bus:i.ness  leaving  the  floors is 
the difference in the hours  of  trading of the World  £A~hanges.  This 
may  arise from  shortness of trading sessions,  as in the case of the 
Continental  Exchanges  or  from  the  need for  twenty-four-hour cover of 
world markets.  Round-the-clock  trading is now  of vital importance.  This 
consideration applies also to London.  In spite of the fact that the  London 
market operates broadly  through  European business hours,  the inter-
national dealing facilities must,  to  be  fully effective,  be available 
over  the  twenty-four-hour  cycle. 
While  settlement problems  are considered elsewhere in this Report,  it 
should  be  noted  that,  due  to its North  American  domination,  trans-
actions in this international market  tend  to be settled on  a  five day 
rolling settlement  and do  not  form  part of the  local settlement.  The 
European  international market does  not have  the advantages of J.6.12 
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disciplined procedures or  computer  support which  are available in 
members'  domestic dealings. 
A_  furth~r complication of European  linkage is that,  except in the very 
largest firms,  European  dealing is an integral part of overall dealing 
in foreign securities.  It will be essential that operat~ons involved 
in European  international  linkage are as  compatible  as possible with 
those of general  international dealing  and  do  not  impede members' 
business ·with  the major  markets  in North  America  and the Far East. 
It will be  apparent that dS  well  as  a  'vertical' division between  the 
European markets·due  to differences  in  the dealing procedures of the 
individual Exchanges -there is  a  'horizontal'  division running across 
all the  Exchanges,  distinguishing floor  trading  in foreigns  from  the 
inte·rnational market. 
Sumr.1ary_ 
The  obstacles to  linkage  present~d by  the different dealing operations 
on  t~e Stock  Exchange  floors  and  in  the international equities market 
appear,  in the  firse instance,  to summarise  to a  single major point. 
This is that no finite progress  can be  made  on  the  'architecture'  of 
the  linkage  system until the Commiss.ion,  the  Conunittee  and  the 
Exchanges  resolve  the policy with respect to  three fundamental  aspects 
of the system design:-
(i)  should the  linkage  be  based on  continuous or collective 
pricinq?; 
{ii)  should  the  l~nkage offer facilities for market-making  on 
a  European base?; 
(iii)  should  ~he  linkag~ embrace  trading in second-country E.E.C. 
equities on  the market floors only,  or  should it also 
endeavour  to provide facilities  for  the segment of  the 
European international market which is now  handled off the 
floors by  the  Stock  Exchange  members?· 267 
In  the view of the Consultants,  the first premise is essential for 
effective operation of an international market.  It is believed that 
this  view  is endorsed by  most market participants. 
The  objectives of the Commission  to establish,  through linkage,  an 
equities market of European scale will not be possible unless the 
second condition is, by  one device or another,  met. 
From views  expressed by  the Stock  Exchanges,  it is clear that full 
agreement will not be  reached  on  the  thi-rd point - the ideal coverage 
of the network.  It is predictable that those ·Exchanges  carrying out 
a  volume  of foreign equities business on  their floor  which is sub-
stantial relative to their overall turnover will be predisposed to 
favour  floor  linkage,  at least until the changes  required by  floor 
linkage,  and  the extent to which  this will open local floors  to general 
European  competition,  are  fully considered.  This preference is  most 
likely in those Exchanges  where  a  market monopoly of securities 
trading is based on members'  floor activities.  The  Exchanges  in which 
the bulk of the member's  international business is carried out off  the 
floor  and which  tend to be  the more  active centres of  foreign dealing 
are more  likely to consider that this business may  not be well suited 
to floor operation.  These  Exchanges  may  fear  that constraining their 
members  to bring their European business back on  to  the market floor 
may  be both difficult and  disadvantageous. 
A compromise  design  will be required,  which will allow  certain of the 
Exchanges toinstallimmediate interfaces between  the  international 
dealing  linkage and  their floor dealing in foreigns  and others  to link 
with the system primarily through the dealing  rooms  of their member 
firms,  both  pos~ibilities being  open  to all Exchanges. 
Floor  linkage should be  immediately  identified4 however,  as  the ultimate' 
target  and  the  issues  involved  in this are set out in Section  21. SEC'!' I ON  17 
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OBSTACLES  TO  LINKAGE  RELATED  TO  THE  MEMBERSHIP  RULES  OF 
THE  COMMUNITY  STOCK  EXCHANGES 
17.1  Introduction 
The  most  fundamental  of all Stock Exchange  rules are  those governing 
admission of members,  the  capaci_ty  and  the manner  in which  they may 
operate  and  the mutual  assurances  under  which  they conduct business. 
While  the problem arising  from different membership  regimes in the' 
e:xchanges  have  been mentipned  in 'the previous Section considering 
dealing operations to which  they have  close bearing,  they require 
brief review in their own  right.  To  date,  li_ttle progress has been 
made  in establishing mutual membership  of  the European exchanges. 
Linkage  of  the  floors will eventually require substantial mutual 
.adjustment of membership  rules.  To  review  the difficulties associated 
with  such relaxation and  the potential it might offer for  inter-market 
linY.~g~ it. is necessary to consider, first the existing membership 
structures  and  second  the changes  which would be ·required an the 
event of linkage.of the  Exchanges. 
17.2  The  present localised membership 
A number  of factors have  limited the closer association of Community 
Stock Exchange  firms  with second-country markets. 
There 1s little incentive  for  firms  to set up branches  and subsidiaries 
in other European  capital centres.  Europe is,  in effect,  within the 
same  ti.Jne  zone.  Telecommunica~ions are considered efficient for  their 
purposes  by  the dealers,  at present  levels of European business.  The 
international banking network is strong.  Setting  up  a  branch office in 
another country is extremely costly.  Under  present circumstances, such 
an office would  not,  in most cases,  be  able  to participate in the 
domestic business of the  second market.  This  incentive,  which under-
lies the  institution-of subsidiaries of London  firms  in the Far East, 
does not exist in the European case. 
Moreover,  due  to the  ease of communication between European markets, 
the branch office may  play little role in channelling business to·its - 269 
home  market,  as is successfully done  by u.s.  and Japanese 
European  offices.  Broker  affiliates  in  Europe  tend 
to be instituted  to  meet  par:·ticular  needs  and  n.re 
exceptional.  Various  London  firms,  have  from  time to  time  opened 
offices in Continental capital centres  but,  other  than  those 
related to Eurobond dealing,  these branches have been closed.  In 
general,  no  moves  have  been made  to facilitate member  firms of 
foreign exchanges  operating in second  European markets.  This appears to be 
due both to a  local policy of protecting members'  business  and also 
to the disinclination of the  foreign securities houses to apply for 
membership of the  local  exchanges. 
Most of the  exchanges  have  removed  any  discrimination against 
individual membership of nationals of E.E.C.  countries.  A summary  of 
the status of foreign  intermediaries in  ~he Community  exchanqes has 
been produced by  the  Committee  of Stock Exchanges.  There is no 
discrimination against nationals of other E.E.C.  countries in 
the  U.K.,  France,  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  Denmark  and  Eire, 
subject  to  conformity  to  local  admission  requirements.  · 
The  A.E.B.  wi~l accept application from  foreigner~provided they are 
resident,and from  banks  when  they are established under  the  law of 
one of the Community  couno·ies.  Membership of  the German  exchanges  is 
totally open,with the proviso  that any institution applying  for 
membership must be  able  to comply with German  banking legislation, 
thereby implying·that it must  set up  or  acquire  a  German  bank.  In 
Greece  and  Ital~ only nationals  are permitted membership. 
This  liberalisation of individual membership has little bearing on  the 
more  significant question of admission of member  firms  from  other 
E.E.C.  exchanges  into a  local market.  For  this,  two  sets of 
permissions are required; first-ly  the  agreement of  the home  Stock Exchange 
that the member  firm  may  set up  an overseas•  subsidiary organisation 
and,  secondly,  the  read1ness  of  the  host  Exchange  to  admit it. 
Footnote:  "Restrictions on  the activities of financial intermediaries 
in foreign countries"  - R De  Baerdemaker  - Secretary 
General,  Committee of E.E.C.  Stock  Exchanges. - 270 
In respect of the first of these conditions,  the member  firms  are 
normally free,  on  terms  laid down  by  the parent exchange,  to set up 
branches in the  othe~ European markets.  Clear exceptions  a~e Italy, 
where  no  form  of corporate association is permitted  ~or brokers,  even 
in the domestic market,  and France,  where  the  foreign participation 
permitted to Agents  de  Change  is automatically limited by  the 
prohibition of commercial  functions  laid down  by  the'code de 
Commerce:  Th~ foreign-based activities of  the Agents  de  Change  are 
thus restricted to participation in non-dealing  firms.  The setting-
up of bankipg subsidiaries,  in those countries in which  the banks 
are  allowed  to operate as brokers,  is governed by  the banking 
legislation of the host country.  In  the  CommunitY, it has only 
moderate effect as  the securities business of  the banks  concentrate 
in their domestic branches in the markets of origin.  The  network of 
European bank  subsidiaries has  not,  as yet,  been exploited to 
Europeanise securities trading in equities. 
The  more  serious obstacle to internationalisation of the broker firms 
within Europe is likely to be  the response of the  'host'  exchange. 
Regardless of the principles of the rules,  the Stock Exchange 
authorities have  de .facto control over  admissions.  Cases exist 
demonstrating  the reluctance of European  exchanges  to countenance 
membership of foreign  firms.  The  incoming  foreign  firm would, 
moreover,  only be  able  to operate in the host market under that 
market's established conventions.  If these,  as would mainly be  the 
case,  were dissimilar  from  those of its home  market,  it would have 
little incentive  to  seek membership.  To  date,  the U.S.  and Japanese 
securities houses  have  exhibited little enthusiasm  to become  m~ers 
of the  European markets,  preferring  to operate outside them,  remote 
from  their own  regulatory authorities  and  free  from  the constraints 
imposed on the  trading of local Stock Exchange members. 
It is important to note  a  significant European exception in which 
membership  linkage has  achieved integration of previously separate 
Stock Exchanges.  The  unification of the U.K.  Stock  Exchanqe~ in  197~ 
was  achi~ved by merging of membership.  The  same  approach secured the 271 
continued assoaiation of the Irish Stock Exchange with  the United 
Kinqdom  Stock Exchanges.  This precedent of unification of 
exchanges within the same  country,  or,  in the  case of Ireland1with 
similar securities and  company  law,  has  no  real relevance to the 
current European situation in which total diversity exists.  If 
the trading procedures  and  other aspects of the securities industry 
environment were  harmonised across  Europe,  the conditions which 
permitted the  U.K.  unification would  then exist in Europe.  This is, 
at best,  a  long  term prospect  and  the  immediate moves  towards 
linkage must accommodate  the different trading procedures  and 
membership structures. 
17.3  The  Existing Membership  Sys~ems 
The  different membership  systems,  as  they affect international 
linkage,  might be divided into four  groups:-
(i)  The  'broker'  exchan~e~ in which members'  dealings are restricted 
to commission-orientated ,agency  business  and  in most of which  such 
functions  are supported by statute.  France  and  Italy. fall 
directly into .this category,  as,  with a  slight qualification,  does 
Belgimn.  Though  external financial participation is allowed in 
the Stock Exchange  firms,  their active management  i:::  s tr  ict.~.y 
confined to the Agents  de  Change,  with vigorous  exclusion of the 
banks  from  any  form  of association.·  The  local Dublin.floor in the 
Irish market conforms  to this category more  than to any  other. 
(ii)  The  'bank'  exchanges,  of which  the classical example is the 
Association of German  Stock Exchanges.  In Germany,  the banks, 
governed by  the Stock  Exchange  and  Custody of Securities Acts  and 
the legislation on Credit Institutions,  perform  the full range 
of securities markets  functions. 
(l.ii)  The  exchanges of \<Thich  the membership  structures are  a  compromise 
between  the  two pure  stereotypes quoted  above, in which both banks 
and brokers may  be members  (Holland  and  Luxembourg)  or  1n which 
brokers may  also be bankers  (Denmark). 272 
(iv)  The  Stock Exchange in the  Uni tL•rl  Kj ll<Jrlom whP.re members  tre~.nst~-ct both commi-
sion and princi.!'lal business within t.he market through the s.eparated capac!  tie• 
of the brokers and the jobbers respect1.vel:y and which, thouqh limiting parti-
cipation by non-members; includinc; l.lanks, in member firms to 29. 9\,  embodies, 
within the floor  of t:r.e  Exchange,  the  essentia~ functions both of  'broker•· 
and  the  't-ank'  systems prevalent on  the  Continent  .. 
From  these differences,  two intractable membership-type obstacles arise 
which require resolution if trading on  the European  exchanges is to be 
effectively linked.  The  severity of  these problems  depends  on  the 
for.n  of linkage adopted.  The  first is  the d1.fferent capacity or capacities 
in which the members  of the different exchanges are permitted to 
operate on  the  secondary market.  Related  to that difference,  and. 
accentuating it, are types of membership in individual or corporate 
terms  which are permitted and  the types of institutions which  are 
a.llm:,;:d  to carry out  these roles. 
The  second obstacle is the difference  in  the scale of operation and. 
·capital resources between  the Stock  Exchange  members  in the different 
countries.  A  ~inked system of  trading which is going  to have  any real 
effect  must  imply greater exposure of a'll  the members  of all the 
exchanges to mutual competition.  Unless  account was  taken of this in 
the design of the system  and  the interests of the smaller  Stock 
Exchange  firms werein  some  appropriate manner protected,  linkage would 
present great hazards  to the  exchanges  comprised of smaller member  firms. 
17.4  Capacity in which members  are permitted to trade 
It might be argued that the most  fundamental membership obstacle to 
linkage of the European  exchanges is the variation in capacity in 
which members  of the different exchanges are allowed to trade.·  The 
different types of Stock Exchange  intermediaries tend,  under present 
arrangements,  to seek comparable counterparties ;i'n  the other European 
markets.  The  U.K.  jobber,  for  example,  tends  to deal with the banks 
which carry out similar functions  on  the Continent.  When  this match is 
close,  as between the London  jobbers. and  the Dutch or German  banks, - 273 
mutual arrangements permitting  joint operation across  the  two  markets. 
are possible.  The  linkage  system,  howeve~would require to establish 
satisfactory order-routing between dissimilar exchanges,  notably 
between  broker  and  bank  Stock  Exchanges. 
The  participation of the present Stock Exchange members  i~ a  European 
floor  linkage,  in their present market-floor capacities,would not be 
possible  and would result in an  imbalanced situation.  Exemplified 
in floor  linkage in which one  side of the transaction might be on one 
floor with the other side on another,  the U.K.  jobber would  be free to 
deal with any member  of the broker Bourses on their own  floors.  The 
German  and  Dutch banks would be in an even more  enviable position, 
being able both to undertake principal business with any European· 
broker direct  and also to carry out braking business across Europe 
with capital resources massively greater  than the agent members  of the 
other exchanges.  The  broker Bourses  would be disadvantaged by their 
ability to deal only as agents.  Although in Brussels, members are authorised•, 
to act as principals.  The  capital centres in which  the broker Bourses are 
situated would be handicapped by the  non-inclus~on in the system of banks,  which 
I  . 
at present play important roles ~n securities trading in  those  locations. 
In floor  linkage,  the  rul~s governing  U1e  c.:1pac:Hy  in  which  members  may 
trade would need  to be  realigned and  largely  standardised across 
the exchanges.  This might be  done  by  extending  the functions of the 
broker  exchanges to include positioning,  with a  sub-division of the 
bank  exchange  functions  into agency and principal business. 
AlternativelY, all exchanges  would  have  to be  limited to agency business, 
possibly under  a  specialist system,  with all large positioning outside 
the  exchange  floors. 
A basic requirement of floor  linkage would be rules changes which would 
enable access to the dealing floor of one  exchange by  a  member  of 
another.  Regardless of its form,  floor  linkage implies that one side 
of the transaction may  originate in one market  and be met by  a  sale 
or purchase on another.  A foreign bank might thus direct a  buying 
order onto  the floor of the Bourse,  which might be met by a  selling 274 
Agent de Change.  This  type of situation would raise a  difficulty  of 
principle for all exchanges,  in that,  universally,  their  rul~s confine 
trading on  the floor  to  their own  members  or  their authorised 
associates.  Such inter-exchange dealing  would raise most acute 
difficulty in the cases of those  exchanges  in which  the status of the 
local Stock  Exchange  members  and  their privileges in floor  trading 
are defined in law.  In the example quoted,  the  foreign bank would 
have  unambiguously dealt on  the Paris Bourse,  which  by  French law it 
would be prohibited from  doing;  In the view of the Consultants,  floor 
linkage does  imply mutual  access by members  to each others'  markets. 
The North American  Inter-market Trading  System offers a  clear precedent 
of what European  floor  linkage would imply.  If,  in the example quoted, 
the German  bank were constrained to place its Paris orders through  the 
French broker,  then neither floor  linkage,  nor any great advance on  the 
present situation,would have  been achieved. 
In terms of any  immediate  initiative~  the Committee  and  the Commission 
could not hope  to achieve  structural membership changes of such scale, 
Domestic evolution of the exchanges  is likely to govern this situation. 
It should,howeve;  h~ noted that,  both w~rld-wide and in Europe,  there 
is a  ~learly discernable trend of convergence of  form  of the official 
markets.  In the United states.,  the old provisions of the Glasa-Steagall 
Act,  imposed  to meet the needs of the 1930's' and  separating bankinq and 
investment functions,  appear  to be giving way  to the broader outlook 
implied by current S.E.C.  philosophy emphasising  competition in the 
securities markets.  The  European exchanges  show  even more  notable 
convergence.  Amongst  the dedicated broker Bourses,  French informed 
opinion has  for  a  decade  acknowledged  a  need  for  the extension of the 
Bour  ... e  into sane  form  of contra-partiste system  and active developments 
are presently in hand in the new  second market.  In Italy,the banks 
have proposed securities houses  which  would  be owned  by  the banks and  of 
which existing brokers might  become.m~bers,provided that they ceased 
to be brokers.  Belgium  already permits brokers  to carry out dual 
capacityoperations in international business.  In Denmark,new  leqi•lation 
will separate the banking and braking functions of the Stock Exchange 
member  firms. - 275 
In the U.K.,  the abolition of the minimum  commission  scale is 
leading  to substantial revision of  the  structure of the market 
and  the member  firms.  The  present single capacity will be  replaced 
by  a  dual capacity system.  The  Exchange  in  London  has  also 
considerably liberalised its attitude  to outside participation in 
member  firms  over recent years.  Luxembourg  appears  to lie at 
the centre of  this convergent picture,  with  no  restrictions on 
membership of foreigners  or  of  foreign ,brokers or  banks,  or  on  their 
freedom  to act as principals or agents.  In  the  longer  term, 
competitive·  forces  may  drive  the  membership  structures  of 
the 
the 
European  Exchanges  towards  compatibility. 
more  immediate  proposals  for  linkage,  the 
In  regard  to 
incompatibilities 
of  the  present  membership  structures  must  be  accommodated  and 
the  linkage  system  must  in  some  way  adjust  to·  them. 
17.5  Scale of operation 
A closely linked problem is the variance in scale of operation of the 
Stock Exchange  intermediaries in Europe  and  the  inadequacy of the 
capital resources of the member  firms of  some  of  ·c.r1c  :::xchanges. 
Evidence  suqqests that  in most of the Community  countries the member 
firms are inadequately resourced  to operate in international securities 
business  and  indeed1 in some,  to serve  the full  needs  of  the domestic 
market.  While  this situation must be attributed to many  factors,  an 
important cause may  be restrictions within the membership rules under 
which the Stock Exchange  intermediaries are constrained to operate. 
The  exchanges at the greatest disadvantage in this respect are the 
broker Bourses.In·Italy,  the Agenti.di  Cambio,  as  a  public official, 
is not permitted any rights of corporate association1 even with his 
broker colleagues.  Membership is personal  and  firms must be wound 
up on the death of a  broker.  There is thus  no  incentiye for inveat-
ment to develop the single-agent firms.  The  situation of the Aqents 
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de Chanqe  in France was  similar until 1967,  when it was  radically 
improved with the introduction of limited partnerships and  the infuaion of 
outside capital through the participation in firms of non-active directors.  It 
has,however 1 been widely questioned in Paris whether both the limited 
function prescribed for  the Agents de  Change  and  the· commission levels 
permitt~d in his agency business have  allowed an appropriate number  of 
adequately resourced modern braking  firms  to  emerge'.  The  limitation on 
concentration of French brokers  imposed  by  the Chamhre  Syndicale has 
achieved its objectives of maintaining  competition within the Bourse 
market  but it has prevented the growth of member  firms  of fully 
competitive,international size.  The  formal  situation is similar in 
Belgium  but the wider  latitude of Belgian regulation,  particularly in 
respect of_  members. rights to act as principals,  has  resulted in the 
emerqence of several leading braking  firms  of international scale. 
The  conse~uences of the confinement of the Stock.  Exchange  firms  to 
commission-orientated trading are made  more  acute by  the fact that the 
broker exchanges are supported by various  forms  of statutory monopoly. 
As  a  result of this assured flow of smaller business,  a  larger number 
of small brokers exist than would  in all probability be the case if the 
markets were on  a  more  competitive footing.  Thi~  agai~ is probably 
best exemplified  by . the extreme case of Italy, where  informeCI  opinion. 
is that the number  of brokers bears  no  relation to the  marke~s need. 
In Milan alone,  the number  of brokers is half the number  of quoted 
equities.  The  number of broker units required on  the Milan exchanqe 
is thought to be one  third of the present one hundred and twenty.  At 
present,  a  broker typically handles  200-300 clients,  a  number  which 
needs to be  extended to  2,000-3,000, if the broker office functions 
are to be comprehensive and efficient.  At present,  investment analysis 
functions are more  fully developed in the investing institutions than 
they are in the brokers'  offices, with possibly only ten Milan brokers 
providing such services· at fully professional level.  In the past ten 
year~ substantial broker firms  have  grown  up in Italy  and the quality 
of brokinq services has radically improved,  but this development is 
due  to the inqenuity of brokers,who  have managed  to devise forms  of 
mutual association which  are effective but which do  not,  in their 
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An  important consequence of the fragmentation of a  broking  community 
into individuals or small units is that it constrains flexibility of 
market development.  The  collective price system,  with short training 
sessions in brief and  sequential dealing in each stock,  is well 
adapted to the small broker firm.  Time  required on  the floor is short 
and most of the day is available for client contact or other work  in 
the brokeri offices.  Continuous dealing,  under a  trading post system, 
of the  type which·both  increased domestic business  and  a  fully 
effective European  linkage would  require,  tends  to  demand  floor 
dealing staff and  would  impose very considerable strain on  the small 
brokers. 
The  example·of the Italian market is used  to illustrate the extreme 
case but general  e~idence suggests  that firms restricted to commission-
orientated business, notwithstanding the success of the  for~ost, have, 
in recent years,  tended  to fall  under  financial strain in maintaining 
their full professional  functions.  The  implications of this problem 
are most  serious in those  exchanges  in which all the members  are 
confined1by  rule, to an  agency  role. 
The  question must arise  wh~ther the  separation of capacity of principal 
and agent,  which  originated  in  markets of different character, has 
continuing validity and  efficiency  ~n modern  securiti~~ trading.  While 
this is a  question which  each market will resolve nationally,  in its 
own  way,  it has close relevance  to international trading and,therebY, to 
European linkage.  ·The resources  required for international trading 
operations·are constantly increasing.  This  has  tended  to concentrate 
this activity.  For example,in the Belgian market,  due  to tighter 
arbitrage margins,  the  number  of internationally active brokers has 
markedly fallen in recent years.  Jn discussions with the Consultants, 
the Paris brokers expressed concern that,  due  to constraints on the use 
of their capital,  they had difficulty in  participating fully in the 
international market,  which calls for  instant response  in large-sized 
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In contrast to  the broker Bourses,  the scale on which  the members  of 
·the bank  exchanges are able to operate is virtually unlimited.  With 
the advantage of large capital resources is combined  an  effective 
f~eedom to 'deal as agent or principal.  The  poten~ial competitive 
impact of the bank members  of the European  exchanges  in equities 
dealing is diminished by  a  number  of factors.  The  exchanges which 
constitute the domestic equities markets of the banks  are weak  relative 
to the size of their economies  and  the banks'  financial resources.  The 
securities functions of the banks are  secondary  to the credit functions. 
Comment  was  made  that the main  stream of bank promotion lies outside 
the secu:dties departments  and able staff tend not to  remain  in 
thern  for  long.  It was  also  suggested,  in the German  market,,  that the 
full developme:nt of  professicr;al  securities functions  of the banks has 
tend~d to be  stifled by  an  ambiguous  approach  towards  the more 
commercial  aspects of banks'  securities activities,  which are not 
readily compatible with  their prime  role as credit institutions. 
Fureign counte_rparties had  observed  a  w~de range of  att~tudes across 
the German  oanks  towards  the more  e11trepreneurial  and  risk-taking 
aspects of securities trading.  The  potentlal power  of  the banking 
system as  an  ~nt~rnational securities  trading, network  is further 
reduced by the convention of  centri.""g  the  securities activities of  the 
European banks  in their danestic offices.  As  lnt.ernationalisation of 
the equities market progresses,  this-convention may  become  strained. 
There  are already examples of the  develop~ent of equities market business 
in bank branches established in second  E.E.C.  capital centres. 
The  exchanges which insist on  single capacity handling of agency 
business  - the broker Bourses  and  the U.K.- are fully alert to the 
risks of competitive exposure of  their  systems  to foreign  intermedieu-'ies, 
which may  operate in dual capacity  and which  thereby tend to be 
heavily resourced and  t.o  be  more  able  to carry out a  full range of 
securities markets  functions.  The  spur of this competition is, in 
the main,  interpreted as  coming  from  t.he  North American securities 
houses.  The  problem  exists,however~within the European  EXchanges  and 
it will be precipitated by  floor  linkage.  None  of the European 
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restrict the ex!stinq operations of thair members.  The  route to some 
form of compatibility is likely to lie in  the extension of  the  function-s 
and de-restriction of the scale of operation of members  of the 
Exchanges  which are at present constrained.  An  intermediate  a~ep 
which would  be of great assistance to any practical linkage scheme 
would  be  for  the dual capacity markets  to agree to clearly define 
their principal and agency business  and permit it to be subject to 
different rules in the linkage system. 
17.6  Membership problems of  'floor'  and  'indirect'  linkage 
It is apparent that the acuteness of the problem of reconciling the 
different membership structures  ~ill be heavily dependent upon  the 
type of linkage implemented.  As  discussed in Section 13,  there are 
essentially two  approaches to linkage.  The  first,  which is the ideal 
but which may  not be possible for  some  years,  is linkage of floors. 
The  second is indirect linkage of the markets  through  strengthening and 
broadening  the  existing channels of order-routing between  the 
members  of the different exchanges.  It has  been submitted that any 
practical scheme  is ·likely to comprise elements of both these approaches, 
to accommodate· the requirements of the different Exchanges. 
The  ·two  approaches  have  a  very different level of  i_mpact  on membership 
rules.  In the design of any practical system of linkage in the 
shorter term,  this may  prove to be a  very important consideration. 
Floor  linkage in any real sense  and,as  implied by  the objectives of 
the Commission of confrontation of all orders in major securities at 
European level,  implies  trading across  the floors of the type 
exemplified above.  It would  be  immediately apparent that,for such a 
system  to·operate without severe  imbalance of advantage  to the 
exchanges,  radical changes  to  the membership rules of many  exchanges 
would  be required.  As  the status of members  in most  exchanges  tends 
to be based in  law,  legislative change would be required.  A further 
critical requirement would  be  enhanced capital resources compared  to 
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While  in the  lo~ger run  these problems,  which are already the subject 
of concern at national level,  will require to be resolved at European 
level to permit the ultimate and  inevitable linkage of the Community, 
exchanges,  it should be  noted that the  second appraoch,  indirect 
linkaqe through members,  poses  no  problems of membership rules whatso-
ever.  The  existing network of contacts which handles the present 
cross-border business has  been built up  pra~atically.·  Members 'of 
each exchange  have  exploited the concession in for.eign dealing made  by 
their authorities  or taken advantage of  loopholes in legislation 
never  designed  to cover  internatiqnal  trading.  While it  may 
be  held that linkage secured in  ~his way  is less thah ideal,  extension 
of the existing  system  in a  manner  which would make it available not only 
to large professional  firms  which  have  pioneere~ the  network  but also to 
all Stock Exchange members,  would offer considerable potential for 
improvement in the volume  and quality of inter-market trading. 
The  present international  network  between members  also avoids  the 
rela~ed probl~~s of scale of operation.  Through  the existing contacts 
a  broker of any size may  deal with a  major  foreign  intermediary whose 
direct incursion into the broker's domestic  market might have  devas~ating 
effect.  It is true that the  small broker,  under  the present system, 
may  require the assistance of a  domestic  bank,  but it is considered in 
the markets that professional help will continue  to be required in the 
international dealing of  the smaller brokers as  long  as  the technical 
'differences between the European markets  ~ersist. 
Difficulty  ~n achieving  the changes  in membership rules and associated 
dealing practices which  would  be  required by market floor  linkage 
constitutes a  major  argument  for  initially basing  th~ network  on 
existing order routes between  the exchanges.  During  such an initial 
phase,  more  inter-market business  could be generated on a  broader base 
and  the potential of the European market concept could be more 
extensively appreciated..  Concurrently,  floor  interfaces with this inter-
national market could be  immediately  developed  by  those Exchanges 
which  considere~ that some  form  of  floor  linkage  was  immediately essential. 
The  more  fundamental  problems of full  floor  linkage could,  at the same 
time,  be  i'dentified and  tackled. 281 
17.7  Closer association of Community  brokers  and  market-makers 
17.8 
Reqardless  of· the linkage network,  closer  <.~ssociation between brokers 
on the different Exchanges  should be  encouraged  to  allow mutual 
development of agency business.  This  would permit increased broker 
participation in the European international market which by-passed 
the arbitrage system:  Informal  association would raise no  technical 
membership problems  and  would  have  valuable by-products.  It would 
reduce  the cost of  involvement  in  the  international  European market.  A 
capability to advise on, and  execute, European  transactions is expensive. 
Foreign economic  and market situations have  to be  appraised.  Information 
additional to that statutorily available has  to be  sought.  Language 
barriers have  to  be  overcome.  Executing  and  settling transactions 
in the foreign markets calls for  specialist skills.  Such  activitie~ 
to be successful,  have  to be maintained  through bad years as well as 
good,  and  the European markets  have  tended  to be notoriously subject 
to· investment vogue. co-or-eration between broker firms might permit economical 
sharing of research information costs  and  the mutual  extension of client 
business into each of the markets.  The  essential basis of such associa-
tion would possibly be  commission  sharing,  ~s considered in Section 18. 
The  poten.tial for market makers  to operate across  two  or more,of  the 
European  exchanges has already been noted  and  the existing precedents 
in this field are considered significant. 
Non-Community  securities houses  and  European  linkage 
A peripheral problem of linkage of  the  European  exchanges arises  from 
the status,  in relation to a  new  system,  of exchanges  in non-Community 
countries and,  more  relevantly,  the status of subsidiary organisations 
in Europe or  non-Community  securities hou$es. 
It does not appear  that limitation of  the linkage  to  Communi~y 
countries will present great difficulties.  Both  from  comment  in the 
markets  and  from  figures previously considered,it does  not appear that 
the exclusion of Switzerland,  at· least from  an equities dealing 
standpqint,  is an  insuperable obstacle.  It might be desirable, on  the 
other hand,for the settlement arrangements  to link with S.E.G.A.,  if 
this proves possible. 
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Although concern has been expressed  on  the point, it does not appear 
that the establishment of a  European  market  'entity'  would 
compromise  Stock Exchange members'  international operations outside 
Europe.  It is assumed  th~t the  linkage would  leave  the  same  loopholes. 
tha~ members  currently exploit to carry out  thei~ foreign contacting 
and dealing.  Business with  non-European  exchanges  would be unaffected, 
other than that market  linkage would mutually provide  the Community 
Stock  Exchanges with a  broader European  base of activity.  The  real 
complication is the eligibility or otherwise of  the European branches 
of non-Community  brokers and  banks. 
In  the present situation,  the  large  non-Europ~an securities houses  (i.e. 
the North  ~~erican and  Japanes~  are  established in Europe  to promote 
the securities of their home  markets  and  to  seek orders in these. stock~ 
which are then executed on  their home  exchange.  Provision of corporate 
finance  services  is  often  an  important secondary function.  In the 
main,  client business, in the domestic  securities of the host market, is 
not sought.  With minor  exceptions,  these European offices have not 
tended  to use either their financial  power  or  their flexibility of 
function  to make  markets in local securities of  the host Exchange.  The 
London market,  which is exceptional,  must be  exempted  from  this state-
ment.  There,  foreign  intermediaries have  already had  an ·impact  on the local 
international market  and  some  are already active in U.K.  securities. 
While  to date  this fringe activity is not a  serious erosion of the 
domestic market,  it cannot be  regarded with complacency.  Reports of u.s. 
houses offering very high  salaries to attract London  brokers are  now 
common.  one major u.s.  broker  has  gone  so  far  as  to advertise  for 
London  staff expert in trading  as principals in non-Dollar equities 
and declared its intention to deal as principal  not only in Dollar, but 
also in Yen· and  Sterling, equities.  Increased  foreign participation in 
London  member  firms  has  been  noted  in Section 11. 
on  the Continent,  other  than 'in  the  cases  where  the  non-Community 
intermediaries are members  of  the European  exchanges,  a  convention of 
non-involvement  in the  local domestic market is, at presen~generally 
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a  written  'gentleman's agreement',  though it may  be of interest that 
the  largest of the u.s.  broking  firms  operating  in Amsterdam  has  not 
yet signed it. 
The  presence of the  North  American  and  Japanese  brokers in Europe is 
substantial and  increasing.  There  are, for  exampl~ five major North 
American  houses  in Brussels  alone.  A point of considerable relevance 
to  the  European  linkage proposals is  that while,  as pointed out above, 
European members  tend to operate  ~n Europe  from  their domestic base 
only,  the  large U.S.  and  Japanese  brokers  have  pr-esence  in all the 
main markets.  They  invariably have at their disposal up-to-date and 
powerful  telecommunications  facilities.  Their  facilities  linking  the 
European markets are superior  to  those available  to Stock  Exchange 
members.  While  the market capability  that this represents has  not been 
used  to generate business  in European  securities,  partially for  reasons 
of good  local relations and partially due  to  the possible effect on 
local orders for  their own  securities if it were,  its existence should 
provide  a  considerable  stimulus  for  closer European  liaison.  The  chief 
executive of one  of  the major  u.s.  securities houses  in Europe 
confessed himsE;lf mystified  that the  European  exchanges  had,as yet,done 
nothing to ins tall  a  telecommunications  linkage  through which  they eould 
develop  a  European base of dealing. 
In  the present situation,  the main  significance of  the  strong presence 
of  the u.s.  and  Japanese  brokers  in Europe  is to endorse  the dominance 
of their d6mestic markets  in  world-wide  securities trading.  Their 
success in attracting European  investment  to their  home  markets is 
evident ·from  the data of capital flows, quoted in Section 12.  As 
discussed elsewhere in this Report,  this heavy  flow of funds  from 
Europe  acknowledges  the superior breadth,  depth  and  efficiencies of the 
North American markets.  To  some  extent, the  capital· outflow must hinder 
the development of a  market in Europe  with  comparable  competitive 
characteristics.  The  effectiveness of  the promotional activities of 
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It is assumed  that the foreign securities houses  ~hich are not members 
of any Community  exchanges  would  not be eligible to participate in the 
linkage  system.  Assuming,  however,  eligibility to participate in the 
system is to be  based on  Community  Stock  Exchange membership,  there 
can be  no proper grounds  for  excluding  th€  European  subsidiaries of 
foreign brokers or banks which  are already members  ot  the Community 
Exchanges.  In the bank ,Exchanges, there are  already many  members  of 
th.!.s  type.  It is questionabl'e whether  inclusion of these local 
subsidiaries would,in itself,pose any  acute problem.  If 
Stock  Exchange  membership  is held by  a  locally-incorporated-subsidiary 
under national regulation and  under  Stock  Exchange  rules,  and if 
linkage is to be  through  the market floors,  any  problem  of participa-
tion of  these  foreign members  is closely similar to  t~at raised by, 
participation of  the  European  banks.  With  regard  to linkage through 
the existing member  network,  the  rules of each  exchange governing 
memne~d permission to deal with 'foreign securities houses  could continue 
to appiy  and  there would  be  no  change  in  the existing situation. 
17.9  Financial assurance 
All participants in fully-linke?  floor markets  would  require assurance 
of the integrity of  the market and  the  solvency  and efficiency  o~ their 
counterparties within it  of  the  same  order  that is presently available 
in  their domestic operations.  The  nub  of membership  rules is the 
agreement and obligation of all members  to trade together.  A prime aim 
of floor  linkage will be  to replace  the present fragmented  order-routing 
in the European international equities dealing,  now  based on  two-way 
correspondents,  agents  o~  'friends'  in the  foreign markets, by  a  system· 
through which  any member  of  any  exchange can deal with any member  of 
another.  It is essential  that mutual  confidence  should exist in this 
situation  and  that investor protection should not be  diminished. 
This  implies  that the  forms  of mutual  assurance  erected to provide 
maximum  reasonable guarantee both  to brokers and clients,  are harmonised 
and made  applicable to the  linkage dealing.  Schemes  of moni taring 
member  firm.finances  by the Stock  Exchanges  would  have  to be brought to 
an'agr~ed standard.  Terms  of  compenscttion  schemes  and obligations in - 285 
default would  h~ve to be  aligned.  If present levels of investor 
assurance were  not to be  downgraded,  the  existing  systems of mutual 
liability at national level would have,  one way  or another,  to be 
applied to inter-floor dealing. 
Floor  linkage will bring  a  new  dimension  to investor assurance. 
Present compensation  schemes  accord protection to the client by the 
particular Exchange  on which  a  defaulted transaction  is  executed.  For 
example,  a  European client could  be discretionarily indemnified against 
loss  through default on  The  Stock  Exchange  through  the  London 
Compensation Fund.  This  would  remain  the  situation insofar as  linkage 
was  'indirect'  and  followed present international dealing channels.  A 
transaction arising  from  floor  linkage,howeverj cannot be  identified 
against either Exchange.  While  the  location of default can  be 
difficult,  adjustment  to  the  assurance  schemes  operating  in  the 
Community  Exchanges will  bP  necessary  tn  d<:r.ommodate  the  new  situation. 
Complication will arise  fn'm  t.he  investor  assurancE:: being  derived  in  a 
different manner  in  the  bank  and  the broker  Exchanges. 286 
SECTION  18  OBSTACLSS  TO  LINKAGE  RELATED  TO  COMMISSIONS  AND  DEALING  CHARGES 
18.1  One  of the  fundamental  requisites to ensure  the  successful growth of an 
international  European  Securities Market,  the  efficient routing  and 
execution of market orders at the fairest prices  and  thus  the concentra-
tion of transactions on  the official market  pla~es  (with  the consequent 
major  transparency  and  liquidity of  the Euro-equities market)  is, 
undoubtedly, the existence of uniform,  relatively inexpensive  and 
competitive dealing charges,  particularly with regard to inter-market 
trading activities. 
From  the  information contained  in  a  loose  leaf handbook  on  commission  fees 
and other charges  p~lished by  the  Federation Internationale des  Bourses 
de Valeurs  and  updated at regular intervals, it has been possible to 
establish the present situation.  Table  18.1 depicts respective 
commission  fees  in force  on  the different European Community  Bourses and 
compares  tnem with  those applied  on  the  US  Exchanges.  Table  18.2 
illustrates respective extra charges  such as  stamp duty  and  value  added 
tax  {VAT}.  Table  18.3 attempts  to quantify the consequences of varying 
charges with  regard  to three different sized orders  - (£2,000;  £10,000; 
and  £100,000). 
A careful  study of the  third table clearly shows  that  t~e European 
securities firms/banks  operate at varying  and considerable handicaps  in 
relation to their American  colleagues.  Only  six of  the ten Stock 
Exchanges  referred to in  the  study  have  scaled commission  fee  structures. 
In the  case of the Netherlands,  this was  considerably modified .and 
improv,ed, as  recently as  1982, in an effort to encourage more institutional 
trading on  the official market.  At  the  same  time only  four  of the  ten 
Stock  Exchanges  have precise arrangements  concerning  commission  sharing 
with foreign intermediaries. 
The  ~xi~tence or  not of  scaled commission  fee  tariffs is obviously of 
considerable importance  in the case of  large orders.  On  the smaller 
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is offered by France,  followed  by  Italy and  Denmark,  whereas  the 
heaviest charges  are in force  in the  United  Kingdom  and  Ireland, 
followed  by  the  Netherlands  and  Germany.  On  the other hand,  in the 
case of the largest order size considered  (£100,000) ,  the most 
competitive  fees  are  offered by Denmark,  followed  by France  and Greece. 
In this case, theposition of the  U.K.  brokers is much  improved and is 
next in line.  Conversely,  the highest fees are charged by Germany, 
Luxembourg  and  Belgium. 
Several internationally active 'market places  such as Brussels,  the 
German  Stock Exchanges,  Luxembourg,  the Amsterdam  and Paris are only 
able to.offer more  competitive rates for the smaller order sizes. 
However,  bearing in mi~d the predominance of the institutional investor 
in the international securities market,  the largest order size is 
probably the most typical example.  To  judge  from  the established rates 
practised,  it i~ therefore,hardly surprising that third country 
securities houses are capturing  a  considerable and  incre~sing  ~lice of 
total international business in equities.  This  is clearly discernable· 
in the most aggressive role of the American  and Japanese brokers in 
Europe,  especially London.  In the short span of time which has elapsed 
since  non-member  organisations were permitted to buy  up  to 29.9\ of the 
capital of London  jobbers  and  broke~s  (May  1982),  several  outside 
securities houses  and banks  have  already taken sizeable stakes in memO:~ 
firms  and others are expected to follow. 
Transaction costs are not limited to commission  fees but often include 
other charges  such as  stamp duty and  V.A.T ..  In  the case of the U.K. 
and Irish Stock  Exchanges,  these charges are  by  far the most  significant 
part of aggregate transaction costs,  whether it be  for  the smaller order 
size  (£2,000}  or  for  the largest order size  £100,000).  That is 
principally owing  to the stamp  duty  charged  to investors.  The 
British  and  Irish  Stock  Exchanges  still  appear  to  remain 
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Any  efforts by the European authorities to reduce or abolish·such 
charges which unjustifiably penalise such market places would, 
undoUbtedl~ improve  the competitive position of their Stock  Exchanqes. 
On  the other hand,  the  relative cos·t of operating on the German  and, 
even more,  the Luxembourg  Stock  Exchanges, are now  much  improved,  owing 
to the non-existence or very  low  level of extra charges. 
In  due consideration of the  enormous  sums  which  are  invested abroad, 
principally in the U.S.  and  Japan,  it is·easy to  imagine  that the 
greatex  part of  such portfolio  investm~nt is  be~ng channelled through 
the international branches  of  the u.s.  and  Japanese securities houses, 
in order to avoid  the higher  commission  fees  and other charges in force 
in  Europea~ markets.  The  same  is probably  true of  the growing  interest 
by u.s.  institutional investors and pension  funds  in Euro-equities, 
partly sparked off by  the high  flying dolla,r  and  the feeling that major 
foreign  economies are likely to follow the U.S.  economic  up  turn.  In the 
four~~ quarter of 1982  alone,  it was  estimated that there was  a  $1.3 b 
surpius of purchases over  sales of  foreign  stock by  American  investors 
and most of  s~ch outward  investment was  directed towards  Europe  and the 
Far East.  In the first half of 1983  this trend continued and the surplus 
was  calculated at being equivalent to $2.8 billion. 
Nevertheless,the Consultants are uncertain of exactly'bow much  such 
transaction costs,  which are based on official data supplied by  the 
respective European Stock  Exchanges,  really reflect what actually happens 
on the international securities markets.  That is natural·ly. bearing in 
mind  the problem of having to compete with the U.S.  and Japanese brokinq 
houses  and  the  need  to attenuate,if not totally avoid1 charging double 
commission  fees. 
In fact it is known  that several Exchanges  are taking appropriate 
action  - London  has  already  permitt-ed  negotiated  commission rates  for 
international dealing  and  full scale international dealing  firms  h9-ve 
been instituted to carry out  international principal business on a  net 
basis.  In France  and  Germany  members  are permitted flexibility of 
commission charges  for  foreign  transactions. 
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One  leading  U.S.  firm has, in fact mor~ than  trebled its staff in the 
last two  years  and it is said to have  recently recruited,  both in 
New  York  and  London,  dealers specialised in the  trading of non-dollar 
equities as principals. 
The  successful development of a  European Securities Market concentrated 
on  the official markets through the member  firms  and capable of 
competing with broker houses of non-European  Exchanges  would  seem to 
hinge on  a  greater uniformity and competitiveness of transaction costs. 
This will obviously require the adoption of competitively scaled,if not 
negotiable,commission fee  rates as well as a  reduction if not total 
abolition of other charges  such as  stamp duty.  Reduction in transaction 
costs is essential to assure  that  mar~et preference by investors arid 
financial operators will,  in future,  be  based  on  the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the respective markets  and their member  firms. 
Similarly,  within Europe,  the  problem of double  commission due  to agents 
in two markets  needs  to be  overcome,  and  replaced by  net-to-net inter-
market dealing facilities between principals  and agents.  The  serious-
ness of this obstacle is clearly demonstrated in Section 12,  with 
reference to three  leading  international market places.  It is, in fact, 
estimated that the total market in international  e~~ities is, at the 
least,  respectively eight and  ten  times  the official figures  on  the 
London  and Amsterdam  Exchanges  and,possibly  twice  the official 
turnover  in international equities in the case of  the  German  Stock 
Exchanges. 
Failure to secure reduction of these uncompetitive charges will tend to 
drive  an  ever-growing proportion of the developing international 
securities markets  away  from  the official market member  organisations. 
The  operational utilisation and .expansion of·the envisaged inter-market 
information trading and  settlement network will be  minor.  Institutions 
will continue to deal directly into the main  domestic market,  an 
increasing proportion of  such  turnover will therefore be  executed out-
side the control or  knowledge  of  the  national  Stock  Exchanges  and  even 
of member  firms.  Most  damaging  of all,  the  true  dimension and  liquidity 
of  the Euro-equities market will  remain  unknown. 290 
'rt would1 therefore,appear that international arranqements for  a 
rational,  competitive and mutually fair system of commission  fees  and 
other charges  for  inter-Exchange dealing is not an ancillary to the 
successful development of a  European Securities Market but is, on  the 
contrary,  a  fundamental  requiremen~whatever be  the  form  of inter-market 
connection eventually implemented.  The  importance of this aspect will 
be  even greater should the declared pre•ference  for  floor  linkage be 
confirmed. '
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STAMP  DUTIES  AND  TAXES  CHARGED  ON  STOCKBROKING  ACTIVITIES 
ON  E.E.C.  MEMBER  STOCK  EXCHANGES  AND  U.S.A. 
STAYP DUTY ON 
WA~K!TTAAH&AcnoNS 
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1}  Including certificates  issued  by  Belgian  no.minee· 
companies; 
2)  0.35%  and  0.17%  resp~ctively on  cash  and  te~ 
transactions; 
3)  0. 085%  or 0. 170%  are  respectively charged if such 
carry-over deals  laps~ within or after  20  days. 
4}  Calculated  on  the  market  value  of  the equity 
transaction  and  divided equally  between  buyer 
and  seller  (0. 25%  each) . 
5)  The  18.6%  VAT  is calculated on  the value  ·of  the 
corr.mission  fee  received  by  the  btoker  and  ~ot on 
the  value  of  the  transaction.  · 
6)  Stockmarket  turnover  tax  which  is payable "N'hether· 
or  not  the  trade  takes  place  on  the  Stock  Exchaa 
ge. 
7)  ~transfer charge of  O.J%  is made  by  brokers  on 
transactions  involving  registered  shares.  How  -
ever  only  bank,  insurance  and  some  inves~~entco~ 
pany  shares  are  of  the  registered category. 
8)  All  these  stamp  duty  charges  refer  to  every Lire 
100,000  (or  fraction)  of market  values  of  tran-
sactions  and  have  been  quadrupled  as  per  law  no. 
953  of  30/9/1982  which  is  in  force  since  1/1/83. 
~N'O  rates  are  given  under  bonds  and  shares:  they 
respectively refer to  cash  and  term  trades.  Only 
convertible  bonds  and  shares  may  however  be  trad 
ed  term. 
9)  The  three  differen~ rates depend  on  the  three  rna 
xirnum  expiry dates:  that  is within  45,  90and135 
cays. 
10)  More  precisely  up  to 55 consideration =sp; 
from  ~  5  to  b  10  =  lOp  from  ;  10  to  ~  20  =  20p 
from~ 20  to  ~  30=  30pand  so  on. up  to  ;  100.Frorn NOTES  . (cont.d  2) 
- u  .. K.  and 
IRELAND 
-~. 
- 296 
& 100  to  b  300  stamp duty rises in steps of 
20pper  b  20  consideration.  Charity 
organisations  are  exempt. 
11)  Stamp  duty  on  options  and  on  London  traded  op-
tions is charged  ~nly on  a  call option whene  -
ver it is exercised.  Charity organisations 
are  exempt. 
12)  Contract  stamp duty  payable  wherever  t:he  value 
of  the  stock or marketable  security is: 
- b  100  or  less  Nil 
Exceeds: 
- b  100  and -does  not  exceed  b  500 .••...  10p 
- 'b  500  II  II  II  h  1 f  500 o  o  o  o  o  o  30p 
b1500  or  plus  ........  ; ............•... 60p 
The  full Contract  Stamp  is payable  on a·pur-
chase  and  on  a  sale,  and  is payable _by  both r! 
sidents  and  non-residents.  One  half of the Co!! 
~ract Stamp only  is  payable  on  optioncontracts 
and  is calculated on  the·striking price.  The 
remaining  half of  the  Contract Stamp  is howe  -
ver  payable if the  option  is exercised.  This 
also applies to  London  traded options. 
1 3)  VAT  · (Value Added  Tax)  is not chargeable  to non -
residents  of  the  United  Kingdom. 
14)  Council  for  the Securities Industry levy paya-
ble  on  bargains  exceeding  h  5,000  except where 
a)  nominal  value  is expressed other  than  in 
sterling; 
b)  the  security is an  Insurance or  Property 
Bond,  an  offshore or overseas  fund  or are 
units or sub-units of  Unit Trusts. 
15}  The  New  York  State transfer tax ·on  New York trad NOTES  (cont.d  3) 
- Y..:..2.:..! • 
- 297· 
ed  shares  was  totally waived  as  from  October 
19·81 . 
16)  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  charge  on 
transactions  in equities. T
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 SECTION  19 
- 301 
APPLICATION  OF  INFORMATION  TECHNOLOGY  TO  LINKAGE  OF  THE 
COMMUNITY  STOCK  EXCHANGES 
19.1  Growth  of Information Technology in the Financial Environment 
Regardless of the general policy of linkage which  the Commission  and 
the Committee  ultimately choose,  full exploitation of the available 
facilities of up-to-date information technology is essential. 
Whether  the floors  form  the nodal point of European· linkage  or 
whether members'  activities in the international off-market are also 
accommodated,  the  requirements  for  advance  telecommunications  and 
information processing systems  linking  the European  ~xchanges is 
likely to prove  a  common  denominator of either approach. 
The  significance of information  technology may  be greater,  in that 
failure to exploit it will  leave  the official markets  vulnerable to 
competition that  is exploiting  jt. Electronic processing  and  high  speed 
telecommunication arenow  rapidly  conditioning the  technical environ-
ment of the financial markets in which  the Stock  Exchanges operate. 
In that sense,  these developments  may  be  a  determinant of. what  the 
Community  Sto~k Exchanges  must do,  if,  through  European  linkage,  they 
are to remain competitive in the international markets. 
The  general background is known  and  requires only brief  mention  in 
this Report.  The  total instailed base of·computer units in Western 
Europe  which stood at 590,000 in 1980 was  forecast,  during the  study, 
by  International Data Corporation,  a  leaoing market research organisa-
tion specialising in data processing,  to rise to 3.5m in 1986.  The 
installed base  of  application terminals was  expected to rise from 
470,000 in 1981  to 1.6m  in 1987,  an  annual  growth rate of  22.9%. 
The  impact of such  technological  development in the  financial 
institutions is becoming apparent.  The  major World  banks  have 
established international networks of dealing  rooms,  incorporating 
global  communications  and  information systems  immediately accessible 
to the traders.  Dealing stations may  be  equipped not only with video 
terminals  but also with desk  top computers  linked to the bank's main ... 
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frame  computers.  Clients may  have  electronic access for transaction 
confirmations and settlement instructions.  Through such facilities, 
international securities,  money  market  and  foreign exchange business 
can be conducted with highest efficiency on behalf of the banks' 
corporate institutional and personal clients. 
The  relevance of these developments  to  the international linkage of 
Stock Exchanges is well illustrated by brief quotation from  a  six page 
supplement in a  leading financial  journal* by  a  major  international 
bank,  through which it advertised the facilities of its re-equipped 
London  dealing  room. 
"The  scene is London,  but the  same  professional dealing capability is 
evident in each of  {our)  trading  locations  throughout the world.  One 
of the keys  to success  •... in any  business operating in a  highly 
competitive environment,  is to identify properly the needs of your 
customers  an~ in doing  s~ to differentiate your product from your 
competitors". 
"Pricing was  considered to be  an  obvious determinant.  Many  years ago, 
determining  a  competitive price to quote  to a  customer often simply 
meant qialling a  few  brokers  to find  the  'market'  ... Todats world is 
much  more  complex.  Intraday price  mo~ements can virtually wipe  out 
your  capital". 
"To  be  able  to quote  competitively and profitably in such  a  complex 
environment,  dealers must possess as much  information as possible 
relevant to their market  . . .  The  'state of the art' .global information 
Footnote:  "Chase  Manhattan Bank  :  Supplement in the Financial Times, 
London  - 9  August 1983 • • 
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and  communications  systems built into each dealing position supplies 
each trader,  at the push of a  button,  with all the  information he  needs 
to construct and quote  to you,  the best possible price  for  your 
foreign exchange,  money  and  investment needs". 
"Fine pricing alone  however  is not the only  criterion.  In an 
environment where interest rates  and  foreign  exchange  rates  fluctuate 
widely  from moment  to moment ... clients also demand  quick  response  time. 
Indeed in any given trading day,  market prices are likely to vary ••• 
during a  short interval •...  no  customer likes being kept  'on hold' 
waiting for a  quote while  the market is rapidly moving  away  from  his 
desired dealing price". 
"Our perception two  years  ago  as  we  looked ahead at the evolution of 
the ••• environment was  that price volatility was  likely to become  a 
permanent feature of the financial markets,  thus  requiring  the 
commitment of significant human  and capital resources  to ensure efficient 
and speedy response in order to retain and obtain customer bus;i.ness". 
"Every aspect of,the  (dealing)  room,  -the seating configuration between 
s~lespeople and dealers,  the integration of the different communication 
and  information processes,  the  finger-tip access  to real-time automated 
information systems,  the curvature and  low  height of  the dealing desks, 
- were all designed in the finest detail to ensure efficient lines of 
communi'Cation  and  rapid flow  of information between  the various  ·  .•. 
professionals  interacting to complete your  financial  transactions". 
''Reliability completes  the list  ...  In  corfjunction with our new  dealing 
room  project  (we  have)  significantly upgraded our back office processing 
capacity and  capability". 
This quotation fairly typifies the  facilities available to the banks' 
international dealing networks.  While  such  capability within the banks is 
predominantly orientated to  'treasury dealing' i.e. operations on the primary 
and  secondary bond  markets,  foreign  exchange  dealing  and  currency hedging, 304 
the money  market and gold,  it might be observed that the application 
of  advanced  technology  to  these· areas has  co~ncided with  a  period when  the 
bond markets were  dominant  and  the equities markets  depressed and 
inactive.  With  the resurgence of the equities markets worldwide,  it 
might be considered within the  bounds  of possibility that these 
ideally-adapted facilities could be  turned  towards  international 
equities trading. Even if this  does not prove  to be  the case,  the 
efficiency of these bond  trading sys  terns sho\]-ld pose  a  competitive 
challenge .to the Stock  Exchanges  in several ways. 
First,  it'should be noted that the international organisation of.the 
banks permits  a  global operation to oe  estabhshed withi.n a single,  if 
compleX,  corporate  framework.  This  implies that the level of 
international business of any  bank is known.  The  potential of such 
business  can be estimated and capital expenditure plans  implemented 
accordingly.  This  does  not apply  to  the Stock  Exchanges,  which are 
set up  on  a  national basis,  and which conventionally see the 
international activitie.s of their memb.ers  as  fringe business.  As 
pointed ?Ut elsewhere,  the stock  Exchanges  do  not know  the extent of 
their members'  international business. 
Second,  even if the  stock  EXchanges  did have  adequate knowledge  of 
their member~ international operations,  any  large  joint capital project 
between  the  Stock  ~changes to  support such dealing would present 
great difficulty.  Spending priorities of $tock Exchange  members  are 
likely  to  be  firmly  linked  to their domestic market.  The  case  for 
provision of facilities to support member's  international dealing with 
appropriate services  and technology,  on  the basis of business in a 
single national  Exchange is difficult to establish.  It should be  noted, 
however,  that the London  Stock Exchange  appears  to be  contemplating 
this in respect of its new  International Dealer  firms. 
Third,  as  a  result of this situation
1technical support by  the E!JC:changes 
of the international 'dealing  by  their members  is neg.ligible.  There  are no 
dealing  links between  the  European· EKchanges  as  such.  Such  communication as 
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the members  of the European Exchanges  have  painstakingly established 
between. themselves is crude compared to the banks'  international 
dealing facilities,  If the stock Exchanges  do  not resolve this 
problem of the gap between the inadequacy of the support to their 
members•  international dealing,  and  the sophisticated facilities 
available to the bank  dealer,  there must  be  a  risk that  as  the 
importance of the international dealing in equities increases,  the 
Stock Exchange  members  will lose business to off-market competition. 
Fourth,  a  point of interest in the bank  supplement quoted above is 
the obvious attentioh to the  ergonomic  aspects of design of 
international dealing  rooms.  In Section  16  ,  it was  noted that 
international dealing  imposes  different  phys~cal requirements  to  those 
conventionally met  on  the  Stock  Exchange  floors.  The  total and 
integrated re-design of dealing facilities,  supported by  every current 
technological aid,  may  suggest the  ap~roach which  should be  taken in the 
linkage of dealing in the.Stock  Exchanges  themselves. 
The  power of the inter-bank  network is greatly enhanced by  SWIFT.  The 
phenomenal  growth of SWIFT  itself,  now  linking  2,000 credit  i~stitutions 
in.some  50  countries,  is an important factor in the situation.  At the 
request of its participants,  SWIFT  has  co-operated with  the International 
Standards Organisation in the  standardisation of  security messages,  and 
message-switching  functions  are currently being extended to this field. 
The  power of the  SWIFT  services has  already resulted in membership 
problems related to the banking/braking interface.  The  possibility of the 
use of  b~IFT as  the main vehicle of international securities communication 
between the Exchanges  may  exist,  but any  agreement which would make  all 
Stock  Exchange  members  equal beneficiari.es of such  arrangements might be 
difficult to attain.  At  the  second phase of SWIFT,  to be  implemented 
in the next few  years,  inter-active use of the  system by participants 
will be possible.  This will offer the potential to extend the  system 
wn~ch in its first phase was  confined to message-passing  to  such 
applications  as  international dealing. - 30~ 
A second important technical incursion into the European _financi.al 
environment has arisen from  the strong networks  across the community 
capital centres established by  the North  American  and Japanese 
securities houses.  A public statement made  by  Yamaichi*,  the  longest 
established of the big four  Japan~se securities houses,  exemplifies  ,  .  I 
the extent to which  the communication  facilities available to world-
scale brokers operating in Europe  exceeds  that available  to the 
members  of the Exchanges,  who  tena·to remain nationally based. 
Yamaichi  stress their growing  emphasis  on  internationalisation,  aiming 
at 100\ increase of their international business.  Yamaichi  International 
(Europe), set up  in 1973,"is also seeking  to strengthen its capability of 
doing all kinds of European business,  even where  Japan is not directly. 
involved"._  To  support this initiative,  Yamaichi,  which  engages  in 
investment banking,  currency underwriting,  stockbroking and dealing, 
has  five offices in Europe,  - in London,  Amsterdam,  Frankfurt, 
and Switzerland where  they are locally  incorporated,  and  a  representative 
office in Paris.  The  statement stresses the integration of their 
European operation  •  "Efficient communications  link the YIE  office 
network.  The  si~ offices in Europe  and  the Middle  East  (London  covering _ 
the Bahrain office)  have  hitherto operated more  or less in parallel, but 
are now  moving  to a  more  systematised relationship,  co-ordinating their 
work  more  integrally.  Each  retains its independent status formally, 
but in their business reiations they are as  one."  The  European  coverage 
of YIE  is,  through  London,  linked with the  four other world capital 
centres  forming  the core of the company's operation.  The  article affirms 
that it is not the sole objective of the organisation to link these 
affiliated organisations to Tokyo,  but to operate across all the markets 
which may  be  important.  The  individual branches may  be  substantial, 
with that in London  employing more  than  70 staff. 
Footnote*  "An  Inside View  of Yamaichi  International"  ;  Yamaichi 
International  (Europe)  Limited;  Financial Times, 
January  17  1983. 307 
In a  further statement in January 1984,  Yamai9hi  announced on-line 
operation of its Total  Information Service  from  Tokyo,  with computer 
transmission of the information products of the Yamaichi  companies. 
In the system,  London is  'the satellite,  feeding  TIS  to Paris,  Bahrain, 
Amsterdam,  Frankfurt,  Zurich  and Geneva' •  The  same  emphasis on 
sophistication and efficiency of inter-market communication systems is 
evident.  ' 
Yamaichi  is quoted simply  as  an  example of the strength of operation 
which  a  number of major North American  and Japanese securities  houses~ 
have attained in Europe.  In the main,  as  noted elsewhere,  a  diplomatic 
convention exists mitigating the competitive  impact which these 
heavily capitalised foreign houses,  with their potential for unrestricted 
o~erations in any  capacity across  the European markets,  might 
potentially have  in the  localised and  dis-united capital centres of the 
community.  In  the  discuss~ons held  by  the consultants with  the  leading 
foreign  secu:n ties houses,  which  included  Yamaichi,  it was  very evident 
that the Directors had  considerable regard to the proprieties of the 
local market.  Nevertheless,  w~atever "gentleman's  agreements"  or 
other devices  there may  be at present protecting  the European domestic 
markets,  the competitive advantage  represented by  the close integration 
of the operations of these  foreign brokers across  un-linked European 
markets  and by their efficient communications,  will inevitably assert 
itself over the course of time.  There are already examples of markets 
lost by  the European Exchanges  to overseas'  competition. 
The  Consultants  do  not wish  to infer that the movement  of powerful 
foreign brokers into Europe is an undesirable development.  To  the 
contrary,  the  local activities of large U.S.  and  Japanese brokers arc 
likely to provide a  salutory competitive spur  for  the Community  exchanges 
to move  towards  more  dynamic  and  full-scal.e securities trading..  An 
argument for linkage,  however, ·is that the World's  largest brokers, 
whose  individual  turnover may  exceed  that of most  of the European 308 
Bxchanges*,  have  resources which permit them  to establish effective 
international bases.  Fe~ if any,  of the European Stock Exchange 
members  could compete  on  even  terms  with these large non-Community 
brokers in setting up  the offices and the supporting communication 
facilities which effective international trading requires.  At present, 
many  members  of the European Exchanges  use inter-European communica-
tions facilities and international financial  services provided by the 
large foreign securities houses.  An  opportunity exists in European 
linkage for joint provision by  the Exchanges of  a  unifying  system 
which would offset the disadvantage of the local operation of 
European brokers.,  and also provide,  on  a  common  basis,  the technical 
infrastructure of European dealing. 
It is stressed that the adverse comparison between  the technoloqy 
available to the European Stock Exchanges  and that already applied by 
their potential competitors is valid only in context of international 
dealing.  The  domestic  operations of the European EXchanges are,  in 
the main,  supported by  advanced  computer  and telcommunication 
facilities.  In the international sphere this is not the case,  and 
linkage will .offer the opportunity to extend appropriate technological 
support into members~  international dealing. 
19.2  The  American  Precedents 
Two  important developments  in the American market demonstrate the 
potential of information technology in dealing operations,  the 
NASDAQ+  system and  the  Inter~market Trading  System.  Neither can stand 
~· - ~ - - ~  ~ - - - ~ - - - - - -
•  To  put this unfortunate  comparison with a  little more  force,  the 
public listed equity trading volume  of a  single ~erican broker 
was  in 1982,  in broad terms equivalent to the total  eq~ities 
trading in that year of all the Community  stock exchanges  combined. 
The  customer base of this trading was  4.2 million accounts with a 
sum  invested which was  equivalent to  18%  of the total market 
capitalisation,  bonds  and equities,  of all the Community  exchanges. 
In 1982,  the  sum  invested would represent 66\ of the total Community 
equity market capitalisation. 
+ The  National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
System. - 309 
as a  design precedent for  European  linkage.  A full scale over-the-
counter market of the  NASDAQ  type  has  no  relevance  to the European 
situation,  ~here this form  of off-market is most likely to fulfill a 
useful function as a  nursery prior to Stock Exchange  listing. 
Similarly,  until harmonisation of trading procedures is attained on 
the European Exchanges,  a  system like the ITS,  which forms  part of 
the u.s.  National Market System,  could not be applied in Europe.  In 
terms of technical precedent1 however,  both are important in 
demOnstrating  the relevance  and  power  of the use of sophisticated 
information technology in securities trading across dispersed locations. 
The  use of computers 'and  advanced  telecommunications in dealing is 
still regarded with  intense suspicion by  the majority of Stock  Exchange 
members.  ,This  scepticism is endorsed by  the  low  level of success of 
certain ventures  such as  INSTINET  in New  York,  ARIEL  in London  or 
EUREX  in Luxembourg.  The  current growth of NASDAQ,  which  no~ in 
respect of elig.ible securities, forms  an  integral part of the National 
Market System,  can hardly be  ignored.  The  NASDAQ  market is the second 
largest and fastest growing  stock market  in the u.s ..  Its volume  in 
1982  was  over half that of N.Y.S.E.  and more  than six times that of 
A.M.E.X •.  The  numbers  of NASDAQ  new  issues and issuers were  greater 
than those of N.Y.S.E.  and  A.M.E.X.  combined.  OVer  1978-82,  NASDAQ 
volume  more  than  tripled,  while N. Y  .s  .. E.  grew  two  to three times,  and 
A.M.E.X.  one  and  a  half times.  During·l975-81,  O.T.C.  shareholders 
increased by  97%  and  N.Y.S.E.  shareholders by  50%.  Six hundred  NASDAQ 
securities eligible for listing on  the  N.Y.S.E.  remain in the  NASDAQ 
market because  the issuers prefer the  competitive  m~ltiple market 
system of NASDAQ  to the single specialist system of the exchanges. 
The  striking performance of  NASDAQ  has  been made  possible by  the 
effective use of automated  communications  over  a  national and world-
wide market.  In  1981-82  the  system was  modernised at a  cost of 
$22  m,  with  a  further  $5  m invested in 1983.  The  central computer was 
replaced by  a  UNIVAC  1100/82  system,  with  three  times  the memory 
capacity and  twice  the speed of its predecessor.  A new  generation of 
'terminals was  implemented at two  of the  three levels of operation of 
the  system.  The  level one  terminals  used by  the stockbrokers  to get 310 
NASDAQ  quotes  rose to 81,000,  while  1,700 level-two and  level-three 
terminals,  for  interrogation and  input of bids and offers respectively, 
were installed in trading  rooms  by  the end  of 1982.  Traffic on the 
system averaged  906,800 calls per day,  with a  peak  of  1,257,400.  The 
reliability of the  system was  98%. 
The  recent dynamic  growth of  NASDAQ  may  or may  not endorse  the assertion 
of the Chairman of NASD  that NASDAQ,integrated  into the National 
Markets System,is  'the prototype of the stock market of the future.•' 
In the context of European  linkage however,  NASDAQ  stands as  an  eminent 
example of how  a  success'ful  automated communications  system can be 
developed to handle multi-location trading. 
The  pattern of operations of the existing European international equities 
market is closely similar to that of NASDAQ.  There are  multiple 
market-makers  from  whom  quotations  are sought by  second-country brokers. 
The  NASDAQ  system could almost be  applied as it stands to this dealing. 
The  development by  the European Stock  Exchanges  of their Community 
international market,  using  the  techniques of NASDAQ  would,  howeve~pose a 
quandary  to the Stock Exchange  authorities.  From  one point of view,  it 
would provide  the Exchanges  with  a  joint opportunity of regularising 
and developing their member's  present off-market business on  a  European 
base.  Against that it might be held that such technical facilities for 
the member  off-market might prove  so effective that they  would  reinforce 
present trends which are drawing business  away  from  the stock exchange 
floors.  This  problem requires serious  conside~ation by  the stock 
exchanges.  The  Consultants encountered widespread discontent among 
major investors  and  intermediaries on the inadequacy of the present 
international equities network.  The  view was  expressed by several of 
the leading banks  that if the Stock Exchanges  failed to provide  inter~ 
national equities trading with a  market  system,  it was  virtually certain 
that other agencies would fill the gap. 
In the same  way  that NASDAQ  sets a  technical stereotype of relevance 
to linkage of the  European  ~nternational equities market as it exists 311 
at present,  the American Inter-market Trading System  (ITS)  offers guidance 
on  the type of technical facilities which floor  linkage Would  require. 
Given  that at some  future  time,  trading in similar instruments  under 
similar trading rules  could be attained in the Community markets,  as 
in the American  case,  floor  linkage  along the lines of the American 
system would be possible.  The  ITS,  which  responds  to one of the four 
requirements  laid down  by  the  SEC  in 1978  specifying Uhe  National 
Market System,  is jointly operated by,six of the U.S.  stock exchanges 
and  NASD.  Inter-market trading in eleven multiply-quoted securities 
commenced  in April  1978 with  linkage of  the  N.Y.S.E.  and  the 
Philadephia Stock  Exchange.  The  Pacific,  Boston  and  Mid~West Stock 
Exchanges  and A.M.E.X.  were  linked later that fear,  and,  in response 
to an  SEC  order,  NASD  joined the system in 1982. 
To  quote  from  the  SEC  Report  on  the operation of the  ITS* 
"The  ITS  is a  communicat~ons system facilitating trading between 
competi~g market centres.  The  primary function of ITS  is to link 
the participating market centres by  routing messages  between  them 
so that participants  (brokers  and market-makers)  in one market  a 
centre can communicate  with participants in other market centres to 
buy  and sell stock.  This is accomplished by means  of a'computerised 
communications  system;  which consists of a  central processor,  high 
speed transmission lines and input and output devices  located on  the 
floors  of the participating  ~changes". 
The  ITS  enables brokers  and  specialists who  are physically present in 
one  centre to transmit electronically their own  or  customer~ orders 
in an  ITS  stock  to another market centre.  After exploring prices 
available in their own  market  centre,  a  broker or market-market can 
attempt to reach  a  better bid or offer being displayed within the  ITS 
network.  This is done  by entry of a  bommitment. to  trad~  into a 
*  u.s.  Securities and  Exchange  Commission;  Reports  on  the Operation 
of the Inter-market Trading System  1978-82. 312 
computer  loc~ted on  the floor of the participating marke~centre.  A 
commitment  identifies all the information necessary to execute a 
transaction,  including price,  size,  and the time period for which  the 
commitment is irrevocable. 
The  efficiency of the system  depends  heavily on its computing  and 
communications  support.  Any  commitment  to trade delivered by  an 
originating centre into a  a~mputer terminal  is delivered or queued  for 
delivery to  the.  destination market in a  matter of seconds.  If the 
trade is accepted by  a  broker or specialist at the  receiving market 
centre,  a  short message  is entered in  the  system reporting an execution 
back  to the originating centre.  If the commitment is not accepted 
within the specified time period,  the  commitment is automatically 
cancelled. 
The  ITS  does  not disseminate quotations  information and the  system is 
dependent on the composite quotation information being already displayed 
on the market floors. 
The  original computer  system was  designed as  a  pilot,  and during 1982-83 
Securities Industry  Automation Corporation  (SIAC)  the ·Facilities 
Manager  of the  system,  undertook  a  total redes·ign of the ITS  systems, 
styled''ITS II"*.The overall configuration of ITS  divides between  the 
participants local computer installation,  operated by  the exchanges 
themselves  and  the central element of  the  ITS  system.  The  objectives 
of the  ~e-written system are  to  increase its  throughpu~ to  improve 
response  time  under heavy  trading  conditions,  to provide  for  the various 
user  system interfaces,  to make  the  system.more maintainable and  to 
provide  flexibility for  user needs. 
Diagram 19.1 schematically illustrates the structure of the system. 
The  rectangle labelled "ITS  II"  represents  the central processor,· 
comprising a  five processor Tandem  system.  To  the right is the New 
York  Stock Exchange's  equipment  configuratio~.  Their principal inter-
face  to ITS  is through  a  separate Tandem  system called the Universal 
*  The  Consultants are obliged to Mr  .G  M Tieri,  Vice President,  SIAC 
for this information on  the  ITS  re-design. i
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\ 
Floor Device Controller  (UFDC).  The  UFDC  and a  device controller  (DC) 
complex  control traffic to and  from  multi-purpose  terminals on  the 
N.Y.S.E.  trading floor.  The  Bell System terminals - DS  40 CRT's  and 
printers - directly linked to ITS  are now  used  primarily for administra-
tive traffic and supervisory  functions,  as  opposed to commitments  to 
trade and responses  to commitments. 
The  upper left portion of  the diagram illustrates the  ITS  interface 
for  the American,  Boston  and  Cincinnati Stock  Exchanges,  all of which 
use  terminals exclusively.  Below  that is the  NASD  computer-to-computer 
interface  ("CMC"  stands  for computerised market centre,  and is yet 
another Tandem  system - belonging to the NASD  - used for message 
switching). 
The  Midwest,  Philadelphia and Pacific exchanges  currently use directly-
linked terminals  for  ITS traffic,  but are migrating to computer 
interfaces as  illustrated by  the  "RCI"  box,  which  stands  for  regional 
computer interface.  Thus  ITS  II will support three different computer 
interfaces  (UFDC~  CMC  and  RCI)  in addition  to directly  linked devices. 
The  diagram il'lustrates the  types of terminals  used  for  ITS, 
but not their number.  The  participants at present use over 650 
terminals  for  ITS  traffic,  including those at the  N.Y.S.E.  which serve 
other purposes  as well. 
The  estimated development  cost of the  system  re-designed was  stated in 
the proposal  for  ITS  II to be $907,176.  Of  this $697,176 was  shared 
cost,  while  $210,000 were  direct costs allocated to participants for 
the  construction of the system interfaces.  The  operating costs of the 
new  system,  which  presumably  includes  r~covery of capital cost,  was 
estimated at $2,168,412  per  annum.  These costs are  allocated to the 
participants based on  their share of overall consolidated tape system 
trading volume,  rather than  on  their relative use of ITS.  In addition 
participants pay directly for  the cost of their  ITS  terminals;  for 
example,  the American Stock Exchange  uses  19  CRT's  and  19  printers for 315 
ITS  at a  monthly  rental cost of approximately $12,000  including 
communications  lines and  controllers.  There  a~e no  system fees  for 
ITS-transactions,  nor do  participants charge one  another any  fees.  One 
exchange  charges its own  members  a  small  fee  for  commitments  to trade 
entered into ITS. 
Two  aspects of the  European  situation w9uld  greatly complicate installation 
of an  ITS  type  system  in  the Community  in the immediate  future •.  First is 
the diversity of the Exchanges  and their national  circumstances.  Second, 
and equally important,  the American  initiative was  mandatory,  reflecting 
stipulations, of Congress  carr~ed through by  the  s~curities and  Exchange 
Commission,  and  pursuan~ to part of Section 11  of the Securities 
Exchange  Act of 1934  and  ~he Securities Acts.Amendments of 1975  which 
enumerated  certain characteristics required of  the National Market 
System. 
The  Objectives of the  ITS  derived  from  concepts· of a  fair market rather 
than  from  the development of business or  potential cost-benefit 
conside~ations.  In  consequence,  the reports on  the  ITS  to SEC 
concentr~te o~ the efficiencies of the new  market.  No  studies appear 
to. have been carried out on  the cost-effectiveness of the system with 
regard,  for  exampl~,  to comparative  tran~action costs.  The  proportion 
of business conducted  on  the  ITS  by participants is small relative to 
their overall  trading  volume,  at some  8%  of trades and  5%  of volume of 
shares traded.  These  trading  volume  figures  cannot be  related to 
E~ope.  For national  reasons,  a  greater proportion of European orders 
might be expected to be  channelled through  a  linkage  system  towards  the 
markets of origin of the securities.  For  European  linkage to attain 
financial performance  comparable  to that of  the ITS,  the proportion of 
system trades would  have  to be  far higher  than that of the American 
system.  The  present level of floor business in second-country E.E.C. 
equitie~ would certainly not be  adequate  to support the implementation 
of a  Community  ITS. 
on  the other hand,it must  be  recognised that even  ~iven·the necessary 
harmonisation of  trading  procedures,  full  floor  linkage will 
:·  ''  7'-~·"' . - 316 
inevitably require a  central facilities structure along the lines of 
that designed for the ITS  system.  Minor variants may  be required, 
but the logic of inter-floor connection to provide  forconfrontationof 
orders is identical whether  the application is the u.s.  Exchanges or 
the Europeanones.  With  regard  to  the  technology of floor  linkage,  the 
U.S.  precedent may  be  considered not only indicative,  but in its 
essentials, definitive. 
A  f~ther u.s.  precedent of interest to the European Exchanges are the 
formalities through which  the SEC's  four  requirements  - for  the 
consolidated quotation system,  the market linkage,  the order routing 
system  and  the central limit order file  - have been progressed. 
Formal plans* were  drawn  up  which detailed in full both the objectives 
and facilities of the system  and  the administrative arrangements  for 
development  and implementation.  These  agreements were  formally  signed 
by each participating stock Exchange.  In  so contentious a  field as 
market reorganisation,  these plans must have  provided an agreed  frame-
work  which held the American  initiative together.  In the American 
contextsuch detailed plans  were  in any  case essential,  as  submission 
of  them  to  the  SEC,  as  the  regulatory authority,  constituted the, 
necessary  response of  the  Stock  Exchanges  to  Congressional wishes. 
In establishing European  linkage,  no  authority has  comparable 
responsibility tothatheld by  the SEC  in the u.s ..  The  programme  of 
linkage must emerge  from  and  be  carried through by mutual  agreement of 
the stock Exchanges.  In the view of the  Co~sultants, the European 
exchanges would be well  advised not to  embark  upon  even  the initial 
developments of linkage until the Exchanges  have  subscribed to a 
series of agreed plan documents,  similar  to  those to which defined 
*  "Plans submitted to  SEC  for  the purpose of  implementing Rule  llAc 
1-1 under  the Securities Exchange  Act  of  1934  (1978);  'Restate-
ment  and  amendment  of plan submitted to SEC  pursuant to Rule  17a-15 
under  the Securities Exchange  Act of  1934  (March  1980);  etc  •• 317 
the American initiatives.  To  date,  policy has been left to emerge as 
the consequence of pragmatic actions.  Initially this approach may 
have been essential  to overcome  inertia.  It is likely to prove 
inadequate,  especially in the  case of floor  linkage,for which the 
exchanges  would incur substantial central and  local capital costs. 
The  proposal  (which has  been mooted  by  at least one  European capital 
market expert)  to elevate the collective  price-fixing of.the national 
Exchanges  to  European  level,  implying  processing  a~d execution 
of transactions bf  a  central  European  computer  installation is 
reflected in a  similar demand  in the'u.s.  for centralised computer 
processing of all orders.  An  exposition of this view was  advanced in 
the Peake  - Mendelson  - Williams proposal  for  an electronically assisted 
a~ction market.  The  proposals advocate  an  electronic exchange,  directly 
linking all market-makers  and  brokers  through  a  computer  controlled 
communications  system.  The  system would  allow for  the entry of firm 
bids and offers which  could be  executed  automatically when  they matched 
in price and other conditions.  While  acknowledging that such a  system 
would  involve  the most  sweeping  re-ordering of the markets,  its advocates 
argue  that best execution can only be obtained through  such a  central 
system.  Th~y assert that  using current technology  such  a  central. 
market could be·constructed.  They  claim that the proposal aligns with 
the  language of Congress,  that  'new data processing and  communications 
technology create the opportunity for more  efficient and  effective 
market operations'. 
The  SEC  rejected the concept of centralised confrontation of all orders 
in a  computer-based system,  on  the grounds  that it 'would have  an 
impact on existing market institutions that could properly be  viewed as 
a  fundamental  change in the manner  in which- securities trading is now 
conducted,  and  that it wouid  be difficult to foresee,  and·provide 
against,  the  problem~ and  difficulties that might arise'.  Thus, although 
the American  ITS  is far in advance  of European  linkage,  it is in no 
sense revolutionary.  The  form  in which it was  implemented met the 
criteria required by  the Eur'opean Stock Exchanges  that the present 
form  of the markets  and  their methods  of  tradin; should be respected. 318  ~ 
19.3  ~ 
Positive progress  towards electronic linkage of the Community  markets 
is at present limited to the approval  by  the Committee of Stock 
Exchanges  of the initial  stages of the Inter-Bourse Data  Information 
system  (IDIS}.  The basis of the present work  is the Project Definition 
presented to the Committee of Stock Exchanges  in early  1983,  which 
assessed and  confirmed the  feasibility of  information linkage between 
the E.E.C.  Exchanges based on  publicly-administered communications 
facilities.  In the  Report  a  group of experts  recommended  the 
investigation of the use  of packet-switching,  i.e.  PTT  systems of 
computer-assisted data routing,  of a  type currently operated by  Belgium, 
France,  Germany,  Netherlands,  Spain  and  the  U.K .•  The  proposal drew a 
distinction between  'building a  system',  which is not intended,  and 
developing  a  capability to use a  new  and  standardised communication 
technique .  The  latter is to be  the  !DIS  approach.  It is anticipated that 
the prices of up  to  400 securities will be  exchanged.  The  Report 
proposes that the time  and data charges  involved in operating  the system 
should be  appropriately apportioned to the participating exchanges.  It 
indicates that the required packet-switching facilities would be available 
by  the end of 1983.  The  proposal acknowledges  that the development of the 
inter-vQmmunication  c~pab~lity leaves  import~nt elements  ~f the system 
dependent on  the extent and  efficiency of  the local computer 
installations of the exchanges  themselves,  and  that the  success of the 
central aspects of the project depend upon  the willingness of the EXChanges 
to communicate data to  each other. 
The  Consultants have,  throughout  thel.r project,  attached great importance 
to the general  support given by  the majority of the Committee  to the IDIS 
project and,  in their first Interim Report proposed  that the  IDIS  system 
should be developed to provide  a  dealing  network.  !DIS  represents the 
first positive commitment  to  European  linkage.  Early  in  the detailed 
design of the informational  phase  of  IDTS,  most  of  the basic problems of 
dealing linkage will begin to emerge.  To  enable  IDIS  to function· 
effectively,  even as  a  price  information service,  a start will have  to 
be made  in resolving the general problems  of European  linkage which are 
the broad concern of this Report. - 319 
It is not inte·nded as  a  criticism of  IDIS  to point out that the 
technical Project Definition makes little attempt to identify,  much 
less to resolve,  these market problems.  This was  beyond .the brief 
·given to the technical experts.  Moreover full ventilation of such 
; 
basic problems at the preliminary stages of the IDIS  proposal might 
have increased the difficulties of the Committee's decision and 
extinguished a  valuable practical initiative. 
The  Consultants do not consider it in their brief to make  a  critique 
of the IDIS proposals,  o~ to present any  full evaluation of the market 
difficulties which are to be  surmounted if the hopes  for  the system 
are fulfilled.  Brief reference  to  some  of.these complications does, 
howeve~  endorse  the  view  that  IDIS  will prove  to be  a  very real first 
step towards  the  European  Linkage. 
The  Definition state's that IDIS  will be  a  • system ..• which wiJ,.l  peDDit 
the current prices of stocks to be  available  simultaneously on each 
exchange'.  It acknowledges  the problem arising fran different trading 
hours  and price ·formation systems,  suggesting that the  collective 
price fixings would  become  single transmissions among  the continuous trading 
prices of other Exchanges.  It is doubtful whether this will prove adequate,  or 
indeed whether it will represent any  enhancement of facilities already 
available.  The  collective prices are,  at present,  important  'punctuations• 
in the continuous  inter.:.Exchange  trading of the  400 or  so securities 
which the system would  cover,  but after the market had  adjusted to them 
they have only historic relevance.  The  members  of Exchanges  trading  , 
continuously over the day require  the full range of current quotations 
both from  the floor trading sessions  and  the bank markets.  The  problem 
of reconciling.methods of trading arises at the price reporting stage. 
The  nature of the prices to be disseminated reqUires precise definition. 
The  price record proposed  contains fields  for  bid,  offer and mid-prices. 
Given that it will be essential  to disseminate bid,  offer and mid-prices 
in some  manner which wouJ_d allow positive response, it is clear that 
substantial analysis  and  negotiation will  be  required before  com~arable 320 
pciee indicators• can be obtained from  the diff•tnt markets.  The bid 
and Offer derived tram the closing prioee of a colLective  ~ice 
lxchan;e have very c1iff•rent meaninq  to the  b.t4-~:~ffo pcioes 
quoted,  for  example,  by a  London  jobber,  or by a  Cont4,nental bank in 
the off-market.  Tbe  collective spreadf  once  dete~ined carries no 
subsequent CCIIIDi tment to trade ,  the  jobber'  s.  quotation· does. ·  Lea9.i.ng  , 
aside the purely technical matter of  standardising prices in 
currttncy,  settlement etc.  terms,-(which  the Report acknowledqes)  it is 
clear that the fundamental market pr.oblems  are involved in establishing 
prices across Europe  in bid and offer terms ·  If such prices are to be 
of practical use it is essential that these problems  should be resolved. 
The  IDIS  proposal  st~tes that the project will  'not concern itself with 
the subject of dissemination by  the  Exchanges of  inf~rmati~ r,eceived 
over  the system  •  This is deemed  to be  a  local situation with regard 
to which each  Exchange  has  complete  freedom  of choice as to the method 
most appropriate for its own  situation'.  It is questionable whether 
this policy will prove acceptable to the  Exchanges at the initial 
information stage,  and it certainly will not be valid or acceptable 
when  the  info~ation disseminated is later enhanced to be  used for 
inter-EXchange dealing.  In general  terms,  the transmitting,  not the 
receiving  Exchange  has the greatest interest in the detailed pattern of 
receipt of the information on  its prices.  It is likely to be  found,  as 
argued in previous Sections,  that the uneven profile of  Eu~opean Stock 
EXChange  membership will not prove  a  satisfactory common  base of 
participation in the  IDIS  dealing network.  On  one hand,  any extension 
of participation at a  receiving capital centre might,  or might not,  be 
acceptable to the Exchange  originating the information.  Conversely,  an 
originating  Exchange might consider a  membership base of distribution 
in the receiving  EXchange  too  narrow  for  the operations of its own 
members.  It might  exert  pressure for  a full range of its  own counterparties 
in the receiving capital centre to be  included.  Problems of disparate 
EXChange  membership will arise immediately,  though their impact might 
be  softened by definition of eligibility for different levels of  se~ice 
of t!he  system. - 321 
A further problem in principle relates to the off-floor market in which 
European international transactions increasingly  tend to be executed, 
and which must  remain in existence until  European floor  trading in 
major equities is harmonised.  While  the proportion of this trading 
exeC?Uted  on the floor of one or other of the markets  would be pickea up 
by  IOIS, it has been  argued in Section 12,  that the majority of this 
business is not reported to the  stock  exchanges.  The  inclusion of 
these transactions in !DIS would  raise many  of the problems  considered 
in this Report.  In the case of the German  banks,  for example,  formal 
reporting under  a  Stock Exchange  system of international business might 
well bring statutory complications.  In the  new  arrangements  for 
International Dealing  firms  in London*  member  firms doing business with 
an  I.O.  are required ·to report on  such  transactions,  stating security, 
price,  size and whether purchase or sale.  The  ~ouncilstates that it  does 
not currently intend  to pUblish this information. 
The  above  example  suggests that  at the first stage of its detailed 
design  the  IDIS  project will encounter problems in principle related 
to different price formation  and  trading structures,  different 
membership patterns,  and  to the relative position of  the floor and the 
off markets.  !DIS  is likely to prove  an  instrument  for  the evolutionof 
a  jOint policy by  th~ stock  exchanges  on  essential questions of 
linkage.  It will be  proved mistaken to consider that !DIS can avoid 
these problems,  or that it is possible to progress European  linkage 
simply as  a  technical problem of electronic communications. 
This situation endorses the constructive aspect'of the IDIS  project. 
It might be  argued that IDIS  cannot be  justified if its sole purpose 
is to be limited to dissemination of price information available from 
trading  on the Exchanges.  This  function is already carried out by several 
specialist communication systems,  supported by  a  broader data base 
than will be available to  IDIS  and with sophisticated proqrammes  to 
*  Stock Exchange  Council  Notice  105/83  December  23  1983;  Dealings 
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inter-relate tyPes of data.  These external  il.,rvic~" are alrelldy  b\,111~ 
into the  in  .. house  systems  ot many  major  participants in the markets.  If 
this line of arqument is developed,  it becomes  eleU' ··tlt&t the ul'timate 
and more  significant purpose of the IDIS  network must be· to pxovide 
the EXChanges  with efficient facilities for transacting their inter-
national· business and  to pre-empt  any  initiatives from  outside the 
official markets to exploit the potential of electronioally-asaieted 
dealinq between  the European centres. 
This  further application is envisaged in the IDIS  project definition. 
It states that the objectives of exchanging prices is to achieve  'a 
more  perfect market which  can be  judged by  reduced opportunities for 
arbitrage trading between centres'. 
The  EMchange  of information alone will not achieve this.  The  price of  a 
foreign security in any  Exchange is already influenced by known  overseas 
prices,  both official and off-market.  The  local price is also 
influenced by  the availability of deliverable stock in any given centre. 
As  long as the balance of time,  currency, and the form of the security and other 
international. obstacles continue to exist,  the need for arbitrage 
dealing will not be eliminated by dissemination of more  local price 
information. 
The  IDIS  proposal,  therefore,  carries the implication that linked 
dealing between the EXchanges  is envisaged.  This is further  endorsed 
by the nature of the prices,  i.e. bid and offer, which it is proposed 
that IDIS will transmit.  The  system's  aim  of diminishing  the need to 
arbitrage  stock onto the individual floors would become  achieved 
when,  through the electronic linkage,  members  are able to respond to 
offers and bids made  in the other markets. 
lt might on  the other hand  be noted that the transmission of prices in 
local currency which  IDIS  proposes is not compatible with the use of 
bid and  offer prices.  To  permit bids and  offers to be arrayed on  the 
system all conditions of the proposed transactions,  including currency, 
would  require to be  standardised.  For example  no  computer can process 323 
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the relative price of offers of,  say,  AIZO,  quoted in one case in 
Belqi-.n bearer in Belgian francs  for fifteen plus·day delivery,  and 
in another case quoted by  a  London  jobber in  u.s.  doliars in the 
actual stock  for  five day  cash  settlement delivery in Amsterdam. Terminal 
array requires all offers to be capable of evaluation aqainst each other. 
A further important consideration is that it will prove vital for_IDIS 
to transmit real  (ccimmitted)  bids  and offers.  If not, the risk is that 
it may  transmit information contrived to mislead,  as has been the case 
in certain other electronic trading systems. 
The Consultants endorse  the belief of the Committee of Stock Exchanges 
that the  IDIS  system contains  the germ  of European  linkage.  If its 
development is dynamically progressed it will create a  situation in 
which  the Exchanges,either willingly or unwillingly,  will have to 
address the problems of harmonising European trading.  The  more 
directly the question of. ultimate use of the  system is addressed at 
the early stages,  the more  cost-effective will be  the approach to its 
development  and design. 
The  steps in·the technical development of the system in support of 
international European dealing  should be assessed and anticipated. 
System re-design and  equipment changes  might be  avoided.  The  initial 
technical proposal to use  PTT  packet-switching systems should be 
considered in relation to increased traffic which  may  arise if the 
system is used for passing settlement instructions,  as  proposed in 
Section  20,  or for  further  envisaged applications.  Notably,  the stage 
of development at which  an  interactive system,  with central processing 
capacity will be  required should be  established  • 
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SECTION  20  A  STRATEGY  TOWARDS  A  EUROPEAN  SETTLEMENT  SYSTEM  FOR  CORPORATE 
SECURITIES  BASED  ON  THE  EXISTING  NATIONAl.  eRPJIWARY  lNS'fl'l'U'l'I?NS 
20.1  Introduction 
The  Consultants  found  an almost un4versal demand  in the markets for 
improvement in the settlement facilities for  equities transactions 
involving  two  or more  European ca,pi tal centres.  In the first place, 
allthe market participants interviewed stressed the  need  for greater 
efficiency,  and  the replacement of the present labour-intensive and 
error-prone operations  by  a  full co-ordinated system of European 
clearing and  settlement based on  immobilised  certific~tes and delivery 
between centres by  stock account credits and debits.  Secondly, it was 
widely considered that the Stock Exchange  themselves  should take this 
initiative.  They  were  recognised as  the appropriate authorities to 
provide such a  system.  It was  felt that,  as is the case in the 
domestic markets,  the  settlement machinery would provide a  cohesive 
structure for  the European  international market. 
The  two  approaches to  linkage generally considered in this Report,  -
'indirect'  linkage of members  through existing channels of international 
business on the one  hand,  and  linkage of market floors on  the other, 
have different settlement implications.  The  first approach calls for 
settlement machinery which will regulate and provide services for 
international dealing in the present convention,  i.e. a  •rolling'  cash 
settlement with delivery and  payment five business days after dealing. 
Alternatives exist for  the dealing and settlement period chosen for 
floor linkage.  Floor  linkage would  however  carry the categorical 
requirement  tha~ like the dealing,  the settlement of the stocks in the 
system was  standardised across the participating market floors. 
The  settlement problems related to linkage will,therefore,have to be 
resolved at two  levels,  first  providing  most settlement 
services to the present European international equities market  (to 
which  most market comment  received by  the Consultants referred),  and 
second,  planning  an  ultimate and ideal system supporting 
standardised trading procedures on  the linked floors. 325 
. Prior to reviewing these problems,  the followil'l9  sub-section briefly 
sets out the existinq agencies  throuqh which the settlement linkage 
must be  achieved.  A point of importance is that  in floor  linkage 
not only the depositaries, ~ich have  tended to be  the  ~ehicles of 
international co-operation to date) but also the underlying Stock 
Exchange clearing and payment systems are involved. 
Table 20.1 sets out summary  volume data compiled for  the Second 
Interna~ional Symposium  of Security Administrators held in Zurich in 
1982.  With the help of the depositaries,  the volumes  and values have 
been  divided  to distinguish between bonds  and shares.  The comparative scales 
of operation of the national European depositaries,  the independent 
depositaries and the Depositary Trust Company  are indicated.  There 
are no apposite' figures  for  TALISMAN,  which is a  clearing rather  than 
a  depositary organisation. 
2o.1.1  Belgium 
The·Caisse  Inter-professi.onnelle de  Depots et de Virements de Titres 
(C.I.K.}  is respqnsible for  the deposit and  transfer of securities. 
It was  set up in March  196~as a  result of a  Royal  Decree of November 
1967,  as a  monopoly  company  by statute and  changes  to its rules require 
'an official amendment. Its capital as aSociete anonyme'is subscribed by the 
Commission de  la Bourse.  The  members  are physical and  corporate 
persons authorised to receive orders to buy or sell shares in Belgium, 
Belgian private savings banks,  related Stock Exchange  institutions 
such as  the Caisse de Compensation and  the Co-operative de  Liquidation 
du  Terme,  and  their foreign  homoloques.  The  law of 1967  permitted 
fungibility of deposited stock.  The  legal status ?f depositors is 
that of  co-owners,  and  they  are responsible,  proportionate to  their 
holding of the issue concerned,  for  any  loss of securities of the 
same  nature deposited with C.I.K .. _____  __,_ _____________ ·- ------
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Two  axcha119e  settlement systems underly the depositary functions.  The 
Caisse de Compensation du  Comptant,  of which all Agents de Chan;e are 
members  provides next day cash settlement.  Delivery is made  of all 
stock,  either physical or C. I.  K.  transfer and net payment is carried 
out automatically through members'  accounts with the National Bank. 
Debit positions are not allowed and must be covered the next day. 
The  terme market settles through the eo-operative de Liquidation du 
Terse,  instituted by Royal  Decree, whichhas  a  restricted membership.  The 
dealinq period is fifteen  day~ set according to calendar.  A  'couverture' 
of not less than one quarter of the value of the operation  is  paid 
not later than the third trading day following  the deal.  ~t the end 
of the dealing period members  receive from  the Centre Informatique 
statements of all deals concluded in the market,  net stock and money 
positions and their receive and deliver instructions.  Physical 
or book  entry delivery of stock  is  on  the fifth  d~y of the 
settlement  period,  preceded by  the payment  of  the  debit  balances 
of clients  and members  on  the  third and  fourth settlement days 
respectively  • 
.  On  the  Bourse  market,  registered  (U.S.  and  U.K.)  stock 
transactions  are settled  exclusively  by  C.I.K., 
acknowledged  by  C.I.K.  credit.  In fact,  C.I.K. 
delivery  being 
chooses  a 
l 
depositary  organisation 
are  registered,  in  the 
there  in  the  name  of 
in  the  country  of  origin  .the  shares 
name  of  the  depositary  and  are  kept 
c.I.K.  which  in  turn  recognizes  each 
of  its  members.  Links  have  been  established  between C.I.K. 
and  several  other  Community  depositaries.  That  between 
SICOVAM  and  NECIGEF  are  noted  below.  C.I.K.  has  two 
important German  links.  Since  1974  settlement  arrangements with  the 328 
Dusseldorf JCassenverein have existed for  Belqia~ an4 German  stock 
jointly quoted.  The  accounts however muat be in credit,  supported by 
c. I .J. or German  crecSits to c. I .K.  members.  The o,rr~t  is in one 
c:U.:r:ection,  i.e. the C.I.K.  account· with the l<As ..  nverein  (K.V.)  u 
German  law forbids the latter to be a  m.mber of C.I.K.,  nor  c~  C.I.K. 
hold German  shares in its vaults.  A  second  link existll,  throu;h the 
Auslandakassenverein/with  t~ Frankfurt Kassenverein. 
C.I.K.  has no  direct links with CEDEL  or EUROCLEAR,  thouqh the view was 
expressed by Belgian broker.s that this was  desirable..  At present,  the 
effective links with  these aqencies are through the brokers and the 
banks themselves. 
20.1.2  Denmark 
The  Danish depositary,  the Vaerdipapircentralen,  (VPC)  althouqh,in terms 
of technology and dematerialisation aims, possibly the most advanced in 
Europe,  may  be treated briefly here as the VPC  is, at this initial 
staqe,  solely concerned with bonds.  Due  to the strenqth of the Danish 
bond market VPC  is a  larqe scale operation,  and in terms of value of 
securities deposited it  ·:was, in 1981, one of the largest in Europe.  It was 
established in 1980 under Act  179 of May  14 - the Danish Securities 
Centre Act,  and its functions are based on an uncompromisinq policy of 
dematerialisation,  the abolition of certificates and the substitution 
of computer book-entry transfer and clearance.  The depositor,  under 
the VPC  system,  retains his right of ownership,  and  VPC  bears any'loss, 
and is able to proceed against the member.responsible  ~or that loss. 
There is no  forward dealinq on  the  Copenhagen Exchange.  Settlement is 
at three days after dealing,  when it is estimated that 80\ of the stock 
is del~vered.  VPC  does  not handle payment,  this is made  through the 
National Bank,  with which all brokers must be in account.  There being 
no  dealing period,  delive~ and payment are as dealt. 329 
20.1.3  ~ 
The  French depositary SICOVAM  (Societe Interprofesaionelle pour la 
Compensation des Valeurs Mobilieres)  is a  commercial private law 
company  of which the capital is held by the  ~anpaqnie des Aqents de 
Chanqe  and  the French banks.  Ita services are restricted to member 
financial intermediaries,  brokers and banks.  There were  217  members 
in 1981. 
SICOVAM  opens and operates current accounts in securities for its 
members,  which it operates by book entry transfer.  It receives in 
deposit French bearer securities subject to French leqislation.  It 
further accepts reqistration into its name  of foreign nominative stock; 
and  carries out trustee functions  for  the beneficial owners.  SIOOVAM 
may  accept the affiliation of similar foreiqn depositaries. 
Admission of securities may  be determined by  SICOVAM,  and  French bearer 
or  foreign-quoted bearer shares,  French bearer and convertible bonds, 
which do not involve drawings,  and other non-quoted securities subject 
to the approval of the Ministry of Finance may  be accepted.  In 1981 
the number  of securities deposited was  3,566.  Of  these 188 were  foreign 
shares, mainly either u.s.  or U.K.  registered, or Dutch,  German  or 
Belgian bearer. 
Having  received foreign  stock into its own  name  for  i~  members, 
SICOVAM controls (though does  not make)  all benefit payments  and rights. 
The  system facilitates arbitrage operations between Paris and  the 
other world cap!  tal markets. 
The  securities of certain foreign countries,  which still include 
Canada,  u.s., Italy and Norway  can only be entered into SICOVAM  in the 
name  of French residents.  These restrictions, which are due  to 
requirements of the issuing countries,  are progressively being removed. 
SICOVAM  treats its holdings as  fungible,  and,  concurrent with the study, 
plans for total dematerialisation were  proceeding.  Securities held in 
SICOVAM  may  not be pledged. 330 
The SICOVAM  operations arising  frctll  tAe  Pu~  ...,left ue undwl&t.a 
by the clearinq system of the Ch-.bre Syndi.oale.  a. cl-.r1nq ctivida. 
into teriDe  and cash market settl•enta.  l'or t1w  fOJtller·,  in which a  40\ 
cover is required for equities dealing,  there is fl Liquidation Mensuelle 
on an appointed day at the beqinninq of the tbirc! week of the month. 
This is followed by a  seven day settlement period with delivery of 
naninative,  delivery of bearer,  and money settlement on the third, 
sixth and seventh days respectively.  In the cash market the settlflllent 
period is two  weeks in respect of SICOVAM  transfers,  and one week in 
respect of others. 
The  Chambre  Syndicale clearing system builds up  the record,  against 
subnitted punch cards,  of the market dealinq of the brokers,  and at the 
time of liquidation it makes  necessary debits and credits through the 
brokers accounts at the Banque  de France.  cash settlement is made 
outside SICOVAM,  the depositary being responsible tor the stock 
transfer.  ~took deliveries outside  SICOVAM  are made c:lirect. 
SICOVAM  has been highly active in establishing international links. 
The  clos.est and most effective is that with C.I.K.,  both  deposi~ies 
holding membership of e.ach  other.  The  arrangement covers Paris-listed 
·Belgian and Belgian-listed French stocks.  To  expl~in the arrangement for 
the sale of a Belgium stock in Paris SICOVAM debits the French member's stock account 
credits C.I.K.'s  SICOVAM  ~ccount, at the same  time. telexinq this informa-
tion to C.I.K  ••  C.I.K.  then debits its SICOVAM  account and credits the 
c.r.K.  account of the buying c.I.K.  member.  The arrangement has the 
advantage that special accounts  can be opened mutually for rights,  and 
dividend coupons  can be detached the  same day to avoid cum  or ex 
anomolies on delivery.  Under  the scheme debit balances are allowed. 
cash payment .forms  no part of the  linkage.  A difficulty arises from  the 
insistence of the Belgian investors on receiving physical stock.  This factor, 
which does not apply in Paris,  means  that a  higher proportion of stock 
deposited tends to be with  SICOVAM. 
Negotiations between  SICOVAM  and  the Kassenvereins,  now  of sane_six 
years duration, have yet to yield  re~ults.  Although,  subject to amendment - 331 
of  the Depotqesetz,  all the technical solutions have been W04ked  out, 
their implementation is delayed by a  series of problems.  The  K.V.'s 
cannot maintain securities accounts with similar institutions abroad 
and  only  authorised German  banks' can act as .collective depositary 
institutions.  Dividend arrangements present difficulty in that 
Germany still insists on the clipping of coupons  when  this is appropriate. 
Germany  has not yet ratified the European convention on  st9Pped 
securities~  no  stop  (arret)  of a  security in SICOVAM  is possible. 
SICOVAM  may  not hold German  stocks in Paris. 
In  December  1982  a  new  scheme  linking  SICOVAM  and  NECIGEF  was  implemented, 
superseding  the previous Depot-Eehange  arrangements.  Under this scheme, all 
Dutch  certificates relevant to SICOVAM  operations were deposited with 
NECIGEF.  To  achieve delivery from  Paris to Amsterdam,  the selling 
member  submits  an  International Delivery Order to SICOVAM.  ·  SICOVAM  then 
telexes the transfer information to NECIGEF,  which credits the account 
of its buying member  (or delivers CF  or  K certlficates as required), 
which  SICOVAM  confirms  to the issuer of the Order.  The  process can be 
achieved in 48  hours.  The  arrangement is one-way,  but this is simply 
due  to the  de-~isting of the French nationalised stocks in Amsterdam. 
It related only,  therefore,  to Dutch  stocks  listed in Paris.  At the 
request of SICOVAM  and in the interest of simplifying dividend payments 
and benefit administration,  the arrangement requires credit balances in 
Arnsterdam. 
SICOVAM  has also negotiated arrangements in London  whereby  TALISMAN  is 
now  designated as  the depositary's sole agent in London  for withdrawal 
of stock from,  and delivery to SICOVAM.  This represents a  modest step 
towards  linkage of TALISMAN  and  SICOVAM,  but it is understood that the 
possibility of SICOVAM  holding an  account in TALISMAN  is being 
investigated. 
There is no  direct link between  SICOVAM  and  CEDEL  or EUROCLEAR.  Links 
exist  indir~ctly through the Paris banks.  One  major bank,  carrying 
out substantial settlement functions  in the Paris market was,  when 
interviewed,  transferring all its German  stock settlement functions to 
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Through  Article  94-11  of  the  Lei  de  Finance  of  May  2nd  1983,  it was 
required  that  within  the  eighteen months  of  publication of  that  law  all 
shares  should be  held  and  transferred by  book-entry.  Amongst  the 
.provisi~ns,  SICOVAM  was  empowered  to open  accounts  for  fo~ign 
intermediaries,  to  create  representative  certificates solely  for 
circulation abroad,  and  to arrange  nominative  inscription  in foreign 
depositaries  in  the  name  of  the  foreign  depositary. 
20.1.4  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
a)  The  German  <regional>  'Kassenvereine'  ('security-clearing associations> 
The  Federal  German  Securities  Deposit  Law  <Oepotgesetz)  of  1937  forms 
.the  legal 'basis  for· the  custody  of  securities  in the  Federal  Republic. 
Said  law  distinguishes  between  separate  custody  (defined  by- the  law 
and  practice  as  'separate safe  custody'  or  'jacket-custody')  and 
collective  custody  <also  called  'giro-transferable collective 
custody'). 
In  the  case  of  separate  custody,  the  securities held  in  custody  by  the 
depositary  banks  for  their  customers  <depositors>  are provided  with 
,a  jacket  markea  with  the depositor's  name  and/or  security deposit 
account  number.  The  depositary  bank  notifies  to the  depositor  the 
security  numbers.  The  depositor  is owner  of  such  securities. 
In  the  case  of  collective  custody,  the  deposited securiti'es are  held 
together  with  the  deposits  of  one  and  the  same  kind of  security of 
other depositors. 
The  function  o~ collective  custody  is  exercised·by  the Kassenvereine 
which  are  defined  by  the  Securities  Deposit  Law  as  'Wertpapiersammel-
banken'/collective  security-deposit  banks.  The  depositors  authorize 
their depositary  banks  to place  the  customer  securities deposited with 
them  in  collective  custody  with  the  regionally  responsible  Kassen-
verein.  Fungible  securities only  are  eligible  for  collective  custody. 
There  are  seven  Kassenv~reine in  the  Federal  Republic,  i.e.  in all 333 
cities having  Stock  Exchanges  (Bremen  excepted):  in Berlin, 
Dusseldorf,  Frankfurt,  Hamburg,  Hannover,  Munich  and  Stuttgart.  The 
functions  of  the  Kassenverein  for  the  Bremen  Stock  Exchange  are  taken 
care  of  by  the  Hamburg  Kassenverein.  The  Kass.nvereirie  are  legally 
independent  bodies  having  the  legal  form  of  Aktiengesellschaft  (joint 
stock  companies  under  German  law),  linked  by  mutually  held  accounts. 
Under  Federal  German  Banking  Law,  the  Kassenvereine  hold  bank  status. 
Shareholders  of  the  Kassenvereine  are  the  bigger banks  resident  in 
the  respective  stock  exchange  centres  and  which  are  also engaged  in 
securities business.  In  order  to guarantee  the  necessary neutrality 
and  independence  of  the  Kassenvereine  their  shares  are  issued  in  the 
form  of  registered shares  which  may  only  be  transferred with  the 
consent  of  the  individual  Kassenverein.  With  a  few  exceptions,  no 
one  interest  held  exceeds  ten  per  cent.  Only  credit  institutions 
which  are  subject  to  German  bank  su~ervision by  the  Federal  Banking 
Supervisory  Office  in  Berlin  can  be  participants  in  the  Kassenvereine. 
These  institutions also  include  branch  offices  and  subsidiaries of 
foreign  banks  which  undertake  banking  and  securities business  (by 
virtue of  law~ they  then  are  subject  to State  bank  supervision). 
Brokers  cannot  be  participants  in  the  Kassenvereine  as  they  are  not 
considered  to  be  credit  institutions.  Each  shareholder  is  also  a 
participant,  but  not  all participants  are  shareholders~ 
In  Germany,  the  idea  of  collective  custody  dates  back  to  the  last 
century.  The  'Bank  des  Berliner  Kassenvereins~  was  the  first  bank  to 
•  introduce  collective  custody  in  1882:  at  that  time  the  Bank  des 
Berliner  Kassenvereins  was  the  central  <note-issuing)  bank  of  the  city 
of  Berlin.  For  reasons  of  tradjtion,  most  of  the  collective 
security-deposit  banks  set  up  in  the  other  German  stock  Exchanges 
integrated  the  designation  'Kassenverein'  in  their  firms'  names. 
The  custody  and  administration  of  securities  as  well  as  securities 
giro  transfer  are  among  the  most  important  duties of  the  Kassen-
verei'ne. 334 
The  collective  custody  of  securities  ia effected  in such  a  manner 
that  the  securities deposited by  the participants in  the Kassen-
verein  are held  together  with  deposits  of  securHies of  one  and 
the  same  kind  made  by  other participants.  The  sum  of  securities 
of  one  and  the  same  kind  held  in  the  giro-transfer.able  collective 
security deposit  at  the  Kassenvereine  is called collective 
custody.  At  the  time  of  lodgment  of securities by  a  participant 
in  the  collective  custody  at a  Kassenverin,  the  previous 
individual  ownership  of  the  participant  or  his depositor 
specified  by  the  itemised  list  ceases  to exist  and  simultaneously 
converts  into proportionate  co-ownership of  economically  the  same 
value  in  the  collective deposit  increased  by  the  lodgment. 
The  Kassenvereine  are  not  able  to establish whether  the 
securities deposited  with  them  are  the  property of  the partici-
pants  or  of  the  latter's depositors  <beneficial  owners>. 
Likewise,  the  names  and  amounts  of  securitiPs holdings of  the 
individual  beneficial  owners  are  not  known  to  the  Kassenvereine; 
they  work  on  the  principle  that  all securities deposited with 
them  are  the  property of  the  participants'  depositors.  This  is 
the  reason  why  the  Kassenvereine  have  no  right  of  ownership  on 
securities deposited  with  them,  unless  they  have  pecuniary  claims 
against  their participants originating  from  purchase or deposit 
fees. 
Eligible  for  giro-transferable  collective  custody  in  the  Federal 
Republic  are 
German  shares,  mutual  funds  and  bonds  :  the  latter, however,  only 
if  they  are  not  redeemable  by  drawings  according to numbers.  An 
official quotation  at  the  German  stock  Exchanges  is not  required; 
Foreign  shares,  mutual  funds  and  bonds,  if they  are  fungible. 
Foreign  shares  and  bonds  are  required  to be  officially quoted  on 
German  stock  exchanges  or  eligible.for  regulated unofficial 
dealing.  Foreign  mutual  funds  are  eligible for  giro-transferable 
collective  custody  only  in  such  cases  where  their sale  in  the 
Federal  Republic  has  been  approved  by  the  Federal  Banking  Super-335 
visory  Office.  Foreign  registered  shares  must  be  converted  into 
bearer  instruments  through  corresponding  certification  Csee  under 
b)  Der  Deutsche  Auslandskassenverein  AG).  Eurobond·s  denominated 
in  Deutschmarks  are eligible,  almost  without  exception,  for 
giro-transferable  collective  custody;  Eurobonds  denominated  in 
other  currencies  are  only  eligible  in  cases  where  the 
lead-managing  issuing  house  is  a  German  bank  and  has  applied  for 
the  bonds  to be  made  eligible. 
It  is estimated  that  75  to  80  per  cent  of al( German  securiti~s are 
concentrated  in  the  Kassenvereine. 
According  to  th~ Securities  Deposit  Law,  the  Kassenvereine  must 
undertake  the  safekeeping  of  securities exclusively-in their own 
vaults  or  in  the  vaults  at  other  banks.  The  Kassenvereine  are  not 
permitted  to place  the  securities  in  (third-party>  custody,  be  it with 
other  banks  or  foreign  depository  banks.  It  can  be  expected  that  as 
from  1985,  at  the  latest,  the  Securities  Deposit  Law  will  be  amended 
and  the  Kassenvereine  will  be  allowed  to put  securities  in 
(th1rd-party)  custodt  with  foreign  depositary  banks,  subject  to  their 
having  the  same  functional  standard  (for  example,  SICOVAM,  CIK, 
NECIGEF).  The  Kassenvereine  will  then  be  in  a  position to effect 
international  security giro  transfers. 
The  administrative  acts  regularly  performed  by  the  Kassenvereine  for 
its participants  in particular  include,  but  are  not  limited to,  the 
collection  and  distribution of  repayments  due,  dividends  and 
interest,  the  setting up  of  subscription  and  fraction  rights  accounts 
in  cases  of  capital  increa~es,  the  procurement  of  new  sheets  in  cases 
of  coupon  sheet  renewals,  as  well  as  the  exchange  of  securities  in 
cases  of  corporate  changes,  mergers,  conversions  and  similar 
operations. 
However,  the essential  practical  effect  of  giro-transferable col-
lec~ive custody  lies  in  the  security-giro transfer  system,  allowing 336  -
a  purely accounting transfer of  co-ownership  shares  jn  collective 
custody  from  one  beneficiary  to  the  other .without .n«c:essH.ating  the 
physical  movement  of  a  single document.  Pursuant  to .tbe  Securities 
Deposit  Law,.  the  buyer  of  securities has  to acc,pt  delivery by  ·rae-.aAs 
of giro security  tra~sfer as  performance  of  the  stock· exchange  tr-ans-
action. 
Due  to  the  fact  that  all  German  Kassenvereine  are directly  connected 
with  each  other  through  mutually  held  accounts,  a  transfer of  sec-
urities· without  their physical  movement·can  also  be  effected by  way 
of  giro transfer  in all  such  cases  where  seller and  buyer  banks  are 
located at  different  stock  exchange  centres  and  thus  are 
·participants  in  different  Kassenvereine. 
The  facilities of  the  Kassenvereine  are  also available-to  th~ 
participants  f~r money  payments,  settling stock.exchange  transactio~s 
by  way  9f money  clearing. 
The  handling of  all  stock  exchange  transactions  is done  fully  auto-
matically.  The  proc~ss runs  as  follows  :  a  broker  having  determined 
a  price  feeds .all  orders  executed  at  this price via an  imput  unit, 
_after  visual  checking  on  a  screen,  into  the  EDP  syste$. ·  On  account 
of  a  most  variable  input  method  the  system  performs  an  extensive 
logical  input  check  and,  in the  event  of  input  errors having  been 
made,  will  not  accept  or  process  the data  but  return  it on  the 
terminal  screen  to  the  broker  for  correction. 
The  system  then  matches  the  contracting parties,  i.e.  allocations  are 
d~ne and  records  of_sales  stored.  Contract  notes  <confirmation of. 
transaction>  are  then  written.  The  stored broker  input  data  is also 
used  for  book-entries at  the  Kassenverein.  Every  trading day,·after 
input  of  all  transactions  by  the  brokers,  the  EDP  system  works  out  for 
each  stock  exchange  firm.a  so-called delivery  list containing details 
of. all orders  executed.  The  seller banks  can  establish  from  such 
lists which  of  the  transactions  have  to be  serviced two  days  later, 337 
as  is  customary  in  the  trade.  All  those  transactions  which  a  seller 
bank  cannot  perform  on  the  performance  date  by  way  of  security giro 
transfer  via  the  Kassenverein,  because  the  securities  are  not  in  the 
giro-transferable  collective  security deposit,  or  because  no  cover  on 
the giro-transferable  collective security deposit  account  is available 
that  day  for  the  securities  concerned  due  to delay  in  the  performance 
of  a  back-to-back  transaction,  are  marked  correspondingly  by  the bank 
committed  to delivery;  the  list will  then  be  returned  to the  Kassen-
verein.  The  Kassenverein  will  make  book-entries  only  of  such  trans-
actions· which  are  released  for  delivery.  The  transactions  not  re-
leased  in  the delivery  list will  continue  to  appear  in  the  subsequent 
Lists  until  the  obstacles  to their  release  have  ceased  to exist  and 
book-entries  in  the  collective  security deposit  accounts  can  be  ef-
fected. 
Simultaneously  with  the delivery  of  sales  by  way  of  security giro 
t~ansfer,. the  Kassenvereine  effect  money  clearing on  payment  against 
delivery  basis;  this  is  done  via  the  money  accounts  of  the parti-
cipants  held  with  the  respective  Land  Central  Banks  <the  Kassen-
vereine  have  ~en authorised  by  their participants  to  opefate  such 
money  accounts).  The  drawing  up  of  invoices  by  the  seller banks  is 
nc  longer  necessary  as  the  add-up  countervalue  is  stored at  the 
Kassenverein. 
b)  Der  Deutsche  Auslandskassenverein  AG 
Whereas  trading  in  domestic  securites  has  operated  smoothly  for 
decades  due  to  giro-transferable  collective  custody  as  laid down  in 
the  Securities  Deposit  Law  and  the  security transfer  system  connected 
therewith,  considerable difficulties  have  existed  in  the  past  concern-
ing  the  servicing of  transactions  in  foreign  securities  which  had  been 
kept  in  custody  abroad  and  were  not  eligible  for  official German  stock 
exchange  trading.  These  difficulties were  primarily due  to  very  dif-
ferent  securities  regulations  and  administrative practices.  The 
Kassenvereine  were  unable  to  contribute  to  the  improvement  of  this situation as  their business  activity,  pur~uant to the provisions  set 
forth  in  the  Securities  Deposit  Law,  extends  exclusively  to domestic 
securities,  which  are  held  in  custody  by  the  Kassenvereine  themselves. 
Therefore·the  Kassenvereine  founded  the  Deutsche  Auslandskassenverein 
Aktiengesellschaft  CAKV)  in  1970,  with  its head  office  in  Frankfurt/-
Main.  The  objectives of  the  AKV  are  <1~ to operate a  security-rights 
giro  transfer  system  in  foreign  securities deposited with  foreign 
banks,  in addition  <2>  to  cooperate  as  trustee  in  connection  with  the 
introduction of  foreign  registered  shares  to official  listing on  the 
German  stock  exchanges,  and,  finally,  <3>  ·to  help  foreign depository 
banks  and  international  clearing  institutions  to  find  affiliation with 
the German  Kassenverein  system.  The  AKV  is not. a  collective security--
deposit  bank. 
All  categories of  foreign  securities  from  18 countries deposited with 
German  credit  institutions  by  their  customers  are eligible for  the 
AKV's  security-~ights giro transfer  system.  For  practical  reasons, 
such  securities are  not  brought  to  the  Federal  Republic;  they  remain 
in  the  safe  custody  of  foreign  banks.  The  AKV  holds  those  deposjts 
for  its participants uniformly  under  its name  in  a  foreign  country, 
i.e.  per  country  in  one  single. depositary.  The  AKV  serves  its 
participating credit  institutions  as  central  booking  and  clearing 
agency  both  with  respect  to  the  securities as  such  and  the  payment  of 
settlements of  related trading  transactions.  The  participants will 
receive  from  the  AKV  an  advice  of  credit  to  a  securities account  in 
the form  of  a  fungible  deposited-secu~ity account  and  will  pass  en 
such  advice  of  credit  to their  customers.  This  helps  to avoid  time 
and  cost-consuming  security movements,  deposit  transfers  and  new  share 
registering  abroad  in dealings  among  the  AKV's  participants.  In  cases 
where  transactions  in  foreign  securities are  concerned  which  are 
eligible  for  over-the-counter  trading  in  Germany,  settlement ·and  de-
livery are effected fully  automatically  as  for  official trading  within 
the  scope  of  the  central  stock  exchange  business  clearing. 339 
Under  a)  it  was  explained  that  with  giro-transferable collective 
custody  at  the  German  Kassenvereine  the  receivers of g1ro-transferable 
collective security deposit  credits obtain  proportionate  co-ownership 
in  the  collective deposit  of  the  Kassenvereine;  thus  said  receivers 
are  fully  covered  in  a  case  of  bankruptcy  of  their depositary bank  or 
their  Kassenverein.  When  receiving  a  credit  advice  for  securities 
from  the  AKV  in  the  form  of  a  fungible  deposited-security  account  the 
depositors  do  not  obtain  co-ownership,  but  only  a  <contractual)  right 
to  claim delivery  of  their  securities  deposited  abroad.  {Depositors 
receive ·deposit  credits  in  the  form  of  a  'fungible deposited-security 
account'  also  in  such  cases  where  their  foreign  securities are  not 
held  in  custody  via  the  AKV  but  via  their depositary banks  with 
foreign  banks.> 
In addition  to  the  task  of  operating  a  security-rights  giro transfer 
system  for  foreign  securities deposited  with  banks  abroad,  the  AKV 
also acts  as  trustee  in  connection  with  the  introduction of  foreign 
registered  securities  to official  Listing at  the  German  stock ex-
changes.  Registered  shares  of  foreign  companies  cannot  be  admitted 
to official dealings  at  German  stock  exchanges  in their original  form, 
both  for  legal  and  factual  reasons.  British  registered shares,  for 
example,  lack  the  qualification  as  securities  required  under  the pro-
visions  of  the  German  Stock  Exchange  Law;  Japanese  registered shares, 
indeed,  possess  the  security  character  required under  German  law  but 
are  drawn  up  in  a  script  and  language  not  generally  understood  in 
Germany;  US-American  registered  shares  must,  on  account  of  differing 
laws  and  securities  regulations,  be  adapted  to German  conditions. 
The  AKV  assists  in  the  introduction  of  foreign  registered  shares  to 
official  German  stock  exchange  dealings  by'  issuing bearer  collecti~e 
certificates  for  the  foreign  registered  shares  which  are  the  subject 
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The  cover  funds  of original  shares  forming  the basis of  the  bearer 
collective certificate are  held  in  trust  by  the  AK~ under  its name  in 
the  country  of  the  home  stock  exchange.  The  AKV  deposits  the bearer 
collective certificate  in  a  giro-transferable collective sec·urity 
deposit  with  a  German  Kassenverein  and  in  this manner  creates giro-
transferable  collective  secu.rity  deposit  fractions  negotiable on  the 
stock  exchange  which,  like  domestic  bearer  instruments,  can  be  trans-
ferred  through  the  security giro  transfer  system. 
As  regards  the  AKV's  participation  in  an  international  sec~ity giro 
transfer  system,  it  cooperated  in  the  foundation  of  the  'Centrale de 
Livraison  de  Valeurs  Mobilieres  S.A.'  <CEDEL>  in Luxembourg  on  Sep-
tember  28,  1970.  CEDEL's  objective  is  the  performance  of  an  inter-
national  giro  system  in  Eurobond  issues •. Acting  for  German  ctedit 
businesses,  the  AKV  has  atquired an  interest  in  CEDEL  and  set  up  an 
accounting  connection  with  it.  This  allows  German  banks  parti~ipating_ 
in  the  AKV  to  settle transacted dealings  in Eurobonds  on  the.basis of 
'payment  against  delivery•  via  this  clearing  linkage  both  among  each 
other  and  also with  foreign  participants  in  CEDEL.  In  this case,  too, 
the  AKV  provides  its participants  no  co-ownership,  but  only  the 
<contractual>  right  to  claim  re~elivery of  like securities of  equal 
amount.  Book-entries  are  effected  in  'fungible deposited-security 
account'  and  not,  as  with  t'he  Kassenvereine,  in  'giro-transferable 
collective  custody'.  Moreover,  the  AKV  acts  through  the  German 
Kassenverein  system  as  depositary  bank  for  CEDEL  and  EUROCLEAR  in 
respect  of  Deutschmark  denominated  Eurobonds  which  are  eligible for 
the  German  giro-transferable  collective  custody  system.  Furthermore, 
the  AKV  keeps  in  custody  for  CEDEL  and  EUROCLEAR  any  German  shares  and 
domestic  bonds  which  may  be  eligible  for  the  systems  of  the  above-
mentionned  clearing organisations. 
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20.1.5  United Kingdom 
Although the central pivot of the design of the London  settlement 
system  which serves the Stock Exchange  and the Stock Exchange  (Irish) 
is the recognition of the role of the  jobbers in the market,  and 
although the domestic functions of the system will necessarily continue 
to relate to registered stock,  the functions of the  TALISMAN  system are, 
in principle,  the  same  as  those of the Continental depositaries.  The 
obstacles to effective linkage of TALISMAN  with its Community  counter-
parts are those of law or protocol,  and are not related to its 
technical functions. 
The  TALISMAN  system is based on  the operation of a  nominee  company 
(SEPON  Ltd.)  in which  each  issuing company  listed on the stock Exchange 
has an account.  Shares of selling clients are transferred into SEPON, 
held in the  n~inee in trust on behalf of the beneficial owner,  and,  on 
settlement,  are transferred out into the buyers name.  Within  SEPON 
separate accounts are  mainta~ned for  each jobber.  The  central computer 
system sets up  the  transaction records  (the  jobber always beinq the 
intermediary between  the broker sold and bought bargains in London 
tradin~  and processes the various steps of settlement.  In effect, 
as no  certificates are issued for  a  SEPON  holding,  SEPON  is a  jobbers' 
depositary.  Jobbers' stock,  and movement  of stock in the market is thus 
dematerialised.  Individual items of stock in the  jobbers'  accounts 
become  fungible,  and constitute a  pool  from  which  stock can be - 342  -
apportioned by  computer against a  queue of buying orclera.  With TALISMN, 
a  simple  'settle-~s-dealt'  system became possible,  replacing the 
previous complex  clearinq which }¥ld  been constrained by the need to 
opt~ise delivery according to available physical shapes.  central 
stock payment  functions are integrated into TALISMAN,  a.ncl  stock moves 
against money  within the system. 
TALISMAN  does not itself handle  the nominative  share registers,  which 
continue to be maintained by  the issuing companies'  registrars.  The 
syst~  has  however,  through machine-readable interfaces with the larqe 
service registrars,  facilitated and  speeded the registration process. 
An  important by-product of the system,  self-evidently available from 
the computer records of transactions and of change of ownership,  are 
efficient systems for payment of dividends,  rights,  and other benefits. 
TALISMAN  does not handle gilts  (government bonds),  which are settled on 
another separate system. 
The  settlement system is supported by  a  large computer installation, 
comprising  two  computers of four and three megabyte memories,  linked 
to which are  ~enty four disk drives with capacity of five billion bytes. 
In active trading the system may  handle over  30,000 transactions a  day. 
Under  present plans put forward by  the Powell  Committee*_ and approved 
by  the Council 9f The  Stock Exchange,  it is intended to proceed further 
with dematerialisation.  It is not intended to set up a  central 
registry,  as the system is already linked effectively to some  1,000 
registrars wlio.  carry out their func:::;tions  effici.ently,  and absorb much 
detailed work  which might not benefit from  central concentration.  The 
banks are satisfied with present arrangements,  and  the oompanies  have 
not expressed any interest in  t~e centralisation of  sh.are registers.  A 
compromise  scheme  to exploit the benefits of book-entry transfer under 
the existing structure is therefore pz:oposed.  It is  int~nded to develop 
a  facility of uncertificated holdings available to investors through a 
Central Settlement Office.  Shareholders,  under a  voluntary scheme, 
will be able to maintain uncertificated accounts with transfers of 
ownership taking place wi tho':lt  the moveme_nt of documents.  The  main benefit 
* Securities Industry Consultative Committee;  "Report on Equity 
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of the proposal is considered to be the achievement of all the benefits 
of book-entry transfer through a  central nominee while  leaving the 
company  in close contact with its shareholders. 
Plans were  announced in December  1983  which envisage the start of the 
new  system in 1987.  As  well as  the  features mentioned above,  they are 
expected to include aqent nominee  facilities for  small investors,  the 
extension of the net payment system presently available to brokers 
and  jobbers to major investors and  agents,  and the use of the clearing 
house  auto~ated payments  system  (CHAPS)  for  electronic transfer of 
funds  between  the participants. 
Responding  to demand  in the  London market,  the priori  ties in the 
exten~ion of the TALISMAN  system relate to the foreign centres with 
which  London  principally deals,  and,  amongst  them,  those which present 
most difficulties of settlement.  ~  office was  first opened in South 
Africa  for  such reasons.  During  the study,  current plans were  to open 
administrative offices in New  York,  Melbourne  and TOronto,  with 
further moves  eventually into Hong  Kong,  Singapore  and Kuala  Lumpur. 
The  function of the  TALISMAN  offices will vary according  to the 
interface necessary with each  local depositary.  TALISMAN  considers 
that the system of aaministrative local offices is more  effective than 
the use of settlement agents,  which  tend  to be  slow and costly. 
Although  the nature of London  settlement,  due  to its concentration on 
'  registered stock,  is somewhat different from  that of the Continental 
depositaries,  TALISMAN  could play a  full role in any European'depositary 
linkage,  given that legal and institutional obstacles  to_ it doing so 
were  removed.  The  fact that there is no  bearer in TALISMAN  is not a 
problem.  Upder  European -linkage,  stock transfer would  be achieved in 
the countries of origin of the securities.  Continental bearer,  as is 
almost universally the case now,  would  be held abroad.  Present practice 
for example,  is for  a  U.K.  institution to hold German  bearer in the 
stock account of a  German  bank,  sub-account the institution's U.K. 
bank,  reference the institution.  Any  necessary accounts related to 
settlement in the U.K.  market could be within TALISMAN,  without that system ·ever handli119  the bearer aec:uz-ities.  Convw ..  ly,  t!w· '1'~·· 
functions  w~ld·  be  foun4  to be responsive to the requirGenta of the 
Continental markets in respect of London-lis·ted, reqiste~ed stock. 
Due  to prime attention having been paid to foreign mazokets which have tended 
to be more volatile in volume ~an the· Continental Exchanges., only the first 
tenuous steps have been so far taken by TALISMAN  to. develop this 
European relationship.  In 1982, a  Settlement Services investiqation 
into European problems was  discontinued in the face of higher priori  ties 
related to the Ausualian market.  The report on  this work was· of 
interest to the Consultants.  Ostensibly the investigation related to 
'checking'  (i.e.  the dual input of the transaction r.:ecords  to  the 
central computer  system) .  The  perceptive conclusion was  that the 
difficulties arose not from  any  technical problems of checking, but 
from  the absence of any well-formulated London  proceduresforsettlem~nt 
of European transactions.  The  problems were considered to be equally caused 
'by the  jobbers evolving separate systems  and  the brokers'  confusion 
in dealing in these markets'.  The  report CJavedocunentary  endorsement 
to  general.  comments  . l'llade  to the Consultants in all the markets. 
Positive results in European linkage  ar~ as yet, limited to the 1983 
agreement with SICOVAM.  Under  this initial step to establish liaison, 
TALISMAN  took over the agency functions previously carried out by 
eleven London banks on behalf of SICOVAM.  TALISMAN  deals with 
instructions to London  correspondents for  stock held in the name of 
SICOVAM.  TALISMAN  receives  from  Paris the relevant certificate, and  ··"' 
raises a  TALISMAN  sold transfer against it, after which  the transaction 
can be processed through the London  system.  The  arrangements cover 60 
stocks listed on  the Paris Bourse,  20 of which are U.K.  securities,  and 
40South1\fricanwitha U.K.listing.The advantages are the centralisation 
to a  single agent, .the use of telex to anticipate stock movement,  and 
the ability of TALISMAN  to operate stock balances held to the order of 
SICOVAM.  on  the deposit side,  speedier LOndon  payment can be faeili  tated 
by SICOVAM's;ac«eptance of telex notification of stock delivered to 
TALISMAN.  While  the scheme  falls far short of the mutual holding of 
stock accounts, it is seen_by both parties as  a  first constructive step 
towards fuller  li~age. - 345  -
20.1.6  Italy 
The  immediate relevance of the Italian depositary,  Monte  Titoli s.p.a., 
to European  linkaqe is severely limited by  ~e Exchanqe Control regime 
which has isolated the Italian markets  from  international dealing.  The 
emerqence of this powerful depositary system which is well-aliqned in 
all respects to link with its Community  counterparts  doe~  hopefull~ 
have siqnificance for the future. 
Monte  Titoli was  established in 1978  in Milan under Law  1966  of 
November  23  1939  as  a  trustee company with the conventional objectives 
of limitinq ·physical movement  of stock,  lowering stock transfer costs, 
avertinq theft and fraud,  and increasing the  speed of settlement.  The 
stockholders of Monte  Ti toli are  the Bank  of Italy,  (the larqest Italian 
bank),the Bank  Associations  representing the minor banks,  the 
Associazione Bancaria Italiana,  and  the  broker~ association.  The 
participants are the institutions linked to Monte  Titoli by mandate, 
which may  be banks,  brokers  (through a  joint nominee)  trustees,  clearing 
houses,  and  financial institutions whose  activity is compatible with 
that of the depositary.  An  irony of the Italian Exchanqe Control 
situation is that, of all the Continental depositaries,  Monte  Titoli is 
the mostfree in respect of establishing relations with depositaries 
abroad,  a  facility which is a  dead letter in present circumstances.  In 
1980 Monte  Titoli was  explicitly authorised by  the Ministry of Finance 
to admit foreiqn securities, whether  shares or bonds.  Article 10 of 
the depositaries statutes foresees the  need  for  Mon~e Titoli to become 
a  member  of  foreign depositaries. 
The  basic operations of Monte  Titoli are deposit,  block-transfer free 
of payment,  and withdrawal and settlement of shares bought and sold 
during  the month.  Within  the system securities are fungible.  Special 
operations carried out are acting as pledgee,  underwriting new  issues, 
operating a  proxy service,  managing  rights accounts  for capital increases, 
and  collecting dividends  and  interest. 
The  implementation of the depositary· system was made  difficult by a lack of 
legal support or compulsory  sanction.  On  the other hand,  this freedom 
• • 
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from  external regulation con£ers on the de~itc"y qreat flexibiUty. 
Mherence to the system has been encouraq-.4,  in x-ecent.,yNrs,  by 1the 
Bank of Italy and the CONSOS. 
The  depositary admits both shares (which in Italy with the  e~ception 
·of  ce~tain savings shares  (A~ioni di Risparmio),  must be registered) 
into its own  name,  and bonds  (which in Italy muat be  bea;re~. 
In  secur~ties sett~ement in Italy, delivery of securities is  tigh~ly 
linked with cash  ~yment, but this is achieved  through the. clearin; 
system of the Bank of Italy.  Monte Titoli itself has no  p&yment 
function,  and is notified of the net transfers of securities resulting 
from  the Bank's stock and payment clearing.  cash transactions  are for 
three day settlement, while  the  account dealil\g,  which  runs  mid:..month 
to mi,d-month,  is settled at the 'end of the second month.  Monte Titoli 
is connected to the six clearing houses of the Bank-of Italy, of which 
the principal is Milan.  The other five clearing houses  have securities 
deposited in Monte Titoli in Milan,  and their clearing is co-ordinated 
through the Milan clearing.  Brokers in the four Stock Exchanges 1!fi th-
out clearing  ~acili  ties may· either settle direct in their centre, or carry out 
their bargains c:m  an Exchange with  bank clearing.  '11le  system has thus 
the advantage of  highly centralised bank clearing in a  national 
system.  The depositary is driven by  a  magnetic tape on which  the Bank 
of Italy gives the necessary transaction information.  Government bonds 
which are now  largely dematerialised,  are settled by the Bank  of Italy 
without involvement of Monte  Titoli. 
Monte  Titoli~s targetat the start of its operation in Novemberl98lwasto 
achieve immobilisation of securities and to consotidate certificates 
into large denomination,  leading to tiLe  use of global certificates and 
ultimately to dematerialisation. 
The policy in Italy is to attract into the depositary a proportion of issues to 
cover active trading.  The  depositary does not aim to secure deposit of the 
major block holdings which  are not normally traded.  At the beqinninq 
of 1984,  seventy seven shares of all types,  out of some  250 listed - :47  -
were  admitted,  representing some  20\ of the  issues concerned,  or 300 
million shares.  Ninety corporate bonds ot pri\'l\te industrial 
companies or state-owned corporations were alao handled. 
20.1.7  Luxembourg 
As  an international centre of great importance in the Eurobond markets, 
Luxembourg's  settlement systems are almost entirely related to  the field 
of Eurobonds.  The more sophisticated aspects of the Stock Exchange  systems, 
linking bond markets  'A'. and  'B'  through key-to-disk equipment to 
a  central processor which  then produces  output for the clearing  · 
system,  handle variable-income,  fixed-income  and convertible Eurobonds. 
The  Stock  Exchange  runs  the Chambre  de  Liquidation for delivery and 
payment and  includes the Clearing House  of the Luxembourq-establiahed 
banking and  financial institutions,  organising the daily settlement 
of all claims between its members.  In  1982  balances of Flux SO,lllm 
were  settled against gross claims of Flux 236,091m. 
While,  in a  study restricted to the equities market,  th~e LuxemPc>urg 
bond operations have no  formal  relevance,  the contrast between the 
efficiencies of international bond  and  international equities settle-
ment is marked  and  is widely recognised by market participants.  The 
comparison is developed in certain respects later in this section. 
Luxembourg  is the location of CEDEL,  the  ~nternational bond  clearing 
agency,  and its operations require brief note.  CEDEL  is incorporated, 
and has its head office in Luxembourg,  with a  representative office 
in London.  Its shareholders are  95  banks  and  institutions.  CEDEL 
operates a  securities and precious metals clearing system.  No  share-
holder can hold more  than  5%  of the company,  which is a  co-operative 
operation for  ~e benefit of 1,200 participants in fifty five countries. 
Through participants'  account~transactions in some  5,000 fixed interest 
securities can be settled in any  of twenty  five countries. 
~articipants' securities are held by  CEDEL  on deposit with approved 
depositary banks,  of which  there are  twenty  four  and which,  in principle, 
are also shareholders of the company.  Participants' deposited cash 
balances  are maintained in their original currencies,  CEDEL  being 
required to maintain cash and deposits at least equal  to the funds - 348  -
entrusted to it in each currency,  subject to the gr.-nting of overdraft 
facilities to participants. 
Participants holdinq CEDEL  stock :and  cash accounts,  havinq executec1  a 
transaction, transmit instruction8 to CEDEL.  Tlu'ouqh· the  computeris~ 
book-entry system,  the securities are transferred fro. seller to 
buyer  and  simultaneously cash is transferred  fr~ buyer to seller, 
with the transaction being  cleared the.  same day.  CEDEL' s  system can handle 
securities on a  fungible or non-fungible basis.  For the transmission of 
transaction instructions and  of  re~orts the CEDEL  communication 
system uses Chemlink,  General Electric Time-sharing  network, 
Investdata  (Telekurs)  s.w.I.F.T.,  or computer-computer link. 
Securities are kept in segrated vaults in the depositary banks  with a 
record of certificate numbers,  and  are isolated from  the accounts of 
the depositary bank.  The  system rejects stopped bonds.  The  depositary 
banks must insure securities held,  to which  is. added  CEDEL  insurance to 
cover possible deficiencies.  CEDEL  operates financing  and bond-lending 
services,  with forty eight hour overdrafts at the discretion of the 
Executive  Comm~ttee and longer term  finanee available through 
participating banks.  Stock borrowed before 11.00 hours can be used 
to settle transactions that day.  CEDEL  administers collateral free of 
charge.  custodian fees are charged according to the volume  of securities 
deposited.  Transaction fees are charged,  subject to a  volume discount. 
Interest on overdrafts is credited to participants after appropriate 
deduction. 
Between  1972  and  1982  the number  of CEDEL  participants grew  from  300 
to 1,200;  issues admitted to the  system fran ,500 to 6,000;  and 
securities deposits  from  zero to $45  billion. 
The  other bond market clearing  system EU:ROCLEAR,  thouqh operating 
from  Brusselsand not Luxembourg,  is best considered in this context. 
EUROCLEAR  is larger than CEDEL,  with;  in 1982,  1,300 participants,  8,000 
securities admitted and  securities deposited in excess of $105 billion. 
The  system processes more  than 12,000 instructions daily,  •nd its - 349 
annual  turnover exceeds  $500 billion.  The  syst• )\as  evolved fran a  .. 
settlement service begun  in 1968  by the Brussels office of the 
Morgan  Guaranty Trust Company.  It is now  owned  by Euro-clear Clearance 
System p.l.c. whose  shareholders are 120 banks,  brokers and  investment 
institutions located all over  the world and active in the international 
securities market.  The  company,  in which  each participant has a  small 
percentage of shares,  determines policy,  the securities to be accepted 
and  fees  to be charged.  The  Euro-clear system is now.  operated under 
contract by  Morgan  Guaranty in Brussels where  a  distinct organisation, 
the Euro-clear Operations Centre has been set up,  employing  300 staff. 
The  functions of the system are book-entry clearing with simultaneous 
transfer of stock and payment,  the latter in twenty currencies,  custody 
through a world-wide  network of depositary banks,  and  securities 
·lending and  cash clearing.  Enhancing  the system,  links have been 
established with CEDEL  and,  through the A.K.V.,  with the German 
Effectengiro permitting EUROCLEAR  members  book-entry settlement of 
transactions with members  of  those  agencies. 
In the  intere~t of efficient communication,  participants may  use the 
EUCLID  programmes  within the G.E.  l'iark  III time-sharing netW()rk  to 
send instructions or receive reports,  and this system is now  usedfor 
eighty per cent of securities instructions received by  EUROCLEAR. 
Participants may  choose  their own  form  of communication,  and messages 
may  be.sent by  SWIFT  twenty-four hours a  day.  ~h~ile almost the 
entirety of EUROCLEAR  deposits are Eurobonds,  foreign bonds,  domestic 
bonds  and  certificates of deposit,  equity shares are accepted into 
the system. 
A securities lending and borrowing  service is offered to participants 
and  EUROCLEAR's  system,_ introduced in 1976  was  the first of its kind 
for  internationally traded securities. 
Like CEDEL,  a  feature of the EUROCLEAR  system is the efficient and 
instantaneous reporting of securities and money  positions to 
participants.  A distinction between  CEDEL  and Euroelear is that the - 350  -
latter only handle• aecuri  tie  a  in fungibl·e -tona.  ·. 
In the conteXt of these  independent international elMrinO'  ageftOiea, 
the success anc1  growth of SWIFT  (the Society for WCX"l4-wi4e·  Interbank 
Financial Telecaamunication)  must be noted.  SWIFT,  set up in May  197.3, · 
is an international transaction proces.sinq and  traMIUli·ssiOh  system 
whiah by 1983 had  expanded  to cover 1,000 JHIDl)er  J:)anks  in over fifty 
countries.  SWIFT  is a  non-profit making  co-operative society,  owned  and 
controlled by the member  banks who  use  the service.  The  principal 
function of the network  is international processinq of transactions,  i.e. 
bank  transfers,  foreign exchanqe  confi~tions, statements,  documentary 
credits etc. ,  and  interbank securities tradinq.  An  important faciU.  ty 
is that of message-text standards for universal computer-readability. 
The  oriqinal system,  SWIFT  I,  now  approaching the end of its service 
life, was  a  centralised network  based on  a 
1 store and forward 
1  approach 
to processinq •. SWIFT  II,  to be  implemented in 1985-87,  is to be a 
modular  system based on  'transaction processing'.  It will be more 
flexible,  permittinq user banks  to incorporate a  variety of processing 
or application functions  for  regional or national services,  and it will 
permit  inter-a~tive systems  between participants.  Terminal interf•ces 
with SWIFT,  subject to meeting the specifications necessary for the 
system,  are member-owned  and may  be of  afJ.Y  manufacture,  bu~ SWIFT  also 
offers a  ranqe of interface packages  from  branch to bank main-frame 
·scales of operation. 
SWIFT  ls increasingly being drawn  into securities business by demand  of 
its members,  and in 1983  a  Securities Working  Group  was  desiqninq 
standards for securities messages.  At  the· time of the Consultants' 
discussions,  consideration was  being given to the participation in 
SWIFT  of leading world braking houses.  It was  sugqested .that the 
banking Community  would ,P.  in two  opinions on  this question.  In the 
interests of bank!ng  (and  securi~ies industry)  efficiency, it was  felt 
desirable that the large-scale securities houses  should participate. 
on  the other hand,  there were  functions within the member  banks which 
might lead banks  to interpret such a  move  as admission of competitors. - 351  -
20.1.8  Netherlands 
Amsterdam  settlement procedures originate in the"Effectenclearinq b.v., 
a  collective settlement system, the principle of which is that the system acts 
as a  canmon  counterparty.  Bargain records are based on the input of punch 
cards  from  the market floor  and  transaction lists are produced for 
members  overnight, to be available at 0900 hours the next day.  The 
'lists give the cumulative  stock and money  balances. 
The  Effectenclearing adjusts the liabilities for  stock  bargains to the 
market price of the current day,  to maintain protection against price 
movement,·and nets this difference out on delivery of stock.  Settlement 
is formally  ten days after dealing  (or earlier),  b~t up to twenty one 
days is allowed,  and  twelve to fourteen is considered the norm.  A 
disadvantage of the present clearing computer  system is that it cannot 
monitor delivery date against transaction date.  A new  system is being 
developed which will permit enforcement of higher discipline of 
delivery,  but it is anticipated that it will not be  implemented until 
1986.  For Stock Exchange  transactions both the cash and stock movement 
is driven by  the Effectenclearinq,  which  sends  the instructions for 
stock transfer· to the Dutch depositary NECIGEF. 
NECIGEF  (Nederlands Centraal Instituut voor  Gira~l Effectenverkeer b.v.) 
was  established in July 1977,  under  the Securities Giro Act.  All its 
shares are owned  by the A.E.B ..  Its objective,  under  a  voluntary 
system,  is to replace  individual ownership of specific shares by  joint 
ownership of deposited blocks,  so permitting giro transfer.  The 
depositary is forbidden  to incur  any  commercial risks.  The  functions 
of NECIGEF  are  the safekeeping and management of the securities"in the 
central deposit,  the related accounting work,  carrying out the 
computerised book-entry transfers,  and controlling interest payments  and 
dividends,  allotment of drawing groups  and settlement of drawn debentures 
and conversions.  Transfers in NECIGEF  holdings may  arise from  instruc-
tion of stock Exchange  members,  through  the Effectenclearing,  to deliver 
giro stock,  from  non-member  banks'  instructions to Effectenclearing in 
regard to a  Stock Exchange  transaction,  or  from  delivery between members 
on  the basis of direct instruc.tions  to NECIGEF  from  the banks.  Giro 
delivery is normally  four  to five days after dealing.· - 352  -
Membership of NECIGEF  is available to institutions operating in safe 
keeping,  management  and administration of securities, i.e. ·banks or 
brokers,  provided they are registered under the Credit Supervision 
Act.  The  Nederlandsche  Bank  n.v.  and  the Effectenclearinq are members 
by virtue of their clearing roles.  Foreign depositaries are alsO 
eligible for membership. 
The  NECIGEF  giro deposits are required to be at sufficient level to 
SUpport members I  transactiOnS  and  are  SUpplemented by a· pre-depot 
system.  Securities are entrusted to the depositary under  a  principle 
of co-ownership,  to which  importance is attached by the Dutch 
authorities in respect of relations with other depositaries.  The 
client can demand  physical securities equivalent. to hts holding,  and 
his securities are not liable to be  attached in the event of failure 
of a  member  or of NECIGEF.  When  a  member  bank alters a  client's 
securities account,  the client must be  in-formed.  If at fault, the 
depositary is liable for  loss,  otherwise members  have collective 
responsibility if the loss is not covered by insurance. 
NECIGEF  is mo:t;e  than usually restricted in the corporate securities i't 
may  admit.  Only bearer securities are admitted;  reqis.tex:ed stock and 
non-fungible bonds  are not,  on  the basis that these securities are not · 
fully interchangeable.  The  depositary, is therefore, able to admit most 
of the Amsterdam-listed equities,  and  the parallel market stocks which 
are not registered.  At present,  no  foreign securities are admitted to 
NECIGEF,  but it is anticipated that this restriction will be  removed. 
While  the foreign  stock,  under  a.  system of linkaqe,  would  be  left 
abroad,  NECIGEF  accounts  jn such'stock would  be essential.  The 
depositary  may  also accept A.D.R.'s  and  C.D.R.'s for U.S. 
securities. 
While  the Dutch investor  has  a  legal right to hold bearer secur'ities in 
their classical  (K)  form,  administration of these.securities has been 
modernised by  the institution of the.centrum Voor  Pondsenadministratie 
b.v.  (CF).  The  function of CF,  in  ess~nce, is the control of a  system 
of exchange  agents who  transform K securities into CF  form,  or vice-
versa,  maintain  an  appropriate  system  of  records  and - 35'3  -
control of CF  securities issued.  The  CF  certificates, which are small 
and  two-part,  affirm both the holding itself and the standing entitle-
ment of the holder to all benefit of the stock,  so averting  the need 
for physical detachment of coupons.  The  CF  certificate itself may, 
in practice,  only be kept by securities institutions.  NECIGEF  is a 
participant in the CF,  like the member  banks  and stockbrokers.  Under 
the  system,  payment of dividends is streamlined.  The  companies remit 
the dividends  to the CF,  which  then transfers the total net amount of 
dividends to NECIGEF  and the bank depositaries,  who  are then responsible 
for appropriate credits  to the stock account holders.  Subscription 
rights .and  other benefits may  be  handled in the  same  manner.  For 
conversions or drawn  debentures NECIGEF  sends  the securities to the 
exchange or payment agents. 
NECIGEF  accepts both K and  CF  form  ~ecurities, but not in respect of 
a  single stock.  If both CF  and K are in circulation,  then NECIGEP  will 
only accept CF.  If the company  has not,  through the CF,  issued CF  · 
form,  then NECIGEF  will accept K form. 
20.2  The  requirement for  a  long-term strategy in the development of 
European Settlement 
It appears  reasonable to suggest that the approach to the development 
of a  European  settlement system  should reflect the  p.n.losophy  and, 
possibly, the technical approach  which  the Stock Exchanges appear like~~ 
to adopt in the development of a linked  trading  system.  The  vital need  to 
respect the domestic role of the national institutions  as  European 
linkage is progressed  applies  equally in both cases. 
As  regards  settlement, this implies a  strategy whereby .the development 
of European settlement will be  firmly based on  linkage of the existing 
depositaries,  rather than on  any  centralised institution.  It further 
implies that development  towards  a  fully  linked system will be 
progressive.  In the first instance,  given  the implementation of an 
enhanced  and  inter-active IDIS,  as  proposed in Section 19,  the network 
would be used as an instrument o£  more efficient communication in the 
passing of standardised settlement messages,  and progress could be 
developed  f~om this modest  threshold. - 354  -
Acceptance of the ultimate,target of a  European system andof the 
proposal for'an effective communications  netwo~k tmplies  a  fundamental 
difference of approach  from  the bi-lateral associations  through which 
progress is presently being attainep.  Even  the first moves  to 
establish effective communication  on  an inter-European basis will 
raise difficulties  in  standardising  the underlying meaninq of the 
data transmitted.  As  these information difficulties were identified 
and overcome,  the need for  further standardisation of proce4ures would 
become  progressively apparent and would  need  to be  confron~ed.  Somemight 
be resolvable within the field of settlement.  Some,  such as  standardisation 
of dealing and  settlement periods might require to be  resolved in 
conjunction with  the development of  mo.rket  linkage.  At the level 
of European  linkage,  a  different orientation of depositary policy, 
aimed more  at business  development and  less based on  investor 
protection might be required. 
A European settlement system might thus  emerge  progressively, 
starting with  a  network of inter-depositary canmunication which 
eventually developed,  in the  longer  term,  into a  jointly owned 
organisation of depositary linkage which  provided the markets and the 
national d:eposi taries with  the services required for settlement of 
international transactions.  The  European settlement would be  a  linking 
and clearing function,  rather than a·central depositary as such. 
The  Consultants do  not believe that at this point the progression 
towards  increased standardisation  o~ European settlement can be 
predicted.  Nor  do  they believe that it  is their task to attempt to  ~.redict 
it.  It would  be ·identified from  expert Working  Groups  first tackling 
the elementary aspects of international communicationr  and the obstacles 
would  emerqe  logically as  further standardisation was  seen to be 
required.  It is apparent,  assuming  the  IDIS  scheme  rapidly progresses 
to the point at which it can record,  within a  single information 
system,  all sides of an  international transaction between  two  or more 
European  Stock  Exchanges,  that an  entirely new  potentialcould emerge  for 
settlement linkage.  The  possibility 9f a  jointly owned  central service - 355  -
to manage_ the  link between  the depositaries in such  transactions is 
immediately evident. 
An  important consequence of the adoption of  such a scheme of l,inkage  by 
the depositaries,  concurrent with the development of the dealing 
linkage,  is that it would call. for  a combined effort ~Y all the 
depositaries.  It is submitted that this might prove more constructive 
in  the  long  run  than reliance,as at present,  on  bi-lateral negotiations. 
In  advancing  such  an argument,  no  derogation is intended of the 
formidable  work  which pas,  in spite of the difficulty and  complexity 
of the -field,  resulted in constructive  arrangements  between individual 
countries.  It is,  however,  questioned whether  this approach  can be 
trusted to yield results in the  time-scale likely to be  required in · 
the European international market  and whether it is likely to produce 
in the longer  term  the facilities which  the efficient operation of the 
linked market will require.  This question is discussed more  _fully in 
Section  20.12  below. 
20.3  The·  need  for  improvement of European  International settlement 
From  the discu~sionsbetween the Consultants  and all typea of market 
participants, it is evident that there is considerable pressure for 
improvement of international settlement within the Community.  The 
situation.is that market operators have  been  largely  ~eft to evolve 
their own  systems of dealing and procedures for inter-Exchange settle-
ment.  Dissatisfaction with  the latter was  universal,' subject 
to  expression  of  appreciation  o.f  effective  bi-lateral 
agreements  in the small  number  of cases where  these exist.  In general, 
European international settlement is unregulated,  confused and costly. 
A typical statement from  a  large broker,  succ~ssfully active in 
European dealing,  was  that complex back office procedureswere  '50%  of 
the business'.  Office costs of transactions are high,  estimated by 
one  efficien~ internationally active broker as approximately $60  a 
bargain.  Expectedly  European international settlement is labour-
intensive compared with other fields. - 356  -
Business is inhibited by  the fact that any  advantage gained from competent 
dealing at a  fine price can easily be offset by  undue costs. of settle-
ment,  which  are much  at hazard,particularly with reqard to timinqs of 
delivery and payment.  Issuing companies want better procedures for the 
international movement of stock.  Increased U.S.  involvement in the 
European markets is introducing an  important pressure group who  will 
seek  the same  efficiency of inter-exchange settlement that is available 
in the u.s.,  and who  will take steps  to provide it if they do not find 
it locally.  In this situation it may  be  appropriate that the national 
depositaries should review  the significance of the emergence of the 
independent settlement agencies,  such as  CEDEL  and EUROCLEAR  and of the 
high interest which is being  shown  by both intermediaries and major 
inves~ors in the  type  of facilities which  these  two  international 
agencies are able to offer.  Many  brokers,  banks  and international 
market-makers  are beginning to use  the services of these  commercial 
agencies  to bridge  the gap  between the depositaries.  While  the manage-
ments of CEDEL  and  EUROCLEAR  have at pres~nt no positive desire or 
a~parent plans  to attract international equities business,  this 
situation could change if their participants were  to demand it. 
If this were  to occur it could raise serious issues for  the inter-
national business of the depositaries.  The  view expressed by  one 
major  European bank,  itself highly active in the international capital 
market,  was  that any  tendency of international settlement to move  from 
national Stock  Exchange-based depositaries to independent commercial 
agencies  would  constitute a  threat to the cohesion of the  individual 
Exchanges,  in a  much  more  real way  than,  for  example,  the  loss of 
market information services to outside specialist firms.  If the 
emergence of this competition implies that the national depositaries 
must .move  to maintain  thei.r own  position in face  of it,  then they have 
to set up  an organisation to provide  the central communication  and 
processing which would be  required to achieve effective linkage. 
The  remainder of this Section reviews  the main  problem areas in 
establishing such  a  concept.  These  are considered to be membership of 
the  system,  type of securities admitted,  facilities for delivery - 357  -
against payment,  provision of commercial  and foreign exchange facilities, 
coupon payments dividends  and benefits,  and  technical considerations.  In 
this broad context,  it is argued  that bi-lateral negotiation is likely to 
fail to produce an effective European settlement system in a. competitive 
time-scale,  and  a  preliminary indication of the  type of scheme  on  which 
the depositaries could embark  is attempted. 
20.4  Membership of the depositaries 
In  theory,  bi-lateral agreements  between depositaries should, 
ultimately,  produce  a  network  linking the membership of each depositary, 
through which  an account holder in any  could take or deliver stock 
through book-entry transfer  from  or to any other account holder in any 
other depositary.  The  ultimate scheme  ~s best illustrated by  the 
present CIK-SICOVAM  arrangement,  and  the lists  of participants in the 
procedural documents  for  this linkage make  clear the·very wide  range of 
trans~er-routing which may  be  establish~d in this way.  Similarly,  the 
more  limited arrangements between CIK  and  the Dusseldorf Kassenverein 
and  Auslandskassenverein  mean  that CIK  participants have  the facility 
to  take into,  or deliver  from  the1r credit balances at those depositaries 
in settlement of transactions  involving all  the German  Kassenverein 
members. 
As  linkage proceeds  a  problem will arise,  however,  ovBr  the disparity in 
qualification for membership  (i.e.  depositary stock  account holders), 
as  this varies  from  country to country.  Liberality of membership 
criteria differs,  in some  cases  be1ng essentially defined by  legislation 
governing credit institutions,  in others permitting broader participation. 
In  London, at present, on'ly  the brokers  and  jobbers participate in the 
settlement system.  In  December  1983,  The  Stock  Exchange Council,  within 
proposals to implement electronic book-entry transfer for equities 
settlement,  expressed  the intention to extend  the net payment system to 
major  investors  and  agents.  While  from  an industry standpoint this 
proposal is most constructive, it may  imply broader depositary member-
ship than is permissible in most other Community  countries. - 358  -
Depositary membership  i~ therefore, not consistent across the markets. 
Where 
the 
intermediaries  do  not  have  local  a~rangements  with 
agencies  with  which  they  settle  their  business,  they 
tend to j'oin  non-Exchange  systems.  A thorough  review by  the national 
(Exchange-based)  settlement organisations of such external affiliations 
of their own  Stock  Exchange  members  would givean indication of  the 
nature of the international linkage  and tqe facilities which  their  local 
settlement really  re~uires.  Tn~ likelihood is that such a  study would 
point to the need for international initiat1.ve taken by the depositaries  them-
seives.  Market participants commented  favourably on  the fact that 
CEDEL  and  EUROCLEAR  could accept virtually 'all agencies',  and  that 
this was  a  great simplifying factor in conducting settlement through 
them.  Linkage  through  membership of each national depositary 
would be both less comprehensive  and  less uniform,  and  the situation, 
as bi-lateral linkage gradually  proceede~would be patchy and  ~omplex. 
A view of  some  interest met in the markets is that international 
settlement of equities should be  based  on  the settlement machineries 
of the Stock  Exchanges.  Both  the regulatory  function of the official 
markets  and  t~e necessary· expertise in local equities were considered 
~mportant in this respect.  It is likely that any move  by  the Stock 
Exchanges and the depositaries  to set up  effective international linkage 
would  receive  stro."l.g  support  from  institutional investors. 
In any  sch~e to link  the depositary systems without any  international 
framework,  it appears  likely that one major  inefficiency of the present 
international settlement  - the widespread use of settlement agents  -
would  remain.  The  use of  these agents arises  from  the need of an 
oP.rator in.market  'A'  to have  an  'agent'  within the depositary 
system in market  'B'.  The  operatcr in  mark~t  'A'  appears  to require 
this contact in the other market  to effect all necessary  s~ttlement 
instructions· within the  foreign  settlement system  (of which  'A'  is, of 
course,  not a  member),  and  also partially for market reasons,  such as 
preservation of the confidentiality of certain aspects of dealing.  It 
~s presumed  that if a  central arrangement were made  between the 
depositaries which,  in effect,  made  the operators  ir; markets  'A'  and  'B' - 359  -
me!Dbers  of the  ~ame settlement network,  the need for  settlement aqen·ts 
and the substantial cost of such extra intermediaries would  disappear. 
The more  fundamental  problem  - t.he mutual membership of  th~::  C!eposi taries 
themselves with each other -has been  the prime  concern of the  ~i-lateral 
negotiations to date.  It appears  that during 1984  SO!.t.e  of the long 
standing obstacles between certain of the markets may  be  removed.  The 
problem remains  to be  resolved in respect of those countries which are 
not yet involved in negotiations.  The  deep  :r:oots of each national 
depositary in local  law and  in legislation drafted primarily with the 
local market. and  the protection of  t..he  local investor .in mind  may 
continue  to  impede mutual  international membership.  Complicating  this 
problem is the fact  that the depositaries are organised with different 
constitutions,  different corporate  forms,different  adc~nistering 
aut..'"lorities  in regard to quite deep  technical detail,  and with different 
relationships to their national.  Stock Exchanges. 
LOcal  law  may  restrict not only depositary membership but also the 
client~ for  whom  th~ members  act as  nominees.  For  example,  restrictions 
on  ti1e  nationality of beneficial  owners  prevent SICOVAM  from  accepting 
iiill.'llatriculation  (via the bank member)  in  favour  of clients of certain 
n<itionalit:t.es  in certain stocks.  While  these restrictions have been 
eased in 1983 with regar·d  t.o  two  important marki.H:o 1 
remain,  complicating  the  use of the depositary by participa.r.i.:s  aJld 
foreign clients. 
'l'he  introduction of  a  linkage organisation at European levelmight 
bring  more  flexibility  to  the si  tuatJ.cn.  A  common  criterion, 
broader  than that of na. <.::icnal  depositary  membership might be  accepted, 
which would widen participation across  the  sec'..rd ties industry,  while 
the depositaries .lt national  le11el  woul.d  continue to operate their 
present.  'prot.ective  •  :co2.es.  Secondly,  present problems of mutual 
mecbership of depositaries might be eased if the relationship was 
secured th;rouyh  an  intermediary organisation at European  level, run b.y.,. 
the depositaries  themselves. 
, 
I 
i • 
- 3W  -
~e  of  secar~ties admitted to the linked depositary system 
At:  inherent problem of a  'l)i  ... lateral solution'  1s  the restriction of 
~)7~S of  sec~riti~s which the depositaries are permitted to admit.  The 
~.:.;:treme  caset::;  l;.ossibly  a:r:e  1-<""ECIGEF,  •.o~hich is only penni  tted to hold 
be;;-rcr  ::Jecurit:.i~s  "J.nd.  is thus  forbidden  from  holding  foreign reqistered 
st:o~~kt  .'!;:ld  l·ondon,  where  the s;cttlement  syster.~s do not handle bearer  a-:: 
all.  The  Kassenverein  restrictions are more  complex,  and,  against 
criteria derived  from  German  securities law,  they admit certain foreign 
sec•~rities but net others. 
A  further  limitation which  appears  to have  entered all bi-lateral 
~egotiations is the tendency to  confi~e  agr~ernent not only to listed 
securities,  but,  more  :!:"estrictively,  tc..  scc·Jrities mutually listed on 
both exchanges.  This constraint appears to app:y to  ~;e whole  network 
of  agreements between  NECIGEF,  CIK,  the Kassenvereins  and SICOVAM.  In 
:n..i-·-'"':;.r:(]  ·:;,1~  C'-"quir.s·.1:::nr..  f0.r:  mul tir:,lt.·  listing  r  they  severely limit the 
::cope  oi sec·  .• r:i.x.ie.;  cc.v.:;:.r.eJ.  The  :t~.lcical  effect of such :cestrict:ion is 
oest illustrated by  the  recent  F:r.~nch nationalisations,  which,  at a 
stro~e,  m~de a  dead  letter of  the French element in  the  SICOVAM/NECIGEF 
ag:r.·acment  of '1982,  ar:d,  likewise,  caused all the  Kassenverein holdl.ngs 
of Frend>.  securi  t.ias  to be  retu:Lne-J.  to France. 
It is unclear  1.·1hy  chis  requirement has  crept into the bi-lateral 
negotiations as,  in their domestic  function,  all the depoaitaries have 
latitude to deal in any  securities wherever  they  are listed and indeed 
in some  cases,  they may deal insecurities which are not officially quoted at all. 
This broader definition is  fa~ more  relevant to the  idiom  in w~ich the 
international market operates. 
It is further  alleged by market practitioners that in the agreements 
reached so far  there has  tended to be  discrimination by depositary 
authorities  in favour  of bonds  and  against shares.  The  Kassenvereins 
are
1 ·for  example1 alleged to have  been more  flexible  in setting up 
effective external links between  their depositaries and  the Eurobond 
market  than  they have  for  shares.  In principle it would appear - 361  -
illogical to discriminate in favour of a  bond  issued by  a  company,  and 
against the shares of the company  which underlie any assurance 
represented by the bond itself. 
There  appears to be widespread demand in the markets that any internationally 
traded European  sha~e should be  held  'in one place'.  The  precedent of 
the Depositary Trust Company  is quoted,which facilitates transfer 
betwee~ ~.S. Exchanges  and  now  holds  some  95%  of u.s.  stock.  As 
pointed out below, it is considered that such an  arrangement would 
meet  t~e money  and  stock control  requirements of  the market operators. 
Interpreting the u.s.  situation into the European context,  the ultimate 
logic is for  each national  settlement institution to be  the depositary 
for  the securities issued on  its own  market,  and  to be in account with 
all other Europec:.n.  depositaries in respect of  those securities.  Under 
suer.  an  arrange~1ent,  restrictions confining national depositaries to 
local.  securities form  would cease  t:o  be  an obstacle.  While  this is a 
professed aim  of the bi-lateral relationships which are  now  being set 
up,  sucn  a  system,  if the full  necessary interactions are to be 
obtained,  would· require central reporting and message  transm.Losion 
pt:cc<:!dures  supported by technical equipment  capable of handling the 
traffic invoJvPd  J:t  is, therefore, argued  that'.  iu::..:.  :"'0.'., :·:1<)!.';; .:·r"c·t  ~.:I  the 
bi-lateral relationships ..,1ill  inevitably in due  course  t..~.u·c"  ~.lF·  th<.t1  .~.eed 
for  central European clearing,  and  that·the problem may  as well be  faced 
at an  early stage.  Such  European-level negotiations would also provide 
c:m  appropriate workshop  to identify o.nd  resolve  technical problems 
related to types  of securities  across a·gradually broadening range,  which 
w1.l1  be.; reqt.ired  i..f  a  genuine inter-linked European market is to be developed. 
A further complication is the apparent need  for  a  physical instrument 
which would co:-;stitute qood  de:Livery in all of  the Community  markets. 
Until various  iisc&:  ~nequalities inflicted on  investors of different 
countries are removed,  it appears  likely that physical delivery of 
stock will continue to be  required for  tax  reasons.  This apart, it will 
be  some  ~ime before  the preference of some  national investors for 
physical stock will disappear.  The  likelihood is that,  at least in most 
t 
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countries,  the right of the investor to demand it will remain protected 
in law.  Expert opinion is that in most.of the Community  countries 
oematerialisation cannot be  compulsorily achieved. 
A further  powe~ful factor  inhibiting total dematerialisation is the 
:nslstence of.  important foriegn intennediaries,  notably the SWiss 
banks,  on holding physical  stock.  The  Dutch  and  Ger.nan  markets  are 
particul~rly concerned to accommodate  this need,  and  the French 
dematerialisation  scheme  permits  SICOV~~ to issue certificates in 
favour of  for~ign holders. 
!}~a:cer securit.ies are already deli-..erable  in all the European markets. 
Unde:c  -:;.ny  linkage  sy.:>tem, ccmplications  wo~ld only arise from  the 
exclt:."i':>n  of  al.l  or certain bearer securJ.ties  from  a  depositary's 
accounts  or  from  certain transformations  to which  the securities may 
certificates 
i" 2gist·~red securities which  canr.ot, fo:c  reasons  of either  la\v  or 
conv~nience,be dealt in local _markets. 
r-.;o  ol.·lginality of  t.:.ought  ~s required  to  reach  the solution to this 
problem,  which  has  been  resolved at local level in several of the 
European  markets.  The  reconstructio:l at F:uropean  level of  national 
systems of issue of  local certifica.t;:;s,  (such  as  t.r,at  in Belgium),  to 
produce a  system of European  Depositary Receipts,would appear to continue 
to meet the  local needs while at the  same  ti:rrie  broadening  the markets 
which the local certificates at present serve.  The power  of the U.S. 
ADR  system is now  apparent.  The  Consultants  investigated this  U.S. 
market in the course of .their study,  anc.  consider that it could offer 
an important precedent for  E~rope.  The  success of the present u.s. 
ADR  market is ~ore significant than the  failed past attempts  to  launch 
an  EDR  market~  ~hich were  under-resourced.  The  ADR·market is capable 
of moving  the main market in European  securities to New  York.  A French 
international bank  asserted that the.vast majority of transactions in 
Paris in South African gold shares  are now  in  ADR  form. 
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The  feasibility of, and the case for, a  system of EDR: s  •.:;,;;.nnot  be  fully 
reviewed in this Report,  but brief figures  express  the dimension of the 
problem.  ADR's  were  established in 1928,  but the real growth of the  · 
system has come  in the last ten years,  initially in South African qold 
shares,  later stimulated by  American  investment in Japan and Europe. 
Four hundred  foreign securities are now  issued in ADR  fo:.::Jl  by Morgan 
Guaranty Trust,  of '<lhich  some  eighty are European equities;  In the 
five months  following  March  1983  nearly half the  new  ADR's  issued by 
Morgan  Guaranty were in European shares.  In  1970 ADR's  represented 
approximately  100 million underlying shares;  by mid-1983  this. had 
increased to over 750 million shares,  of which  sane  35%  were  European. 
The  strength of these markets might be  exempU.fied by the turnover  in 
1982  of 10,371,000 Glaxo  one-for-one ADR's,  or of 9,623,200 Novo 
Industries ADR's  in the  same  year which represented  some  $664 million 
trading.  If t.he  need for  such  a  s_Ystem  in Europe  were  established, 
the  prime requirement would be  an organisation,  pres,.liYlably  based on 
depositaries  and operated by their member  banks 1  who,  at European  level, 
would issue these instrtwents.  The  system would  serve the double 
purpose of facilitating delivery of European  stocks between  the Community 
exchanges  and pffering potential  to  create  Community  markets in 
non-European  stocks. 
The  main drive of internaticnal settlement would be  towards effective 
bc,ok-ent:z:y  transfer of. securities,  but this will not be totally 
achieved in .ince:r-national  t.rading.  The  contl.m.u  .....  ;;;.  ·,  ";l~:d  l:~r  i~·)struments 
of physical  form  which  could be dealt acro.ss  the markets  m:..~zht.  ::)c~  1il~t 
by  an  EDR  system. 
Facilities f.or  delivery against payment 
One  of the mo3t:  important arguments  in favour  of a  linking organtsation 
relates to the money  and  stock management  functions of the major 
investors and  intermediaries.  A major  transaction may  involve four, 
five or six European centres.  Even  in two-centre transactions, 
complications of movement  of stock and money  are inevitable  from 
disparate settlement scheduling  and procedures.  An  international 
dealer has  a  constant problem of  'where is the stock,  where is the - 364  -
money?'  In  inter~European settlement this is acute.  one major 
market~aker c~~ented that his trading was  only possible through the 
latitude of European banks who,  knowing  the situation,  were helpful 
~nd flexible.  If the normal  standards of domestic  banking disciplines 
were  imposed,  he believed the market would  not be viable.  In the 
E~~opea~ international market there  tends  to be  far  too  m~ch 'free 
payment'  with the movement  of stock  and money  inadequately linked. 
Ma!'ly  market operators appear  to believe th.at  the answer  to this problem 
lies in  some  form  of  Europe-wide  settlement in which  the  stock and money 
movements  are firmly  locked  together.  The  international investor or 
dea~er does not want  a  complex  statement of  stock and money  in 
different currencies  from  di=ferent centres.  ~e requires  a  single 
contrcl  for  effective cash management,  and the more  complex  the sources 
are,  ~~e more difficalt is his task of  drawing  up  the daily statements 
from  which he  can  manage  his money  balances. 
'I'.i1~s  implies  settlemem: through agencies whL:::h  handle not only 
securities but also money  within the  samr~ system.  In this way  payment 
J.s  neither at  ~isk nor is it subject to costly delay.  The main risk 
to w.n.l.ch  international operators are at present  exposed is not the 
total default of a  counterparty,  which  ~s most unlikely and  which  can 
be  avoided by  normal  market expertise and  prudence.  The  real risk is 
incompetent settlement,  which could cost  them  more  than the margin  or 
the commission on  the  transaction.  European  international settlement 
should be  supported by  inter-depositary  lines of communication,  and 
this system  should be  linked with  the banks,  presumably  through 
National  Bank  Clearing  and  SWIFT. 
In principle,  this requirement is unlikely to be disputed by  the 
national depositaries.  Although  only_ two  of  the  systems,  the German 
Kassenvereins  and  the  London  settlement have  fully  integrated· domestic 
systems of stock against payment,  all the depositaries are in effect 
supported by  their domestic  clearing-systems in which payment against 
delivery is instantaneous  and  guaranteed.  Examples  are the 
Effectenclearing system via the KASS  Associatie  Bank  in Amsterdam,  the 
Caisse de  Compensation du Comptant  and  the Co-operative de  Liquida.tion 365 
du Terroe  using·the Banque  Nationale  de  Belgique  ir.  B~uss~ls,  the 
clearing system of the Chambre  Syndicale  using  the Banque  de  France 
in Paris.  The  assurance of payment  from  these  systems is however 
only available to members  of the specific clearing organisations, and the 
procedures  do  not cover  transactions with a  second country counterparty. 
To  underpin an inter-linked European market  and  to  :f<:·~cj.l i.t2.te  more 
dealing,  either linkage of ·the clearing organisations or development of 
·parallel procedures is renuired at Euro0ean  level. 
It seemed generally acknowledged that the plethora of settlement 
contacts presently involved in international European  transactions 
should be  replaced by contact with as  few  agencies as possible.  This 
requirement,  so well perceived and carried through  in the bond market 
in the plans  for  CEDEL  and  EUROCLEAR,  is discussed elsewhere  in this 
Section. 
20.7  Provision of f.i.nancial  facilities 
An  important aspect of the facilities provided by  CEDEL  and  EUROCLEAR 
are the money  and  stock management  functions  and related financial 
services.  These  appear to have great appeal  to market participants. 
They  simplify the work  and control  functions  of the large professional 
dealing houses while,  at the same  time,  they offer effective help to 
smaller participants who  do not have  specific contacts in foreign 
centres. 
A single system  for  stock,  money,  stock borrowing  and  tite  ~s€ vi 
stock for collateral is seen as essential to the development of a 
European market by many  market.practitioners.  The  independent 
commercial depositaries are able  to offer comprehensive services of 
money  management,  placing  overnight and  short-term money  on  behalf of 
participants,  and  facilities for  stock borrowing  are  smooth  and 
well-organised. 
The  international markets'  requirements  for  such facilities pose  a 
quandary in considering the appropriate European-wide role of the national 
depositaries.  The  gtliding principle of the legislation underpinning 
t 
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the national depositaries  ~1as  less the provision of market services 
than the assurance of absolute integrity of a  depositary  system 
meeting  the  needs  of local investors.  Accordingly,  the depositaries 
are virtually all precluded  from  any  commercial  functions apart  from 
t.1'l.OSI:l  r:re-:~s.aiy related to custody  and administration of securities. 
The  l'i:.CJ•-tl  tc.:..hnicali ties of  the  forms  of  joint holding available to 
t."le  :r.aal  owners  tend  to be  the definitive aspect of  the  arrangement. 
It is asserted,  as  a  resultJthat it would  be  improper  for  a  depositary, 
in which beneficial holders  enjoy  a  right of joint ownership in 
dt:;?OSl.tS,  to link With  i'l.  'commercial'  depositary, ,in Which,  it is 
alleged,  the beneficiaries'  stock rights  are merely  those of the 
creditor.  It further appears  that even establishing which of these 
cases  u..ight  apply is  a  matter of  consido<!rable  controve.csy. 
It is clear that the national  deposi tan.es may  encounter considerable 
:~.e:;;r::::  ,=:  fficult:i.es  in any  collaboration betwaen  them to set up  a 
Europ~.>:;.r,  system which  ~ncorporat.cd  cz;itJ.merc~a.l  facilities of the  type 
alr.e:d.y  available  in the bond markets. There may however be some room to 
rr.anot:·uvre  in that such  a  European organisation could be  an adjunct to, 
rather  than  an inteqral part of,  the  local institutions. 
The  provision of  commercial  and  financial  facilities has  a  very direc.t 
relevance  to the effective  linkage of  European equities settlement. 
Apart  from  positioning in the international market,  discussed below, 
the bought  and  sold sides of inter--market transactions  are dealt in 
different dealing periods  for different  settle~ent dates.  It can be 
anticipated that the  forward  dealing  and  settlement periods will not 
be  harmonised  for  some  years.  Meanwhile~  a  constructive proposition 
might be that one  of the  functions  of  the  linkage organisation would 
be  to absorb  the inefficiencies  of  the present situation by offering 
central facilities related to  the various  br·idging  operations which at 
present are  t1andled by the dealing  f'i  rms. 
For~ign exchange facilities 
A similar r.;.bse.cvation  would  apply  to  the provis1.on  of foreign  exchange 
facilities.  At  present,  in  ~he settlement  system of each  centre,  the 
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currency of settlment tends  to be restricted to  local Ci.u:rency  or the 
U.S.  dollar.  In Amsterdam,  for  example,  int:erne,tional  settlement may 
be either in guilders or dollars. 
'l'he  independent international depositaries  do  not suffer  from  this 
restriction and both EUROCLEAR  and  CEDEL  transactions may  be  $attled 
by  the buyer in virtually any  currency.  T'nis  facility has  the potential 
of permitting the  international dealers  to bring all their money  to a 
single currency position,  which,  for  control  purposes  they clearly 
require to do. 
It would be  highly desirable  for' any  system linking the depositaries 
to offer a  similar facility.  This  could not be  achieved  through 
bi-lateral linkage,  and  implies  the existence of  some  common  clearing 
structure.  As  most of the depositaries do  not handle  the money  side 
of the transactions, it also implies  that the Stock Exchange  payment 
institutions should,  where  necessary,  be  associated with the system. 
For example,  in Amsterdam  not only  NECIGEF  but also KASS  Associatie 
would be  involved in the networ,){. 
20.9  Coupon  payments;  dividends  and benefits 
The  tasks associated with the administration and distribution of  interest, 
dividends  and other stock benefits,  and the accounting  entries connected 
wi  t:h  them,  are greatly eased when  the deposited physical stock is 
concentrated in one place·.  This  appears  to  be  an  al.m  ;"J.~- tbe present 
bi-lateral negotiations.  An  ultimate  ideal situation would  be;;  tc  iia\•1?. 
all securities issued onto  each  exchange held in the depositary of that 
country,  with the members  of  that Exchange  as the sole paying agents.  At the 
same  time,  the other Community  depositaries would be  in account with 
the depositary in the country of issue,  and  the  necessary credits could 
be transferred through  the  system. 
Wh~ie this struct.ure is achievable by bi-lateral negotiation, it appears 
likely that the  traffic resulting  from  the benefit payments  would be  so 
heavy  as  to require  some  form  of centralised communication  framework, 
which bi-lateral negotiation could not achieve. ..  ,..-· 
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Agreement  to participate in the  linking of  European depositaries might ease 
SOJI.e  of the problems in this field which  appear intractable at 
national  level.  For  example,  di
1ffti.culties at present arise due  to 
the insist.ence of Belgian bar..ks  for  Dutch  certificates in classical 
form  for  payment of coupons.  The  banks,  not unreasonably,  are  not 
concerned with the difficulties incurred by CIK  and  NECIGEF  in the trans-
formation of  CF  form  to K.  If, however,  the Belgian banks  as participants 
in CIK  also held membership  of  a  European  linking arrangement of which 
c::K  •;;as  u.  component,  they would be  lnvoJ.ved  in the general  efficiency 
of that  iir~age,  and  the present attitude would possibly not be 
sustained.  The  argument applies  to many  nationally-based problems 
w:1ich :night 9radually be  re.solved  by  commitment  to  a  European-level 
linking  arra;:1ge.r~ent. 
7echnical considerations 
wn~l~ tDe  extent of  applica~ion of  computer  technology  to the dealing 
CJ.na  market functions  of  Stock  .2;:,.cc:.a;~ges  remains  a  controversial and 
undetermined mn.tter,  its relevanc"'  to back office procedures  and 
settlement is  firmly  established.  The  trend  towards  total automation 
of securit.les setllemE!nt:  is clear,  and it will proceed  further as 
de-materiahsation of transfers  and securities graq.ually becomes.t.he 
norm. 
The  Community  countries have  overall  made  great progress in the 
imp:eme~tation of modern  depositary  systems,  and,  normally  under  the 
aegis of the Exchange,  highly  sophisticated systems  have been 
implemented at national  level.  As  more  business  tends  to move  into 
international dealing,  two questions might be posed. 
(i}  The  first relates to the optimal scale of operation.  The  depositaries 
draw  their revenues  from  custodian charges  and  fees'charged  on 
accounting entries.  Economies  of scale apply,  and it is clear that 
. the smaller de?Qsitaries,  or depos1taries which  have difficulty in 
sect.tring adequate lodged stock  for  one  reason or  another,  have  more 
difficul~y in generating adequate  revenue  than their larger counter-
parts..  In consequence  their charges  have  to be high,  and  they may - 3i:fl  -
have  d~f:ficulty in maintaining a  fully  competitive rate  :.>f  devalopment 
of their international services.  Disparate charges  and disparate rates 
of technical development might detract  from  a  system based on 
bi•lateral agreements.  Cost factors might begin to indicate that 
nationally-based operation in all the ten countries was  not the most 
efficient scale.  Participation in an effective scheme of linkage would 
do much  to shield the smaller depositaries  from  the effects of such 
concentration,  and assist in the protection of their domestic  functions. 
(ii)  Second,  it appears questionable whether  the scope of the  pre~entagreements 
between.depositaries adequately anticipates the future deraands of the markets. 
For  example  the NECIGEF/SICOVAM  links are based on  telex messages 
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between the depositaries.  Yet both market opinion and  recent develop-
ments  such  as  the  'electronic bridge'  between  CEDEL  and  EUROCLEAR 
indicate that computer  linkage is likely to be  the pattern in the 
future.  This  cannot be  achieved bi-laterally between  ten  depos~taries. 
The  effectiveness of the communication between  the client,  the 
depositary member,  the first country depositary,  the  second country 
deposi~ary,  the second country depositary member  and his client needs 
to be  carefully reviewed  in comparison with  the facilities available 
to  the international bond dealer through  CEDEL  or  EUROCLEAR.  From 
such  an  investigation it wopld  emerge  that while movement  of paper  -
international transfer orders,  etc.,  and  tel~x messages- prevail 
wher~ the depositaries are concerned,  they  dre,  ir·  t~e  cas~ of CEDEL  and 
EUROCLEAR  largely replaced by on-line computer  communiQation. 
Bi-lateral negotiation  ~s not adequate 
While  the progress made  in recent years  in setting  up  the existing 
links between the depositaries must be  fully  and generously  acknowledged, 
it appears questionable whether  this general  approach will be able to 
achieve effective European international settlement in the time-scale 
required.  In  face of the rapid progress being  achieved by outside 
agencies,  the Stock  Exchanges  need to extend  the coherence of the 
official markets which is obtained through their settlement machineries 
to a  European  level,  and  to do  so as  an  urgent  task~ 1  ,; 
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The concept of ·a  European settlement was  proposed at least as early 
as  1958,  then by  M.  DeWaay  of  the Brussels Bourse.  Yet still the 
i4eal of full international association  remains  a  distant target. 
The  tally of two-way agreements  to date is small,  amountinq  to:-
SICOVAM  - CII< 
SICOVAM  - NECIGEF  (one  way,  credit balance) 
CIK  - NECIGEF  (one way,  credit balance) 
CIK  - Dusseldorf Kassenverein  and  Fra1~furt Auslandkassenverein 
(one  way~  credit balance) 
SICOVAM  - TALISMAN  (agent function only;  no  depositary connection) 
In 1984 more progress may  be  achieved-~y the amendment  to the 
Depotgesetz which would permit further  linkages to the Kassenvereins. 
r::ven  oo,  when  e~.e  required scope of ·the bi-lateral approach is 
considered,  the extent of the  rem~ining problem is striking. 
Theoretically,  arrangements  between  ten countries will be  required. 
This. results in a  total of forty  ·five  negotiations  between those 
coum:ries.  Regrettably ~this  number  doubles,  since each  country ls in fact 
~nvolved  in two  sets of negotiations,  one  with  regard  to 
setting up its own  acc9unts  for  foreign  securities in the second 
country,  and  one with regard  to setting up  the  lqcal  accounts of its 
own  securities for  the foreign depositary.  These are  two quite distinct 
problems  and subject to different constraints. 
Apart  from  the fact that this.number of negotiations is monUmental, 
and would consume  time out of all relation to the·availability of 
qualified staff to carry it through,  the·approach has other flaws. 
First,  the negotiations will  tend to be private between  the countries 
concerned.  They will focus  on  the resolution of individual national 
differences,  and  no  opportunity  for  the emergence of general principles 
and  common  resolution of  common  problems will occur. 
Second,  the ultimate problem  o.f  technical compatibility and capacity 
of the linkage system willnot be  faced.  Assumptions  of traffic etc., 
- '  ....,....,  ···~  •  .... '  .. 
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relevant to negotiations between  individual member  countries may  be 
invalid in relation to the  total situation which will result from . 
the sum  of the aqreements. 
Third, it has been noted  tl&at  there ar·e  certain problems  impeding 
effective inter-European settlement which might best be  dealt with 
at European level.  The  most  obvious  of these might be  the distortions 
and dis-incentives  imposed by  the different and complex procedures 
associated with withholding  tax and  tax credits.  The  common  ventila-
tion of these questions at European level might offer the best 
opportunity of amelioration.  At  that level also there might be 
potential for  relaxation of constraints which are appropriate at 
national level on  depositary  functions,  but which might be relieved 
in respect of their participation in an agreed,  depositary-based 
linkage. 
Fourth,  there is already an  evident and understandable  tendency to 
disregard the more  awkward  aspects of bi-lateral negotiation.  For 
~xample, in spite of·the close business association between  the  AEB 
and  the London  Stock Exchange,  NEGIGEF  has  not yet considered any 
linkage with the  London set  tlernen  t sys  tern.  This is on the reasonable grounds 
that existing negotiations with depositaries of similar structure is 
already exhausting the resources  they have  for  su~h nE:;goti.a tions. 
The  more difficult, but possibly more  significant,  relatior~hips may 
therefore be ignored. 
The Consultants wish to stress their awareness  of the achievements 
made  in the complex  field of depositary linkage  through bi-lateral 
negotiation,  and of the importance of continuing work  on this basis. 
They  believe,  however,  that concurrent with it and  derived  from it, 
a  major initiative should be  mounted  to plan the steps by which the 
general linkage  system proposed in this Report could be achieved. 
Such work would  require detailed systems  analysis of the type 
conventional in designing  the  settlement systems of the individual 
exchanges. .,  1 
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Lest is has not been made  clear,  they would  further stress that their 
proposal does  not imply  the creation of a  further level of settlement, 
with the diseconomies which that would  involve.  The  proposal no more 
implies creation of another level of &ettlement than  a  banker's 
clearing house  impiies another  level of banking.  This  comparison 
effectively illustrates the rationale of  the proposals. 
Future progress 
The  purpose of this Section has  been  to review the present  statu~ of 
negotiations between the depositaries,  and  to suggest that there maybe 
a  danger of their international  functions gradually being eroded_by 
outside organisations ·which presently appear in a  position to play a 
fuller role and, in some  respects, offer wider  services·.  Compensatinq 
this is the  acknowledged specialist knowledge of the national depositaries 
of the complexities  of  equities settlement,  which places  them  in a 
strc·ng position to_ extend their role into the international market. 
While  the Consultants de  not attempt to present any definition of the 
form  and  scope of the  linkage ideally required between tne European 
depositaries to meet such  a  challenge,  the essential characteristics 
and the pattern of activities towards  them  are clear.  Moreover, 
assuming  the Commission  and the Committee  of Stock  Exchanges  proceed 
to implement  dealing  linkage,  the  time is appropriate for  a 
similar initiative in international European settlement. 
The  dealing context of the  settlement planning  i·s  not easy to predict. 
The.  international market in equities has  a  dual structure.  The 
majority of the transactions are carried out off themarket floors by 
intermediar~es who  may  or may  not be members  of the official markets. 
The  nature of such transactions are,  to a  declining extent,  arbitraqe 
operations  and, to an increasing  exten~direct international deals. 
The  deals  ma.y  have  one  side as  an  exchange  transaction,  but  they may 
be off market altogether.  The  other type of dealinq in foreign 
securities is that carried out on  the stock Exchange floors,  normally 
to provide a  local market for private investors.  The  settlement 
impli~ations of these  two  types of foreign markets vary. - 373  -
As  regards the  ~international m4rket 1  and  the  local professional 
dealing in foreigns  frequently associated with it, the installation of 
an  inter-Exchange 1nformation linkage  system offers revolutionary 
possibilities.  Hitherto,  as u.s.  securi~ies dominate this market, it 
has  tended,in the absence of any  formal  European arrangements,  to fall 
into a  five day rolling settlement.  It will possibly be correct to 
rationalise this market on  that basis.  The  enhanced  IDIS  will mean  that 
both sides of these  t~ansactions will, for the first time,  be  recorded 
in a  single settlement information system.  The  potential for  the intro-
duction of settlement disciplines in  transactions between European 
international dealers will exist. The transactions themselves will be brought 
into inter-Exchange settlement and the compilation of statistical recorrs of 
the European business transacted by Stock Exchan(Te members will be ~ossible. 
In the case of transactions  in which  one  side is on  an Exchange  floor, 
the  •streamlined'  international settlement will not be relevant,  as 
the dates  of settlement of the two  sides will differ.  Until harmonisa-
tion of dealing markets occurs,  the  ]inked settlement system would  ha~e 
to accommodate  the variances between  the present markets. 
Opinion oivides within the  Committee  of  Stock Exchanges  as to  wheth~r the 
lir~ed dealing  system should primarily  nupport the international 
market as it is t.ending  to develop,  or whether it should be based on 
floor linkage,  in the belief that. this will bring i rn  .. ·~:rna  tiona! 
transactions back onto the floors.  The  Committee is at present 
pre-disposed to the latter course.  The  Report has earlier discussed 
the problems  related to both of these approaches.  The  ultimate 
e~olution of the long drawn  out process of linking the exchanges rests 
on the decisions of the Commission  and  the Stock Exchanges.  On  the 
other hand it is clear that the application of  IDIS  to European settle-
ment will present the settlement experts with three challenges,  in the 
following  sequence:-
(i)  The  rationalisation of the existing European international market, 
at present operating  loosely  on  alleged five  day  $ettlement,  and,  by 
uni~ersal voice of the participants in the market,  in dire need of 
regulated settlement; r' 
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(ii}  -:ehe  implementation of intermediary  network· functions which will do 
something to minimise  the  ineff~ciencies in international transactions 
(iii) 
involving the market floors  arising  from  different dealipg and 
settlement practices; 
'rhe  gradual evolution of proposals  for  a  fully  linked European settle-
ment  arrar~ement, based on  the  depo~itaries, which  could  support the 
harmonised trading system which  fully  effective floor-linkage  implies. 
The  pattern of objectives 'implied by  the  above  synopsis  might be 
divided.into short-term,  medium-term  and 
might be  summarised as  fol·lows:-
Short-term 
long-te:rm.  The  sequence 
(i}  Exploitation of the  coml<Junication  ond  inter-dcti  ve  message  switching  system 
of  ~ne enhanced  IDIS  to carry settlement  ~nstructions;  agreement of 
stand~rdised set~lement communications;  definition of the message 
switching  systems; 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Linkage of the' IDIS  system  with  bank  clearing at national level 
and with SWIFT  at international level; 
Determination of the corporate  form  and/or the  formal  agreements  under 
which  the linkage  system would operate;  definition ofthe range of 
participants,  possibly of different levels of service;  definition of 
the distinction between dealing and  settlement participation in the 
IDIS  system; 
(iv)  Control by the  system of delivery against payme?t,  supported by 
appropriate banking agreements; 
·(v}  In respect of international. transactions with one side on  a  market floor  -
absorption by  the linkaqe system of all possible settlement 
incompatibilities arising  from  different Exchange  procedures,  settlement 
periods etc.; 
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(vi)  In respect of the  'international'  off floor  market created by members 
of the exchanges  - definition of  a  full  system of five day  rolling 
international settlement,  payment  against delivery,  of which  the 
basis would be book-entry transfer of stock  and  inter-bank money 
movements; 
(vii) 
(viii) 
(ix) 
Concentration of all stock in the depositary of  the country of issue; 
I 
Transmission of dividends  and benefits  through the system; 
Ins~tution of  a  system of European  Depositary Receipts which  would 
be  good delivery in all Community  markets. 
The  short-term objectives might therefore relate to the development of 
inter-depositary communication  channels,  which would effectively 
anticipate future traffic needs.  These  would  connect with depositaries, 
their members  and possibly the big investing institutions,  the 
settlement stock payment agents  and  the banks.  Transactions reports 
and settlement.instructions would be  routed through  the network.  The 
system would  '?rive'  the book-entries related to international trans-
actions in the depositaries and trigger payments  through the banks, 
thus  automating many  present paper procedures.  The  system would 
rationalise the present international market between members,  bringing 
their transactions back into the exchange machinery.  it:.  would  absorb 
some  of the present inefficiency of floor based international trans-
actions in major securities. 
Medium-term 
As  the  linkage developed  and  confidence  in the system  increased, 
consideration might be given to providing the types of services at 
present available  from  the central settlement organisations of the 
bond market.  These might comprise  such  functions  as:-
(i)  OVernight money  management  of participants credit positions; 
(ii}  overnight borrowing facilities with deposited stock as collateral1 (iii} 
(iv) 
(v} 
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Associated financial  control  and reporting functions  for participants; 
Foreign exchange services,  and  foreign  exchange management of 
participants' cash· positions: 
Management  of both sides of stock borrowing facilities for participants  • 
. As  an alternative to the linkage organisation carrying out such 
functions,  a  turopean Securities Finance Corporation might be set up, 
along  the lines of  the Japanese  system.  This might be similar in 
principle to the Japan Securities  Finane~ Company,  and operate  with 
similar official sanction.  The  function of the European Corporation 
would differ from  the role of  t~e Japanese counterpart,  but the 
authorisation of it would be  similar, 'enpowering it to operate 
commercial  functions  under  supervision. 
Long-term 
In the short and mediUm-term it is presumed  ~~at the  form  of the 
European markets  serviced by  the settlement linkage will not have 
materially  changed.  The  European international market off the Exchanges 
will continue to develop,  possibly strongly,  along its present lines. 
The  present mixed  function of  'arbitrage'  and direct internati9nal 
dealing will continue to pr·ovide  the necessary intermediation between 
the national·markets,  and,  through appropriate  financial  adjustment, 
bridge their different characteristics.  If floor  linkage is established 
during this period  without fundamental  change  to the trading procedures 
of each Exchange,  floor  linkage  must  be  achieved  through  the 
same  form  of intermediation carried onto  the market floors. 
However,  the aim  of the Commission  and  the objective of the Committee 
of Stock Exchanges  is to achieve  the European  dealing linkage  throuqh 
the floors of the.Stock  Exchanges.  This  implies total harmonisation 
of trading procedures  in the major  European  securities,  and also,  to 
ensure the balance of the systen,  alignment of the capacity and  scale 
of members  of all the Exchanges.  In  the view of  the Consultants,  these, -. 377-
and similar conditions related to the equilibrium of the system, 
are  categoric~! requirements of  f~ll floor  ltnkage. 
Viewing  the situation realistically, it is likely that such 
standardisation of all significant market characteristics will only 
be achieved in the long-term.  on  the other hand,  as  the development 
of linked settlement proceeds,  the  longer-term objectives of 
barmonised markets  should be held in view,  with fully  linked European 
settlement as the target.  It miqht  then be possible for  the inter-
mediate  improvements  in international European settlement to be 
related to the long-term ideal. 
Note:  The  compari·son  made  in this Section between  the  bond market 
central depositaries and  international equities settlement 
has  been considered the most apposite  to demonsl...cate  t.he 
comparative facilities.  From  the  standpoint of competitive 
challenge however,  it should be  borne  in mind  that the major 
non-European  securities houses already provide  international 
financial  and  settlement services,  and  members  of European 
Stock Exchanges  take  advantage  of  them. - 378  -
SECTION  21  THE  ULTIMATE  STRATEGY:  DIRECT  LINKAGE  OF  'l'HE  OFFICIAL MA1U<ETS 
21.1  Introduction 
'rhe  ideal linkage of the c&nmuni ty Exc;hanges  would be  achieved 
through full interaction of the market floors.  Th,e  floors still 
; 
constitute the focal points of the Exchanges.  Most of the Exchanges 
are keenly concerned to re-concentrate  the off-market business in 
European securities in their official markets.  In most cases this 
is interpreted to imply  the re-concentration of such business on  to 
the physical market floor.  This  aim links with  the objective of best 
. execution for any Community  investor in any com:munity  security.  This 
implies direct inter-Exchange dealing,  which could,  as the mark~ts 
are at present constituted,  only be  secured through floor  linkage. 
The  aim is further supported by  the close relation between  floor 
dealing and  the privileges of members  of certain of the Exchanqes. 
This  Section of the Report  t.herefore considers  the requirements of such 
ideal  .Linkage  between  the  Exchanges.  Th.::  Consultants  consider·  that 
they would  be doing  less than the task  assigned to  them  if they failed 
to discuss what,  in real terms,  effective  linkage of the Community 
Stock  Exchanges  would imply.  They  ~re fully  aware  that to do  so exposes 
them  to the crlticism that they are proposing  an unattainable ideal,  no 
matter pow  long  the  time-scale  in  which it is considered.may be. 
There are three principal reasons why  the Report must address  the 
question of full and direct linkage of the market floors.  The first 
is to clear away  the idea,  which has been expressed by certain Exchanges 
during the project,  that floor  linkage represents. an easy option whereby 
linkage of the markets might be  secured while,  at the same  time,  the 
present national characteristics of  the Exchanges  could be preserved 
undisturbed and  the present interests of members  could be left 
unaffected.  The  fact is that floor  lir~age can only be attained through the 
adoption of an integrated market system across the  Ex~hanges.  If the 
national markets were  to remain  the fulcrum  of  the  system,  inter-
mediation or arbitrage between  the different markets would  remain 
necessary,  and  no  fundamental  improvement of  the present international 
trading system in  Eu~ope would have been attained.  Uniformity of market 
procedures is therefore implied. 
.. .....  , .... • 
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Second,  most unfortunately,  there is no  easy progressive route to 
effective linkage of the markets.  The  transition from  separate to 
effectively linked markets is a  categorical step which,  at some  point, 
however distant,  will require a  series of  cateqor~al decisions by the 
involved parties.  As  discussed in this Report,  the present inter-
national market is largely off the floors.  Within the  limi~ations of 
a  system based on arbitrage between separate markets, it is increasing 
in efficiency and volume.  In sane quarters it is considered that there 
is a  danger  that the preliminary, progressive moves  to develop  the 
EUropean market may  consolidate  the  imperfections of  the present market. 
Section 22  is devoted to consideration of this question  • 
Third,  the view that a  genuine European capital market,  even as  a 
long-term target, is unrealistic and  idealistic needs to be reviewed 
in light of the pace of capital market developments outside,  rather 
than inside the European Stock Exchanges.  The  Report has attempted 
to demonstrate the speed at which the securities market  environment is 
changing with  the growing  internationalisation of  the markets  and the 
emergence of world-scale multi-purpose securities houses with their 
strong incursion into Europe.  It has described  the  large-scale 
technological initiatives now  implemented by  banking,  foreign braking 
and commercial  information houses which are  now  generating international 
facilities far superior to those available to members  of the Community 
Stock  EXchanges  in the mutual transaction of their European business. 
The  principal determinants of such  changes in the capital markets  are 
economic  and  financial  forces.  These  forces will fill any gaps  ~n the 
international financial  syste~ left by  the inaction of any Exchange 
authorities.  It may,  therefore,  be not unreal to  assume  that, at sane 
point,  the European Exchanges will recognise that a  European capital 
market with its own  identity is needed and would be to  their advantage,  and 
that, if such an'identity is not to be totally overlaid and diffused 
within the world international market,  some positive and radical action 
is required.  At  such a  point,  the steps needed for  effective linkage 
might  be  taken. 
As  matters stand, it must be admitted.that, with one or possibly two 
exceptions,  the pace of development of  the E.E.C.  Exchanges  bears no 
relation to the pace of restructuring and  technological  development of 
the  financial environments in which  they operate.  If this continues  to - 380  -
be the case,  the individual Exchanges  stand at risk of continuing to 
lose international business to ~ember and non-member  off-Exchangematkets. 
Under  such  a  trend,  European international business will become  no 
more  than a  diffuse segment of the international market at large. 
The  opportunity to create a  discrete European capital market,  serving 
Community  interests, will be  lost.  Time  is not on  the side· of the 
Stock Exchanges. 
For these reasons,  the Consultants believe that they are being starkly 
realistic,  and not idealistic,  in stating  in this Section  what 
effec~ive linkage of the European Exchanges  would  imply.  Such 
consideration is essential to this Report.  The  objective of floor 
linkage,  in the  sen~e of full linkage of the official markets,  though 
at odds with the traditional and inert aspects of the Community 
Exchanges,  is fully in harmony  with the progressive and dynamic  trends 
which are clearly evident in almost all the Community  markets, trends 
which,  during  the Consultants' survey, brought so many  expressions of 
impatience  from  major market participants at the slow rate of 
modernisation of the European official market systems. 
The  Consultants attempt to argue in this Section that if effective 
linkage of the.E.E.C.  Exchanges is to be  secured,  and if, in line with 
the Treaty of Rome  and general Community  economic  interests,  a  viable 
European capital market is to emerge,  the national Exchanges  are 
inescapably faced with a  task of harmonising  their procedures. 
To  do  so implies  no  more  than that they respond to the pressure,  the 
challenge and  the potential of European-scale activity in the  same  way 
that large-scale industry has  had  to do. 
In the  course of the study, the view was  expressed by authorities of certain 
of the Stock Exchanges  that effective floor  linkage could be obtained 
without harmonisation of procedures,  and,  indeed,  without any modifica-
tion of the present local priorities of the Exchanges.  Such views were 
not articulated into any practical schemes  which might vindicate such  a 
belief, but the Consultants were  sufficiently disturbed by the 
possibility that they had failed  to appreciate the feasibility of any 
such  scheme  that opportunity was  taken to discuss the question with  New 
York  specialists with practical experience of inter-market floor  linkage. - 381  -
Their categorical view  was  in support of the Consultants'  belief  t~at 
floor  linkage,  to permit inter-market dealing,  would  be totally 
impossible in Exchanges  operatin~ different trading proceduree  and 
quoting  securities for different deliveries in nifferent currencies. 
This  Sectio~ does  not purport to set out a  detail~d des~gn of  the 
optimal floor  linkage  system,  which was  b¢yond  the  ~ermitted or 
practical scope of the Consultants'  work,  and which cannot proceed in 
any  case until the Exchanges  themselves at national level,  are firmly 
committed  to the concept.  The  general form of market floor linkage is, 
however  self-defining.  'rhis Section sets this oqt in broad  terms,  and 
indic~tea possibl~ways of re5olving  5ome  o!  the major  problems  of  floor 
linkage.  Detailed technical definition of the sy•tem  in each of 
the specialist fields  indicated below  will only be  achieved by  joint 
projects set up by the Stock  Sxcha~ges themselves,  involving expert 
Members  and specialist administrative staff. 
21.2  The  basic premises of the proposal to link the Community  Stock 
Exchanges 
The  Consultants'  work  has been at the  level of technicalities of 
investment and market procedures.  The  initiative to link the 
Exchanges is,  however,  an integral and  significant comfonent of the 
economic  develo];;nent of the  Ca~~~Dunity.  The  commitment  of the Exchanges 
to these wider perspectives needs  to be clear before linkage proposals 
can  reach the stage of useful technical design.  :O:r  .•  ~Pe-1,  if it is not, 
technical  a~gument will be premature and  poss~ly spurious. 
The  concept of linkage is set with a  progressive series of narrowing 
premises.  They  are  taken  for granted in  the Consultant's terms of 
reference,  but they ~erit consideration. 
(i)  The  first premise,  - the broadest perspective,  - is acknowledgement of 
the objectives of the Community  itself.  The  Report assumes recognition 
by  the Community  capital market authorities of the obligations they 
have,  in their significant roles,  in reapect of countries committed to 
the  EQ~Opean ideal.  Even  at this level,  the priority accorded  to 
European  considerations  is,  in reality,  likely to be  tempered·by 
nati.oll4ll  interest  at this stage ot the Community• s  development. - :=i:Q  -
(ii)  Tiqhteninq the focus,  the  second premise is the acknowledgement of the 
need for European  financial  integration,  with the ulttmate target of 
replacing the dollar satellite status of the Community  economies with 
~~e independence which could come  from  an effective European financial 
system.  ~~le, at this more  specific level,  there are notable achieve-
ments  such as the E.M.S.,  Ccmmunity  agreements on banking and  insurance 
(iii) 
st.andards,  and  the successful.. launch of the E.C.U.,  a.t  1st  1.  level of 
qovernrnent,  there  has  been  a  reluctance  to face  and resolve the 
many  fiscal  and  legal obstacles· standing in the way  of harmoni•.t·J'\9' 
the financial  infra-structure.  The  removal of such. obstacles is essential for the 
effective linkage of the national capital markets.  The  European 
financial  system,  a  concept clearly seen  from  the early stages of the 
Commun~ty~ and  implicit in the Treaty of Rome,  is still far  from  achieved. 
A  t.endency  to consider its problems more  appropriate to future genera-
•  tions is endemic,  both amongst national administrators and,  more 
justifiably,  amongst market practitioners who  have no  power  to change 
the present situation. 
Tightening  the  focus  further  to  the precise field of this study,  the 
final premise is that a  key  component of that financial  system should 
be  a  common  capital market.  For  the users,  the issuers and  the  investors, 
such  a  market would provide facilities for the allocation of financial resources 
for cap! tal developments and invest:rnen t  <?f!:'Ortuni ties on  Furooean scale.  For 
the members  of the Exchanges,  it would provide the broad base on  whi~h 
they would  develop market firms  able  to face  the full onslaught of world 
competition. 
21.3  The  Policy Context 
It is worthwhile briefly examining  the.degree to which  these premises 
are accepted by  the  two  groups with which  the linkage project is concerned; 
the investors and issuers,  and  the Stock  Exchanges. 
(i)  It is fair to say  that ~e general concept of a  European market is 
broadly supported by  the large investors and  the issuing companies.  In 
virtually all the countries vi9ited,  the Consultants met general comment 
by major investors deploring  the fact that the European capital centres 
appeared incapable of developing markets  in their own  securities of the 
........  "!'!. depth and liquidity needed  for their operations.  As  regards  foreign 
securitie$,  the inv,stors know  the vast volume of Nprth American stocks 
held in Europe  and the high value of associ4ted  transa~tions.  ~ey 
know  the potential which exists for  a  European market in such stocks. 
They  are pre-disposed to deal locally,  because of national sentiment 
and for material reasons.  But sheer business realities constrain  them  to 
deal in Nortp America. 
The  phenomenon  cannot complacently  bQ  disregarded as  no  more  than recourse 
to markets of origin.  Not only have  the  North American markets a  virtual 
monopoly  of business in their own  securities but they aremoving  a  sub-
stantial volume of business in European  securities to  North  America at a  rate 
which  must be  considered alarming.  Nor  is this question limited to the 
attracting  of  dealing  to the major u.s.  markets.  American market 
technology  now  has  an  international dimension,  with over 8,000 NASDAQ 
level 1  terminals  located in  33  countries  ~utside the United States. 
The  scale of the problem has been considered in Section  19·. · 
(ii)  The  stance of  the  Stock  Exchanges  towards  the  conce~t of  a  Community 
capital market,  on  the other hand,  is less clear.  This  ambi~uity 
towards  linkage arises in the m4in  from  the inevitable obli9ation of  the 
authorities of each Exchange  to protect the national  fun~tions of their 
official market,  and,  on a  lower  plane~protect the existing interests of 
the generality of their members.  In the sho{ter  term,  it is likely 
that any positive move  ~o eatablish linkaqe will appear to have  an aavcroc 
impact  on both these sets of interests.  It ~Y  appear to create 
a  disturbance  in sensitive national developments,  during a  period in 
which the roles of the Stock  Exchanges in virtually every European 
capital market are under  review. 
The  priority accorded to European  linkage by  the Exchanges is likely 
to be  based  on  business considerations.  To  date  bus~ness betwQen  the 
European markets has tended not to be considered· very  important.  This 
attitude requires to be revised for  two  reasons.  First the official 
figures. of the Exchange•,  in virtually all cases,  understate the true 
volume of this market.  Second,  it is questionable whether present 
business  levels should be  the governing criteria of the Stock Exchanges• - 384  -
decision.  Such  argument would  imply  tr~t if 45' of foreign transactions 
are in U.S.  securities and  20%  in European,  then European  linkage has no 
particular priority.  This is clearly a  fallacious and  invalid attitude. 
The  corollary of it is that each of the European Exchanges  should stmply 
link with Wall Street.  The  decision should not be based on  the-- present 
business situation, "'hich may  require to be  reconstructed in the interest 
of  the  European  markets,  but  on  whether  the  European 
Exchanges  could link so as to construct a  market entity capable of 
developing appropriate competition to the s·tronger  North American 
Exchanges,  - to the ultimate benefit of both the European and  the 
American capital markets. 
Nevertheless,  a  critically important working  assumption  which has 
governed  the Consultants'  approach  to the problem of  linkage  is that 
it would  be  rash to assume,  at this moment,  any full commitment  on  the 
part of the Stock  Exchanges  to the concept of a  European capital market. 
In  ~~is situation,  interpretation of the Stock Exchanges'  apparent pre-
ference  for direct floor  linkage  (as  opposed to  'indirect'  linkage as 
dis-cussed in Section  13)  poses  a  problem.  'i'he  preference of the 
major~ty of the Committee  for direct floor linkage may  stem more  from 
a  justified motive of protection of the position of the official market 
floors than  fran· a  studied  apprec:~ation of the changes  which  floor  linkage 
will involve.  This misgiving is enaorsed by  an  inconsistency in the 
positions of several Exchanges  which  opted for  floor  linkage,  but at 
the  same  time insisted on  the immutability of their national systems. 
A further point of concern is that the  Exchanges  which  had  doubts on 
the oracticabilitv of di_rect-.  flooY'  link<=Jae  were  t.hn~:;p  on which  thP 
bulk of international equities business in the Community  is at p:Dr.sent 
conducted. 
The  Consultants nevertheless  consider that the objective of floor 
linkage is" far-sighted and correct,  and that it should be established and 
agreed  as  the ultimate target,  with immediate steps  taken  towards its long 
term achievement.  The  facts considered above  should,howeve; induce 
caution,  not only in implementation but  ~lso in the development work  to 
achieve it. - 385  -
21.4  The  General Requirements  of Floor  Linkage 
Two  clear objectives  should be attained  through  market  linkage. 
The  first  is the  provision of  a  capital  market on  a  Community-wide 
base,  as  noted  above.  The  second  is  that  the  system 
should offer the opportunity of  'best execution'  to any national of the 
Community  dealing in E.E.C.  equities.  'l'hese  two objectives demand  the 
same  condition that,  in the internationally dealt European stocks,  there 
should be  a  single market in the technical sense,  whether contrived 
through  the market floors  or otherwise.  For all investors of any  E.E.C. 
country to have equal opportunity  to obtain the same  price and 
conditions of a  transaction,  the operation of  'a market'  to  which all 
investors,  issuers and Stock Exchange intermediaries have  access,  must 
be presumed. 
The  solution that such  a  market might be  achieved by  the super-imposition 
of a  Euro-Bourse has  long since been discarded by all parties.  It is not 
necessary to enumerate  the many  reasons related to  the national functions 
of the  Exchanges  which  render  this solution inappropriate.  Nor  is it 
necessary to do  more  than  note that the  solution of a  central international 
price-fixing is impracticable.  This would  involve remote  pre-submission 
of orders  from members  of the various  Exchanges  and electronically-
automated execution.  It would  supersede  local price fixing mechanisms  with 
which  such  a  system  could  not work  in parallel,  and it would  be unacceptable 
to the  Exchanges, 
The  only other route to an effectively linked market is through a  homogeneous 
system interconnecting the Stock Exchange  floors.  This  solution  r  if success-
f,llly applied, would have several notable ad.,-antages.  It would re-inforce the 
position of the national Stock Exchanges, a  consideration which is of par,amount 
importance with reqard  to both their economic  and  their  rQO'ulatory  roles.  It 
would offer  the possibility of a  single harmonised  system of trading 
and settlement for  the major European equities,  while leaving undisturbed 
tile national primary and  secondary markets in smaller  local stocks.  It 
would meet the criteria of a  Europe-based capital market and of best 
execution.  It wou~d totally remove  the ne.ed  for arbitrage between the 
Community  Exchanges of the securities included in the  linkage system. 
It would,  to a  large degree,  preserve existing patterns of  revenue of - 386  -
Stock  Exchange  members.  It would assuage  the fears  of the Stock Exchanges 
that linkage might further  erode floor business,  a  factor  of great 
relevance in those cases where  the members'  monopoly  privileges are 
based on their status as  floor  traders.  In principle,  there can be 
little question that linkage of the  market  floors is the  ultimate approach 
to integrating  the  European  equity  market.s. 
It must be  recognis~  howeve~ that the only available solutions to the 
problems of  floor  linkage tend  to be of an absolute nature.  Local 
floor operation in the securities included in the system would contioue,but it 
,.,auld re within a homogeneous market system. To  have  the bought side of a 
transaction on  one  floor  and  the sold on  another must  imply identical 
market procedures.  Floor  lir~age poses  the uncompromising  requirement 
that the selling and buying brokers on  the participating floors must 
be dealing  ~~e same  product  (i.e.  a  securities instrument which is 
equally deliverable to and goodfor delivery  in all centres},  under  the 
same  set of bargain conditions,  in the  same  currency and  for  the  same 
st'!ttlement.  If any of these conditions  ~s net met,  the markets 
have different characteristics and must be recognised as separate 
markets.  There would  'Ele  price sensitivities reflecting these market 
differences,  and  some  type of arbitrage  function would remain necessary 
to absorb  them~ 
Similar,  though  less  categorica~preconditions are that the  systems of 
price formation  should be  common,  and that,  to assure fair competition, 
the capacities in which members  are permitted and able to operate 
should  likewise be  common. 
The  stark truth is that if linkage is to be  based  on  the floors  then 
the Exchanges must develop a  homogeneous  trading  system in the major 
European stocks.  This  fundamental  requirement cannot be  circumvented 
by  any  ingenuity of design.  The  only compromise possible is to set up 
market-floor interfaces  with the international market.  This possibility 
is considered in the following Section to assure  involvement of the 
floors at an early stage.  It is stressed,  however,  that such interfaces 
would  not represent  'floor linkage'  in the proper  sense of that term. - 387  -
The arranqement would retain the imperfections of th• present European 
international market.  The  Consultants do not believe that in the present 
European  situation an  interface of this type  could be successfully 
automated  to take account of market  difference~ by  electronic processing. 
In any effective  scheme  of interconnection,  the  term  'floor  ~inkage' 
will require to be defined broadly.  The  inherent concept of floor 
linkage is a  single concentrated official market in each centre,  unifying 
the present floor  and off-floor markets,  linked with the other Exchanges. 
The  definition of floor  trading in this context should hinge on 
effective concentration of dealing in the  Stock  Exchange market rather 
than on dealing on  the physical market floor.  In  some  cases,  concentra-
tion of all dealing  on  the actual floor may  be possible and desirable. 
In others a  broader definition of  'floor trading'  would be needed.  The 
London  jobbers,  for  example,  and  possibly the German  banks may  require 
to retain their off-floor dealing rooms.  So  long  as  the operations of 
these  rooms  were  within Stock  Exchange business and  thereby  linked to 
the  system,  their physical remoteness  from  the market floors would  not 
matter. 
The  following  sub-Sections consider the main areas in which 
harmonisation  o~ Stock Exchange procedures must be  achieved to make 
linkage of the market floors possible.  The  Report makes  no  ~ecommenda­
tions in· respect of such changes,  and  limits comment  to an assessment 
of their relationship to cu:crent developments  in the market  .. 
21.5  Harmonisation  of price formation  systems 
To  secure genuine confrontation of orders,  under  the open  competition 
required for  'best execution',  the  securities in the European linkage 
system would  have  to be dealt  on  each Exchange  under  similar 
procedures of price formation and trading.  The  Report has earlier 
submitted that the collective price  system will not  lend itself to 
international trading,  either within  the Community  or  in  linking the 
European  Exchanges with the world.  External pressure may  conduce  move~ 
ment  towards world practice.  The  total turnover of equities in 
European  Exchanges,  as recorded by  the F.I.B.V.,  represents less than  lO\ - 388  -
of world volume.  Of  the remainder virtually all is transacted under 
continuous price systems.  Within the  10%  represented by  Europe,  some 
half of the market floor business is cont~nuous trading,  as is all the 
off-floor dealing.  It might not be  unreasonable to deduce  that,  in 
due  course,  European price formation will align with world practice. 
Acceleration of this process,  to permit a  harmonised European  system at 
an early stage of  linkage is desirable but will involve great difficulty. 
At  least one  of the Exchanges,  Brussels,  is deeply  committed  to the view 
that its present price-fixing system is ideally adapted to· local needs. 
Any  movement  of the German  Exchanges  towards  continuous prices poses 
legal difficulties, as would  any  attempt to move  the continuous inter-
national markets of the German  banks  onto  the floors or J.nto tl-.e official 
market.  There appears however  to be growing  acknowledgement of the 
need for  continuous quotation in most of the Exchanges;  The  London 
market has  always operated by continuous quotation.  All major  securities 
are  ~oted continuously on  the Amsterdam  floor.  The making  of continuous 
pricas is under discussion in Paris  ..  The  'Durante'  market in Italy 
fi~~~  ~ore  active,  is a  move  in the  same  direction.  The  stock market 
boom  and  the growth of the  o!t'~f'l-ot:n:·  market to an unaccept~bly  high level has 
resulted in proposals  for  a  continuous market in Copenhagen. 
The  assumption is made in this Report that tl-.e need for continu~us  marl<e~.s in major 
stocks is increasingly being  accepted  in Europe,  and  that the floors 
will progressively move  to this system of trading.  As  they do so,  the 
stock Exchanges will need  to resolve  the problem of their members' 
off-market dealing,  which  h~s been tacitly permitted to grow due  to the 
traditional short trading hours of the floors. 
21.6  Harmonisation of market floor  trading  systems 
While  the gradual movement  of the European Exchanges to continuous 
price systems  can be  foreseen,  and  can be  anticipated as  a  development 
which will assist floor  linkage,  the type of trading procedures within 
which continuous prices will be made  is far  less clear. - 389  -
Continuous  tradinq requires a  two-way  price,  qivinq continuous  indication 
of the spread between the  lowest price at which stock is offered,  and 
the hiqheat price bid for its purchase.  In order to assure the 
liquidity of such trading,  some.form of market-makinq or  'positioning' 
is necessary.  For  European  linkage to constitute an effective market 
system,  it is desirable that at least a  substantial element of the 
market-making  function is designed  into floor operations.  There are  two 
principal ways  in which this m~ght be·  achieved. 
(i)  The  first is the creation of a  specialist function of North American 
type,  supervising and participating,  to an appropriate degree,  in the 
trading of designated stocks ,with an obligation to maintain a position,whether 
long or short in the security to ensure liquidity of the market.  At the 
side of the market maintained by  floor  specialist function  there would 
be  automated matching  of small  transactions at a  price derived from  the 
specialists' market,  and  a  system of block positioning which would  permit 
transactions  exceeding  the  capacity of  the  floor market to be  'put through' 
in some  agreed  transparent fashion,appropriately  linked to market trading. 
It might be  argued that the trading procedures of most of the Community 
Exchanges are poised to move  in this direction  once  the problems of 
establishing continuous  floor markets  are fully confronted.  such a 
move  would be  a  sig~ificant change  from  the present situation,  in which 
the price officials are essentially functionaries,  and  in which their 
intervention in the dealing is usually limited to  ~1at =equired to 
achieve the final balance at a collective price.  The  essence of thei:.: 
function is  also  to determine  a  single price,  though,  as noted earlier, 
offer and bid prices emerge  during  the short Periods of individual 
price trading which are permitted on  the Continental floors.  In certain 
Exchanges  movement  to a  specialist system would  be  a  radical change.  In 
Franc~ broker positioning is prohibited by  law,  though a  contra-partiste 
function has  begun  to emerge in the  second Market,  and  a  continuous 
market is widely accepted in Paris to  imply  a  market-making  function. 
The  extreme case is Italy where  brokers must report stock  taken up  to 
the Ministry of the Treasury,  after,which they are committed  to hold it 
fo~ not less  than six months.  Nevertheless,  the likely evolution of the 
Exchanges is towards the spec~alist flGGr trading system, as  occurred on  the (11) 
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New  York  Stock .  Exchanqe. one  hundred years  aqo,  when  its  call-over 
system became· -inadequate.  This would  avoid the problems of capital 
intensity associated with full-scale floor market-makinq.  It would also 
involve.~ewerconcesaions of principle in those Exchanqea  committed to 
the belief that price-fixing and not price-makinq is the correct 
function of the market floor.  It is also possible that arrangements 
could be  contrived in these Exchanges whereby a  specialist type operation 
could meet the legislative requirements  for  'official prices•,  possibly 
based  on  specialists'  openinq prices.  The  arrangements  in this regard 
for  example,  guaranteeing German  private clients an  'official price•,  are 
already  somewhat artificial in present market circumstances. 
Undc:..·  such a  sy~tem, devised for  European  needs,the role of the price officials 
mig:-.t  be developed to mak<:!  them specialists,  who  woula  be  empowered  to see all 
member  firm  transactions.  There would be  a  formal  reouirement that memters 
carry out all .deals with each other either on  their  fl~r or,  through 
~~e linkage  system,  on  another European  floor.  The  off-market business 
:,.t  p.r-~ :_:,~nt  ,::arried out by  larger members  would  be re-concentrated into 
-::;ific~o;::..l.  m.uket dealing.  This  Si.'1gle  signifit::ant cr.ange would auto-
~atica:ly requ~re the transformation of the  Coittinental market officials• 
i?reser.t price fixi.ng role into SUperVision  and  servicing of COncentrated 
markets.  It is·of interest that the discussions on  the future structure 
of th(; Amsterdam  Stock Exchange  fQcus .  on  the role of the hoekma.n, 
whlch  may  be  strengthened.  The  hoekman 's  role is  the  nearest  in 
Europe  to a  specialist function.  The  Dutch development may  anticipate 
a  similar trend in other  Community  Exchanges. 
A  second  form  of  market-making,  for  which  precedent 
also exists in the Community  is the system whereby members'  markets 
are made  on  the  floor  of  the  Stock  Exchange,  through  a 
stock  jobbing  system.  The  two essential requirement  of this system 
are separation of capacity of principal and agent  between different 
m~er firms  of the Stock  Exchange,  and  the existence of sufficient 
jobbers to assure competition of prices. - 391  -
Althouqh the U.K.  jobbing- system,  which is unique not only in Europe 
but in the world,  might have appeared,at first consideration;an obstacle 
to European floor  linkage, it is debatable whether this is so. 
Certainly,  if no changes were anticipated in the Continental market 
floor procedures,  none of the other Exchanges  could afford to link with 
London  because of the market-making strength of the London  floor  jobbing 
system.  Given,  however, that the Continental Exchanqes are pre-occupied 
with the re-concentration of securities trading on  their market 
floors  under continuous quotation,  and given that this may  well 
lead in due  course to specialist-type functions on their floors,  there 
will be  far qreater equivalence of strength of floor markets  in Europe. 
A floor  ~pecialist system,  well contrived for European  linkage,  with 
floor market-making backed by a  block positioning convention which 
permitted a  second  level of large-scale market-makin~ by the larger 
members  through the floor,  would  be  equal match for  the London  system. 
Moreover,  the  systen in London  is to change.  It has been agreed in 
London  that,  with the  removal  of  the  min~mum commission scale,  the 
single capacity system  cannot survive.  It is thou;;ht  that.  the  29.9% 
limitation of  outside participation  (by  anyone,  including banks  and 
foreign  brokers~, will be  eased.  The  spate of outside participation 
now  arranged  seems  to have been motivated by  this belief. 
The  underlying  intent of building  up  or  admitt~ng muJti-purpose securities 
houses  similar to  those of North .America  together with competition follow-
ing  the abolition of minimum  commissions,  would  put the  jobbing obligations 
under strain.  New floor procedures are :.,einc;  designed,  modelled on the multiple 
market-maker  system of the American  O.T.C.  net~ork.  The  need  to respond 
to the competition  from  large u.s.  and Japanese securities houses is being 
recognised,  as  is the incompatibility of opening  the market to inter-
national competition and attempting  to preserve market structure orientated 
to domestic business. 
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The  setting up  of International Dealer  firms,  which as  noted earlier 
may  only act as principals,  but in which brokers and  jobbers may 
operate  jointly acknowledged  that single capacity operation was  not 
adapted to the international market.  The  i.nternational dealer firms 
are of great significance in light of  the possibility advanced earlier 
in this Report that,  by  the  end of the decade,  the  London  equities 
market could be primarily international,  and  only secondarily domestic. 
It has been  acknowledged  that the floor procedures  thEII!lselves  will 
require  to change  ~n response to  the  new  structure of firms which will 
emerge  following  the abolition of minimum  commissions. 
There  appears at least a  probability that the floor procedures of the 
Continental Stock  ~changes and  those of London may  proqressively 
converge  towards a  similar form,  from different directions but in 
response to similar competition.  If this were  to prove  so,  and the 
Consultants believe it.to be supported by present observations of the 
markets, encouragement of the  trend could provide a  major  sttmulus to 
European  linkage. 
21.6  Dealing features 
While -it would  be premature to consider detailed dealing facilities and 
procedures of floor  linkage,  one major question merits notice.  Floor 
linkage would  impose  a  necessity to standardise the present diverse 
periods and conventions of account  (terme)  dealing,  and  similarly, 
standardise  the  cash  (comptant  )  markets •. 
The  present situation is complex.  There  are no  forward markets  in the 
A.E.B.  or in the Copenhagen  Exchange.  In  German~ forward  dealing or 
margin trading is forbidden by  law.  On  the other hand,  Belgium,  France 
and  U.K.  operate  forward markets based on  scheduled dealing periods. 
In the first two countries 'terme'dealing is the most tmportant seqment 
of the equities market,  while  in the U.K.  it constitutes its near-
totality. - m  -
Linkage would, in fact,present an opportunity to  transr~$e the valuable 
and well-established market facility of account dealinq onto a 
.Europeaft base.  If this were  not done,  the individual  national account 
markets  would  in due course  come  under  increasing pressure to align 
with an  ever-growing international market,  which  tends to deal day by 
day  for  five days  cash settlement,  influenced by the procedures of its 
largest participant.  It would  be incorrect for  the European account 
markets to be abandoned with the  a~ of moving  the Community markets 
to a  standard pattern closer to North American procedures.  Forward 
dealing of European type makes  an  important contribution to the liquidity 
and technical·operation of the markets.  Such operations may  have  an 
underlying fiscal significance, -a point of  ~portance inthe context of 
general  fiscal  discrimination againRt risk capital. 
Any  proposals for  a  homogeneous  dealing  system at a  European·~evel which 
deprived the Exchanges  of  the range of dealing facilities presently 
available within the national Exchanges would be totally unacceptable 
to Stock Exchange members.  Floor  linkage would offer the possibility 
of devising  standardised procedures of dealing  for  use  in the  inter~ 
connected floors.  Sueh  preced~res would  retain the principal features 
of present  ~l~or dealing,  and  re-asocMble  them  into some  mutually agreed 
standardised form. 
The  fact that all countries may  not,  by virtue of their leqislation,  be 
able to par~icipate in all the available  feature~ ~f linked floor dealing, 
does not preclude its standardisation.  Presumably the cash marke~ 
facilities would  be biased towards  the requirements of those countries 
required to deal in it. 
The  dealinq perioda(and settlement dates) ofthe present forward markets 
would  require to be aligned.  The  present disparities,  - London  with ten 
days  and Paris with a  month  for  example,  - arise from  historical chance, 
and their alignment raises only technical problems.  Similarly the 
facilities associated with account dealing,  such as contangos  or early 
bargains in London,  or_primes  in Paris differ in technical detail, but 
serve  the  same  purpose and  could be  standardised.  The  principlesgoverning 
transactions closed within the account would  need to be agreed. - 394  -
The  main difficulties  in institutinq a  European  forward market would 
relate to financial  assurance.  At present,  for  example,  membershiP of 
the Belgian Compensation du  Terme  is not extended to all Stock Exehanqe 
members,  in  London  they  participate in  acco~~t dealinq.  In Paris and 
Br·11ssels  margin-type payments  are required on  dealing;  in London all 
payment  for  account transactions is deferred until account day. 
The inability of the German ~tack Exchanges to deal in the forward mark~t  would be 
.-1  no.table imperfect:.on of the  mar~cet,  but the Consultants were given to understand 
that the German  authorities were,  during  the period of the study, 
reviewing the question of forward  trading. 
Movement  towards  standardised procedures  and facilities as  linkage 
proceeds would offer opportunities  to  develop  common  conventions  and 
bargain conditions.  Not  only would this offer speed and efficiency 
of dealing similar to that presently attained in the individual markets. 
but,  in the European context, it would make  a  great contribution to 
overcoming  the barriers of  language.  The  most conspicuous present 
difficulty in this respect is less the different lanquaqes  themselves, 
than  the fact·that,  in the Stock Exchanges'  jargon,  words  literally 
translated often do  not mean  the  same  thing.  Under  standard systems 
a.nd  conventions,  the connotation of terms  in different languages could 
be  firmly established. 
21.7  The  impact of floor  linkage on Stock  Exchan~embership regulations 
The  membership  problems of European  floor  linkage are a  re-expression 
of  those of the dealing  system in the  idiom of membership rules and 
regulations.  The'essence of the problem  is,  firstly,  the extent to 
which  the members  of the  Stock Exchanges,  in their present floor 
functions,  cover the full range  of  secondary market activities which would 
·be  required by linkage based on continuous two-way quotation.  Secondly, there is 
the problem of whether  the existing members  or member  firms of the 
Exchanges are capable of handling,  servicing and assuring the liqudity 
of markets  re-concentrated,  in each capital centre,  on the local 
Exchange  floors·.  The  first of these issues relates to the capacities in 
which they a.re  permitted  to act,  and whether both these  functions are 
comprised within  the Exchange  membership structure.  The  second relates 
to  the scale of operation o!'  the Stock  Exchange intermediaries. - 395  -
(i)  In respect of  the range of capacity required by  the floor  linkage,  the 
Stock Exchanges  can be divided readily into those which are well 
adapted and  those whieh are not: 
In the  former  cateqory would  be  the A.E.B.,  or  the  U.K.  Stock Exchange. 
In  the  Netherlands  the  present  membership  structure  of 
the A.E.B.  appears to accord  readily with that required by  the  linkage 
system,  as might be  expected in a  market heavily involved in inter-
national dealing.  Through  bank,  non-bank brokers and hoekman  members 
both  the market-making  and  dealing  functions of the local capital 
markets  are effectively in the hands  of Stock Exchange members. 
There is no  technical reason,  under existing Rules,  why  the  hoekmen 
should not be developed  to  support effective inter-floor dealing in a 
European  system. 
In  the  London  floor market,  the  Member  Firms  cover both  the market-
making  and  the.,  agency dealing  functions  of  the secondary market. 
The  Stock  Exchanges  less adapted  to  linkage  are  those in the capital 
markets  in which. significant secondary market  functions  are carried out 
by  non-member  banks,  - notably France  and  Italy.  If participation in 
the  linkage were  limited  to  the Stock  Exchange members,  as must 
necessar~ly be  the  case  for  floor  link~ge,  only  the agents de  change 
and  the agenti  di  cambio would  be eligible from  these  countr~es.  This 
would  no.t  be  satisfactory as in those Exchange$  the  linkage would  be 
limited on their side to commission-orientated business.  In France for 
example,  the banks  play important roles in the international· trading. 
This  was  acknowledged  by  London designated dealer rules in which 
concessions,  limited in other cases  to members  of Stock  Exchanges, 
are  extended to the French banks.  A similar and more  acute problem 
would  exist in Italy if the  linkage were  to be  limited to floor business. ~ 
--'!-
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In the other Exchanges  the adaptability of the membership structures · 
to floor  linkaqe is more  ambiquous • _  The  Belqian membership structUre 
provides a  somewhat  more  effective basis for participation in linkaqe. 
The  Belqian brokers are allowed to take positions on their own  account 
and  there is  already  minor specialist activity on the. floor.  As  has 
been noted,  there is a·  group of large brokers in Brussels already 
highly active in the international equities ma.ket.  As  in France, 
however,  the Belqian banks play a  significant role in international 
order-routing,  and in the dealing of large transactions. 
In Denmark,  the bJ;"okers  are permitted to take positions but do  not 
normally do  so in equities.  The  exclusion of the larqe Danish banks 
from  the system would result in very  partial representation,of the 
Danish international market in -any  scheme  _of  floor  linkage. 
'J' 
The  position of the German  Stock Exchanges  in floor  linkage cannot be 
easily hypothesized. From the point of view of mei!'I.bership it  is _evident that the 
German  bank members  represent potentially the most powerful participants 
in the international securities market in Europe.  They  have great 
capital resources and at present have· the ability to operate tn dual 
capacity across  the total range of international securiti·es functions. 
on  the other hand,  floor  linkage would pose  considerable  ~oblems for  the 
German  banks,  as it would require them-to Lring all their dealing in system stocks 
onto the market floors.  It  would then, by  law, beccme  constrained to the 
pattern of dealing in local securities.  The  ability of the German 
Stock  Exchange members·  to adapt to floor linkage thus rests entirely on whether 
the floors of the ~ermap  Association of Stock Exchanges move to continuous quota-
-tion,wi  th the developr~~ent of the Kursmal:ler into a rr.odern spe·eialist role.  If this 
were  to occur,  the present German  m~ership regime would  be  the best 
adapted in Europe to internat1onal equities trading.  If, however, 
-German  floor trading remains  in its present form,  then the Geiman 
banks will consider it impossible to transfer their present inter-
national business in European securities on  to the German  floors  and 
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{ii)  'l'he  problem of scale of operation of the European Stock Exchanqe 
members  relates closely to the capacity in which  they are permitted. to 
operate.  In  those Exchanges  in which members  are confined to  agency 
business,  the capitalisation of member  firms  tends to be  low,  and  the 
emergence  of large positioning  firms  to facilitate linked floor trading 
would present difficulty.  The  creation of strong liquid floor markets 
will be  further canplicated,  even  i .  .n  those Exchanqes with bank members, 
(iii) 
by  the  fact that in the international market  professional 
positioning is carried out by member  banks off the floors,  as is the 
case in Bolland and  Germany. 
The  more  general development of strongly capitalised securities houses 
in Europe,  able  to hold their own  against the large American or Japanese 
brokers,  which  are of vast dimension  compared  to any of their European 
counterparts,  is a  basic need,  regardless of plans for  European floor 
linkage.AEuropean response  to this challenge,  if allied,  as possibly 
may  be  the case,  with policies of re-concentration of member  trans-
actions  in the official market,  should produce general results which 
will assist linkage. 
The  Consultants submit that  t.l'1e  rnos t  profound problems of ~loor linkage wi 11 
arise  from  standardisati.on of trading  and of capacity in which members 
are  pe~itted to deal.  It is again stressed that  in considering  these 
issues  the Consultants merely  hypothesize  what may  happen,  rather than 
make  recommendations  on  what  should.  The  current  ~esponse  ~o competitive 
challenges in the Community  marketssuqgests that many  di~fcrences  which 
at present appear  intractable obstacles to floor  linkage  .may  be  far 
less acute in a  few  years time.  This is a  more  credible presumption  than 
ex!'ectation that the Stock Exchanc;)'es will remain precisely as they are.  It is 
a  fact  that  through  force  of economic,  political and  social  circumstances 
many  of  the  Community  Exchanges  have,  until  now,  adhered 
traditional forms  essentially defined more  than a  ceno1ry ago. 
Immutability is not normally  a  characteristic of a  commercial survivor. 
During  a  period of intense change  in the capital and financial markets, 
when  the  larger world Exchanges have been subject to organisational 
ferment,  it would  be totally illogical to assume  that,  in sane 
privileged way,  the European  Exchanqes can remain in a  cocoon of paat - 398  -
tradition.  Indeed,  if they were  to do so,  they would becaDe,  under 
present trends,  rapidly overlaid by  the far more  powerful  international 
market.  The  evidence is that the Exchanges  are responding to the 
competitive challenge.  The  results,of this at national level,  are 
likely to render  th~ proposal for floor  linkage,  through which the 
competitive response could be  established on  a  European base,  fully 
credible in a  few  years  time. 
For  reasons put forward  in the  introduction to this Report,  the 
Consultants have preferred to  imply,  rather than make  explici~ the 
actions  incumbent· on  national market authorities if an effectively 
linked European market is to be achieved.  Fran the evidence presented, 
however.  it will be  apparent that all proqress in any of the detailed 
areas  reviewed,  such as  trading procequres or membership,  depends on the 
resolution of one single major question.  The  key to the entire problem 
is an  agreed definition of the role of the commercial banks  in the 
equities markets.  There may  be  national sensitivity on  this question, 
but it would be neither revolutionary nor  inappropriate to attempt to 
establish the principles of this  fundamental  structural question at the 
European level 
The  conventions by which bank participation in the equities markets 
might most effectively be achieved  !n respect of such matters as 
the degree of corporate separation required to achieve an appropriate balance 
between the credit and  securities functions,  or  the degree of separation of 
capacities needed to minimise conflict of interest  might thus  be  established. 
Such  conventions would be  to the advantage of both the banks  and  the 
markets. 
If,  as  the prime  element within  the  policy initiatives proposed above, 
a  standard approach to the role· of the commercial banks  in the equities 
markets  could be achieved,  adapted to the different national situations, 
virtually all the technical  problems  discussed  on  this paper would  be 
readily  resolvable. 
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21.8  Technical facilities of Floor Linkage 
As  has been illustrated in Section l9,the linkage of  the floors of the 
Community  Stock Exchanges will be  a  natural application far  an 
electronically-assisted dealing  system  using hiqh-speed  telecommunications. 
The  general  technology of such an application is well established through 
existing precedents,  which make  the basic requirements clear.  These 
would  comprise: 
(i)  a  high-speed  telecommunications  network  linking the Exchanges,  diffusing, 
via real-time systems,  historic price informationr 
(ii)  a  central processor interfaced with each national terminal  network 
through appropriate traffic control devices,  permitting the transmission 
and  processing of pre-dealing information  (i.e.  bids and offers,  -
'commitments'  to trade and  'responses',  together with all information 
required to permit a  transaction to be  executed .on  the intervention ~f 
the dealer) ; 
(iii)  systems  to permit the transmission and receipt of commitments  to trade, 
the  transmission and receipt of responses  to commitments,  to output 
confirmation of transactions,  and  to create transaction record files 
and  generate reports; 
(iv)  systems  to permit transmission and processing of pre-settlement 
~nstructions; 
(v)  establishment of electronic interfaces between  the dealing and the 
national clearing/depositary systems  and  any European central 
clearing system  that may  be appointed or instituted by  the Exchanges, 
which would  also link the European  settlement system with  the banks' 
clearing systems  for money  settlement. 
The  video displays on  the floor  would  provide the dealer with bids  and 
offers currently available  in the other Community  Exchanges,  arrayed 
according to lowest offer or highest bid.  The  scene it is necessary 
to visualise is a  group of electronic trading posts,  implanted in a ·-~ 
- 400  -
floor environment in which  continuous face-to-face  floor  trading is 
takinq place.  The  electronic trading posts would  compriae clearly 
visible terminal  screens on which dealing  information was  displayed 
on  the basis of fully .standardised bids  and offers.  The  screens would 
provide the dealer with  offers and bids  from  other community  markets 
presenting  alternatives  to  those  avai~a~le-on his own  floor. 
Data entry facilities would be available on  the floor to allow input 
by  traders of commitments  to trade or responses,  according to the 
dealing  system ultimately determined.  Associated printers would be 
required for hard copy  confirmation of transactions and of  the necessary 
print-outs.  It is stressed that the system  envisaged would provide 
electronic assistance  to dealing  and  not automatic execution of 
transactions.  Comment  from  market participants strongly supported 
computer-assisted processing  and  transmission of pre-dealing information 
and  post-dealing instructions,  but insistence on personal  intervention 
for  execution of transactions was  universal. 
The  operating efficiency of the  system would be of paramount importance. 
To  be  of any practical use,  an electronic trading post would  have  to 
operate at the level of efficiency of the market which it served. 
It would  have  t'o  permit execution of transactions with the brokers 
(or market-makers)  on other  floors at· the same  speed as that on  the 
local Exchange.  The  efficiency of the u.s.  system is measured in 
seconds  and  the pre-occupation of  the monitorinq reports with execution 
time makes  clear how  important speed of processing and  transmission is 
to the viability and  competitiveness of  a  floor  linkage system. 
It is assumed  that,  like the existing networks,  the system would operate 
at least three  levels of service.  The  first would meet the requirements 
of the  specia~ists,  the second  those of the brokers,  and  the third would 
be  an  information level,  which itself miqht require to be divided into 
dealing information and price information.  At  floor  linkage,  the 
network would be  complex.  Its primary purpose would  be  to permit inter-
floor  trading,  to which,  using  a  broad definition of  'floor' it is 
assumed  that  members  dealinq  in  system  securities 
would  be  confined.  'J:'hc  info:rnational  elements  of  the - 401  - \ 
system would require more  extensive diffusion,  presumably with dealinq 
information and settlement input facilities to member  offices, and' 
price information to a  wide  range of investors and  outside services.  The 
way in which the linkage system would· interface with members •  private systems 
for dealing  (in system securities)  with non-European centres would 
require to be carefully considered.  Eligibility to participate in the 
system  at the different levels would hinge on membership problems already 
discussed,  the main quandary beinq .the eligibility of non-mamber  banks  in 
certain countries. 
While  not under-rating the technical challenge of installing such a 
system across ten different countries,  the technological precedents to 
determine its form  already exist.  If.desired,  a  'turn-key'  operation 
would  be possible.  The  major challenge posed by the technical installa-
tion relates to the readiness of the Exchanges  to  plan, .  finan~e· 
and develop a  1arge  system as a  joint .enterprise,  the scale of which 
is approximately indicated by  the  $2m per annum  costs of the Ainerican 
ITS  II. 
An  important premise of the proposals is the belief that the business 
base  to support a  Community  network  already exists.  The  Consultants 
consider that the data analysed in section 12,  though  incomplete, 
adequately indicates that the Stock Exchanqe  figures are a  considerable 
under-expression of the real volumes  of transactions in second-country 
E.E.C.  equities.  This  inter-market business appears, at the minimum 
estimate,  to be  somewhere  around  the average value of turnover of the 
European Exchanges.  On  a  Community  basis,  there appears  a  case for 
supporting and providing  the resources  for  this market accordingly.  When 
it is taken into account that this estimate of business is likely to be 
very  low,  and  that it reflects a  value of business achieved under ad hoc 
procedures and without technical support in the most  complex  securities 
market in the world, it is clear that the network,  when  installed,  should 
attain a  much  higher level of traffic,  and  that given proper organisation 
and  support,  the size of the market should increase.  • • 
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21.9  MUlt.itle H•tiy of Securities handled by the Floor JjJ.nkse !X•t. 
As  the COnaultants•  brief was  confined to the secondary equitiu 
market,  the problems of staridardisation of liatiaq requiremeDta ia not 
fully considered in thiti Report.  This 11  &  ujor qaation in ita own 
right.  The  standardisation of liatinq raquircenta, with a  qenerally 
accepted level  o~ new  issue documentation and procedures  of 
continuing disclosure,  raises problemsfor the primary,  rather than the 
secondary market. 
At present,  local listing is not essential for international dealing by 
Stock EXchanqe  members  in European securities.  Trading  throuqh 
inter-member channels is normally possible in any security listed on any 
Exchange.  This situation would radically change with floor  linkage,  and 
multiple  listing,by all participating Exchanges,of  securit~es included 
in the system would  become  necessary.  The  flexibility pemi  tted to 
members  in their present  off~floor dealing ·would  not be available 
in  a  floor  linkage system.  Dealing on  a  floor network in securities 
which were  not locally listed in some  manner  or another,  would  compromise 
the whole principle of Stock Exchange listing. 
Nor  would  the concessions  from  the full riqour  of listing disciplines, 
as  for  example  in the LOndon  Unli.sted Sec;uri ties Market or the French 
Second M&rche',  be of relevance to thi·a problem.  The  canpaniea whose 
securiti~s would  be  included in the European network would be major 
corporations for which any  form  of rudimentary listing would be totally 
inappropriate. 
Floor  interconnection would  therefore properly require standardised 
listing and  the implementation of  the three Directives already 
adopted which  cover  this subject.  The  Directives  themselves pose 
considerable problems  of rigidity in a  field in which flexibil_ity 
is desired by  the Exchanges.  The  scale of difficulties is exemplified 
by  the fact that in spite of the acknowledged quality of  the security 
concerned, it took several years  for  a  major  German  bank  ~o  obtain 
a  London listing,  due to differing national principles of consolidation of 
accounts.  'l'he revision•of German legislation which  would  have averted 
the  delay  is  taking  place  some  years  after  the - 403  -
liatinq waa  achieved.  Por floor  linltaqe,  a  ccmprcmiae might be reachwi 
whereby  the Stock Exchanges generally accepted a  common  denominator of 
listinq requirements,  or whereby  a  security miqht ba accepted into the 
linkage system if it already had a  certain level of multiple listinq on 
the European  Exchanqea. 
It is assumed that in the first instance only the larqer European 
equities would  be  included in the system.  Criteria could be readily 
established,  based on market capitalisation, local share turnover and 
present volume  of international trading,  - factors which tend to 
correlate,  - to determine the securities eligible for inclusion. 
The  assumed situation is that designated securities would be  transferred 
in successive blocks to the linkage system.  The  national Exchanges 
would  by mutual  agreement  release their major domestic securities 
onto the linkage  system in an agreed proportion so that reciprocal effects 
in the local markets equated.  This proportion might be determined as 
a  percentage of all overall equity market capitalisation of each 
Exchange,  or as a  percentage of market capitalisation of securities in 
the linkage. 
As  anticipated·in the initial IDIS  proposals, it will be essential that 
not only European,  but also non-European securities which are. actively 
traded.in the Community,  should be  included in the  linkage  system. 
The  possibility would  then exist for a  Europe-wide base for dealing in 
these securities and their inclusion would also facilitate members' 
dealinq with foreign centres. 
Given  that it would  be necessary for all securities dealt on the net-
work  to be listed on  each of the participating Exchanges,  a  common 
convention of listing fees would  be  required.  It would be inequitable 
and unrealistic to charqe listed companies  the standard fees  now 
charged by each Exchange.  It is assumed  that issuers would  probably 
be  charged the listing fee of the market of issue, plus a  fee  covering 
quotation in all the Exchanges participating in the network. - 404  -
It is 4eairable, to make  an eatiJiate, at an e&r'ly  ata9e,  of the nQiber 
of European securities which  should be included in linkaqe daalinq 
with the system in full operation.  It is assumed that iinkap would. 
be developed first throuqh the securities in which thue ia alr.e&4y 
substantial inter-market activity.  Larqer numbers of securities would 
be  handled in the systaa as market inter-penet:ation inc=ease d. 
It is of importance  that'linkaqe should provide a  possibility  for  ~eal 
involvement of ·second-country investors and  thereby market intermediaries  1 
in all the Community markets.  This· impliea a  sufficient ranqe. of. secur-
ities to meet selective investment criteria  1  the needs of technical dealing  1 
and the re-disposi  tion of  investme~ts wi thin..a European market in response 
to financial and economic trends.  Although the situation is.tmprov1nq, 
the present investment criteria in European equities have  tended to be 
crude,  based on currency views,  with total withdrawal  from  the market 
on  any change of climate.  The  selection ~f stocks has often been  a  secondary 
matter.  The  European market should progressively offer to the second-
country investor similar scope to that which is  ava~lable to him in his 
domestic market.  The  present internationally-active stocks are an 
under-expression of the ranqe. of securities which would be required to 
establish effective market linkage.  The  selection of securities should 
thus  take into account the proportion of total trading on each market 
represented by the securities in the ·system.  It i.s unlikely that real 
participation in a  second-country market would be obtained if the 
securities in the system constituted leas than about 40' of the local . 
.  dealinq. 
In this reqardthe present proposal to launch the  IDIS  system with 
3oo-400 stocks,  includinq the non-European securities, represents only 
a  first move.  Admittedly in some  Exchanges,  the problem is of another 
order,  and  far more  than 40\ of trading is concentrated in  fewer  stocks 
than the system will admit.  OVerall,  however,  the proposed nUIDber 
will,  in due course,  require to be considerably extended. - l.Q5  -
21.10  Commission  and  transaction charges 
Floor  linkage would  inevitably remove  the present  'double commission' 
convention  which has hampered  collaboration of brokers across community 
markets,  and which,  as.pointed out in Section 18,  has cau•ed European 
brokers•ehargesin  inter-marke~ transactions to be less competitive than 
those of non-European securities houses.  In general,  the present 
situation is that under  the rules of the ExchaOies  a  client contracting 
a  bargain in a  foreign country security with a  broker in one  market for 
execution in another,  must be  charged a  commission in both the 
markets.  According to different Exchange  rules,  this  'extra'  charge 
may  or may  not be made  apparent to the client, but it is, of course, 
well appreciated by the institutional investors.  It is unclear how  much 
business is actually lost to the Exchanges  frqm this cause,  as the 
larger investors avoid paying double  commission by direct recourse to 
the markets of origin.  The  link between  the broker and his natural 
local clients is weakened by this practice. 
A  further distorting factor is the inequality in commission rates and 
structures between the different Exchanges.  Th~s may  make  dealing on 
one  Exchange  more  attractive than on  another,  or may  take business o£l 
the  Exchanges  a.ltogether. 
In principle,  both these problems would  be  solved under floor  linkage. 
In a  system in which  the local broker himself had recourse to the 
second-country market floor,  his bought bargain would be the subject 
of his buying  clien~s commission payment,  while  the sellinq client in 
the foreign market would  simply pay  the sellers commission.  No  double 
commission could be  involved. 
Standardisation of commission rates and other dealing charges would 
present more  problems.  These would require to be balanced across the 
system  if the market  were not to be distorted and  the Stock Exchanges 
were  to have equal opportunity of participation.  Concessions in 
commission scales would  have to be  sought.  The  most difficult problem 
posed by  floor  linkage in this field would be  the accommodation of 
canpetitive commissions which the largest market,  the U.K.,  is to 21.11 
- Ia,  -
institute before the end of 1986.  '!'be  LOndon  IXcllaftge will be unable 
and  unwillinq to relinquish this principle,  while the various authOrities 
responsible for  commission levels on the other Exchanges may  be uD&ble 
to accept it .  It  would certainly be strongly opposed by 
several of the broker camnuni  ties on the Continent. 
Floor  linkage would provide a  salutary stimulus for the removal of 
other dealing charqes  sue~ as stamp duty or other present. forms  of 
transaction tax.  Equa.li  ty of dealing costs is not a  prescriptive . 
requirement of floor  linkage,  and the  lack of competitiveness in this 
respect of an  Exchange miqht be offset by other factors.  Unequal  charges 
would  however  represent a  major  imperfection in the  linked market. 
Settlement Services 
As  submitted in Section 20,  to permit the inter-connected floors to 
function effectively, ~e installation of  Community-wide  settlement 
linkaqe would be essential.  The  harmonisation of trading procedures, 
associated dealing facilities and bargain conditions will pezmit 
standardisation of settlement. 
The  settlement. system  supporting floor  linkaqe wouldnot be  in the 
conventions of the international market,  butwould s_ervice mutually 
agreed trading-procedures of  linkage whichwould transmute the dealing 
facilities presently available to Stock Exchange members  into a  European 
system.  The. European settlement would preszably ):)e  based on 
.de-materialised holding or tmmobilised certificate8, with transfer· 
achieved by computerised credit and debit of stock accounts.  With 
the support of such a  system,  liquidity of dealing could be greatly 
increas8d.  Costs associated with transfer would be both minimal  and 
standard across the markets.  Present costs associated with stock 
movements  and  insurance would  be  avoided.  The  present operations 
supporting European  international dealing,  which are labour intensive 
and which may  take  some  twenty  times  ~he man  hours required by domestic 
settlement,  would be brought into line with the efficiencies of the 
local markets. 21.12 
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It has been arqued in Section 20  that the nacesaary central clearinq 
agency should be attained by linkaqe of the exiatinq national clearlng 
systems  and depositaries.  It is suggested that the present approach ot 
bi-lateral aqreements between the depositaries,  thouqh valuable ground-
work,  will not in the longer  run achieve  the deqree of harmonisation 
and provide  the settlement facilities required for floor linkage.  A 
more  general initiative is required to co-ordinate these bi-lateral 
negotiations into a  general European approach.  It is further submitted 
that this international linkage,  run by  the Exchanges  and  based on  the 
depositaries,  should take account of the financial services related to 
equity settlement which  are already offered by  independent settlement 
agencies,  which might,  in the future,  be in competition for  this 
business. 
Preliminary negotiations for  floor  linkage 
There is no  doubt of the desirability of linkage of the floors of the 
Community  Exchanges  to permit a  common  market in major equities.  It 
meets  the expressed preference of the majority of the Exchanges  to 
preserve their physical floors  as  the nodal point of their structures. 
It would  consolidate the future of the floor markets,  so assisting the_ 
regulatory role of the official Exchanges,  and assure  transparency of 
the market to the public. 
It will be  noted however_,  that this preference infringe• at least one 
of the stipulations of the terms  of reference.  The  Consultants consider 
it totally illusory to believe that floor  linkage can be  attai~ed 
without changes  in the present market floors.  Attention has been 
drawn  in this Report to the considerable range of difficulties involved 
in implementing  linkage of the floors.  Floor  linkage caMot be  secured 
by half-measures.  Negotiation towards it, and  tr~nsfer of securities to 
it could be progressive,  but the implementation of the system would  be 
an  abrupt rather than a  gradual change.  It implies a  willingness of the 
Exchanges  to make  adjustments  to their rules and procedures in the 
interest of creating a  common  capital market. - 4US  -
It is no coincidence that pressure fraa the CallllUility  and investors for 
a  European market is concurrent with fundamental reconsideration at 
national level  of the structures of alJDoat  avecy Bxeh&nqe  repreaented 
on  the Ccmmi ttee.  'l'he ·national need  to moderniae  the lxcbanqea in order to 
ensure that their economic and  social functions are propcly diecharqed, 
relates to the European priorities.  Movement  towards  a  market base at 
European  level ought to be an essential element of any of the 
re-orqanisation schemes  beinq pursued at ·national level.  The 
credibility of such an idea is endorsed by the similarity of the 
problems  each Exchanqe  faces  in its own  environment.  Mutual  collaboration 
between the Cam:lluni ty Exchanqes  in facinq  these problems of strenqthening 
the official markets  and the scale of operations of their members,  miqht 
permit a  converqence of approach to the qeneral benefit of linkaqe. 
As  things stand it may  be questioned whether European considerations 
fiqure at all in the intense national debates on  local chanqes.  There 
is a  yawning  qap  between the linkaqe initiative  aimed at a  Europe-wide 
capital market,  and the wranqlinq on  domesti~ issues at national level. 
This miqht suqqest that a  positive role  for  the Ccmmittee would  be  to 
infuse into these national debates  appropriate consideration of the 
community  objectives. 
The  Exch4nqes  may  be  influenced by  the consideration that the future of· 
the-Stock Exchanqe·floors cannot be assured bya negative defence of 
existinq practice.  At present the European  financial environment 
serviced by  the Exchanqes  and the cCDPeti  tion within it frcm  outside 
the  c~uni  ty  has moved  far faster  than the Stock Exchanqes  in the 
exploitation of technoloqy in the international markets.  If the 
stock Exchanqe  floors are to retain their central siqnificance in the 
_securities industry they must modernise international equities dealinq. 
They  cannot afford to iqnore technology of which their ccmpeti  tors are 
already makinq  effective use.  An  advanced system of linking the floors 
might be one  means  through wbich such progress could be achieved.  The 
European Stock Exchanges  could collaborate to pr?Vide,  on behalf of 
their smaller members.,  a  technical infra-structure of international 
communication to off-set their disadvantage when  faced with non-European 
organisations which  are s.ufficiently  large to provide such facilities· 
in-house. - 1{1)  -
It is clear that floor  linkage cannot  ap~ropriately be considered an 
immediate tarqet.  Solutions to the problems associated with it wili 
require detailed analysis and complex neqoti&tion,  and are likely to 
be achieved only over time.  Five years would be an optiaistic 
schedule for its implementation. 
It is accepted that this proposal is radical.  For its effective 
implementation it would require  the attachment of some representative ·Of 
the Committee to the Groups  which,  at the level of each national Exchanqe, 
are considerinq their modernisation proqramme.  It would  imply mutual 
influencing of Stock Exchanges at nati~nal level.  The first step miqht 
be modest,  and  limited to the buildinq up  of continued intelligence of 
current and proposed changes.  ·The Secretariat of the Committee. could 
act.as the repository of any  forward planning information that the 
Exchanges  were  prepared to release. 
A  clear problem  will  arise in influencing the situation within the 
necessary time-scale.  The  London  market is likely to evolve its-
new  structure  and  procedures  in  the  next  two 
years.  Practical results on.a European plane miqht,  for  example,  emerge 
£com  eff~tL»e liai~on betWeen  LQndQn  ·and'~tar g~oups enchArgea with 
reviews of Community  Stc.ck  Exch21nge  dealing systems. 
It is difficult to see how  the obstacles to floor linkage could be 
overcome  without extensive and  continuing collaboration between  the 
policy planners of the inaividual Stock Exchanges.  A practical method 
of initiating such  a  dialogue would be  to submit to each Stock Exchange 
an initial outline design of a  harmonised  trading system which might 
form  the basis of floor  linkage.  Comments  would  be sought on the 
design,  and  the Exchanqes would be offered the opportunity to propose 
alternative schemes.  The  extent of commitment  to the concept of linkage 
would  be established.  The  'dummy'  design initially presented to the 
Stock Exchanges would have significance only as a  discussion document. - 410  -
lt  would however offer the epportunity for tlwt  Exch~AnC;Jes t9 express;_' in 
sufficient detail to verify their -.rJtet loqic,  the. t;.ypes  e>f  li~a,e 
which woulA  be acceptable to the~ and  the PJ:••ed  n& ture of the 
participation of their members  in it.  F:r:GP,t  a~b :r:eapcm•••  ~e r-.+ 
dimensions of the problem of linkage would emerge and tbe  pr~ct1cal 
issues which the Exchanges would have  tQ  reaolve ~-·~  ~selves 
would be "tablished. - 41.1  -
SECTICil  22  . INTERM!DIA'l'B  AC1'ION  TPWAR0S  FULL  LIHKAGB  OF  '1'BE  OFFICIAL  MAlUCBTS 
22.1  The  need for a  Phased !pproach within an aqreed overall policy 
The  problem facing  the European  Exchanqes  ill .taking  the preliminary 
steps towards  linkage  may  be summarised in the following manner. 
'l'he  membership structures, market procedures and priori  ties of the 
Exchanges are at present totally orientated to national considerations. 
Althouqh one or two  local official markets in second country B.B.C. 
securities exist,  the bulk of such business,  as is generally the case 
in the international markets,  is dealt  in  the market.of origin. 
'1'he  mechanisms  to achj,.eve  this have  tended to develop · in the off-
markets,  outside the. official Exchanges.  'Ibis has occurred for good 
reasons,  to do  with the inadaptability of the floor market procedures 
to this type of business,  due in the main to long-standinq leqislative 
orientation of the market floors to danestic needs  and,  to sane deqree, 
to the nature of.the privileqes of their members. 
In this situation,  the development of  the  European  international market 
raises a  quandary.  The  provision of  improved facilities may  re-inforce 
the present flight of the international securities markets·from  the official 
Exc:hanges,a·nd fur.ther erode their standing in the international environment.  On 
the other hand, the diversity of the present Exchanges,  which  has generated 
the preaent form  of the European  inte~national securities market, will 
not be easily changed  to secure the harmonisation necessary to present 
the Exchanges  as  a  cre~ible alternative to the present channels of 
international dealing.  Sane progressive route is thereby required 
which would  support and stimulate  ~e European securities market,  and 
which  would,  at the  same  time,  consolidate the position of the official 
markets and  secure movement  towards  the harmonisation  w~ich is ultimately 
required. 
Such  a  progressive route might best be achieved by accepting  a 
phased approach to linkage,  during which  the incompatibilities  inheren~ 
in the objectives expressed .above might be resolved as improved inter-
Exchanq.e  dealing facilities were ·installed and as more  in~er-Europea!l 
business developed..  'l'he  approach should be wi  th~n the context of an agreed 
overall strategy.  It is well unde;cstood  that national sensitivities (i) 
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appear to prevent discussion,  let alone resolution  of the key isaues 
related to linkage.  It should  eqtaally well be understood bowwar 
· that unless the Exchanges are ;ble jointly to agree -on  a  long-tem 
strategy of effective linkaqe,  events are 'Certain to .overtake that. 
The opportunity  to establish  ,  by their joint action,  a  8\J:ropean 
identity in the international securities markets would otherwise be lost. 
It is submitted that the three phases  on which general agreement should 
be souqht might be: 
Phase  I  Policy Determination and Information Service 
IDIS  would be  implemented,  as had already been agreed,  as .an inter-
Exchange information system.  For  reasons expressed below it is 
likely to be found that  long~term policy formation is needed, 
even at this stage. 
· (ii)  Phase II  :  Enhancement of  IDIS  to an inter-Exchange dealing systan 
(iii) 
At this phase,  the harmonisation of Exchange procedures is not 
presumed.  Improved facilities for members'  inter-European dealing 
would be implemented,  based on and  rationalising the idiCXD  of the 
present international market.  The nature of the interfaces between 
the network  and each Exchange  would,  subject to general agreement of 
arrangements,  be defined ·by  each Exchange  according to local needs. 
Phase III  :  Linkage of the official markets 
At this point,  the major  European  s~curities would progressively be 
moved  into a  harmonised  system of trading,  linking the official 
markets,  as described in Section 21. 
Phases  I  and II would  thus constitute the transitional phases  towarda 
linkage of the official markets.  During this period the opportunity 
would exist to tackle and resolve the obstacles to full linkage.  The 
stimulus to the European markets given by the facilities provided in 
Phases  I  and II would provide  the ineentive to face these problems. 22.2 
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Phase  I  :  The  implementati~n of IDIS  and  the fo:r:mulation of linkage policy 
The  implementation of IDIS  as  an  inter-Exchange information systeiD has 
already been agreed by the Committee  of Stock &xcban\Jes,  and requires 
only limited mention in these proposals. 
A valuable consequence of this initiative will be ·that,  even at the 
first informational stage of the systEm,  consideration of sane of the 
key  issues of linkage will be provoked.  The  obvious desirability of 
standardised information will be recognised when it becomes apparent 
that the IDIS  prices are in quite different forms.  The  prices will be 
of different  type~  sane formed  collectively and  sane formed  in 
continuous dealing.  The  prices may  relate ~  local instruments rather 
than the Underlying stocks.  '1'he  timing of prices, - a  crucial factor 
in international price communication,  - will differ.  The  absence of 
the continuous prices of the major off-markets, (for example, of the 
European international bank markets)  will prejudice the usefulness 
of the system.  It will becane apparent that for IDIS  prices to be of 
practical use,  harmonisation of the trading systems originating  them 
would be required. 
The  problem of _eligibility to  transmit prices throuqh the system will 
arise, if these deficiencies are to be overcome.  Likewise the 
. destin~tion of price information wil~ raise questions of principle. 
The  European prices will,  in the main,  have relevance to the activities 
of members'  dealing rooms  rather than the floors. 
tt might further be argued that IDIS,  as presently conceived in its 
initial stage, will not produce information superior to that already 
available to the active international dealers from  c~ercial systems. 
Indeed it might be inferior in that such  systems at present,  at least 
in the bond market,  have facilities for contributor pages on which bid 
and offer prices may  be made,  continuously,  by participants.  Such 
facilities could be rapidly extended  to equities as  the demand  became 
manifest. 
If IDIS  is to be effective and  '!;:o  receive market support,  there is 
likely to be pressure for it to be rapidly enhanced into a  system 
which will provide full pre-dealing information,  and which will have ....  414  -
the capacity to record and  process post-dealing transaction instructions. 
This development  ap~ears to be anticipated in the initial project 
specification approved by  the Committee of Stock  EXcha~es. 
'l'h• illpl..-ntatiOft of the  IDII network,  and 11:8  extension to  the trans-
mission of bi4,  offer and other pre-dealinq infoxmation  before any 
harmonisation of floor dealinq procedures has  be~ attained, will cause 
the d•and for the system to ccae freD  existinq international dealinq 
channels.  Althouqh,  as noted below,  cru4e floor  interfaces m:t.qht  be 
constructed by Exchanqes  which considered a  link  with their floor 
dealinq an immediate imperative,  true inter-floor dealing will not be 
possible prior to harmonisation of tradinq procedures.  The  system will 
therefore tend to be most used by the international dealers.  This does 
not mean that its use will be confined to professionals.  The present 
international network  includes professional -posi  tioners,  such as the 
London  jobbers or the Dutch or German  banks,  but it is, in the main 
made  up of the brokers who  deal with  them.  The activity of commission-
orientated intermediaries in the international ~arketwillgreatly increase 
once an efficient and well-regulated European network is available.  ~ 
extension of IDIS  to cover existiM dealinq channels,  to which it will 
tmmediately be drawn,  would' do much  to broaden the international market 
to the qeneral -advantage of the European investors •.  It will be noted, 
however
1.that it will re-inforce the  ~isting i~ternational dealinq 
channels,  a  trend which  the Consultants  consider quite inevitable at·the 
stage before  f~Qqr linkage is achieved. 
Opinion UlOnq•t  the Stock bchanqes i• d1  vided on thi• ~••tion.  The 
majority support floor  linkaqe in principle.  A minority acknowledqe· 
that it  miqht be difficult to attract to the floors international 
business which has  alre~dy left them,  and  that the floors may  not be 
the best place for development of international busineBs.  Interpreta-
tion of this  divis~on of view is complicated.  The minority qroup  ~f 
Exchanges  transact the bulk of the international equities business, 
and it is possible that  sa~e siqnificance should be attached to their 
opinion.  The situation is further complicated by  the fact that no 
market participant interviewed by the Consultants believed that floor 
lirikaqe was possible in the prevailing circumstances of the markets. - 415  -
The  Consultants believe that the solution to this quandary is for  the 
Committee  to ensure that the firat technical develqpments to implement 
even  the first stages of lOIS  should be within the framework  of a 
broad policy aqreed and affirmed by  the Committee  and  the Commiasion. 
From  the expressed views of the Committee,  it is interpreted that such 
a  strateqy should be expressed as a  statement of lonq-term intent to 
create a  Euro-equities market, 
(i}  to link the official markets of the Stock Exchanqes  for 
major European equities and  non-European  equities 
actively dealt in the Community  capital centres; 
(ii)  to achieve th:J:s  ltnkage wi:th.  the appropriate assistance of 
electrontc processtnq and  htqh~speed telecommuntcations, 
(iii)  to reconcentrate all .the European equities business of Stock 
Exchange members  onto the official markets,based on  transparent 
and fully-serviced operations on  th' Stock Exchanqe  floors, 
accepting that the definition of  'floor• will be essentially 
~etermined by the inclusion of dealing within the system 
and under  the regulation of the official markets,  rather than 
by  narrow physical definition; 
(iv)  progressively to  achieve  such harmonisation of the regulations 
governing  trading,  membership,  commissions  and settlement as may 
be required  to_achieve effective floor  linkage. 
On  the basis of such an agreed statement of intent,  a  formal Plan to 
which the Stock  Exchanges might subscribe could be  drawn  up,  as 
proposed in Section  19_.  The  Plan would indicate the technical 
requirements of floor  linkage.  To develop it, high level policy 
groups would be required to resolve the problems discussed in this 
Report in the fields of Dealing,  Membership matters,  Commissions,  and 
Settlement,in light of developments occurring on the national Exchanqes. 
such Policy Groups  would assist the Commission  and the Committee  in 
their direction of each phase of the network project.  The  policy 
groups  should be required to submit their proposals not later than 
twelve months after approval of the Statement of Intent. 
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The  Conaultants believe that unless  such Policy Groapfl are fozaec!,  end 
the ujor.  queatiOD8 of linkaqe addressed ~  retJOl.wd.,  the aucces• of 
the technical work,  both in the initial IDtS  .tafoaaa~ODAl ataqe and 
in ita later developaent into a  Sure--equities .aazltet a-yetta,  will be 
seriously campramieed. 
First, as arque4 above,  if the inforaation system is dev~lopad out of the 
context of its later dealinq applications, it is vuy likely that 
in response to dema.."ld,  the trend of its initial development w1i1 
reinforce the present trading channels,  which are not those ideally 
required by the longer term aiu  of the  Caami ttee.  The most obvious 
example of this is the danqer of pranotinq the price infor:maticn 
service before the levels of the. future  system have been defined  ... 
There is a  danqer  in admi ttinq any participants into IlliS  ~efore the 
eligibility of the various intermediaries to participate at the 
different and  f~ture levels has been decided,  These basic decisions. 
should be taken befora participation in the  s~stem is offered to anyone, 
at any  level. 
second,  in defininq the route to linkaqe,  no discrimination into 
1 short-tam problems •  and  'lonq-tem problems  1  is possible.  In the liqht 
of an aqreed s'trateqy, . short-term and lonq-tem developments  and 
· implementation can be determined,  bu.t the fundamental problema must 
be addressed and  the  lonq-term tarqeta set before the first stages 
are embarked on,  if the evolution of the system is to be controlled. 
Su.ary consideration of the issues which will confront the first staqe 
of IDIS,  all of which have been considered at mo.re  lenqth earlier ,in 
this Report,  will make it quite clear that the initial development 
staqe,  intermediate to floor  linkaqe, will be confronted by questions 
on which poaitive poliC?Y  quidance will be  reqUired·. 
'  .  . 
The  Consultants experience on the project  ~eads them  to  refute totally 
the belief that,  in sane imprecise way,  the strategy of linkaqe of 
European Exchanges will spontante9usly emerqe  from  ad hoc consideration 
of problems of the IDIS project as they arise. - 417  -
22.3  Phase II  :  Enhancement of IDIS  into an inter-Exchanqe dealing system 
In principle,  the  need  for  a  computer-assisted network  pe~itting 
dealing between the Eurooean  Stock Exchanaes will be readilv seen as 
an  essential aspect of linkage  and  technical considerations related to 
such an initiative have been discussed in section 19.  At minimum  the 
facilities would comprise  enhancement of IOIS  to.  or superwession of 
IDIS  by,  an interactive system with a  central processor which would be 
capable of receivina and  transmitting pre-dealing information and of 
handling post-dealing settlement instructions.  As  regards dealing, the 
system would permit formally arrayed bids and offers upon  terminal 
screens,  securitY by security,  giving  the price at which  the commitment 
to trade was  made,  identifying the participants.  and  indicating the 
size in which  the commitment  was  made. 
A strong preference was  expressed in the markets  that the response  to 
commitments  should be  throuah  traditional channels.  i.e. mainly tele-
phone  or telex.  It would  however be essential for participants to be 
able to confirm  trades,  and  for  the system  to.proeess  transaction data 
and  generate an appropriate range of dealing rePOrts.  From  the outset 
it would  be essential that the system  should  report  the state of 
trading  and  maintain  channels  throuqh which  any  company  announcements 
likely to have bearing on  share price could  simultaneously be  tramsmitted 
to all market centres. 
The  critical question immediately,arises;  given that such an inter-
mediate  system cannot be  linked directly to floor dealing,  how  should 
it  interface with the Exchanges?  Prior to harmonisation of proce-
dures, it would  clearly be  impossible  to create transactions with one 
side entered remotely via  the  network,  and  one side on·a market floor. 
The  only credible formula  to keep such a  dealing  network appropriately 
under the aegis of the Stock Exchanqes  would  appear to be to limit 
participation in it to members  of the Exchanges.  Reservations have 
been expressed that basing an intermediate network on this principle 
would  not be in the interests of the Exchanges.  The  Consultants 
cannot concur with this view,  and consider this prooosal  to be  the most 
constructive route the Committee  can follow,  for  the ·following 
summarised  reasons,  all of which  have been dealt with at length earlier 
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(i)  It-would appear realistic,  in plans  to develop  a  European capital 
market,  to acknowledge  the real!  ties of the present market.  Market 
practitioners  have devised existing channels with skill and expertise, and this 
has made the present and ;rowinq  levels of tradiM possible.  Present 
practices give positive evidence of how,  despite the constraints buposedby 
domestic Stock Exchange rules and national obstacles,  international 
securities transactions ca-n  be achieved in Europe-.  Until rules are 
chanqed arld · national-lev6l obstacles  removed  the  nE~·ed for these 
channels will remain.  'l'he  loqic of market development is to SuPPOrt 
them.  In practical terms,  it might reasonably be asked how  the 
European market is to be develooed,  if the present practitioners and 
the skilled business they operate are not somehow  streamed into the 
new  systeml'  'rhe Consultants believe that any progressive  str-ateqy 
to link the European markets must,  by definition, start from  the 
Eurooean International Securities Market as it exists now.  Any  other 
point of departure would,  by definition,  be  revolutionary in nature, 
would dangerously ignore the realities of the international market, 
and would fail to attract support from  any of the present interested 
and expert practitioners. 
(ii)  As  long  as  the national markets retain their different characteristics, 
and  thus  contin~e to constitute separate  marke~s, arbitraqe will be 
necessary between  them.  'rhere  1 s  a  tendency in saD  a  quarters to regard 
arbitrage as  a  redundant and parasitic function.  This is far  from  the 
case.  It is a highly skilled and highly competitive task,  facilitating 
international transactions and playing  a  vital role in international 
price equalisation.  Improvement of the efficiency of this function 
between the different European Exchanges would benefit both the markets 
~nd the investors. 
(iii)  'l'he  intermediate deal-ing  system would not only,  as has been implied, 
strengthen the arbitrage network.  Given  the agreement of the Exchanges, 
all members  would be eligible to participate.  Brokers would be able to 
match client transactions across  the markets without any necessary 
intermediation of a  market principal.  Effective positioning across the 
markets would  continue to be required,· but it is most questionable 
whether this would constitute the greater part of the trading volume. - 419  -
(iv)  It is lliaquided to believe that aettil'¥]  up  an international European 
network,  in the hands of the members· of the Stoclc  Exchanqes,  would 
fraqment,  or otherwise adversely affect the official markets.  ~  the 
contrary,  the proposed intermediate network would per.it business which is 
at present carried out by Stock Exchange membera·all over 
Europe,  but  falls outside official regulation and  is 
unknown  to the parent Stock  Exchanges,  to be brought into conjoint 
official Stock Exchange business.  Network  dealinq would enter 
official Stock Exchange statistics and be subject to proper regulation. 
If no  effort is made  by the Stock  Exchanges  to encompass members• 
European business  using  the facilities which  such a  network would  provide, 
and if the Exchanges  continue to allow their members  to participate in 
the international markets outside Exchange  rules,  then  the Exchanges will 
continue to  lose their business  and  their position,  as  internationaldealing 
increases. 
(v)  While floor linkage, i.e. full.  linkage of the official markets must 
remain a  distant target,  intermediate linkage through  the members 
could be readily achieved.  The  existing concessions through which 
members  of the different Exchanges  deal with each other would continue 
to apply. 
(vi)  A similar  obse~vation applies in respect of the securities in which 
network participants would be permitted to deal.  The  freedom  now 
generally available to members  in their international securities 
dealing would  continue  to apply using the network. 
(vii)  The  propo~al for an inter-Exchange  network  m~y bear a  significant 
relation to possible future  ~evelopment of the forms  of  the Stock 
Exchanges at national level.  It appears  that several of the Exchanges 
may  be considering  the  local use  of computer-driven dealing networks 
to retain local business in the domestic market.  Such a  device would 
clearly be  a  formula  for  the Exchanges  to recover business at presentkept 
in the off-market because it is not suited to  the  techniques of  local 
floor dealing.  It seems  clear that a  computer driven dealing  network will 
form  an important part of developments  in London.  It is understood that 
the Amsterdam  authorities are also considering  the possibility of a 
network  to re-concentrate  local dealing. - 420  -
There is thus a  possibility that the European official markets of the 
future may·need  to be considered as a  more broad concept than official 
market floors.  An  inter-£xchanqe  n~tftork would .,_ well acS•I)t.S  to auch 
development.  The  existence of any  local network with an establiShed 
relation to a  local floor would  resolve all problems of the appropriate 
point of· access to  the international system. 
(vii-i)  It requires to be recognised that the European Stock Exchanges are 
already losing place,  in international business,  to larqe international 
banks or brokers,  and to commercial  networks,  whose  coverage of the 
European markets  and whose  supporting  technology and dealing facilities 
are superior to'those available between Stock $xchange members.  In 
view of the demand  for increased efficiency. in international dealing 
and settlement, it will be inevitable that such agencies fill the gap 
in Europe,  if the Stock  Exchanges  fail to do  so. 
(ix)  An  intermediate network,  installed in this way  prior to full linkage 
of the official markets does  not preclude  the setting up  of such floor 
interfaces with the system as might appear required by a  particular 
Exchange.  Such decisions would be a  matter  for  each Exchange.  In 
London,  Amsterdam  and Germany,  for  example,  access  to the international 
markets, would  :presumably  continue to be  through  the dealing rooms 
of members,  to which  the  linkage  system would  be well adapted.  In 
other Exchanges,  there may  be  a  wish  to create floor interfaces with 
the  system.  There  would,  in such cases,  be  a  requirement to carry out 
such  intermediation as was  required on  the  floor itself. 
On  the above grounds,  the Consultants believe that the early implementa-
tion of a  dealing linkage between the Exchanges, basad on the extension 
of the present dealing  channels and projected, where considered necessary, 
on  to the StOck  Exchange  floors,  represents the most constructive and 
progressive action that the Stock Exchanges might take, prior to full 
linkage of the official markets.  The  following  sub-Sections consider 
the principal issues which must be resolved to implement such a  network. - 421  -
22. 4  Intemfldiate action required in r•pect of Deal  in! ua Ccaaunicati.on 
Once  the  Committee  had  accepted that the feasibility of the develop-
ment of IOIS  as an  international system to transmit offers and  bids 
should be considered,  direction on the following questions will be 
required. 
(i)  the type of market to be serviced.  The  appar-ent general opinion 
that linkaqe should be based on continuous tra.dinq,  and that liqQidity 
should be assured  within  it  by  some  type of  market  dealers, 
should be confirmed.  'Ihe  extent of business which  should qo  throuqb 
the ma.rket~a.kers,  as opposed to that which miqht be matched directly 
with other agency· orders  shoU'ld  be defined.  The  conventions by which 
principal and  agents business are distinquished,  their treatment,  and 
the nature of any priority to be given to public orders should be 
established; 
(ii)  service levels of the system.  Once  a  dec.ision on  the  type of market 
(iii) 
had' been made  the required  levels of operation of the  system  should be 
specified.  It is assumed  that three will be  required,  - the first for 
~cipants entitled to originate or cnanqe bids and offers,  the second 
for  partici~ta able to receive and respond  to offers and bids,  and 
the third for participants entitled to use  the service for information 
purpo  .. es only; 
tradinq hours.  It is assumed that at first the service will not 
operate twenty four hours  a  day,  but that it will cover approximate 
European business hours.  A system of agreed exchanqe of information 
related to the dealinq positions of principals should be developed 
to permit them  to determine their opening prices, 
(iv)  standardisation of price information,  currency of quotation and 
dealing,  and  bargain conditions.  It is pres\,Uiled  that in the first 
instance the general procedures of the network will respond to the 
requirements  ~  the present international equities market,  i.e. 
dealinq in aqreed currency for cash settlement five business days 
after the deal.  While  net dealing between principals will be  accom-
modated within such a  system,  it is likely that in the 1ntemediate - 422  -
puiod, before floor hamonisation the ayat. MY have to accept offua 
and bids for different settlement periods.  The extent of possible 
~lerance to  deputuJ"e  fr~ sU.ict c~foq1ty to at.arl4az14  bax'gain 
conditions should be  inve~tiqatea, in the  in~e•t'  of permitting 
broker-broker ba:rqaina &e;r(Ms  the Excha,nqea  pa:1oz:  to' fl~  linkage  1 
(v)  ~  extent to which dealing in the system in  ~· selected stocks is to 
be  ~~datory.  While objections mic;,ht  be ra.i  sed to· dealiJv;J  ln 'the 
local '~k.et or if in othe.r European markets throuqh the ayste  beinq 
~-tory, tbis is l,ikely to be  essenti~l both to ~sure traffic within 
the  sys_ten •nd to prevent abuse of the  syste.m either as a  'smoke  screen' 
or a  market of last resort.  Makinq  use of the  system maneatory in inter-
market transactions by members in the selected stocl~s implios no  more  than 
appropriate extension to the European  system of constraint sim'ilar to 
that now  imposed 'at domestic  level; 
(vi)  standardisation of dealing conventions.  The deqree  of commitment to 
trade once an offer or bid has  been made  should be determined.  It is 
assumed that all off~rs and bids will be  firm.  'l'he  period durinq which 
(vii) 
an offer or bid is valid,  and the coDditions under which it might be 
withdrawn,  should, be aqreed.  Obligations with respect to lot s~zes 
(if any),  indication of the size in which the quotation is made,  and 
how  limit orders  should  be  handled in the  system,  should be 
clarified.  The possibility of clearinq small orders at the opening, or 
some  other price,should be investigated, 
interfacing the system with certain Stock Exchanqe floors.  On  the 
assumption that the dealinq network will be installed before floor 
linkaqe can be achieved,  proposals should be souqht  from  the Exchanges 
which consider it immediately essential to link the international 
network.  with their existing floor operation,  on the methods  and 
procedures they propose  to use.  over this period,  an arbitraqe 
function on  the  f~oors appears the only means  by which the dissimilar 
orders could be  linked.  Even this could  only,~ done .where continuous 
tradinq with transactiOns· at two-way individual price& was pemitted - lt23  -
on the floors.  It ia assumed  that such intermediate arranq•enta for 
brinqin; certain floors  in the ayatam will be qu14ed by the developaent 
of plana for full floor linkaqe,  aa discussed in Section 21.  Various 
features of trading procedures,  such as dealinq periods for account 
(terme)  settlement miqht be standardised  lonq before full harmonisation 
of trading procedures. 
22.5  Intermediate action required in respect of Membership  requlation· 
Treatinq the  term  'membersh~  •  in its broadest sense,  a  ranqe of 
problems in this field requi~es solution before  any dealing  system 
can be  launched in ~  QRnf~~~ce that it will evolve.in an  aquitabl~ 
and effeetive way. 
(i)  definition of the status of the linked trading system.  To  permit the 
responsibilities  of  the linked trading to be properly defined and 
held,  and its development and  operations to be effectively managed, 
the.creation of some  form  of corporate body,  jointly held by the Stock 
Exchanges,  may  be necessary.  The  relation of this corporation to the 
participatinq Stock Exchanges  requires to be  established.  It is 
assumed  that the present IDIS  project will form  the nucleus of  ~he 
facilities management  organisation,  and it miqht be advisable  to 
incorporate this as a  separate body,  in light of the ultimate financial 
accountability that will be required.  As  discussed in Section 19,  the 
Consultants consider the U.S.  precedents in this respect valuable as an 
(ii) 
effective example  of .inter-Exchange project collaboration, 
definition of responsibility for  re9clattcn  of  the  information 
and  trading network.  A major  justification for  the type of network 
proposed,  and in particular for its confinement to Stock Exchange 
members,  is the extension  to international equities markets of the 
regulatory regimes of the official markets with regard to company  informa-
tion disclosure and  fair  trading.  While  under a.ny  linkage 
system,  regulatory functions with respect to issue disciplines and 
transactions related to their floors will still be  covered by  the 
national Exchanges,  certain aspects of the inter-Exchange dealinq system 
will require explicit regulations and codes of conduct.  The  source of 
origination,  promulgation and  enforcement of such ancillary rules 
requires to be established1 (iii) 
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definition of the operating rules of the network.  While  this is a 
leaur problem than market rec;ula  tion of the ayste11,  fcnlal rule• tO 
-..ure participants' a4harence  to the  o~ratinq atandaz'da of tbe linkaqe 
syatea will be  nee4ed  1 
(iv)  definition of the capacity in which participants miqht deal,  and the 
dealinq  con~cta available to  diffe~ent caUgories of participants. 
This question will be determined by  the decisions  taken on the type of 
trading system to be utilised.  Assuming  that positioninq and net 
dealing between principals is permitted,  the types of member  in each 
Exchange  allowed. to undertake  such functions should be agreed.  In the 
.period intermediate to. floor linkage,  establishing appropriate inter-
market dealing contacts between·members will raise few  problema,  as 
existing Qispensations in the local rules of the Exchanqes .already permit the 
necessary opera  tions..It needs to be considered, however, whether, in those 
capital centres in which  non-member  banks carry out indispensable 
market functions,  such banks should be eligible for  participation~ 
Precedent for this type of concession already exiats in the dealing 
rules of one  of the Exchanges.  It is likely to prove that common 
agreement between all the Exchanges  on  these questions will be required 
to ensure that common  principles prevail,  and  thattheallocation of roles 
in a  particular location is generally acceptable.  This  should not be 
diffic:u~t  .•  as  thP  present s1tuat.ion in ;nternational  dealif.'9  is tacit'y 
accepted by  the Exchanges.  The  definition of participants at the information 
level of service is a  similar,  thouqh  simple~ problem which will require 
qeneral agreement; 
(v)  definition of financial assurance between participants.  The  relation 
of the present national schemes  of qua.rantee and  compensation to the 
types of transactions possible within  the system  should be 4efined.  It 
should be considered whether  any  financial criteria will be required 
tor all daalinq participant•.  n,.  r~lavanco of  diacr~ninatory member-
ship rules now  existinq at national level  (e.g.  terMe  membe~s and 
non-terme members)  requires to be  considered.  It·is assumed  that there 
would  be minimum  capital requirements  for market-makers.  The  need  for 
conformity of partici~ts to solvency ratios should be  considered,  and 
the relevance and caapatibility of existing national schemes reviewed; 
\ .. 
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(vi)  standardisation of approach to the creation of international dealinq bouses 
by Stock  ~chanqe members.  Linkaqe of the Exchanges miqht be  facilitated 
if a  CCIIDOn  approach  to  the rules governing the developnent of international 
business were  adopted  while,  at the same  time,  defending  the 
position of the local floor in danestic stocks, 
(vii)  definition of th8 position of non-European securities houses.  It is 
assumed  that foreign brokers would  be eligible to participate in the 
system  through any of their subsidiaries which miqht be members  of a 
European Exchange.  A problem of assuring that the condi  tiona under 
which  they are  a~tted to local membership  are satisfactory to all the 
Exchanges  might need·to be resolved; 
(viii)  inter-Exchange concessions permitting joint association and mutual 
corporate participation by members  of the Community  Exchanges..  RaqarCl-
less of the  linkage network,  the potential for  joint mutual participation 
in member  firms  across the European markets should be explored,  to permit 
the development of an international client base and Europe-wide markets. 
The  obstacl's to market-making should be  confronted and  sue~ arrangements 
as  joint stock accounts covering several markets  facilitated. 
22.6  Intermediate action required in respect of transaction costs 
The  principles for  the tariff charges for  the dealing system should be 
established.  It is assumed that the  sys~em will be exploited to reduce 
inter-market settlement costs.  The  weighting of the scale charqes for 
small and large-size transactions should be con.sidered,  as should 
general liaison with users on cost matters.  The  present double 
commission anomaly in transactions involving two markets should be 
largely averted by the linked dealing,  but where it  is~till applicable 
should be supstituted by  commission  sharing arrangements.  In respect 
of linkage,  commission should be a  neutral factor,  to avoid bias to 
particular markets.  The opportunity presented by linkage should be taken to en~ure 
that European broking commissions are no  higher than the level prevailing  .  . 
in the competitive markets of North America.  The  approach  to this  p~oblem 
will be complicated by  the emergence  of competitive commissions within 
the Community  markets. • 
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22.6 .  Intep!!CUate action required in resect of CO!!!P!PY  listin9 and 41pc:losure 
(1,)  in the intermediate period before floor linkBRe, multiple listinq,  and 
thereby fully aqreed standards of listing, will not be essential. 
Members  will continue to exploit concessions currently available to them 
to deal in the international market in securities listed em  any Exclumge. 
The drawing up·of criteria for the progressive selection of stocks for the system 
~ill not present.  a~y great problem.  Two complications may emerqe immediately. 
First those Exchanges  which  limit the dealing of members  in the system 
to a  floor interface would  immediately  need to liat locally all the 
active system securities.  second,  while  the  intermediate ataqe of 
linkaqe does not in general pose problems of universal liatinq, it does 
tmply rapid attention to the associated disciplines of continuing company 
disclosure.  The  success of the network in disseminatinq pre-dealiDg 
information and in providing an electronically-assisted substitute for 
the present narrow personal network will be greatly 8nhanced if it is 
supported by efficient transmission of company  announcements  across 
EurOpeJ 
(ii)  it is assumed that concurrent with implementation of the first staqes of 
linkaqe,  which will present no  listing difficulties,  work will proceed 
to anticipatethe harmonisation of listing requirements for floor  linkaqe, 
which will require multiple listing. 
22  .• 7  Intermediate action required in reapect of Settlement Services 
The  short-term development of IDIS  network in the settlement field 
has been discussed in Section 20,  and may  be  summarised as follows: 
(i)  exploitation of the inter-active message-switching system to carry 
settlement instructions,  which will involve standardisation of message 
fields and  format,  an activity which will tmmediately indicate the 
obvious  areas  for any rationalisation possible within existing 
procedures; 
(ii)  use of the system to permit stock against payment in inter-European 
settlement,  through  linkage of the system with the national bank 
clearinqs and SWIFT; (iii) 
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identification of a  fourth  (settlaaent)  level of service of the network 
With& definition of the intermediaries and  institutions to which it will 
be available.  The  settlement aervice might be available to participant. 
,  who  were  not eligible tor level  a  1  and  2,  for eX&UDple,  larte imr•tinq 
institutions.  on  the other hand it is poaaible that scae participants 
in these levels miqht not be eliqible to particip&te in the settl.ment 
a;,tranqements  in their own  riqb.t·.  The  complex ·and discriminatory arrange-
ments  for membership of the settlement systems in certain .of. the -&cchanges 
will have  to be  taken into account. 
(iv)  examination of the potential for absorption,  within the  linlc:aqe  system, 
of current settlement  inefficienc~es arisinq from  market differences, 
such as different dealiJ:lq  and settlement periodai 
(v)  standardisation of procedures and·  institution of a  settlement  syst~ 
for the existing  'five day cash settlement'  of the international 
equi~ies market in Europe,  and  the provision of appropriate services 
for this market, 
(vi} 
(vii) 
progressive  arr~qement:JI for the concentration of all stock  to the 
depositaries of the countries of issue,  together with appropriate 
concentrated payment-agency  functions  for dividends and benefits; 
creation of a  system of European Depositary Receipts  to assist in the 
developnent of a  European market,  by provision of an instrument 
constitutinq good  physical delivery in all the Community  marketsJ 
(viii)  examination of the extent to which  the network could proq_ressively 
provide financial facilities associated with international stock 
transfer,  to achieve economy  of effort in major firma  and offer 
technical settlement assistance to the smaller. 
22. 7  Phase III  :- Full linkage of the official markets 
The  linkage pf the official floor markets,  seen as an ultimate long  term 
target has been discussed in section 21.  It is considered that,  in the 
same  way  that the informational stage of !DIS will automatically provoke 
consideration of the dealing facilities proposed as Phase II and - 428  -
resolution of the issues associated with it, Pha•e II will stimulate 
recognition of the need for full linkaqe of the offici-al markets in 
the .ystem stocks. 
'lbe COnaultants  therefore attach p_a.rticular  iJilpoJ:tance  to the foz:JHUC>n 
of the Policy Groups proposed in Section 21.  ~s~i~  that the  IDI_S 
initiative is maintained, it will be subject to inevitabl-e technical 
proqression as it responds  to market needs.  lt n-.ds to be  aesur~ 
that such  enhance~aent of the system is firmly in line with the inter-
mediate and  ultil!Ulte  target$ of linJ<ag~. 
Neither the progressive strategy which appears to be  the aim of the 
Committee,  nor the technical initiative arising frc:m  it will be 
successful  unless the present constructive development of hiqh-level 
policy is sustained.  The  consultants believe that progress'will most 
effectively be secured from  appropriate interaction between the 
Policy Groups  proposed and the facilities development role of the 
technical project. - 429  -
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SHEPPARDS  &.CHASE 
KITCAT  &  AITKEN 
PHILIPS  & DREW 
QUILTER  GOODISON  & CO. 
SPENcER  THO~~TON& CO. 
JAMES  CAPEL 
SAVORY  (E.B.)  MILL~ & CO. 
HILL  SAMUEL 
CAZENOVE 
ROWE  PITMAN 
PEMBER  & BOYLE 
VICKERS  DA  COSTA  LTD. 
SAVE  & PROSPER  INVESTMENT 
MANAGEMENT  LTD. 
0T  UNIT  MANAGERS  LTD. 
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-.Mr.  Hugh  HUGHES 
- Mr.  John  KNIGHT 
- Mr.  Leslie  R.TURTLE 
-Mr.  J.L.M.WILSON 
- Mr.  T.  MURPHY 
- Mr.  G.  ·WARMAN 
- ~tr.  Jan  A.SKARBECK 
- Mr.  Stephen  WHITE 
- Mr.  Adrian  COWELL 
- Mr.  Jo~~ K.HOSXIN 
- Mr.  Roaer  HORNETT 
- Mr.  S.  ALDRIDGE 
-Mr.  Christopher J. 
PERREE 
- Mr.  Nigel  RICE 
- Mr  D.  ANDREWS 
- Mr •  Tom  SHOCH 
- Mr.  L.  SMITH 
- Mr.  J.  THAIN 
- Mr.  Peter  Heming 
JOHNSON 
- Mr.  John  GODDARD 
- Mr.  Claude  JEANNET 
- Mr.  NigeL  LEDEBOER 
- Mr.  Philip  GRAY 
Partner 
Partner 
Partner 
Senior Partner 
Dealing Partner 
Partner 
Partner 
European  Divi-
sion 
Partner 
Partner 
Member 
Partner 
Inter.:national 
DeaJ.er 
International 
Deal:er 
Director 
Partner 
Executive 
Manager 
Dealing 
Partner 
Partner 
Manaqer 
Investment 
Manager 
Investment 
Manager THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 
YAMAICHI  INTERNATIONAL 
(EUROPE)  LTD. 
THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 
MORGAN  GUARANTY  TRUST  CO. 
SCUDDER  STEVENS  & CLARK 
t 
NATIONAL  ASSOCIATION  OF 
SECURITIES  DEALERS  INC. 
(NASD) 
THE  DEPOSITORY  TRUST  CO. 
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- Mr.  Yu j i  NAKAMURA 
- Mr.  Genji  SUGIYAMA 
- Mr.  Fumio  SUESHIGE 
- Mr.  Robert  E.MURRAY 
- Mr.  William  E.HOLZER 
- Mr.  George  J.BERGEN 
- Mr.  James  REILLY 
- Mr.  Louis  C.CORBO 
Deputy  General 
Manager 
Deputy  General 
Manager 
Manager 
Vice  President 
Investment 
Manager 
Vice  President-
Director 
Vice President 
Planning 
Consultant - 41.6  -
EUROPEAN  SECURITIES  MARKET  SYSTEM  PROJECT:  LIST  OF  REFERENCE  DOCUMENTS 
BELGIUM 
The  Brussels Stock Exchange. 
Belgian Stock Market. 
Arr~t~ Royal  No.lS  March  9  1982  Portant encourage-
ment a la souscription ou  ~ l'achat d'actions ou 
parts de  soci't~s Belges. 
Arr~~ Royal  No.lS du  March  9  1982  - text. 
Official Listing on  The  Brussels Stock  Exchange. 
La  Bourse de Bruxelles. 
La  Bourse de Bruxelles. 
Chambre  de  Commerce  Belgo-
Luxemboureoise  a  Londres 
ll  ll  II 
l! Andre  Timmermans: 
March  4  1982 
Message  de  M Willy de  Clercq, 
Vice-Premier Ministre 
Moniteur  Belge  - March  12  1982 
Bourse  de  Bruxelles 
Document  etabli par M. J  Reyers, 
President de  la Commission 
Caisse Interprofessionnelle de  Depots et de  C.I.K. 
Virement de Titres - Historique,  etc. 
C.I.K.  - Rapport du Conseil d'Administration 
a  l'Assembl~e Generale Ordinaire du  17  Mars  1982. 
Les  Tarif des  Operations. 
Instructions a l'Usage des Affilies - La  Liste des 
Actions et des Obligations. 
Instructions  ~ l'Usage des  Affili~s - La  Liste des 
Affilie's. 
R~glement G;n~ral  annex~;  l'Arret~ Ministeriel du 
4  avril 1969. 
Statute de C.I.K.  publi~s en annexe  au  Moniteur  Belge 
du  20 avril 1968. 
Textes du  Rapport au  Roi  et de  l'Arr~t~ Royal  No.62 
du  10 novembre  1967  favorisant la circulation des 
Valeurs  Mobili~res. 
Services et Documents  Bancaires. 
Banque  BruxellesLambert- Annual  Report. 
Listing of Foreign Securities on  the Brussels 
Stock Exchange. 
Banque  Bruxelles Lambert 
R~lement da  la Bourse de  Fonds  Publics et de  Change.  Titre V Livre Ier du  Code 
de Commerce - 447  -
DENMARK 
Regulations applicable to printing,  text and design 
of securities admitted to quotation on  the 
Copenhagen  Stock Exchange. 
I 
Calculation of Effective Interest R.ates  on  bonds 
quoted on  the Copenhagen  Stock Exchange. 
Annual  Reports  1978  - 1982 
Kurslisten. 
The  Objective Function for  the Calculation of The 
Copenhagen  Stock Exchange  Index. 
Concerning  Insurance  Schemes  of Members  of The 
Copenhagen  Stock  Exchange. 
Facts about The  Copenhagen  Stock Exchange, 
January 1982. 
The  Copenhagen  Stock Exchange Act No.220  -
June  7  1972. 
Financial analysis of de  Danske  Sukkerfabrikken. 
Foreign Exchange  Regulations. 
Bonds  issued by  Danish Mortgage Credit Association. 
The  Copenhagen  Stock  ~xchange Order  ~~.487 
November  16  1972. 
The  Commercial  Banks  and  Savings  Banks  Consolidated 
Act. 
Executive Order  on  Foreign Exchange  Regulations  -
March  18  1981. 
Kursudvikling  for  Indeks  - Total. 
Arsskrift 1981. 
Statutes of the private,  non-profit,  independent 
institution VPC. 
Act No.l79 -May 14  1980- The  Danish Securities 
Centre. 
'The  Danish Securities Centre. 
The  Role  of the Danish  Stock Exchange  on 
private and public financing. 
Committee of the Copenhagen 
Stock Exchanqe 
II 
The  Copenhagen  Stock Exchange 
.. 
Copenhagen  Handelsbank 
Danmarks  Nationalbank 
Krediforeningen  Danmark 
The  Minister of Commerce 
The  Ministry of Industry -
Denmark 
Vaerdipapircentralen 
" 
II 
Dr.  P  E  Stoneham 
The  Investment Analyst ' . :  ~.· 
- 448  -
F  R  A  N  C  E 
Echange des titres des  soci't~s nationalis,es. 
Tarif du droit de courtaqe. 
Admission to the official list on the Paris 
Stock Exchange  - securities issued by 
foreign companies. 
Service Antiope Bourse. 
L'Ann~e Boursi~re 1981,  1982. 
Liquidations Mensuelles. 
Situation actuelle en  mati~re de  livraisons. 
de titres et de  reglements de capitaux. 
Cote Officielle. 
R~glement general de la Compagnie  des Agents 
de  Change. 
Code  de Commerce,  Livre  Ier Articles 74-76,  85-90. 
Decret du  7  octobre 1890,  Articles  21  et 55. 
Ordonnance No.  58  du  10 dacembre  1958, 
Articles 1-2  • 
The  Paris Stock Exchange  - A guide  for  foreign 
Investors. 
Organisation et Fonctionnement du  Second  March~. 
L'Introduction des Valeurs Nouvelles et les 
operations de Contrapartie sur le Second Marche 
oecisions et avis  ~ propos  reglement mensuelle. 
., 
Organisation et Fonctionnement de  Marche  Unique 
Schema  General. 
Articles re:  Le  'Devise Titres'. 
Les  Investisseurs Americains et la Bourse de  Paris 
(and  other investment papers) 
Caisse Nationale de  l'Industrie 
et Caisse Nationale des Banques 
Arretes Ministeriels 
Compagnie  des  Aqents de Change 
21  January 1983 
27  January  1983 
19  octobre  1983, 
10 November  1983, 
17  Novembre  1983 
8  June  1983 
Goy-Hauvette  & Co  - Agent 
de  Change 
Bertrand Michel,  - Agent 
de  Change  34  Rue  Lafitte 
75009  Paris - 449  -
Reglementation des Changes. 
Conjoncture:  Monthly Economic  Bulletin 
Publication des  taux variables et des  taux flottants 
Con~rence d'information:  'La Commission  des 
operations de Bourse•. 
Commission  des Operations de  Bourse  - 1977. 
Seminaire Commission des Operations de  Bourse: 
'Facult' Internationale des  Soci~t~s'  Statements 
Summary. 
Rapport au President de  la R'epublique. 
Textes concernant le Second  Marc~. 
Caisse des dep8ts1  1979. 
operations sur valeurs  mobili~~es ~ l'etranger 
pour  compte  de  residents. 
Operations sur valeurs  mobili~res pour  compte  de 
non  .. r~sidents. 
Repartition par pays des valeurs etrang;res a  revenue 
variable cotees a  Paris. 
Liste des Agents  de  Change. 
Presentation de  textes  fondamentaux  relevant de  la 
r~glementation Fran~aise des  changes. 
SICOVAM:  La  Soci~te Interprofessionnelle pour  la 
Compensation des Valeurs Mobilieres.  January  1980. 
SICOVAM:  Statuts 1980. 
R~glement General. 
Decret No.  49  - l,ios - 4  August  1949. 
Rapports du  Consei1 d'Administration  21  May  1981 
and  26  May  1983. 
'Resume  statistique sur l'activite de  SICOVAM. 
Facsimile documentation. 
, 
Designation du  Stock  Exchange,~n qualite de 
Mandataire unique de  SICOVAM  a  Londres. 
Association Nationale des 
Societes par Actions 
Banque  de Paris et des 
Pays-Bas 
" 
II  '' 
par M.  Gilbert Mourre 
January  1983 
Caisse des depots et 
Consignations 
Chambre  Syndicate 
SICOVAM 
lO.May  1982 
,'•·. 
.. - 450  -
FRANCE 
Avis  aux adh,rents,  valeurs  mobili~res 
etranqeres nominatives. 
Affiliation de  SICOVAM  au  NECIGEF. 
Le  D~veloppement et la protection de  l'epargne. 
The ·French Equity Market. 
La  Modernisation du March: des Valeurs  Mobili~es, 
and annexes. 
Les  Introductions sur le Second  March~. 
Les  March~s Boursie;es et  Les  Methodes  de Cotation. 
La  Reforme  du  Re'gime  des Valeurs Mobilieres. 
A Capital Account,  Balance of Payments. 
SICOVAM  - ~ August  1980 
19  November  1982 
Resume  des les Dautresmes 
Commission Report. 
Bertrand Jacquillat: 
Professor Universite de Lille 
Report to the Ministry of 
the Economy  by the 
Commission  - Chaired by 
Maurice Perouse 
Bernard Mirat,  Secretaire 
General Adjoint Compagnie 
des  Agents de Change 
Systems  Reports  by  M.  Chiffre, 
Paris Bourse. 
Articles 94-11 de  la loi 
de  Finance pour  1982; 
Decret de  May  2  1983 
Detailed statistics provided 
by  the Banque  de France. - 451  -
GERMANY 
Isider-Regeln 
Leitsatze fur offentliche freiwillige'Kauf- und 
Umtauschangebote bzw.  Aufforderungen  zur Abgabe 
derartiger Angebote  in amtlich notierten oder  1m 
geregelten Freiverkehr gehandelten Aktien bzw. 
Brwerbarechten. 
Bedingungen fur  Kreditinstitue fllr  den  Verkauf 
von  Bundesobligationen. 
Management  and Control of Stock Exchange  Markets  -
A  Summary. 
Commerzbank  - Annual  Report. 
Annual  Report 1981. 
Investor Protection and  The  Stock  Exchange. 
Monthly report of the Deutsche  Bundesbank  - May  1981 
Monthly r'port of the Deutsche  Bundesbank 
March  1982. 
Report of the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  for  the year  1980 
Statistische Beiheftz  zu den Monatsberichten der 
Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Bedinqunqen  f~r Kreditinstitute  f~r den Verkauf 
von  Bundesschatzbriefen. 
Berlin - 3  May  1982 
Borsensachverstandingen 
kommission  beim 
Bundesfinanzministerium. 
1  January 1979 
Commerzbank 
Rheinisch-Westfaliche Borse 
zu  Dusseldorf 
Dusseldorf Stock Exchange; 
January 1976 
Deutsche  Bundesbank 
The  Banking System of the  Fed~ral Republic of Germany.  "  ,, 
German  Stock Exchange  Law. 
8.50\ Anleihe  des  Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 
1982  (1982). 
Instruments of Monetary Policy in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
Deutsche  Bank  - 1981:  A Short Summary. 
" 
Gesch~ftsbericht 1981.  Deutscher Auslandskassenverein 
Dresdner  Bank  - Report  for  the year  1981. 
Geschiftsbericht 1981 
Annual  ~eport 1981  - Frankfurter Wertpapierborse. 
Principles Governing  the Admission of Securities 
for Trading and Official Quotatton. 
Dresdner  Bank 
Frankfurter Kassenverein 
Wertpapierborse 
"  " - 4)2  -
GERMANY 
Automation of Securities Transfers. 
Frankfurter Wertpapierborse:  History - Organisation 
- Function. 
Die  Interventionen der Deutschen  Bundesbank  am 
Rentenmarkt. 
Amtliches Kursblatt der Frankfurter Wertpapierborse. 
Internationaler Kapitalverkehr  - Dirigistische 
Experimente  Konnen  nicht zur  Debatte  Stehen. 
The  Hanseatic  Stock Exchange  Hamburg. 
Frankfurter Wertpapierborse 
,· 
Handelsblatt Wirtschafts-und 
Finanzzeitung,  Dusseldorf 
Hamburg  Stock  Exchange 
Amtliches Kursblatt der Hanseatischen Wertpapierborse.  " 
Hamburgische  Landesbank  - 1981. 
Informationen  f~r den Effektenberater. 
Steuern und GebUhren. 
Sparen mit Bundesanleihen. 
Die Wertrechte des Bundes  und  ihre Eintragung in 
das  Bundesschuldbuch. 
The  Orion Royal  fUide  to the International Capital 
Markets. 
Integrated Remote  Data Processing,  Banks,  Stock 
Exchange,  central Securities Depositary. 
Investdata Systems. 
Fides  Dinex Dealer Information Exchange  System. 
M M Warburg-Brinckmann,  Wirtz  & Co.  -
Geschaftsjahr  1981. 
Condensed Annual  Report  1981. 
Bedingungen  f~r Kreditinstitute fur  den  V~rkauf 
von  Finanzierungs-Schatzen. 
Bundes  Obligationen. 
Finazi  Kurse  Laufzeitgute ·zinsen. 
abrsen der Welt. 
Gentlemen's  Agreement  on  the issuing of Foreign 
Deutschemark  Bonds. 
Hamburgische  Landesbank 
Informationsdienst fur 
Bundeswertpapiere 
.. 
Orion  Royal  Bank  Limited 
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 
VWD  - Vereinigte Wirtschaft-
dienste  GMBH 
Fides Treuhandgesellschaft 
Warburg-Brinckmann.  Wirtz 
and  Co. 
Westdeutsche  Landesbank 
Girozentrale - 453  -
G R E E C E 
Athens  stock Exchange  Official List. 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin. 
Annual  Bulletin 1982. 
Year  Book  of the Athens  Stock Exchange. 
Law  148/1967,  Measures  in support of the capital 
market. 
Legislative Decree  608/1970,  Investment ~ompanies 
and  Mutual  Funds. 
Annual  Report 1982. 
Report and  Accounts  1982. 
Articles of Association. 
Annual  Report  1982. 
Annual  Report 1982. 
Athens  Stock Exchange 
"  "  "  " 
" 
M 
"  " 
Hellenic Industrial 
Development  Bank  1972 
"  " 
National  Ba~ of Greece 
Hellenic Investment Co.  S.A. 
Barik  of Crete , I 
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IRELAND 
The  Stock Exchange  in Ireland - a  Brief History. 
The  Stock Exchange Official List. 
The  Stock Exchange  in Ireland - Reports  1981-1982, 
1982-1983. 
~ssion  of Securities to Listinq. 
Proposal  for Change  in Capital Gains Tax  on  Stock 
Exchange  transactions. 
Fact Sheet 1983. 
The  Need  for Change  in the Current Exchange  Control 
Requlations. 
Recommendations  for  Action  by  the  Government  to 
stimulate the supply of Equity Capital. 
The  Securities Industry Panel - Report 1981-1982. 
Irish Exchange Control. 
The  Stock Exchange  (Irish) 
II  "  " 
II 
Submission to the Minister 
of Finance 
Report to the Ministry of 
Industry and  Energy, 
August  1983 
The  Securities Industry Panel 
The  Central Bank  of Ireland.  · - 455  -
IT A L  Y 
Bilancio Dicembre  31  1981 
Condensed Statement of Conditions  - December  31  1979 
Disposiozioni penal!  in materia di infrazioni 
valutarie. 
Decreta di Costituzione e  Statuto. 
Estratto del Decreta Ministeriale del  March  12  1981. 
Cartellina sul  'International Symposium  of 
Securities Administrators'. 
Credito Italiano- Les  comptes de  !'exercise 1981. 
Accounts  1981. 
Economic  trends in Italy 2  - 1982. 
Ordinamento delle Borse  - Parte 1. 
L.  10 Giuqno  1978  No.295:  Nuove  Norme  per 1'Esercizio 
delle Assicurazioni Private Control  i  danni. 
D.L.  23  Dicembre  1976  No.857  - Modifica della 
Disciplina dell Assicurazione Obbligatoria della 
Responsabilita civile derivante dalla circolazione 
dei veic9li a  motore  ~ dei natanti. 
The  Italian Stock  Exchange.1 
European Securities Market  System. 
An  Analysis of the Economic  Justification for 
Consolidation in a  Secondary  Security Market. 
Relazione,  Giugno  1981  - Giugno  1982. 
La  Futura Struttura della Borsa Valeri. 
Admission of Securities to Listing on The  Stock 
Exchange. 
Teste Inglese del  Filmato  'Una Visita alla Borsa 
Valeri di Milano. 
Government Bill in favour  of fiscal concessions in 
order to enlarge the official equity list. 
Comitate Direttivo Rapporto  Annuale  1981,  1982. 
Code  of Milan Stock Exchange  on  Takeover  Bids. 
Societa CABOTO 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi 
" 
II  " 
Union  Bank  of Switzerland 
Credito Italiano 
Bank  Credito Italiano 
Formal  response of Bank 
Credito Italiano to study 
questionnaire 
Journal of Banking  and Finance 
Associazione Bancaria Italiana 
Bank  of Italy - Emilio Barone 
Borsa Valeri di Milano - 456  -
Code  of Public Offers for Sale. 
Aspects of recent reforms  introduced on  the Italian 
Securities Market. 
Facts Sheet 1981. 
Una  Visita Alla Borsa Valori di Milano. 
Monthly Report. 
'Itle  Importance of The  Milan  Stock Exchange  as an 
integral part of the Italian Stock  Market. 
Centro Elaborazione Dati. 
Italian Senate Commission of Inquiry on the Functions 
of the Italian Stock  Exchange. 
The  Milan  Stock  Exchange. 
Determinazione delle quote massime  e  minime  ecc. 
English Summary  of Law  No.904 ,_  16  December  1977. 
Relazioni  E Bilancio 1981. 
Rapporto Semestrale Al  March  31  1980. 
Country Report  - Italy. 
Statuto. 
Disciplinare. 
Principi Generale dell'Organizzazione ecc. 
Carateristiche General! del Sistema. 
Composizione del Capitale Sociale. 
Composizione degli Organi  Sociale. 
Lista Anagrafica Aderenti. 
Lista Anagrafica Titoli etc  •• 
Borsa Valori di Mil4no 
" 
II 
It 
II 
II 
~rofessor Pivato 
G.U.  19  Dicembre  1977  No.344 
Ministry of Finance 
Banco di  Roma 
Rominvest  International Fund 
International Symposium  of 
Securities Administrators 
Monte  Titoli S.P.A. - 457  -
LUXEMBOURG 
Luxembourg  Stock Exchange's  Information  System. 
Yields  for straight bonds  listed on  the Luxembourg 
Stock Exchange. 
Mouvement  d'Affaires  1981. 
Statistiques Boursieres 1981. 
Rapports et Bilan 1981,  1982. 
Dispositions du Commissariat au Controle des 
Banques  pour 1 'bission et la Cotation d"' obligations. 
Dispositions du Commissariat au Contro1e  des 
Banques pour  l!emission et la Cotation d'actions. 
Gold  fixing at The  Luxembourg  Stock Exchange. 
Cotation de l'or- note explicative sur 1e 
fonctionnement pratique des  ~ances de  Bourse. 
Etab1issement des Cours et Modes  de  Cotation 
en  Bourse de  Luxembourg. 
Repartition du Capital - Composition  du Conseil 
d'administration et du College des Commissaires. 
Rapport  au Commissaire  de  Service. 
Listing  and  Trading  fees. 
Cote Officielle de  la Bourse  de  Luxembourg 
The  Luxembourg  Stock Exchange. 
The  Luxembourg  Stock Exchange  - Requirements of the 
Banking  Control Commissary  concerning the issue and 
the  listing of  Investment  funds. 
Un  resume de la reglementation  du  change  en Belgique 
au  Luxembourg. 
Prospectus della B.A.!.!.  Finance Company  N.V .. 
Les  Soci~t~~ Holding dans  le  Grand-D~c~ de 
Luxembourg. 
Informations Financieres 
L'Access  aux Activites  des  Intermediaries de  Banque 
et de  Bourse. 
Les  Conditions d'acces  a  l'activit~ d'establissement 
de credit et autres professions du  secteur financier. 
Bourse  de  Luxembourg 
" 
Banque  de Commerce  S.A. 
B.A.I.I.  Finance Company  N.V. 
Banque  Internationale a 
Luxembourg 
Albert Dondelinger  -
Commissaire au  Controle des 
Banques,  Luxembourg, 
Avril  1972 
Renne  Link,  Luxembourg, 
Septembre  1981 ' :  .J.t .. ' 
- 458  -
LUXEMBOURG 
Bulletin Trtmestriel 1982. 
La Place  Financi~re de  Luxembourg. 
'  Re9lement de  Fonctionnement - 1974. 
Pr~ts de Titres dans le  Syst~e CEDEL 
Bond1end:  A  Fast and  Secure Service for  Borrowers 
and  Lenders of Eurobonds. 
Settlement of D.M.  Denominated  Eurobond Transactions. 
Fees Effective  - December  1981 
Interest Rates Applied on Participants'  Cash  Accounts· 
for  the year 1981. 
Annual  Report  1981 
Instructions to the Participants. 
The  International Securities Clearing System. 
Liste des Participants. 
Liste des  Emissions. 
CEDEL  Communication  System via General. Electric 
International Network. 
CEDEL  Communication  System via Telekurs;  Investdata 
System Network. 
Statuts  Coordonn~s. 
Information,  Trading  and  Back  Office Services for 
the  International Securities Market. 
What  has  the Eurobbnd  Secondary Market.got 
against Eurex? 
The  European  Unit of Account. 
International Securities Issues  and their Listing 
in Luxembourg. 
Soci~te de  la Bourse de  Luxembourg  S.A .. 
Prospectus della Nederlandse  Gasunie. 
Prospectus della Societa Centrale Nucleaire 
Europeenne a Neutrons  Rapides  - NERSA. 
Entreprises d'Assurances  - Liste des Titres  accept~s 
comme  Valeurs  representatives de  Reserves Techniques. 
Camnisaariat au Controle des 
Banques 
Centre d'Etudes Financieres, 
1,030 Bruxelles 
CEDEL 
" 
Etude de  M Frank  Baden 
EUREX 
Euromoney  - April  1978 
Kredietbank 
Laws  etc.,  and  internal 
regulations governing the 
Bourse 
Nederlandse Gasunie 
NERSA - 459  -
T BE  NETHERLANDS 
The  Amsterdam  Stock  Exchange  Review  1981,  1982. 
De  Amsterdamse  Effectenbeurse in 1980. 
De  Amsterdamse  Effectenbeurse Review  1982. 
A Visit to the Gallery. 
Handel  in American  Shares Amsterdam  System. 
American  Shares Amsterdam  System. 
Share Price Publication System. 
Officiele Prijscourant. 
Investdata. 
A Century of Stocks  and  Shares. 
Beursp1ein  5  - Centre of the Securities Industry. 
Controlebureau:  Formulier  SLI 
The  Principal  features of the System  for Simplified 
Settlement for bargains in Securities in use on  the 
Amsterdam  Stock Exchange. 
The  Devel~pment of  ~avings in Equities. 
Loi  du  8  June  1977  Portant disposition relatives au 
movement  de Valeurs  Mobili~res par Virement. 
Form,  purpose  and  procedures for  CF  stock. 
Regulations. 
NECIGEF:  Securities Giro  System. 
Annual  Report  1982 
The  Amsterdam  Stock Exchange 
(Effectenclearing) 
E. E. C. 
Journal Official of the 
Realm  of the Netherlands  -
1977 
Centrum  voor 
Fondsenadministratie b.v. 
Centrum  voor 
Fondsenadministratie b.v. 
NECIGEF 
Bank  Mees  and  Hope  n.v. 
Amsterdam  1983 - ~  -
U N I  T  E  D  K I  N G D 0  M 
The  Rules  and Regulations of The  Stock Exchange. 
Compensation FUnd  Brochure. 
Members  and Member  Firms,  1981 
The  Stock Exchange Fact Book  - March  1982 
The  Stock  Exchange Monthly Fact Sheets  to October 
1983. 
1,000 Largest Listed United Kingdom  Companies  -
March  1982. 
Information Bulletin to December  1983. 
Dealing in United Kingdom  and  foreign securities 
Register of Designated Dealers  - Notes  of guidance 
on Registration and de-registration. 
Dealings in Overseas Securities. 
Dealings  in Overseas Securities. 
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GENERAL 
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NASD  - 1982  Fact Book. 
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Company  Law  in Europe. 
Balance  of Payments  Manual,  Fourth  Edition. 
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